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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON, etal., ) 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 44625 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, ) 
) Dist Court No. CV-2015-178-C 
-vs- ) 
) 




CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley. 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Honorable Jason Scott, District Judge 
Presiding 
Robert D. Lewis 
Box359 
Boise, ID 83701 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
000002
Date: 1/26/2017 
Time: 10:02 AM 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Valley County 
ROA Report 
Page 1 of 5 Case: CV-2015-0000178-C Current Judge: Jason Scott 
Scott Davison, etal. vs. Debest Plumbing, Inc 















New Case Filed - Other Claims 




Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed in Jason Scott 
categories E, F and H(1) Paid by: Smith, Vernon K. (attorney for Davison, 
Scott) Receipt number: 0003573 Dated: 7/21/2015 Amount: $221.00 





Summons: Document Service Issued: on 7/21/2015 to Debest Plumbing, Jason Scott 
Inc; Assigned to Private Server. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Notice Of Service 
Answer And Demand For Jury Trial 
Jason Scott 
Jason Scott 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Jason Scott 
Paid by: Cantril! Skinner Lewis Casey & Soren Receipt number: 0005214 
Dated: 10/9/2015 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Debest Plumbing, Inc 
(defendant) 
Notice Of Service 
Defendant: Debest Plumbing, Inc Appearance Robert D. Lewis 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 11/16/2015 02:30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Notice Of Compliance 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 11/16/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing 
Held 
Scheduling Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 10/17/2016 02:00 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/08/2016 09:00 AM) 











Affidavit Of Robert D. Lewis Jason Scott 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 01/04/2016 02:30 PM) Telephonic Jason Scott 
968706 
Notice Of Telephonic Hearing Jason Scott 
Notice To Vacate Telephonic Hearing Jason Scott 
Notice Of Compliance Jason Scott 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled on 01/04/2016 02:30 PM: Jason Scott 
Hearing Vacated Telephonic 968706 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 04/04/2016 03:00 Jason Scott 
PM) 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment Jason Scott 
Defendant Debest Plumbing, lnc.'s Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Jason Scott 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit Of Darcy Neidigh 
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Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Summary Jason Scott 
Judgment 
Affidavit Of Gilbert Gould In Support Of Plaintiffs Memorandum In 
Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment 
Affidavit Of Scott Davison In Support Of Plaintiffs Memorandum In 
Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum 
Motion To Strike 
Notice Of Hearing 
Motion To Shorten Time 








Plaintiffs Comments On Defendant's Reply Memorandum Jason Scott 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 04/04/2016 Jason Scott 
03:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Order On Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment Jason Scott 
Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Tape/CD Paid by: Law Office Of Vernon K. Jason Scott 
Smith Receipt number: 0001829 Dated: 4/20/2016 Amount: $20.00 
(Check) 
Motion For Permissive Appeal 
Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Gil Gould 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Permissive Appeal 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/16/2016 03:00 PM) 
Order Resetting Trial 
Motion To Vacate And Reschedule Hearing Date On Pending Motion 
Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Permissive Appeal 









Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 05/16/2016 03:00 PM: Continued Jason Scott 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/06/2016 11 :30 AM) Jason Scott 
Plaintiffs Response And Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of Motion Jason Scott 
For Permissive Appeal 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/06/2016 11 :30 AM: Hearing Jason Scott 
Held (Special Set per Judge Scott) 
Order Denying Motion For Permissive Appeal 
Motion For Leave To File Third-Party Complaint 
Notice Of Telephonic Hearing 
Notice Of Service 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/18/2016 01:00 PM) Motion to file 
third-party complaint 
Telephonic 968706 
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Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Permissive Appeal Before The 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Response And Objection To Debest's Motion For Leave To File A Third 




Motion To Confirm Implementation Of The Provisions Of The Notice And Jason Scott 
Opportunity To Repair Act Apply To Pending Lawsuit 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Confirm Implementation Of The 
Provisions Of The Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act Apply To Pending 
Lawsuit 
Hearing Scheduled (Tentatively Scheduled 08/15/2016 01:30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Leave To File Third-Party 
Complaint 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/18/2016 01:00 PM: Hearing 
Held Motion to file third-party complaint 
Telephonic 968706 
Order Denying Motion To File Third Party Complaint 
Notice Of Service 
Order Denying Motion For Permissive Appeal 










Defendant's Motion To Compel Jason Scott 
Affidavit Of Robert D. Lewis In Support Of Defendant's Motion To Compel Jason Scott 
Notice Of Compliance 
Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of Anne Davison 
Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces T ecum Of Scott Davison 





Defendant Debest Plumbing, lnc.'s Memorandum In Support Of 2nd Motion Jason Scott 
For Summary Judgment 
Affidavit Of Tyler H. Neill In Support Of 2nd Motion For Summary Judgment Jason Scott 
Affidavit Of Tom Petersen In Support Of 2nd Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Affidavit Of Darcy Neidigh In Support Of 2nd Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing 






Defendant Debest Plumbing, lnc.'s memorandum In Opposition To Motion Jason Scott 
To Confirm Implementation Of The Provisions Of The Notice And 
Opportunity To Repair Act Apply To Pending Lawsuit 
Notice To Vacate Hearing 
Affidavit Of Service 
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Affidavit Of Service 
Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure 





Order To Vacate And Reschedule Hearing Date Jason Scott 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 08/15/2016 01:30 PM: Hearing Jason Scott 
Vacated Motion To Conifrm Implementation of the Provisions of the notice 
and opportunity to repair act apply to pending lawsuit 
Notice To Vacate Deposition 
Plantiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defedant's Second Motion For 
Summary Judgment 
Second And Supplemental Affidavit Of Gilbert Gould In Opposition To 
Defendants Second Motion For Summary Judgment 





Defendant's First Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure Jason Scott 
Affidavit Of Laurie Brede In Support Of 2nd Motion For Summary Judgment Jason Scott 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support Of 2nd Motion For Summary Jason Scott 
Judgment 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 09/19/2016 Jason Scott 
01 :00 PM: Hearing Held 
Defendant's Motion In Limine Jason Scott 
Memorandum Decision And Order Jason Scott 
Judgment Jason Scott 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk action Jason Scott 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 11/09/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Jason Scott 
Vacated 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 10/17/2016 02:00 PM: Jason Scott 
Hearing Vacated 
Civil Disposition entered for: Debest Plumbing, Inc, Defendant; Davison, 
Anne, Plaintiff; Davison, Scott, Plaintiff. Filing date: 10/5/2016 
STATUS CHANGED: closed 
Offer Of Judgment 
Defendant's Motion For Costs And Attorney Fees 
Affidavit Of Beth Rountree In Support Of Defendant's Verified 
Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees 
Defendant's Verified Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees 
Motion To Disallow Attorney Fees And Costs 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Disallow Attorney Fees And Costs 
Requested By Defendant, Debest Plumbing, Inc. 
Hearing Scheduled (Tentatively Scheduled 12/05/2016 02:00 PM) 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk action 
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Defendant's Reply Memorandum On Attorney's Fees And Costs Jason Scott 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Jason Scott 
by: Smith, Vernon Kenneth (attorney for Davison, Scott) Receipt number: 
0005372 Dated: 11/14/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Davison, Anne 
(plaintiff) and Davison, Scott (plaintiff) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Jason Scott 
Notice Of Hearing Jason Scott 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/05/2016 02:00 PM) Motion To Disallow Jason Scott 
Attorney Fees 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Jason Scott 
Appeal Filed In District Court 
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal 
Memorandum Decision And Order On Costs And Attorney Fees 





Request For Additional Transcript And Clerk's Record Jason Scott 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 12/05/2016 02:00 PM: Hearing Jason Scott 




Civil Disposition entered for: Debest Plumbing, Inc, Defendant; Davison, 
Anne, Plaintiff; Davison, Scott, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/24/2017 
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Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
ISB 1365 
• 
Telephone (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
DOU. A. MILLER, CLERK 
By ________ Deputy 
JUL 2 1 2015 
Case No ____ lnsl No. __ _ 
Filed A.M., __ _.P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 













Civil No. C, V 2-0 l 5 - l l e,c_, 
COMPLAINT 
Class: A 
Fee: $ 166.00 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs above named, Scott Davison and Anne Davison, by and 
through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, and for their cause of action and claims for 
damages against the Defendant herein, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, do 
herewith allege for their cause of actions as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim(s) alleged herein pursuant 
to §5-514, Idaho Code; that said DeBest Plumbing, Inc. is an Idaho Corporation, 
engaging in business in the State of Idaho, and was transacting business within this State 




profit, by supplying plumbing materials, components and fixture installations, and the 
rendition of professional plumbing services to accomplish those plumbing installations, 
as made to and installed within that certain vacation residence located on real property 
situated in Valley County, State of Idaho. 
2. That venue is proper in Valley County, Idaho, pursuant to §5-401, Idaho Code, as said 
claim(s) for damages relates to those improvements and fixtures made to that real 
property located in Valley County, Idaho, and concerns those injuries and damages 
resulting to the improvements of said real property, caused by the acts or omissions of 
Defendant. 
PARTIES: 
3. That Scott and Anne Davison are residents of the State of California; however, the 
Plaintiffs have and hold the ownership interests in and to the real property and 
improvements located thereon, herein referred to as their vacation home and residence 
located in Valley County, Idaho, being their vacation home occupied by them seasonally 
and periodically, being used as a recreational facility for family and for all entertaining 
objectives undertaken by said Plaintiffs while residing in Idaho; that said real property, 
improvements, and premises is a property interest possessed and utilized by said 
Plaintiffs on an annual basis as their second home and vacation residence within Valley 
County, Idaho, thereby subjecting each of these Plaintiffs to the specific jurisdiction of 
the State ofldaho and this District Court, pursuant to §5-514(c), Idaho Code. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS: 
4. That pursuant to those certain remodeling endeavors undertaken by Plaintiffs at their 
vacation home and residence in Valley County, Idaho, their general contractor undertook 
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to contract with and secure the professional plumbing services from DeBest Plumbing, 
Inc., an Idaho corporation, which corporate entity is engaged in the business of rendering 
professional plumbing services and installations in the area, and said Defendant did agree 
to render certain professional plumbing installations and improvements within the 
vacation residential facility, which services were then undertaken and installations were 
then performed as agreed by the DeBest Plumbing, Inc. personnel, employees, 
authorized agents and representatives, who did make such plumbing installations and 
rendered such services, for which charges were assessed and were timely paid; that the 
remodeling project, as then contemplated to be performed, was then completed as 
scheduled, to accommodate the arrival of Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs did then arrive at the 
vacation-residential facility upon their scheduled date of arrival of July 25, 2013. 
CLAIM(S) AND CAUSES(S) OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES 
5. That upon Plaintiffs' arrival to the vacation residence, Plaintiffs were so informed of the 
extensive water damage discovered within the residence facility, discovered on or about 
July 25, 2013, which extensive water damage was found to be the result of water leakage 
from within the bathroom walls of the upstairs bathroom facility, then confirmed to be 
the result of loose fittings or defective fittings in relation to the connections of various 
plumbing component parts or fixtures that were installed by the DeBest plumber(s) in the 
interior wall(s), the effect of which allowed water to drip and disperse throughout the 
upstairs bathroom wall(s), and then seep through the upstairs floors, down into and 
throughout various areas within and along the walls on the first floor, and generally 
throughout and onto the downstairs floors, causing extensive damage to all of the affected 
and impacted areas, including walls, floors, insulation, ceilings and built-in structures and 
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components throughout the vacation residence, with immediate concern and need to 
address the sagging ceilings then about to collapse, with walls that had softened and 
materials that had expanded, with separated sheet rock from the framing and structural 
members, all of which was water soaked, and soggy to the touch; hardwood flooring 
found to be expanded and buckled throughout the residence, as the flooring was water 
soaked and expanding from the concentration of moisture and was wet to the touch, with 
water accumulation and moisture presence found throughout the affected areas, resulting 
in much flooring having buckled, curled, twisted, separated, and warped beyond any state 
of salvage, requiring the eventual and complete removal and replacement, and the entire 
interior found to have been exposed to a state of prolonged moisture accumulation from 
the water and dampness, resulting in what likely would develop into a serious mold 
formation within the organic structural components and building materials within the 
vacation residence, requiring what was to become an extensive restoration and repair 
project throughout, all of which was required in order to fully address the damages 
caused from this defective and non-functioning plumbing installations. 
6. That immediate arrangements were made to abate the cause and source of the water 
leakage that was causing the damage, thereby involving the immediate return of the 
DeBest Plumbing personnel, who immediately returned to the facility to address the 
defective plumbing installation(s), who thereupon admitted the defects existing in their 
installations, and acknowledged and accepted responsibility for the resulting damages, 
and management personnel of said DeBest Plumbing, Inc. thereupon committed to pay all 
costs associated with the restoration and repair project required to be undertaken to 




the residence reasonable comfortable and merely habitable for Plaintiffs' immediate 
residential needs and accommodations, as Plaintiffs had previously scheduled plans that 
included the scheduled arrival of others who were soon to follow, and within and during 
the following week after the discovery of the damage, arrangements were undertaken to 
address and conduct the temporary repairs to some of those affected areas of the interior 
of the vacation residence, so as to permit Plaintiffs to reside within the facility and 
continue with their vacation plans and scheduled arrival of others throughout the summer; 
that said temporary installations and repairs were made for that limited purpose in mind, 
realizing there would be subsequent, material and substantial restoration undertaken to 
address all of the water stains, organic deterioration, physical destruction and needed 
removal and replacements throughout the residence as a result of the accumulated water 
moisture presence and resulting swollen, separated, and crumbling effects of the water 
moisture damage to the materials, including what was seen to be the eventual removal of 
mold presence and bacteria development located throughout, requiring replacement of 
stained and sagging ceilings, warped and buckled flooring, wall stains and deteriorating 
wallboard substances and structural damage within the affected areas throughout, along 
with removal of insulation and various wallboard components, requiring extensive 
interior restoration to fully address and correct the consequence of the water presence, 
moisture, and resulting damage throughout all of the impacted areas within the vacation 
facility, with the ultimate objective to restore the interior to that state of existence as it 
existed immediately upon completion of the extensive interior remodel of the residence 
vacation facility in which DeBest Plumbing was part of that remodel process. 




remodel project were being specifically rendered under their contractual commitments for 
the installation of same, through their long standing relationship with the general 
contractor engaged in the remodel project, and said DeBest Plumbing Inc. did undertake 
the duty to safely, securely, and properly engage in the installation of all said plumbing 
materials and plumbing components and fixtures, and to provide the rendition of effective 
and professional plumbing installation services, as contracted to be performed; that said 
plumbing installations and plumbing services were expressly being guaranteed and 
warrantied to be installed in accordance with traditional and conventional standards of 
reasonable and effective plumbing installation practices, with plumbing parts, materials, 
components, and fixtures to be installed so as not to leak or allow seepage of water from 
within the interior walls of the residential facility, and all such installations to be fit for 
the purpose as contemplated and intended in the installation thereof, all of which was to 
be performed in a reasonable, safe, secure, and efficient manner, by professional 
plumbing installers, and for all contracting purposes did include the implied warranty of 
fitness and merchantability of said plumbing materials, parts, components, fixtures and 
professional labor as was required and rendered in the installation thereof; that said 
materials and services were not of that standard or degree of care, and proved to be less 
than adequate, secure, efficient, or effective, and were found to be unfit and non-
merchantable, and in fact said plumbing installations were defective, inadequate, 
insecure, and insufficient to meet either their express or implied warranties of such 
reasonable expectations in such installations, and did not meet the fundamental purpose 
and objective of the contracted plumbing services, or that of the intended purpose of 
installing safe, reliable, and secure water line installations within the interior of the walls, 
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where water transmission lines were to be adequately installed and sealed securely so as 
not to leak out of the pipe and transmission line connections, as was the intended purpose 
and objective of the contracted plumbing services. 
8. That in addition to Defendant's direct failure to meet the expectations of the required and 
anticipated contractual services to have been rendered and performed within the intended 
and fundamental purpose of the contract, and in addition to the breach of their express 
warranty of proper and adequate plumbing installations of the component parts and 
fixtures, and in addition to the breach of the implied warranty of fitness and 
merchantability of said plumbing installations, said Defendant's services have been found 
to have been negligent in the installation of same, as the resulting water seepage and 
leakage from the component parts and plumbing fixtures from within the walls of the 
bathroom facility was not the reasonable expectation or intended result to be forthcoming 
from those plumbing services, but rather were the result of negligent and defective 
installations thereof by the plumber(s) performing the services, whose negligence is 
directly attributable to that of his (their) employer, DeBest Plumbing, Inc, the Defendant 
herein, who is responsible for this breach of the reasonable standard and duty of care 
required in the proper and reasonable performance of such plumbing services, and the 
installation of safe, secure, effective and efficient plumbing components, parts, fixtures 
and plumbing materials, and but for such negligence in the performance thereof, the 
water leakage and seepage from within said interior walls from the component plumbing 
parts and fixtures would not have occurred; that said resulting damages are the 
consequence of the plumber(s) negligent installation thereof, and their failure to meet 




9. That Plaintiffs have undertaken the restoration, renovation and repairs needed to the 
vacation residence, and have completed the repair for what they presently believe to be 
the identifiable damage caused as a result of the water leak and water dispersion 
throughout the residence as a result of the defective installation of said plumbing 
component parts and fixtures, and the cost to repair and restore the discovered and 
identifiable damages is presently the sum of $123,345.64, all of which costs of repair 
have been paid in full by the Plaintiffs to the repair personnel, and Plaintiffs are entitled 
to full compensation and reimbursement from Defendant for what has been paid for those 
needed repairs and restoration of the vacation residential facility and premises, together 
with recovery of all accruing interest on those paid funds, from the date of payment until 
fully reimbursed, together with the recovery of all reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this action for recovery and reimbursement of said repair costs. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for entry of judgment against Defendant as follows: 
1. For recovery of the sum of $123,345.64, together with all pre-judgment interest accruing 
thereon, from and after the date of payment thereof, together with recovery of any further 
and additional expenses for future inspections as may yet be required to be paid to 
monitor the potential of further development of mold, or the discovery of further damages 
that requires further or additional repairs, as may come to be discovered at a later date, as 
Plaintiffs are not routinely present at the residence to conduct these inspections for the 
existence of further mold development or consequential damage from said water leakage 
and the onset of the delayed damage in the structural components, as a result thereof. 
2. That Plaintiffs recover all pre-judgment interest at the established rate pursuant to §28-




3. That Plaintiffs recover all costs and attorney fees pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P., and 
pursuant to the statutes of the State of Idaho, including §12-120 (3), Idaho Code, as 
DeBest Plumbing did enter into a contract relating to the sale of plumbing goods, wears, 
merchandise, components and professional plumbing services, allowing the prevailing 
party to thereupon recover reasonable attorney fees under said statutory provision, to be 
taxed and collected as costs. 
4. That Plaintiffs be awarded judgment for all reasonable post judgment attorney fees and 
costs incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment, pursuant to Title 12, Chapter 1, 
5. That Plaintiffs request a jury trial upon all issues 
6. For such other and further relief as this Co 
premises. 
Respectfully submitted this 21 st day of July, 2015. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
VERIFICATION 
COMES NOW Scott Davison, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled matter; that I have ead the above and foregoing 
Complaint, know the contents thereof, and believe the statement th rein contained to be true and 
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. t 





County of ADA ) 
On this,2vi; day of July, 201\Jieforeme·, a notary pu · · and for said county 
and state, personally appeared SCOTT DA.,VISON, known or identified to me be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the withinc· strument, and acknowledged to me that he ecuted the 
same. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, ve hereu 
seal the day and year in this certificate first above~ ' 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) ss. 
County of ADA ) 
COMES NOW Anne Davison, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled matter; that I have read the above and foregoing 
Complaint, know the contents thereof, and believe the statements therein contained to be true and 
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Anne Davison 
Plaintiff 
On this;;JJ;Jaay of July, 2015, before me, a notary public in and for said county 
and state, personally appeared ANNE DAVISON, known or identified to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
- 2083457212 10/09.15 08:36 #458 P.002/004 
DOUG~S A c::iLLER, CLERK 
By {I t'b~ V)!) &Y\ Deputy 
OCT O 9 2015 
Case No.':--__ ,lnst. No 
Filed q;ot A ---.M. ____ P.M 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF SERVICE 
) 





Pursuant to Rule 3 3 ( a)( 5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned party 
has served certain discovery papers upon the opposing counsel (and opposing parties who have 
appeared for themselves without counsel) whose names and addresses where served are listed below: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 




- 2083457212 10/09-15 08:36 #458 P.003/004 
The Discovery papers that were served with a copy of this Notice are described as 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
PLAINTIFFS 
Unless otherwise indicated, all papers were served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid on 
the 3_ day of October, 2015. 
DA TED This _q day of October, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:~~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2 
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From:Cantrlll Skinner - 2083457212 #458 P.004/004 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _:!I_ day of October, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 3 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~.S.Mai1 
Robert D. Lewis 
0000021




OCT O 9 2015 
Case No. ___ !,nst. No ___ _ 
Filed r...M. 2-~ o 'f P.M 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
Class: I 1 
Fee: $136.00 
COME NOW the above-entitled Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., by and through its 
attorneys of record, Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, and answer Plaintiffs Complaint 
as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim against this answering Defendant upon which relief can 
be granted. 






Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not herein expressly and 
specifically admitted. 
II 
In answer to paragraph 1, Defendant admits only that it is an Idaho corporation, it transacts 
business in Valley County, Idaho, and jurisdiction is proper in this Court. 
III 
In answer to paragraph 2, Defendant admits only that venue is proper in the District Court 
in Valley County, Idaho. 
IV 
Defendant is without sufficient information to either admit or deny the allegations in 
paragraph 3, and therefore denies the same. 
V 
In answer to paragraph 4, Defendant admits that there was a subcontract between general 
contractor Gil Gould, and/or Gould Custom Builders, Inc., and Defendant in July 2013 for plumbing 
services and materials to unhook and replace freeze damaged plumbing fixtures in the upstairs 
bathroom at a house in Valley County, Idaho. Defendant admits that the materials and service were 
provided to Gould, including connection of the tub faucet, charges were assessed to Gould, and 
Gould timely paid for the amounts due and owing. Defendant is without sufficient information to 
admit or deny other allegations in paragraph 4 and therefore denies the same. 




In answer to paragraph 5, Defendant admits that on or about July 25, 2013, water damage was 
discovered in the upstairs bathroom and in the ceiling in the bedroom directly below the bathroom of 
the house in Valley County, Idaho. Defendant admits the water leak came from the tub faucet 
connection in the upstairs bathroom. To the extent that other allegations are made in paragraph 5, 
they are denied. 
VII 
In answer to paragraph 6, Defendant admits that Defendant's personnel responded and 
resolved the water leak at the tub faucet connection. Defendant and Gould removed the bedroom 
ceiling sheetrock and insulation between the ceiling joints. No mold growth was encountered. 
Gould had placed towels on the hardwood floor of the bedroom, catching the drips of water. No 
further debris removal activities occurred by DeBest and Gould. By agreement with Gould, 
Defendant left the premises in Gould's hands to follow proper water mitigation protocol and 
replacement of the insulation, sheetrock, texture and paint in the ceiling of the bedroom. Defendant 
specifically denies that any repairs were of limited purpose or temporary repairs; that subsequent 
material and restoration would be needed; or that mold remediation was contemplated. To the extent 
other allegations are made in paragraph 6, they too are denied. 
VIII 
In answer to paragraph 7, Defendant admits that there was a contract between Defendant and 
general contractor Gould to provide plumbing materials and install those materials in a workmanlike 
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manner. Defendant admits that this contract included the tub faucet connection in the upstairs 
bathroom. To the extent that other allegations are set forth therein, they are denied. 
IX 
In answer to paragraph 8, Defendant denies those allegations and specifically denies that any 
negligence on its part caused the water damage. 
X 
Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 9. 
XI 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest as respects all or a part of their claim, contrary to 
Rule 17 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs breach of contract claims are barred because there was no privity of contract. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs were guilty of negligent and careless misconduct in connection with the matters and 
damages alleged, which misconduct on their part proximately caused and contributed to said events 
and resultant damages, if any. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The damages alleged by Plaintiff were proximately caused by the negligence of general 
contractor Gil Gould, and/or Gould Custom Builders, Inc., currently not a party to this action, and 
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said nonparty' s negligence was a sole and contributing, direct and proximate cause of any damages 
and injuries allegedly sustained by Plaintiffs. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' injuries and damages were proximately caused, in whole or in part, by the 
negligence or fault of parties other than this answering Defendant. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by failure of consideration. 
NINETH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' failed to mitigate their damages, if any, and Defendant cannot be held liable for 
any such damage which Plaintiffs could have mitigated. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
By pleading certain defenses, Defendant does so for the purpose of completeness and does 
not intend to suggest that Defendant has the burden of proof for any such defense. Furthermore, 
Defendant has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery in this case, so Defendant does not 
intend to waive any defense that has not been raised at this point and time. Defendant specifically 
reserves the right to amend its Answer to include additional defenses. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Defendant has been required to retained the law firm of Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & 
Sorensen, LLP, to defend this Complaint and is entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees 
incurred in defense of this litigation. 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury in accordance with the provisions of Rule 38(b) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiffs take nothing by their Complaint, that the 
same be dismissed, and that attorneys' fees, costs and expenses be awarded to the Defendant. 
DATED This ~dayofOctober, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By.&~:;??~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ay of October, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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[ ] Hand Delivery 
~S.Mail 
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OCT O 9 2015 
case No. ___ inst.No, __ _ 
Robert D. Lewis Filed "M. ;2_ 
1
• J3' P.M. 
ISB #2713 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) CaseNo. CV15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF SERVICE 
) 





Pursuant to Rule 33 (a)( 5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned party 
has served certain discovery papers upon the opposing counsel (and opposing parties who have 
appeared for themselves without counsel) whose names and addresses where served are listed below: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 





The Discovery papers that were served with a copy of this Notice are described as 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR 
ADMISSIONS TO PLAINTIFFS 
Unless otherwise indicated, all papers were served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid on 
the ~day of October, 2015. 
DATED This 8°dayof0ctober, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
&S~~p 
By: '#l-c&~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1 day of October, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~LS.Mail 
a~ 
Robert D. Lewis 
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11/05/2015 13:08 208345111 
VERNON K. SMITH 
A.TTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W, Main St 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
\/ERHIJH ,< SMITH PAGE 02 -
DOUGLAS ~LEA, CLERK 
By f\1'}? Deputy 
NOV O 9 2015 
case No..._ __ 1,nst. No __ _ 
FilAd Z; S9 A.M----P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND POR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Aime Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
an Idaho corporation 
Defendant 
facsimile transmission to Defendant counsel. 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV 15-178C 
) 







Dated this 6'11 day of November, 2015. 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE P.l 
0000032
11/06/2015 13:08 '2fl834511i PAGE 03 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 6th day ofNovember, 2015, I caused a tme and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following 
addresses as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Va11ey 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
NOTICE OF COtv1PUANCE 
( ) 







Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
- ~~UGL~~LLER, CLERr 
'r~2 Depu~ 
DEC O 2 2015 
Case No ____ 1lrn.t No 
Filed ---· ---A.M._3:'(J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
) 





COME NOW, the Defendant in the above-entitled action, by and through their attorneys of 
record, Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, and pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, moves this Honorable Court for an Order compelling Plaintiffs to answer the 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production served on Plaintiffs' counsel on the 9th of 
October, 2015. 
This Motion to Compel is supported by the Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis submitted 
herewith. A true and correct copy of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for 




Production of Documents to Plaintiffs is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit ofRobert D. Lewis, 
and as evidenced by the Notice of Service filed herein. A meet and confer letter was conveyed to 
Plaintiffs' counsel. It is attached to the Affidavit as Exhibit "B". There has been no response. 
Plaintiffs have refused to answer said discovery, and this Court should further order the 
Plaintiffs to pay to Defendant a sum which the Court shall order as reasonable for expenses incurred 
in obtaining such Order, on the ground that said refusal is without substantial justification. 
Defendant requests oral argument on this motion pursuant to the provisions ofRule 7(b )(3) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED This f day of December, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:_& ~~p ~-=::..:;.____--~~-
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _L day of December, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL - 3 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~·u.S.Mail 
JMfla;_r-
Robert D. Lewis 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
-
~YOUGLAS ~ MILLER1 CLER~' kiii, .. Deputy 
DEC O 2 2015 
Case No ____ lnst No ---Filed A.M .. .3 : 1,J. P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS 
) 





STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Robert D. Lewis, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho and am the attorney 
primarily responsible for representation of the Defendant in the above entitled matter. I have 
personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Affidavit. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS-1 
D ORIG}~'-. L 
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2. On October 9, 2015, I served Defendant's First Set oflnterrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiffs upon the Plaintiffs' attorney in this matter. A true and correct 
copy of the said set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
3. Answers to the said Interrogatories and responses to the said Request for Production 
were due on or about November 11, 2015. To this date, we have not received any answers to the 
Interrogatories or responses to the Request for Production served upon Plaintiffs' counsel. 
4. On November 16, 2015, I wrote Plaintiffs' counsel concerning answers to the said 
discovery. A copy of that letter is attached as Exhibit B. He has not responded to the letter. 
5. The information and materials requested in the Interrogatories and Request for 
Production are important for preparation of the defense of the Defendants in this matter. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this_/_ day of December, 2015. 
Robert D. Lewis 
SUBSCRIBED to before me this _J__ day of December, 2015. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _L day of December, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS - 3 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~U.S.Mail 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
TI\J" THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF SERVICE 
) 





Pursuant to Rule 33(a)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned party 
has served certain discovery papers upon the opposing counsel (and opposing parties who have 
appeared for themselves without counsel) whose names and addresses where served are listed below: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 






The Discovery papers that were served with a copy of this Notice are described as 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
PLAINTIFFS 
Unless otherwise indicated, all papers were served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid on 
the 3_ day of October, 2015. 
DATED This -3.day of October, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:~~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the_:!]__ day of October, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 3 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~.S.Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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- • ~UGLAS A. MILLER, CLERK 
Deputy 
DECO 2 2015 
Case No_ 
Filed., -----,Inst No ___ _ 
-----,A.M. ____ r, 
Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-l 78C 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
TO PLAINTIFFS 
TO: PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, VERNON K. SMITH. 
Pursuant to Rules 26, 33, and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants DEB EST 
PLUMBING, INC. ("DEBEST") request that Plaintiffs SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON 
("DA VIS ON") respond under oath to the fol1owing Discovery Requests within thirty (30) days of 
service: 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 




INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of these Discovery Requests, the following Instructions are applicable: 
1. Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendant 
DEBEST hereby demands Plaintiffs DAVISON to answer under oath the Interrogatories hereinafter 
set forth within thirty (30) days of service. 
In answering these interrogatories furnish all information available to you, including 
information in the possession of your attorneys, investigators, employees, agents, representatives, or 
any other person acting on your behalf, and not merely information known of your own personal 
knowledge. 
If you cannot answer the following Interrogatories in full after exercising due 
diligence to secure the information to do so, so state that fact and answer to the extent possible, 
specifying your inability to answer the remainder and stating whatever information and knowledge 
you have concerning the unanswered portion. 
2. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 34, Plaintiffs DAVISON is 
requested to produce for inspection and/or copying every "document" (as that term is defined below) 
requested that is in its possession, custody, or control. Every document requested should be 
produced at the offices of CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP, 1423 TyrelJ Lane, PO 
Box 359, Boise, Idaho, 83701, within thirty (30) days of service, or at such other time and place as 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
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mutualJy agreed by counsel or ordered by the Court. Designate or mark each document made 
available to indicate the document request to which it is responsive. 
If Plaintiffs DAVISON withhold from production any document requested under a 
claim of privilege, work product, or otherwise, furnish a Privilege Log or list, describing each 
document for which privilege is claimed, so that the applicability of the privilege or protection can 
be analyzed as allowed under Rule 26(b )(5)(A), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Your description 
should provide the following information for each document: date, sender, recipient(s), subject 
matter, and the basis upon which you claim a privilege. 
3. These Interrogatories and Requests for Production are deemed continuing 
interrogatories and requests and your answers thereto are to be supplemented as additional 
information and knowledge become available or known to you, as required by LR.C.P. Rule 26(e). 
For purposes of these Discovery Requests, the following Definitions are applicable: 
A. "Person" refers to a natural person, corporation, limited and limited liability 
company, partnership, limited and limited liability partnership, sole proprietorship, unincorporated 
association, state, political subdivision, municipal corporation, government agency, or other 
organization. 
B. "You" and ''your" refer to the Plaintiffs DAVISON to whom these Discovery 
Requests are addressed. 
C. "Documents" mean, without limitation, the following items, whether printed 
or recorded or reproduced by any mechanical process, including digital and electronic data stored on 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
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computers, tapes, disks, punch cards, or printouts, or written or produced by hand: papers, books, 
lists, memoranda, summaries or records of telephone conversations, summaries or records of 
personal conversations or interviews, diaries, journals, objects, tangible things, correspondence, 
emails or electronic messages, telegrams, cables, telex messages, charts, graphs, maps, reports, 
notebooks, summaries or reports of consultants, photographs, videotapes, video recordings, 
photographic negatives, photographic slides, movies, microfilm, microfiche, brochures, pamphlets, 
advertisements, circulars, fliers, press releases, drafts, letters, and any marginal comments appearing 
on any document, and all other writings. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: (i) Please state the name, address and telephone 
number, of each and every person, as defined on Page 3 herein, known to you or your present or 
former attorneys who have any knowledge, or who purport to have any knowledge, of any of the 
facts of this case. (By this Interrogatory we seek the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all 
possible witness who have any knowledge of any fact pertinent to both damages and liability.) (ii) 
As to each such person you identify, state whether you, or your attorneys or agents, have taken a 
statement ( whether written or oral) regarding any facts or matters which relate to the present action. 
If so, state the date on which said statement was taken, by whom, and who has custody thereof. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please state the names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers of all witnesses you intend to call or may call at the trial of this cause, and specify the facts 
to which they will testify. 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORJES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify every witness you expect will testify at trial to 
present evidence under I.R.E. 702, 703 and 705. Defendant seeks to obtain all opinions, underlying 
facts, and data within the scope of Rule 26(b)(4), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Your answer to 
this interrogatory should be supplemented pursuant to Rule 26( e) at least ninety (90) days before the 
date set for trial to begin. 
(a) For individuals retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in 
the case [ or who are employees of the party] provide: a complete statement of all opinions to be 
expressed and the basis and reasons therefore; the data or other information considered by the 
witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; 
any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within 
the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the testimony; and a listing of any other 
cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
years; 
(b) For individuals with knowledge ofrelevant facts not acquired in preparation 
for trial and who have not been retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the 
case, provide a statement of the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence 
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, 703 or 705, and a summary of the facts and opinions to which the 
witness is expected to testify; 
(c) Further, for each witness identified in Answer to No. 3(a) and No. 3(b), state 
whether or not he or she performed any test, analysis or examination of any physical evidence related 
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to this litigation, and if so: (i) during what dates he or she conducted same; {ii) whether he or she 
reached any conclusions as a result of the test, analyses or examinations; (iii) the name, or other 
means of identification, and address of the person who has present custody of each item that was 
tested, analyzed or examined; and (iv) whether he or she submitted a report setting forth his or her 
opinions or conclusions, and, if so, please state the date this report was submitted, and the name and 
address of the person who has present custody thereof. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please identify and describe in detail all drawings, 
illustrations, photographs, movies or videotapes, written documents or other memoranda of which 
either you or your present or former attorneys are aware which pertain to any of the issues in this 
litigation. In answering this interrogatory, describe the nature and subject matter of the item, its date, 
if applicable, the name, address, job title, and capacity of each person who prepared it or with 
knowledge of it, and for each such item, please specify whether or not you intend to utilize it at trial 
as an exhibit. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please set forth in detail a complete itemization, 
specifying the amount and method of computation, of all special/economic damages claimed by you, 
or to which you claim entitlement, and identify each document that supports this claim. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please state the name, address and telephone number 
of each witness who actually witnessed the water damage that is the subject of Plaintiffs Complaint, 
including the date and description of the damage so witnessed. 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF lNTERROGA TORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please state the name, address, and telephone number 
of each person who responded to, cleaned up, and repaired the property damage subject to your 
Complaint. For each person, describe the nature of their involvement. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please list each person or entity known to Plaintiffs 
that investigated the water damage. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: If you contend that any of Defendant's liability is 
based upon any statute or regulation, please set forth in complete detail: 
(a) The identity of each such statute or regulation; and 
(b) How you contend the Defendant violated each such statute or regulation. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: What gave rise to the need to repair and replace the 
upstairs bathroom fixtures by DeBest Plumbing, Inc. that you allege was defective. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Did you have a written contract with Gould Custom 
Builders, Inc. for repair of the water damage to your vacation home? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: You have been served with Defendant's First 
Request for Admissions dated October 8, 2015. If your response to any Request for Admissions is 
anything other than an unequivocal admission, please set forth the complete factual basis for your 
response. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Please produce the most current 
curriculum vitae for any experts retained by Plaintiffs in this matter. 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please produce all documents which 
pertain to any of the issues (including liability and damages) in this litigation, as well as all physical 
items and documents which Plaintiffs intend to utilize at trial as an exhibit. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please produce all items and documents 
identified in your Answer to Interrogatory Nos. l(ii), 3(c), and 4. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce each docwnent regarding 
all losses or expenses for which you seek compensation in this action. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please produce each document that 
contains, refers to, or relates to any admission you contend the Defendant and its agents have made 
regarding the subject matter of this action. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please produce each document that 
contains, refers to, or relates to any declaration against interest you contend the Defendant has made 
regarding the subject matter of this action. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce duplicate original copies 
of each and every investigation report prepared by you, or any agent or representative of you or your 
insurance company. Include with these reports each and every exhibit to such report. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Please produce each and every written, 
oral, or recorded statement from any witness. 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Please produce each and every 
photograph or video tape of the water damage taken within the 6-month period beginning July 15, 
2013. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce each and every 
photograph taken of the water damage on the date ofloss, and after, relevant in any way to the issues 
in this lawsuit. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce each and every report, 
statement, recording, memorandum, or testimony, whether signed or not, concerning the facts in this 
cause of action prepared by any employee or agent of Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce a copy of all recordings 
of any telephone conversation between the Plaintiff(s) and any of Defendant's employees, agents or 
representative or anyone purporting to speak on behalf of the P1aintiff(s) to any of Defendant's 
employees, agents or representatives in connection with this loss. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce all correspondence, 
including emails, written by any employee, agent or representative of Defendant relating to this loss. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce all correspondence, 
including emails, written by any employee, agent or representative of Plaintiff relating to this loss. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: All written contracts relating to repair to 
the vacation home caused by freezing during 2012/2013 winter. 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
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DATED This .2_ day of October, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKJNNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP By:a~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the!:}_ day of October, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney.for Plaint(ffi: 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1 129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
J.+-7Y.s. Mail 
~~ 
,.,Robert D. Lewis 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFFS - 11 
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CANTRILL, SKINNER, LEWIS, CASEY & SORENSEN LLP 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
1423 TYRELL LANE P.O. BOX 359 DAVtD W. CAHTRlU.. 
GA.RONER W. SK.INN~, JR. 
ROBERT D. LEWIS 
CUNTON 0. CASEY 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
WILLIS E. A\JLUVAN, UI (JM1•2001) 
JOHN L. KJNG (1Ma~I008) 
DEAN C. SORENSEN 
DANIE:LJ. SKINNER 
(208) 344-8035 




Via Hand Delivery 
Vernon K. Smith 
The Law Office ofV ernon K Smith 
1900W.Main 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
RE: Scott & Anne Davison v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
Claim No.: 2165550 
DOL: July 24, 2013 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
On October 9, 2015, you were served with Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiffs. Responses to that 
discovery were due on November 11, 2015. Defendant has received no response to date. 
The purpose. of this letter is to comply with the meet and confer requirements of 
the rules of procedure. Please advise when those responses will be served. If we have 
not received responses or heard from you, or other arrangements on or before November 
25, 2015, we will move forward with such remedies as allowed by the rules of procedure. 





Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
- -
DOUGLAS A. M!LER1 CLE RP 
By J/;;;(& $&:t_Deput, 
DEC O 7 2015 
Case No, ___ _.111t No __ _ 
Filed A.M. {j: (20, P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV l 5- l 78C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING 
) 





YOU WILL PLEASE TAKEN OTICE that Defendant's will call on for hearing their Motion 
to Compel before the Honorable Jason Scott on the 4th day of January, 2016 at 2:30 p.m., or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may be heard. Said hearing will be telephonic with Plaintiff's counsel and 
Defendant's counsel to call 208-229-8030 and then enter Conference Call ID No. 968706. 




DATED This !L day of December, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
&SOR SEN LLP 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _!:f_ day of December, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney.for Plaintiffs 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING - 3 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~U.S.Mail 
~ 
Robert D. Lewis 
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From:Gantrlll Skinner - 2083457212 #697 P.002/004 
~Y~UG~~~!:,C~~;,: 
JAN O 4 2016 
Robert D. Lewis CaseNo ___ ..iln8f. No,~--
ISB #2713 Fdad A.M L/ : 3 f.P.M 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Te]ephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV l5-l 78C 
NOTICE TO VACA TE TELEPHONIC 
HEARING 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel, and notices this Court and 
counsel that the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Compel currently set for January 4, 2016, at 2:30 
p.m. is hereby VACATED, upon the assurance by Plaintiffs' counsel that the discovery responses 
will be delivered to undersigned counsel today, January 4, 2016 with verified signatures to follow 
upon receipt from Plaintiffs in California. Should Plaintiffs' counsel fail to provide the answers to 
the Interrogatories and Requests for Production as assured, then this hearing will be reset. 
NOTICE TO VACATE TELEPHONIC HEARING - I 
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From:Gan trill Skinner - 2083457212 01/04/ -6 11:32 #697 P.003/004 
DATED This l( day ofJanuary, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:~~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
NOTICE TO VACATE TELEPHONIC HEARING • 2 
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From:Gantrlll Skinner - 2083457212 01/04/-6 11:32 #697 P.004/004 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __!.f_ day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
l 900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
NOTICE TO VACATE TELEPHONIC HEARING - 3 
[X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ) Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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01/04/2016 12:59 2083451129-
VERNON K. SiVllTH · 
ATTOR.i.'JEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Mai.ti Sta 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar. No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fa,'{: (208) 345 .. 1129 
1,/ERN0N K ~;MITH - PAGE 02/03 
.:~OUGLAS ~ER, CLERK 
~ Deputy 
JAN O 4 2016. 
CE!ff No_. ----1lnst No ---
Flied A.M L/ ', t> ( PM. 
. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 




) Case No. CV 15-178C 
) 








I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 4tJJ day of January/2016, I provided a true and co 
copy of Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's First Set f Interrogatories and Request fo 
" Production of Documents by hand delivery to Defendant's couns \ 
Dated this 4" day ofJanuary, 201 ~- · / · . · ~ , / · · 
L)g1r"'7? (· .=?:(. . .. 
Vernon K. Smith · '-
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
· CERTIFICATE OF COMPUANCE P.l 
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01/04/2015 12:59 208345112'3- \/ERHOH I< SMITH - PAGE 03/03 
!,:ERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 4th day of January, 2016, I caused. a true and correct 
copy oftbe above and.foregoing to be delivered to the following: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Valley .. 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83 611 
( U.S. Mail 
.:y.,-,..=;--~~~A.2- 82-7107 
HandDelive 
Vernon K. Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPUANCE P.2 
0000062




FEB 2 6 2016 
Case No----....111nst. No. 
F~N ~M ----
---...1P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Defendant by and through its attorneys ofrecord, Robert D. Lewis, of the firm 
Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, and moves this court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for summary judgment in said Defendant's favor, dismissing all claims in the 
Complaint against this Defendant, with prejudice, on the grounds and for the reason that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, and that said Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
0:-llGINAL 
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This motion is made and based upon the records, files, pleadings in the above entitled action, 
together with the Affidavit ofDarcy Neidigh and supporting Memorandum filed concurrently herewith. 
Defendant requests oral argument on this motion pursuant to Rule 7(b )(3) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
DATED This-2:t day of February, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP 
By:~ 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ l{ day of February, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~.S.Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
-
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-l 78C 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, 
INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. (DeBest) presents this Memorandum to the Court in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment against the claims stated by the Davisons in the 
Complaint. The Complaint makes allegations against DeBest that state a cause of action for (1) 
breach of contract against DeBest, based upon breach of the contract with the general contractor, 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC. 'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY ruDGMENT - 1 
D ORfGlrL'\L 
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including breach of express and implied warranties, Complaint Para. 7, and for (2) negligent 
installation of plumbing fixtures, Complaint Para. 8. 
There was no contract between DeBest and Plaintiffs Scott and Anne Davison, owners of the 
subject residence in McCall, that could support a cause of action for breach of contract. There was 
no duty owed by De Best to Davi sons in the supply and installation of the plumbing materials that can 
support a cause of action in negligence. Summary Judgment is appropriate. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The undisputed facts for this Motion for Summary Judgment are established by the Affidavit 
of Darcy Neidigh, submitted herewith. The Complaint seeks damages against DeBest for repair of 
water damage to Plaintiffs' residence at 2109 Waterlily, McCall, Idaho. 
Darcy Neidigh is an employee ofDeBest Plumbing, Inc. and she is the manager of sales and 
service. Neidigh Affidavit, para. 2. 
In February 2013, DeBest did enter into an agreement with Gil Gould dba Gould Custom 
Homes based upon a proposal to repair residential piping and plumbing fixtures at 2109 Waterlily, 
McCall, Idaho. Neidigh Affidavit, para. 3 & 4, Exh. A. 
DeBest had no agreement with the owners of the residence where the work was performed. 
Neidigh Affidavit, para. 5. 
Plumbing materials were supplied to Gould, they were installed for Gould, and Gould paid 
DeBest in full for the work and materials. Neidigh Affidavit, para. 6. 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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There was no agreement by DeBest to supply any material or provide any services for the 
benefit of Plaintiffs, the owners of the residence. DeBest provided its services and materials for 
Gould. Neidigh Affidavit, para. 7. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary Judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, 
together with the Affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). 
The burden is on the moving party to prove an absence of genuine issues of material fact. 
Rees v. State, Department of Health & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 14, 137 P.3d 397,401 (2006). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element of the 
claim does exist. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,476, 50 P.3d 488,491 (2002). 
The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in the 
pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by affidavits or otherwise to set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e). Failure to do so 
will result in an order granting summary judgment. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 
98 (2003). 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 




1. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEBEST FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
There was no privity of contract between Plaintiffs and DeBest. As such, as a matter oflaw, 
Plaintiffs have no cause of action for breach of contract or breach of warranties. 
The only contract in this case that governed the performance of DeBest at the residence was 
the agreement between DeBest and Gould based upon the proposal identified in the Neidigh 
Affidavit. 
DeBest agreed to supply and install the plumbing materials for Gould. Even assuming that 
DeBest breached its contract with Gould, which is assumed only for the sake of argument on 
summary judgment, there is no cause of action that Plaintiffs can pursue against DeBest for breach of 
contract. 
In Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 (Idaho App. 2004), the 
Court considered whether a breach of contract case could be pursued by owners under a construction 
contract with circumstances analogous to those in this case. The Nelsons owned a parcel ofland in 
Island Park, Idaho, and intended to construct a cabin on the property. Nelsons contracted with 
Steinbruegge to design the cabin and procure the necessary materials to build the cabin. 
Steinbruegge ordered panel designs and certain supplies from IBP. Steinbruegge also purchased 
lumber and a flooring system from Anderson Lumber Company. Those supplies and the lumber 
were provided as agreed, and they were incorporated in the cabin. When Nelsons completed the 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
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building, the County Building Inspector advised them that the structure did not meet the snow load 
requirements for that location. Nelsons then sued general contractor Steinbruegge and the material 
suppliers IBP and Anderson Lumber. 
The Court recognized that Nelsons had entered into an oral contract with Steinbruegge, but 
that no contract existed between Nelsons and the material suppliers, Anderson or IBP. Because no 
contract existed between Nelson and Anderson or IBP, Nelson lacked privity of contract with the 
suppliers to pursue claims of breach of contract or breach of implied warranties. Privity of contract 
is also required in a contract action to recover for breach of implied warranties. Id. at 707, 99 P .3d at 
1097; Salmon Rivers v. Cessna Aircraft, 97 Idaho 348,544 P.2d 306 (1975); Melicharv. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co., 143 Idaho 716, 722, 152 P.3d 587, 593 (2007). 
Nelsons contended that although a contract did not exist between themselves and Anderson 
or IBP, they were still able to pursue a breach of contract claim because Nelsons were third-party 
beneficiaries of the agreements between Steinbruegge and Anderson or IBP. The Court recognized 
that in order for a third-party beneficiary to recover on a breach of contract claim, the third-party 
must show that the contract was expressly made for his or her direct benefit and that he or she is 
more than a mere incidental beneficiary. Idaho Code§ 29-102; Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331, 
337,372 P.2d 414,418 (1962). 
The contract itself must express an intent to benefit the third-party. Stewart v. Arrington 
Construction Co., 92 Idaho 526,532,446 P.2d 895, 901 (1968). 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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The Court analyzed the agreements between Steinbruegge and the suppliers, Anderson and 
IBP. The Court recognized that these agreements to supply materials were akin to a subcontract. It 
announced that such contracts are made to enable the principal contractor to perform; and their 
performance by the suppliers does not in itself discharge the principal contractor's duty to the owner 
with whom he has contracted. Nelson, supra, 140 Idaho at 709, 90 P.3d at 1099. The Court ruled 
that the oral agreement between Nelson and Steinbruegge gave the Nelsons the right to a building 
package, including plans and materials. However, the subsequent contracts entered into by 
Steinbruegge with suppliers Anderson and IBP merely enabled Steinbruegge to fulfill his obligation 
to the Nelsons. The Nelsons were no more than incidental beneficiaries of the agreements between 
Steinbruegge and the material suppliers, and Nelsons could not recover under a third-party 
beneficiary theory against those suppliers. The summary judgment granted by the District Court to 
the suppliers was upheld on appeal. 
This situation mirrors that found in the Nelson case. Gould, as general contractor for 
Plaintiffs, contracted directly with DeBest to supply and install plumbing materials. This was done 
in order for Gould to fulfill his obligations to the Davisons. Davisons were no more than incidental 
beneficiaries of the agreement between Gould and DeBest. They cannot recover under a third-party 
beneficiary theory for breach of contract against DeBest. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals ruling in Nelson has been discussed and approved by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in DeGroot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 157 Idaho 557, 338 P.3d 536 (2014). 
DeGroot was a dairy owner. He hired Beltman to build his dairy. DeGroot asked Beltman to install 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC. 'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 
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a manure handling system and use Standley Trenching, Inc. to provide installation services and 
materials. Beltman entered into an agreement with Standley to design, supply and install the manure 
handling system. When DeGroot had problems with its manure handling system, it sued Standley. 
Even though Standley's bid contract mentioned DeGroot in the project name, there was nothing else 
in the Standley contract to indicate the subcontract was intended to benefit DeGroot. The Court 
specifically followed the Nelson ruling when it determined that DeGroot was not a third-party 
beneficiary of the subcontract between Beltman and Standley. The mere mention of another party in 
the contract does not render the party a third-party beneficiary. Id. at 562, 338 P.3d at 541. 
Summary judgment in favor of Standley was affirmed. 
In this case, there was no agreement between Plaintiffs Davisons and DeBest. Gould 
engaged DeBest to provide plumbing materials, along with installation at the residence that Gould 
was remodeling. There is no provision in the agreement between Gould and DeBest evidencing any 
intent that the agreed work or supplies provided by DeBest should directly benefit Davisons, the 
owners. 
Thus, there is neither privity of contract nor third-party beneficiary status that would support 
any breach of contract or warranty claim in this case against DeBest. In addition privity is required 
to recover economic loss for breach of implied warranty of workmanlike performance. Summary 
Judgment is appropriate against the cause of action for breach of contract and breach of warranties. 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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2. PLAINTIFFS HA VE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEBEST FOR 
NEGLIGENCE 
Plaintiffs allege that DeBest had a duty to perform its services in a workmanlike manner, but 
it was negligent in the installation of the plumbing materials. This is the basis for their cause of 
action for negligence. 
Whether a duty exists to support a negligence claim is a question oflaw. Nation v. State, 
Department of Corrections, 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953, 965 (2007). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that a contract does not create a tort duty to support 
a cause of action in negligence. That is, an alleged breach of a contract duty does not create tort 
liability. Gagnon v. Western Building Maintenance, Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 115, 306 P.3d 197,200 
(2013). 
For a cause of action to arise in tort, a Plaintiff must establish the breach of a tort duty, 
separate and apart from any duty allegedly created by a contract. Vickers v. Hanover 
Construction Company, Inc., 125 Idaho 832, 835, 875 P.2d 929,932 (1994). The mere negligent 
breach or nonperformance of a contract will not sustain an action sounding in tort, in the absence 
of a liability imposed by law independent of that arising out of the contract itself. Baccus v. 
AmeriPride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 3 50, 1 79 P .3d 309, 313 (2008). 
Contract actions have been described as creating a claim that protects the interest of the 
parties to the contract in having promises performed. Contract obligations are imposed because of 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC. 'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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conduct of the parties manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named in 
the contract. They do not create a tort duty. Baccus, supri:!, 145 Idaho at 351, 179 P.3d at 314. 
In this case, Plaintiffs assert the contractual obligations owed by DeBest to Gould to supply 
and install the plumbing and the alleged breach of those obligations as the basis for the claim 
sounding in negligence. Idaho law does not recognize that a tort duty can be created by a contractual 
obligation. A cause of action in tort does not arise out of breach of those contractual obligations. 
Thus, the negligence cause of action stated in the Complaint fails as a matter of law. 
Summary judgment is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
DeBest supplied and installed plumbing under an agreement with Gould. The plumbing was 
allegedly inadequate. An alleged leak from the plumbing caused damage to the subject residence. 
The services were allegedly not performed in a workmanlike manner. The services were allegedly 
negligent. The services were allegedly in breach of the agreement. Idaho law does not give 
Davisons the right to sue DeBest for breach of contract or in tort for damages that allegedly arose out 
of De Best's contractual obligations to Gould. As a matter oflaw, summary judgment is appropriate 
and the Complaint should be dismissed. 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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DATED This '2'-(aay of February, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
&s~,~ 
By: ~~::-
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the£ day of February, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~S.Mail 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- II 
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~ a . Ml , CLERK 
FEB 2 6 2016 
-Deputy 





CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) CaseNo. CV15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) AFFIDAVIT OF DARCY NEIDIGH 
) 





STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
1. The matters stated herein are based upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. I am an employee and the Chief Executive Officer of DeBest Plumbing, Inc. I am 
also the custodian of records for DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 




3. I am familiar with the agreement between DeBest Plumbing, Inc. and Gil Gould for 
plumbing work performed and materials supplied at a residence on 2109 Waterlily, McCall, Idaho, 
over the period of February 2013 through early July 2013. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and 
correct copy of the Work Order that initiated work by DeBest Plumbing. 
4. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. entered into an agreement with Gil Gould dba Gould Custom 
Builders based upon a proposal to repair piping damaged by frozen pipes that occurred before 
February 7, 2013. 
5. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. had no agreement with the owner of the residence to provide 
any plumbing work or materials. 
6. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. supplied the plumbing materials to Gil Gould and they were 
installed for Gil Gould. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the DeBest 
Invoice to Gil Gould for the described plumbing work. Gil Gould paid DeBest Plumbing, Inc. in full 
for De Best Plumbing, Inc.' s work and materials. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct 
copy of the check in payment from Gil Gould. 
7. There was no agreement by DeBest Plumbing, Inc. to supply any material or provide 
any work for the benefit of the owners of the residence at 2109 Waterlily, McCall, Idaho. I 
understand the Plaintiffs are the owners. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. provided its work and materials for 
Gil Gould. 
Further your affi.ant sayeth naught. 




DATED this /'1 day of February, 2016. 
-~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 11_ day of February, 2016. 
~4wd 'otaryPubhc for ldaho 
Residing at: _(,:;._.ld__w d 11 I~ . 
My Commission Expires: .. qo I (1: 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARCY NEIDIGH- 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on th~ day of February, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARCY NEIDIGH- 4 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
_jj--tf.s. Mail 




-DEBEST PLUMBING, INC. 
11477 West President Drive 
BOISE, IDAHO 83713 
(208) 322 .. 4844 Fax (208) 322-4889 
TO: 
WORK OAl;lEAEO BY 























11477W.Presldent Drlve,Bolse, Idaho 83713 
Phone:208.322.4844 Fax: 208.322.4889 
BIii To: 
Gil Gould 
291 Ashton Lane 
McCall 10 83638 
Description 
/ INVOICE) 





Job Name:Ann Davison res 
2109 Waterlily 
McCall ID 83638 
Extended Price 
Plumbing work done from 2/8/13- 6/25/13 at 2109 Waterlily, McCall@the Main 
House and Bunk House. 
9,472.94 
Thank You For Your Business! 
Terms: Due on the 10th of month 
Invoice Amount: 
Less Retention: 









11477 W. President Drive, Boise, Idaho 83713 
Phone: 208.322.4844 Fax: 208.322.4889 
Bill To: 
Gil Gould 
291 Ashton Lane 
McCall ID 83638 
___________ Description 
- INVOICE 





Job Name: Ann Davison res 
2109 Waterlily 
McCall ID 83638 
Plumbing work done from 2/8/13 - 6/25/13 at 2109 Waterlily, McCall @ the Main 
House and Bunk House. 
Extended Price 
9,472.94 
GOULD CUSTOM BUILDERS, INC. 
291 ASHTON LANE • PH. (208) 634-2332 
MCCALL, ID 83638 
[!I'3b k~ All of[!l!!serving you"' 
d.4/, 210;:;- ~Ar;(~ , -
i { 
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Thank You For Your Business! 
Terms: Due on the 10th of month 
Invoice Amount: 
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CASE NO. CV-2015-178C 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
QUESTIONS PLACED AT ISSUE 
The Davison Plaintiffs commenced this action in July 2015 as arising out of defective 
plumbing work that was performed by the Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. (hereinafter, 
"DeBest") in the spring and early summer of 2013 at the Davisons' vacation residence in Valley 
County. Because that vacation residence was only intermittently in use, a period of about 40 days 
elapsed before this significant plumbing leak caused by the defective worked performed by the 
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Defendant DeBest was discovered on July 24 2013, which persistent leak in the intervening period 
had caused an extensive amount of damage to the interior walls, floors, and ceiling of the structure 
where water had flowed, accumulated, and caused the resulting damage. 
As required by Idaho law, and as a condition precedent to bringing any civil action to 
recover damages, written notice of this defective work, as performed by DeBest, was provided by 
the Davisons to the general contractor, Gould Custom Builders, Inc. (hereinafter, "Gould"), and 
then to DeBest Plumbing, for purposes of remediation under the Idaho Notice and Opportunity to 
Repair Act ("NORA"), LC. § 6-2501 et seq. See, Affidavit of Gilbert Gould. The general 
contractor of the renovation project, Gould, according to the terms of its own agreement with its 
subcontractor, deferred to that subcontractor that did the plumbing installations, in this case 
DeBest, and ultimately to DeBests' insurer, to primarily provide the required and needed repairs to 
the Davison vacation residence, and to ultimately negotiate, resolve, and determine any final 
settlement that might be reached that would have made this civil lawsuit entirely unnecessary. 
As further addressed below, because the express statutory provisions of NORA include 
both "subcontractors," and those with a right to a lien under I.C. §45-501, within the definition of 
"Construction professional," I.C. §6-2502( 4), defendants, such as DeBest, can be directly named 
as parties against whom an action can be commenced under the provisions of that Act. LC. § 
6-2503(3). 
In this case, as a consequence of the general contractor's deferral and the subcontractor 
DeBests' acceptance of the statutorily-required negotiation and settlement roles required by 
NORA, as a condition precedent to a homeowner instituting any civil action for damages, the 
following two questions have arisen in the context of the claims that Defendant DeBest has placed 
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at issue, as raised in its motion for summary judgment: 
1. Whether the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA"), by its own 
express terms, has eliminated any contractual privity requirement, as raised 
by the Defendant DeBest on its motion for summary judgment in this case, 
by allowing civil actions to be brought against any "person" with a right to a 
lien pursuant to LC. §45-501, or against any person who otherwise meets 
the definition of, "Construction professional," who has otherwise failed to 
satisfy a "claimant's defect claim that has been made under the Act? 
2. Whether a subcontractor, such as DeBest in this case, who has actually 
engaged in the statutorily-mandated NORA settlement requirements, has, 
as a consequence of that conduct, waived, and is therefore estopped from 
asserting, any contractual privity requirement, as a defense that might 
otherwise exist in a direct civil action that has been brought by a 
homeowner claimant against that subcontractor defendant? 
II. 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS CONCERNING THE DEFENDANT 
DeBEST'S DIRECT OBLIGATIONS OWED TO THE DAVISON PLAINTIFFS 
Scott and Anne Davison are the owners of this part-time residence- vacation cabin that is 
located at 2109 Water Lily, Pilgrim Cove, McCall, Idaho. The Davisons typically used this cabin 
seasonally, mostly during the summer and during other warm-weather times throughout the year, 
and therefore there are in fact substantial periods of time when the cabin remains unoccupied. 
Nonetheless, the cabin is fully insulated and suitable for year-round use, and is fully fitted with all 
modem heating and plumbing fixtures making it convenient for such year-round use. 
Consequently, much of the remediation work that did take place in this case, actually was 
performed during the winter months, while the Davisons were back in California, their primary 
residnce. 
In January, 2012, the Davisons had planned to conduct substantial renovations and 
upgrades to their cabin, and they hired Gilbert "Gil" Gould and his construction entity, Gould 
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Custom Builders, Inc., to undertake this project. It was an extensive renevoation project, and 
would take a year or longer to complete. 
Within the scope of this remodel-renovation project, DeBest Plumbing, Inc. was contacted 
to perform the plumbing installations, and DeBest had their employee, Tom Peterson, a licensed 
plumber working for DeBest Plumbing, perform the installations, and he was brought to the 
project, and on or about June 15-17, 2013, he had then completed the installation of the final 
hookup of the faucet fixtures on the claw-foot bathtub that was located in an upstairs bathroom. 
After Mr. Peterson completed his work on or about that date, no one else, including the Davison 
homeowners, were present at the cabin, until Scott Davison then arrived at the cabin in the evening 
hours on July 24, 2013. At that time Scott Davison discovered a water leak coming through the 
ceiling into the bedroom located immediately below the upstairs bathroom where Tom Peterson 
had earlier installed the faucet on or about June 15-17, 2013. As a result of this water leak, the 
bedroom ceiling was sagging down from the water saturated materials and the weight of 
accumulated water, and water was dripping and had already dripped and run-through the bedroom 
ceiling and completely soaked the bedroom's hardwood floors, with water standing not only in that 
room, but throughout, leaving standing water on interior hardwood floors, causing the floors to 
twist, buckle and warp throughout the cabin. 
Scott Davison immediately e-mailed notice of this plumbing problem with his email sent 
initially to Gil Gould, who in tum immediately notified Mr. Tom Peterson of DeBest Plumbing, 
who was then in the area. On July 25, 2013, Mr. Peterson, Scott Davison and Mr. Gould 
undertook immediate measures at the Davison cabin to locate and stop the leak behind the upstairs 
bathroom wall, and to begin the removal of damaged sheetrock, water soaked insulation, and 
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damaged materials in the bedroom below. 
After inspection and identification of the cause of the leak (see Gould affidavit), DeBest 
Plumbing and Tom Peterson immediately acknowledged their responsibility for the water leak and 
the damages it had caused, and from that time forward, all discussions concerning remediation and 
settlement as to the resulting damages occurred between the Davisons, along with the assistance of 
Mr. Gould and Tom Peterson, with the DeBest entity personnel, and thereafter to include the 
involvement of its insurer and their assigned adjuster, the Intermountain Claims ofldaho, and their 
senior adjuster, Ronald Egland. 
After all attempts at full remediation came to an end in the spring months of 2014, 
DeBests' insurer (through their adjusting agent) submitted a statement of its calculation of the 
damages to the residence, and submitted that calculation to the Davisons, in the amount of 
$24,005.06. This amount was in contrast to the Davisons' calculations of the actual costs that 
were incurred for the labor and materials that were actually required to make the complete repair 
and remediation of the cabin in the final amount of $123,345.64. The parties failed to have 
reached anything near any acceptable settlement of their dispute, and for that reason, resort to and 
the filing of this civil action became necessary. 
III. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact, and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). The court must 
determine whether the moving party has shown there is a lack of any genuine issue of material fact 
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as to the issues raised by the motion for summary judgment. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 
133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300, 313 (1999). This burden may be met by establishing the 
absence of evidence on any element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. 
Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct.App.1994). Such an absence of 
evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing that is accomplished with the 
moving party's own evidence, or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence in view of the 
contention that such evidence fails to establish a required element of the non-moving party's 
claim. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App.2000). 
Only once such an absence of the evidence has been established, does the burden then shift 
to the party opposing the motion to show, either by further depositions, discovery responses or by 
affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue of material fact for trial, or if the non-moving party is 
able to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders v. Kuna 
Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). 
The court is required to liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving 
party, and to draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions that are supported by the record in 
favor of the non-moving party. Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho, 373 375, 3 P.3d, 51, 53 (2000). 
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or 
draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 
394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003). To overcome a motion for summary judgment a party need only 
raise a genuine issue of material fact. Prudential Fed Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Johnson, 93 Idaho 
850,853,476 P.2d 786, 789 (1970). A material issue of fact, for summary judgment purposes, is 
one that is relevant to an element of the claim or defense and whose existence might affect the 
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outcome of the case. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,849,908 P.2d 143, 151 (1995). 
Factual issues may not be resolved on summary judgment. Posey v. Ford Motor Credit 
Co., 141 Idaho 477,481, 111 P.3d 162, 166 (Ct.App.2005). A genuine issue of material fact is 
one on which the outcome of the case may be different. 0 'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 
13, 72 P.3d 849, 853 (2003). Summary judgment can only be granted when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact. JR. Simplot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 613, 167 P.3d 748, 750 (2006). 
Issues of credibility should not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Capstar Radio 




The Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act (NORA) Expressly Permits A Direct 
Action Against Subcontractors Such As DeBest, Once The Provision Of That Act 
Have Been Addressed 
As a condition precedent to commencing any civil action for damages, a "claimant," as 
defined at J.C. §6-2502(3) of Idaho's Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA" or "the 
Act") must provide written notice to the "construction professional," as defined at LC. § 
6-2502(4), "for damage or the loss of use of real or personal property caused by a defect in the 
construction of residence or in the substantial remodel of a residence." J.C. §6-2502(1). NORA 
clearly states that, "Any action commenced by a claimant prior to compliance with the 
requirements of this section shall be dismissed by the court without prejudice and may not be 
recommenced until the claimant has complied with the requirements of this section." LC. § 
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A "Claimant," as defined at subsection (3) of LC. §6-2502 of the Act, includes a 
"homeowner," who is specifically defined within the Act as follows: 
(5) "Homeowner" means" 
(a) Any person who contracts with a construction professional for the 
construction, sale, or construction and sale of a residence; and 
(b) An association as defined in this section. 
"Homeowner" includes a subsequent purchaser of a residence from any 
homeowner. 
LC. § 6-2502(5). 
The defective work at issue in this case was performed by DeBest Plumbing and completed 
on or about June 15-17, 2013. The resulting water leak arising from that defective work was first 
discovered by the homeowner, Scott Davison, on July 24, 2013, an intervening period just short of 
about 40 days. Mr. Davison promptly contacted Gil Gould, who immediately in tum notified Mr. 
Tom Peterson and DeBest Plumbing. Thereafter, there was much on-going contact between all 
parties and entities. Mr. Gould and the DeBest employee who performed the work, Tom 
Peterson, began to undertake immediate repairs the next day, including stoppage of the leak and 
removal of damaged sheetrock, water soaked insulation, and damaged materials in the bedroom 
below the upstairs bathroom .. 
DeBest Plumbing has always acknowledged throughout the discussions that its defectively 
performed plumbing work was the cause of the damages to the Davison cabin. 1 Consequently, 
Under the provisions of NORA, admissions of liability made for purposes of 
compliance with the settlement provisions of that Act are not admissible in a subsequent "action," 
(as defined at I.C. § 6-2502(1 )), that may arise out of a failure of those settlement provisions, as 
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the Davisons, as he was directed by Gil Gould, and as accepted by DeBest, entered into direct 
settlement negotiations with DeBest Plumbing and their insurance carrier and claim's adjuster, 
Intermountain Claims of Idaho, for the remediation and attempted settlement of the damages to the 
Davisons' cabin that were caused by DeBests defective plumbing installations. 
declared in I.C. § 6-2503(6): 
( 6) Written or oral statements made by a claimant or by a construction 
professional in the course of complying with the procedures required or 
authorized by this section shall not be considered an admission of liability 
and shall not be admissible in an action subject to this section. 
Therefore, DeBest's declarations as to liability are only offered here as the justification for the 
Davisons' entry into negotiations with DeBest for the purpose of settlement under the provisions 
ofNORA. 
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Under the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA") written notices in satisfaction 
of the Act's requirements were submitted by the Davisons to both Gould and DeBest, through a 
series of emails. See e.g., Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 437, 196 P.3d 352, 355 (2008) 
("Mendenhall's March 11 letter satisfies the notice requirements of NORA for the construction 
defects he alleges therein. His letter sufficiently identified the nature and location of the defects. 
The letter stated, among other things, 'water problem with north roof of great room, east spouting 
leaks in four places.'"). 
Here, although the parties appeared to move forward in good faith for months, as the 
restoration could not get fully underway until the Davisons left for California, much discussion 
was undertaken in attempting to remediate the damages and in attempting to reach a settlement. 
In the end, DeBest, and its adjusting agent, did not actually make a settlement offer. Instead only 
an estimate of remaining damages was submitted, in the amount of $24,005.06 and that was 
tendered on or about April 30, 2014 accompanied by the limiting language that, "This is an 
estimate of damage only and not an offer of settlement. This estimate is not an authorization for 
repair, nor is it a guarantee of payment." (See Scott Davison Affidavit). The Davisons found 
themselves in no different position than that occupied by the Appellant in Mendenhall v. Aldous, 
supra, in which the Respondent Builder in that case had failed to tender a valid response under LC. 
§ 6-2503(2), and as a result the Mendenhalls were entitled to file suit without further notice, as 
provided by LC. § 6-2503(3)(a). 
As a matter of "public policy," (as defined in Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, L.L. C., 
141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332,336 (2005)), the Idaho Legislature has made the determination 
that residential construction litigation in Idaho must first undergo, as a condition precedent to 
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commencing litigation, the settlement provisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, I.C. 
§6-2501 et seq. The Court in Mendenhall v. Aldous, supra, observed that the underlying purpose 
of the Legislature in enacting this requirement was the following: 
The Act was passed in 2003. The Idaho Building Contractors Association 
sponsored the bill in an effort to curb litigation against building contractors by 
homeowners. The purpose of the law is to give contractors the opportunity to fix 
construction defects before a lawsuit is filed. In furtherance of this goal, NORA 
requires a claimant to "serve written notice of claim on the construction 
professional," prior to filing an action alleging a construction defect. 
146 Idaho at 436, 196 P.3d at 354. 
As outlined above, the Davison undertook to satisfy that condition precedent to this civil 
action in their on-going settlement efforts that were directly undertaken with DeBest Plumbing. 
Now that this statutorily-mandated attempt at settlement was determined to have failed, DeBest 
has now elected to raise, through their counsel furnished by the insurance carrier, a defense to this 
action , claiming a lack of privity of contract between DeBest with the Davisons, who had only 
directly contracted with Gould Custom Builders, who in turn, as the Davisons' agent, had hired 
DeBest to undertake the plumbing work at the Davisons' cabin. As declared above, the Davisons 
are proceeding on the basis that it was DeBest Plumbing that has failed to adequately respond to 
and settle their claim under NORA, as provided by I.C. § 6-2503(3)(a): 
(a) If the construction professional disputes the claim or does not respond to 
the claimant's notice of claim within the time stated in subsection (2) of this 
section, the claimant may bring an action against the construction 
professional for the claim described in the notice of claim without further 
notice. (Emphasis added). 
The Act, itself, provides definitions for "claimant," and for "construction professional," 
that do not appear to be narrowly limited to only those individuals or persons,2 who may be in 
2 The Act, in §6-2502(6), also defines "Person" to mean "an individual, an 
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contractual privity with the homeowner. Those definitions, as stated in LC. §6-2502, declare as 
follows: 
(3) "Claimant" means a homeowner or association that asserts a claim 
against a construction professional concerning a defect in the 
construction of a residence or in the substantial remodel of a 
residence. 
(4) "Construction professional" means any person with a right to lien 
pursuant to section 45-501, Idaho Code, an architect, subdivision 
owner or developer, builder, contractor, subcontractor, engineer or 
inspector, performing or furnishing the design, supervision, 
inspection, construction or observation of the construction of any 
improvement to residential real property, whether operating as a 
sole proprietor, partnership, corporation, limited liability company 
or other business entity. ( emphasis added). 
The Idaho Legislature's choice of language in definition "Construction professional," 
appears to be deliberate and is not merely insignificant, by its inclusion of the phrase, "any person 
with a right to a lien pursuant to section 45-501." As a subcontractor providing plumbing 
services, DeBest falls within that statutory category of persons entitled to claim a lien under LC. 
§45-501. Privity is not a required element in actions involving those with a right to lien under LC. 
§45-502, as the Idaho Supreme Court determined in, Weber v. Eastern Idaho Packing Corp., 94 
Idaho 694,496 P.2d 693 (1972), wherein it states: 
However, the Idaho lien statute, LC. §45-501, permits a subcontractor to 
independently file his lien; the workman's classification is unimportant in this 
regard, for the purpose of the lien is to protect the one who expends his labor to 
improve the land. Hill v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land and Water Co., 22 Idaho 
274, 125 P. 204 (1912). See 94 Idaho at 697, 496 P2d at 695 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, it appears that here, the intent of the Idaho Legislature, by its reference to those 
association as defined in this section, or a corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, 
limited liability company,joint venture or other legal business entity." This definition would also 
place DeBest within that class of "persons" with a right to lien" under the definition of 
"construction professional." 
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persons entitled to file mechanics and materialmens' liens, and other construction professionals 
that otherwise might not be in direct contractual privity with a general contractor is to allow 
individuals and entities within those classifications to be directly proceeded against by 
homeowners, if the NORA settlement provisions are not successfully concluded, thus providing a 
civil remedy to homeowners from licensed construction professionals that might otherwise not be 
in a direct privity relationship with that professional that performed work. 
Therefore, because the Defendant DeBests' contractual privity argument appears to be in 
direct contradiction with what is the express statutory language of NORA, that contractual privity 
defense must be rejected by this Court, and the action proceed upon the merits of the damaged 
caused by the faulty and defective work of this licensed construction professional. 
B. DeBest, Through Its Actions, Has Waived, And Therefore Should Be Estopped, 
From Asserting Any Contractual Privity Defense That It May Have Been Entitled To 
Otherwise Assert To The Davisons' Claims for Damages In This Civil Action 
In this action the Defendant DeBest has raised a contractual privity defense to a portion of 
the claims that now have been brought against them by the Davisons. As already argued above, 
this contractual privity defense appears is directly contrary to the civil action that is expressly 
authorized under the provisions of NORA, once the settlement provisions of that Act, as a 
condition precedent to such a civil action, have been addressed. In addition, to the language of the 
Act itself, the conduct of DeBest, in undertaking to engage in direct negotiations with the 
Davisons, and with and through their insurance carrier, and with and through their adjusting agent, 
should be construed as constituting a waiver of any contractual privity defense, such that DeBest is 
estopped from now asserting a contractual privity defense in this action. 
In Pocatello Hospital, LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709,330 P.3d 
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1067 (2014) the Idaho Supreme Court provided the following description of what constitutes the 
"waiver" of a known right by a party: 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or 
advantage .... " Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,457,259 P.3d 595, 
603 (2011) (quoting Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820,824, 136 P.3d 291,295 
(2006)). "Waiver is foremost a question of intent" and the party proving waiver is 
required to show a clear intent to waive. Id. ( quoting Seaport Citizens Bank v. 
Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct. App. 1987)). Waiver will 
not be inferred from the parties' conduct absent "a clear and unequivocal act 
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel." Id. at 
458,259 P.3d at 604 (quoting Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 
256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993)). Importantly, the party asserting waiver must also 
"show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon [the waiver] and that he thereby has 
altered his position to his detriment." Id. at 457, 259 P.3d at 603 (quoting 
Fullerton, 142 Idaho at 824, 136 P.3d at 295) (silence insufficient to show intent to 
waive); see also Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 
785, 788, 10 P.3d 734, 737 (2000) (concluding waiver was not established when 
seller failed to show detrimental reliance on buyer's waiver of payment term); 
Panorama Residential Protective Assoc. v. Panorama Corp. of Wash., 97 Wn.2d 
23, 640 P .2d 105 7, 1060-61 (Wash. 1982) ( concluding that when lease called for 
rent adjustments every two years and landlord failed to adjust rent for many years 
by the terms of the lease, the landlord waived the right to past adjustments but not 
future adjustments). 156 Idaho at 719,330 P.3d at 1077. 
As already noted above, from the time this "occurrence" arose on June 15-17, 2013, as a 
result of the plumbing defects caused by DeBest, and that defect's discovery about 40 days later on 
July 24, 2013, and throughout all of the ensuing months of attempted remediation and attempted 
settlement, until DeBests' insurer and adjuster issued their statement of calculated damages on or 
about the following date of April 30, 2014, declaring, "This is an estimate of damage only and not 
an offer of settlement. This estimate is not an authorization for repair, nor is it a guarantee of 
payment." (see Scott Davison affidavit). The parties (at least the Davidsons) had attempted in 
good faith to settle this matter. When those settlement attempts failed, then the homeowner is 
entitled to "bring an action against the construction professional." If that construction 
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professional is then allowed in that subsequent civil action to interpose, as a defense, the bar of 
contractual privity, then that earlier attempt (and very essence of NORA) at settlement really 
becomes a meaningless exercise of patience and committed good faith efforts by the homeowner, 
because there was little or no incentive for the construction professional to settle, since the 
possibility of being compelled to answer in a civil action has become nonexistent. 
As also noted above, the very existence of the settlement requirements imposed by NORA 
are made a matter of public policy in Idaho, as enacted by the Idaho Legislature. DeBest 
Plumbing could have stood aloof from the inception, and simply declared that any and all remedies 
available to the Davisons must be derived only through their general contractor and renovation 
agent, Gould Custom Builders, Inc. Instead, and as the Davisons believe properly-so, under the 
correct statutory interpretation of settlemet efforts with the responsible construction professional, 
as declared and defined by NORA, we find that DeBest stood forward and shouldered its proper 
responsibilities as the "construction professional", undertook the initial repair of their defective 
workmanship, commenced physical removal of materials in certain areas of the residence to 
accommodate the commencement of further restoration efforts, so as to accommodate the seasonal 
period of the residence of the Davisons while staying in Idaho, and directed that the progress 
billings be sent to DeBest, and they would be forwarded on to the insurance carrier, as that was 
deemed to be the responsible way in which to address the defect and damages that caused the 
Davi sons' claim. Having so acted as they did, and having directed the Davisons to do as they did, 
, DeBest's conduct has only required that they accept direct liability under the Act, but that they 
accept the fact that their conduct has constituted a waiver of any required contractual privity with 
the homeowner, and furthermore, that they are now estopped from asserting any privity defense, as 
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stated in Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873,332 P.3d 785 (2014), 
as perhaps characterized in the nature of a promissory estoppel arising out their engagement in the 
NORA settlement process: 
This Court has described promissory estoppel as: "A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance on the part of a 
promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forebearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Smith v. 
Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 67,625 P.2d 417,421 (1981) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 901(1) (1973)). The elements required to 
support such a claim are: "(1) one party's reliance on a promise creates a substantial 
economic detriment, (2) the reliance was or should have been foreseeable, and (3) 
the reliance was reasonable and justified." Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 
64, 205 P.3d 1196, 1200 (2009). "Promissory estoppel is simply a substitute for 
consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between parties." Lettunich v. Key 
Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362,367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005). Thus, where 
there is evidence of adequate consideration, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is 
ofno consequence. Id. at 368, 109 P.3d at 1110. 156 Idaho at 891,332 P.3d at 803. 
In summary, both under the express terms of NORA, and by application of the doctrines of 
waiver and estoppel, the applicable law would require that DeBest is precluded from raising and 
asserting contractual privity as a bar to the claims made against them by the Davison in this action. 
C. The Mere Existence Of An Underlying Contractual Relationship Does Not Function 
To Deny An Action For Common Negligence Arising Out Of The Installation Of 
Defective Plumbing 
Defendant DeBest has also argued that because of the existence of its contractual 
relationship with the general contractor only, being Gould Custom Builders Inc., that consequently 
there can be no negligence-based claims asserted against DeBest by the Davisons. Long-standing 
principles of general Idaho negligence law, as especially applied within the realm of professional 
negligence, have recognized that negligence-based actions can and in fact frequently do - arise 
directly out of contractual-based relationships. See e.g., Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 416, 
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16 P.2d 661, 662 (1932) ("The gist of a malpractice action is negligence, not a breach of the 
contract of employment."). Earlier this year the Idaho Supreme Court again-stated the distinction 
between those actions that arise in tort and those actions that arise in contract in a decision that was 
issued on February 26, 2016, In re Cornell,_ Idaho __ , __ P.3d __ , 2016 WL 825003 
(Feb. 26, 2016): 
In Bishop [v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012)], this Court 
recognized that "[t]he abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative 
enactment addressing the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern." 
152 Idaho at 619, 272 P.3d at 1250. Under common law, claims arising out of 
contracts generally survive the claimant's death, while those sounding in pure tort 
abate. Id. The magistrate court in this case found the following excerpt from 
Bishop instructive for determining whether a case sounds in contract or tort: 
As this Court previously recognized, "[l]egal malpractice actions are an 
amalgam of tort and contract theories." See Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 
702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982). The tort basis of legal malpractice 
actions flows from the elements of legal malpractice: "(a) the existence of 
an attorney-client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the 
lawyer; ( c) failure to perform the duty; and ( d) the negligence of the lawyer 
must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client. ... " Id. 
(quoting Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 437, 628 P.2d 1336, 1338 
(1981) ). "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined 
by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson, 103 Idaho at 
704,652 P.2d at 652; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P.2d at 643 (holding that 
the tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the attorney-client 
relationship). Breach of an attorney's duty in negligence is a tort. See 
Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004); 
Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55. The contract 
basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to perform obligations 
directly specified in the written contract. See Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 
706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55 (holding that a breach of contract claim 
would arise if the attorney did not do what he promised to do in the contract, 
e.g., failing to draw up a contract of sale). Thus, under the abatement rule, 
breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attorney 
foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the 
litigation or provides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held 
to the standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a 
tort. Id. at 620, 272 P .3d at 1251. The magistrate court relied on the 
foregoing analysis to conclude that the claims, including the equitable 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 17 
00000103
claims, sounded in tort and were therefore abated. 
We agree with the district court that the thrust of the Estate's claims were 
torts in that they focused on Johnson's alleged breach of fiduciary duty and the 
damages that allegedly resulted from that breach. See Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 
Idaho 637,646, 39 P.3d 577, 586 (2001) ("Where the gravamen of the claim is for 
damages arising out of the breach of a fiduciary duty, an award of attorney fees is 
not proper under LC. § 12-120(3) because the action sounds in tort." (citing 
Property Management West, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 899-900, 894 P.2d 130, 
132-33 (1995) (emphasis added))); see also Profits Plus Capital Mgmt., LLC v. 
Podesta, 156 Idaho 873,892,332 P.3d 785, 804 (2014) (recognizing that a breach 
of fiduciary duty is a tort claim); Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, 
Chartered, 125 Idaho 607,614,873 P.2d 861,868 (1994) ("A claim for a breach of 
a fiduciary duty is a negligence action in which the duty to act is created by the 
relationship between the parties."). 
2016 WL 825003 at *3-4 (bracketed reference to Bishop citation added). 
Notwithstanding the fact that generally any breach arising out of a professional-client 
relationship sounds in tort, those professionals retain the right to pursue breach of contract claims 
when their clients fail to pay contracted-for fees. See e.g., Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 
P.2d 633 (1991). 
In Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 93 P.3d 680 (2004) the scope of these 
professional malpractice-type actions were limited to eighteen professions recognized by Idaho 
statute, which excluded the profession of "Realtor," which was the job classification at issue in that 
case. 140 Idaho 351-52, 807 P.2d 682-83.3 Nonetheless, the Court went on to apply in the 
Realtor context a similar long-standing analysis of tort claims arising out of contract, as based 
upon the Court's earlier decision in Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 664, 669 
3 As listed in the statutes cited for support in Sumpter, the eighteen Idaho 
professional malpractice professions are: architecture, chiropractic, dentistry, engineering, 
landscape architecture, law, medicine, nursing, occupational therapy, optometry, physical therapy, 
podiatry, professional geology, psychology, certified or licensed public accountancy, social work, 
surveying, and veterinary medicine, "and no others." 
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(1971). Based upon the Taylor decision, the Court engaged in the following analysis in Sumpter: 
As Taylor states above, "[i]fthe relation of the plaintiff and the defendants 
is such that a duty to take due care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and the 
defendant is negligent, then the action is one of tort." Citing the United States 
Supreme Court, this Court further held: 
The distinction is that: If the cause of complaint be for an act of omission 
or nonfeasance, which, without proof of a contract to do what has been left • 
undone, would not give rise to any cause of action (because no duty apart 
from contract to do what is complained of exists), then the action is founded 
upon contract, and not upon tort. 
94 Idaho at 138,483 P.2d at 669, quoting Atlantic & P. Railway Co. v. Laird, 164 
U.S. 393, 399, 17 S.Ct. 120, 122, 41 L.Ed. 485, 487 (1896). See also Hudson v. 
Cobbs, 118Idaho474,477-78, 797P.2d 1322, 1325-26(1990). Itcanalsobesaid 
that if a cause of action for breach of a duty based on a contractual promise could 
also be maintained without the contract by virtue of a statutory or common law 
duty, then the action is founded upon tort, not contract. Because the duties owed 
by Holland were clearly statutory, the Sumpters must deal with these breaches in 
tort, not contract. As such, we affirm the district judge's determination that the 
four-year statute oflimitations period ofl.C. § 5-224 applies in this case (see Jones 
v. Runfl, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chtd., 125 Idaho 607,613, 873 P.2d 861, 867 
(1994) (holding "[b]ecause there is no statute of limitations specifically governing 
negligence actions that do not involve personal injury or malpractice, we apply the 
four-year statute of limitations found in I.C. § 5-224")). 
140 Idaho at 353-54, 93 P.3d at 684-85. 
The trade classification that is commonly known as "plumbing," as defined in Idaho law at 
I.C. §54-2603 ("Plumbing") and I.C. §54-2604 ("Plumbing systems"), which is firmly ensconced 
within that grouping of job classifications generally known as the "trades," by which a person 
progresses by various degrees from an "apprentice" position, to 'journeyman," and eventually to 
what is now in contemporary times known as "plumbing contractor," but in former times was 
referred to by the term more frequently used at common law, "master plumber." See e.g. IDAPA 
07.02.05.010. Licensure History ("An applicant for any plumbing registration or certificate of 
competency who has been previously licensed as a journeyman or master plumber in any 
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recognized jurisdiction is required upon application to the Division of Building Safety to disclose 
such licensure history and provide sufficient proof thereof. An applicant for any plumbing 
registration or certificate of competency who has been previously licensed as a journeyman or 
master plumber in any recognized jurisdiction shall not be issued a plumbing apprentice 
registration. (3-29-12)"). 
Under Idaho law "there is a 'general rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent 
unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others.' Id. (quoting Sharp v. W.H Moore, Inc., 118 
Idaho 297,300, 796 P.2d 506,509 (1990))." Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 
398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). Such negligence liability has been generally recognized to exist 
in Idaho plumbing cases without much discussion of the underlying principles of negligence that 
apply. For example, in Luther v. Howland, 101 Idaho 373,613 P.2d 666 (1980), Justice Shepard, 
in dissent, provided the following rather succinct summary of the negligence question that was at 
issue in that case involving raw sewage that had run freely and collected under the crawlspace of a 
home without draining through the intended sewer connection: 
My view of the record indicates that Howland testified without 
equivocation that he connected the plumbing. Evidence from the other parties 
indicated that an inspection much later in time revealed that at that time the 
plumbing was not connected. The only way in which Howland could have been 
found negligent is if he did not connect the plumbing. Rowland's testimony 
that he did connect the plumbing constituted sufficient evidence upon which the 
jury could find no negligence on the part of Howland. The jury did so find no 
negligence on the part of Howland. Hence, I would hold error on the part of 
the trial judge in granting a motion for a new trial as to Howland on the basis 
that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict of no negligence on 
the part of Howland. 
101 Idaho at 376, 613 P.2d at 669 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Court in, Richard J. and 
Esther E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 983 P.2d 834 (1999) primarily 
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noted the possibility of De Best Plumbing's potential vicarious liability for the acts ofits employee 
without actually discussing any underlying basis for negligence liability in the case ("Byers was a 
'servant' of the 'master' DeBest in that Byers was an employee of DeBest, and as a consequence, 
DeBest was potentially subject to vicarious liability for Byers' torts. W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 70, at 501 (5th ed. 1984). DeBest's vicarious 
liability 'extends to any and all tortious conduct of the servant which is within the "scope of the 
employment."). 
In this case DeBest has declined to demonstrate what facts, or what evidence they are now 
offering, or upon what applicable law are they relying to provide this court with what the 
applicable negligence standard they believe to exist in Idaho that applies to the conduct of a 
plumber who defectively installs plumbing fixtures such that the resulting leaks lead to water 
damage in a residence. In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party 
has no obligation to present evidence on claims or issues that have not been raised or developed by 
the moving party's motion for summary judgment. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 
Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994). Although on this motion for summary judgment, 
the Defendant DeBest has not placed at issue, nor raised any question in respect to its potential 
negligence liability concerning the conduct and performance of its employees breaching any 
applicable standard of care in undertaking the work in question at the Davison vacation residence 
in the spring and early summer of 2013, it is understood that Idaho does recognize that proof a 
plumber's negligence is not precluded merely because there is an underlying contract between the 
plumber and his customer, anymore than proof of professional negligence would be precluded by 
the mere fact that the professional had entered into a contractual engagement with the individual. 
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DeBest's motion for summary judgment on the Davisons' claim of negligence in the 
defective plumbing installations should be denied. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
precludes DeBest's motion for summary jud 
Respectfully submitted this21 st day of Marc , 
Vernon K. Smitfi----
Attomey for the Plaintiffs 
Scott and Anne Davison 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 21st day of March, 2016 a true and correct copy of the 
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon the following: 
Robert D. Lewis 
Attorney at Law 
CANTRILL SKINNER, et al. 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
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Attorney for Defendant DeBest 
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Case No 
~----....JlnstNo ___ _ 
AL ___ _,..?.M. 
Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV l 5-l 78C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 





YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant's will call on for hearing Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment before the Honorable Jason Scott on the 4th day of April, 2016 at 
3 :00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
[)ORIGINAL 
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DATED This..?--r dayofFebruary, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
-;;?Z~·. By: ~S:: 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2..l{ day of February, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 3 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
. 
[ J_--Band Delivery 
~ U.S.Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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VERNON K. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
-
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
I.S.B. # 1365 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Scott and Ann Davison 
-
DOUGLAUJ~}LLER, CLERK 
By ''ff Deputy 
MAR 2 1 2016 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofValley ) 
CASE NO. CV-2015-178C 
AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT GOULD 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
GILBERT GOULD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
I am over the age of majority; that I am competent to testify; and I make this affidavit upon 
my own personal knowledge. 
In or about the month of January, 2012, I agreed to undertake to engage in a total remodel 
and restoration of the summer cabin of Anne and Scott Davison, located at 2109 Water Lily 
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Pilgrim Cove, McCall, Idaho, through my company, Gould Custom Builders, Inc .. Scott and Anne 
Davison are the Plaintiffs in the above entitled action. 
No written agreement was entered into between Gould Custom Builders, Inc. and the 
Davisons concerning this restoration project, as I have done projects for them since the 1990's. 
Gould Custom Builders thereafter hired DeBest Plumbing of Boise, Idaho to undertake the 
necessary professional plumbing work that was needed in conjunction with this restoration project, 
which they then became involved, and made some installations in June, 2013. 
No written agreement was entered into between Gould Custom Builders, Inc. and De Best 
Pluming, Inc., or with any other subcontractor that worked on the Davison project. 
On or about June 15-17, 2013 Tom Peterson, a licensed journeyman plumber working for 
DeBest Plumbing, finished the installation of the faucet connections going to a clawfoot bathtub in 
the upstairs bathroom in the Davisons' cabin, and Mr. Peterson then turned the water supply lines 
on that allowed water to enter the cabin water system. 
On July 25, 2013, Scott Davison arrived at the cabin that evening, and early that next 
morning I received his email he sent to me, a copy of which is attached hereto, notifying me that he 
had arrived at the cabin and had found a serious leak and standing water on the hardwood floors in 
the downstairs bedroom below the upstairs bathroom where Mr. Peterson had been working in that 
bathroom in Mid-June, 2013, with water leaks continuing to come through the ceiling, and the 
bedroom ceiling sagging down with the weight of accumulated water from the leak from the 
bathroom above. 
I immediately relayed this email and information to Mr. Tom Peterson, the licensed 
plumber who did the installations as an employee for DeBest Plumbing located in Boise, and I 
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called him on his cell phone, 941-8323, and requested he immediately come to the Davisons' cabin 
that morning to locate and stop the water leak, and to assist in the immediate required remediation 
of the direct damages caused by that water leak in the upstairs bathroom, and assist in correcting 
the damage to the ceiling downstairs that was visible in the downstairs bedroom located 
immediately below. 
That morning of July 26, 2013, I traveled to the Davison cabin and there met with Messers. 
Tom Peterson and Scott Davison, and in my presence and Mr. Davison's presence, Mr. Peterson 
undertook the necessary work, as the licensed plumber for DeBest Plumbing, Inc., and corrected 
the cause of the leak and repaired the defective work on the upstairs bathroom that he had earlier 
performed in Mid-June 2013, and assisted with the removal of the damaged ceiling and the water 
soaked insulation materials downstairs. 
The leak in the plumbing installation in the upstairs bathroom was identified as having 
been a trim piece from the tub faucet that entered into and through the wall, and attached to the 
rough plumbing. Essentially, it was identified by Mr. Peterson as having been a loose fitting that 
he had installed, and he admitted to me and Scott Davison that it was his fault, and the leak was the 
result of his installation, and that DeBest Plumbing would accept full responsibility and stand 
liable for the repairs and the damage. Mr. Peterson immediately corrected the leak and stopped the 
water leakage from causing any further damage, and Mr. Peterson and DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
thereupon assumed full responsibility and liability for the defect in that plumbing installations, as 
confirmed to both me and Mr. Davison, and DeBest Plumbing wanted the billings sent directly to 
them for reimbursement and /or payment. 
Thereafter, Mr. Peterson assisted me in undertaking the required immediate measures to 
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remove damaged sheetrock and other water soaked insulation and materials. 
During the years that I have worked as a subcontractor doing electrical work, it had always 
been my practice to handle any claims arising out of work that I had performed through my own 
insurance coverage, and not require the placement of those claims upon either the homeowner or a 
general or primary contractor. 
Whenever I engaged as a general contractor, it has remained my practice for any 
subcontractors that I use for them to be primarily responsible to any homeowner for claims arising 
out of any defective work performed by that subcontractor. In this case, this claim was 
immediately turned over to DeBest Plumbing, accepted by them, and the Davisons and I 
cooperated with DeBest and we directly worked with DeBest, and thereafter with DeBest's 
insurance carrier and adjusting agent. DeBest wanted me to bill them directly at first, and when 
they got the progress billings, showing the extent of the interior damages that was being repaired, 
DeBest then decided to have their insurance carrier become involved in the matter, and to settle the 
matter to the Davidsons' satisfaction. Consequently Mr. Davison and I were directed to send the 
billings to DeBest, and they would then forward the billings on to their insurance carrier and 
claims adjuster. DeBest wanted to complete the required remediation and settlement of the claim 
through their insurance carrier. DeBest placed the claim with their carrier, and the insurance 
carrier employed Intermountain Claims of Idaho, and used the services of their adjusting agent, 
Ronald Egland. 
By my accounting, through the month of March, 2014, the Davisons' total claim was 
$91,716.76, and ultimately came to $123,345.64 upon the completion of the restoration work. 
In my experience, I was stunned by the unreasonable damage estimate that was presented 
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presented by DeBest's insurance adjuster, IntermoW1tain Claims, that was submitted by Ronald 
Egland on April 30, 2014, in the amount of only $24,005.06. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this 21 st day of March, 2016. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO befo e me this 21st day of March, 2016. 
NOTARY PUB_LIC FOR~ 
Residing at ~ -
My commission expires: i 2 -;2o- IR 
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VERNON K. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
• 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
I.S.B. # 1365 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Scott and Ann Davison 
• 
DOUGLASt-~R, CLERK 
By ~j/.. Deputy 
MAR 2 1 2016 
Case No., ___ lnst. No. __ _ 
Filed A.M, 1:, S: f P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 










ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) ss. 
County of San Mateo ) 
CASE NO. CV-2015-178C 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT DAVISON 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SCOTT DAVISON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
I am a Plaintiff in the above-captioned action; that I am over the age of majority; am 
competent to testify; and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge. 
My wife, Anne, and I own a vacation cabin near McCall, Idaho that we primarily use in the 
summer months. 
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Around January, 2012, we determined to undertake some needed extensive remodeling and 
renovation of that cabin facility, and we hired Gilbert Gould of Gould Custom Builders, Inc., as we 
were familiar with Mr. Gould since the 1990's, and we wanted him to undertake that project for us. 
We did not enter into any written agreement with Mr. Gould for the undertaking of this 
project, but rather an oral transaction between us. 
As part of the renovation project, Mr. Gould engaged the services of DeBest Plumbing, 
Inc. to perform the required plumbing services. DeBest Plumbing, through the services of their 
licensed plumber, Mr. Tom Peterson, finished the plumbing work in the upstairs bathroom, and 
then the cabin was locked up until we arrived at the cabin on the evening of July 25, 2013. At that 
time I discovered standing water on the hardwood floor in the bedroom below the upstairs 
bathroom, with water dripping out of the bedroom ceiling, and the bedroom ceiling was sagging 
down, caused from the accumulated water and weight of the water soaked materials caused from 
the leaking water that had seeped into that area from an apparent leak from the bathroom above. 
When I entered the upstairs bathroom, it was clear there was an active leak in progress, as 
an examination of the bathroom flooring showed serious water damage, and the leak was likely 
to be within the wall behind the clawfoot bathtub, and was an active leak in the bathroom wall with 
the plumbing connections. 
I then contacted Gil Gould, to alert him to the issue, and notifying him of the situation by 
email the following morning, a copy of which is attached hereto. I notified him and requested his 
assistance with contacting the plumbers for their immediate repair in order to locate and stop the 
leak, and to address the required cleanup and remediation from the damage that had occurred. 
On the morning of July 26, 2013, both Gil Gould and the plumber, Tom Peterson, of 
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DeBest Plumbing, came to the cabin, and Mr. Peterson located the leak from within the bathroom 
wall, and undertook to correct the defective connection in the plumbing line and stopping the leak, 
and then he began to assist in the immediate remediation and repair of matters, and acknowledged 
the leak was his fault, and that his company, DeBest Plumbing was responsible for the repairs, and 
they would pay for the cost of all repairs and restoration of the cabin. 
There has never been any dispute in this matter that DeBest Plumbing was responsible for 
the leak that caused the damage throughout the interior of the cabin, and now the subject at issue. 
DeBest had acknowledged responsibility from the time that the source of the leak was determined 
by Mr. Peterson. 
Once it was determined that DeBest was both the responsible party, and accepted the 
liability for the damages, Gil Gould indicated to me that my wife and I would be dealing with 
DeBest, and its insurer, for the settlement of the damages and payment or recovery of the repair 
costs. While Gil Gould has remained actively involved in aiding our efforts to reach a settlement 
over the damages, and undertook to conduct the restoration required in restoring the premises, it 
was our understanding we were resolving the matter in direct communications with DeBest, that 
then came to include its insurer and their assigned claim's adjuster, Intermountain Claims of 
Idaho, and I had direct contact with their agent, Ronald Egland thereafter. 
Once the full extent of the water damage caused from this plumbing defect and water leak 
throughout the cabin was finally determined, it was discovered that the water had run into ceilings 
and walls in the downstairs, having begun with the bedroom immediately below the upstairs 
bathroom where the defect was located, and into the entrance hallway ceiling and walls of the 
hallway and clear out to the front door. All of the sheetrock and insulation for sound proofing in 
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the cabin had to be removed. Hardwood flooring had to be removed as well as the underlayment 
throughout. This was in addition to the floor and walls in the upstairs bathroom and the areas 
around the tub which ruined the underlayment and the vinyl flooring which all had to be replaced. 
Incidental to that damage was the removal and replacement of the doors, trim around the doors and 
various windows, and removal and replacement of the baseboards and crown molding and accent 
trim throughout. The entire interior of this cabin had been completely remodeled before this 
damage had taken place, so everything that had been water damaged and had to be replaced had 
just recently been installed by Mr. Gould in our remodel project that had begun in 2012. 
When the adjuster, Ron Egland, came to view our cabin property in April, 2014, I had no 
idea that he was prepared to present any substantial dispute as to either the amount or extent of the 
damage claim for which we were requesting reimbursement, as arising out of the plumbing leak 
caused by DeBest in June, 2013, and discovered July 25, 2013. 
Consequently, when the adjuster's final cost estimate was submitted on behalf of DeBest 
on April 30, 2014, in the amount of $24,005.06, we were rather dismayed by that estimate, as it 
was so far apart from the actual costs that had been incurred in the restoration of what was our 
recently remodeled cabin, which by that date, was already in the sum of $91,716.76, and the 
restoration, when it was then finally completed, produced a final bill and actual cost of restoration 
in the amount of $123,345.64. We had further discussions with the adjuster, but the adjuster 
refused to make an offer, unless I was willing to accept his damage estimate of $24,005.06, which 
was unreasonably below the actual costs, and though I was not looking to take advantage of the 
insurance company or take any advantage of the liability of DeBest Plumbing the estimate was 
wholly inadequate, and despite that unreasonable offer, I did consider at one point in time to accept · 
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$91,716.76, and the restoration. when it was then finally comp)eted, produced a final biH and 
actual cost of restoration in the amount of $123,345.64. We had further discussions with the 
adjuster. but the adjuster refused to make an offer, unless I was willing to accept his damage 
estimate of $24,005.06, which \Vas unreasonably below the actual costs, and though I \\'8S not 
looking to take advantage of the insurnnce company or take any advantage of the liability of 
DeBest Plumbing the estimate was wholly inadequate, and despite that unreasonable offer, I did 
consider at one point in time to accept it. in an efTort to avoid the expense and inconvenience of 
litigation, but I then concluded that their estimate was outrageously unreasonable, when 
considering the repairs and expenses involved in restoring the premises, and I then decided I was 
unwilling to accept it, and it then appeared there was no other available alternative, but to secure 
the assistance of counsel and commence a civil action against DeBest to recover the expenditures 
[ had paid to repair and restore the premises from the actual damages that had been caused to the 
cabin as a result of the defective plumbing work of DeBest Plumbing, Inc. DeBest was the 
construction professional, and the plumbing services were performed by their employee, a 
licensed plumber, Mr. Tom Peterson, and they had accepted the liability and assumed the 
responsibility to satisfy and settle the costs of restoration, and I intend to hold them to their word 
and performances under their acceptance of liability. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this 21st day of Marc~ 2016. 
-
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Scott Davison 
~~ ~.·. c~L·t~,,,.Oi J (~½ ct Dd/Y) JY)~ 
· SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 21th dayofMarch, 2016. 
NOTARY PUBLICFORCALIFORNIA 
Residing at rq~Jt> f'o.r/"4-., CA, 
My commission expires: . 05 jz-2:f~ 1; 
A£FI~iwi·of sJ~tp(/JA;JIJSOff.IN•"§UPPtJRTOFl!cEA.J!t'IIFF'S!Mf,MORA.NIJPM 
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From: SCOTT DAVISON <scottdavison13@gmail.com> 
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 2013 06:48:44 -0700 
To: <chinadoll797@frontiernet.net> 
Cc: Anne Davison <adavison1@aol.com> 
Subject: The Cabin looks great 
Gil, 
• 
I arrived in McCall yesterday and the cabin looks wonderful. I also appreciate 
how much care you took in getting things back into the cabin - really great. 
We do have one issue, though. There is a pretty serious leak in the ceiling of the 
downstairs bedroom {presumably from a pipe coming from the upstairs 
bathroom). Looks pretty serious - and means we can't use the upstairs 
bathroom until we at least fix the leak. In terms of fixing the ceiling, we've got a 
bunch of guests coming a week from today so it would be great if we can get it 
repaired. 
Thanks again for such a great job - and sorry to the bearer of bad news. 
s. 
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Case No. ___ lnst. No._,--_ 
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CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
14 23 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. (DeBest) and hereby submits its Reply 
Memorandum in further support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DEBEST GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Davisons sue DeBest for breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, and negligence in 
the supply and installation of plumbing fixtures, which led to water damage in their home when a 
leak occurred at a fixture DeBest installed. 




Plaintiff's hired Gil Gould d/b/a Gould Custom Builders, Inc. to remodel and renovate their 
cabin. Gould hired DeBest to provide plumbing fixtures and services for the remodel. 
The only conduct by DeBest that gives rise to any cause of action was performance of the 
contractual obligations DeBest owed to Gould under their agreement. DeBest had no agreement with 
the owners of the residence and were only on the residence premises because of their contractual 
obligations to Gould. 
In order for Davisons to pursue a cause of action for breach of contract, privity of contract is 
required under Idaho law. Privity of contract is also required to recover for breach of warranty. 
Salmon Rivers v. Cessna Aircraft, 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). Davisons have no privity 
with DeBest and therefore no right to sue DeBest for breach of contract or breach of warranty. 
Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 (Idaho App. 2004). Nor are 
Davisons third-party beneficiaries of the Gould/DeBest agreement. DeGroot v. Standley Trenching. 
Inc., 157 Idaho 557,338 P.3d 536 (2014). (A third party to a contract has no third party beneficiary 
status unless the agreement specifically is made for the express benefit of that party). Summary 
judgment should be issued against the breach of contract and breach of warranty claims. 
The Complaint also states a cause based upon negligence arising from the improper 
installation of plumbing fixtures that DeBest installed under the agreement with Gould. Idaho law 
recognizes that breach of contract does not create tort liability. Gagnon v. Western Building 
Maintenance, Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 114, 306 P.3d 197, 199 (2013). The mere negligent breach or 
nonperformance of a contract will not sustain an action sounding in tort, in the absence of a liability 
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imposed by law independent of that arising out of the contract itse1£ Baccus v. Ameripride Services, 
Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 350, 179 P .3d 309, 313 (2008). No such independent liability is shown. 
In their Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs do not mention these 
legal principles, do not attempt to distinguish the case law from this situation, and thereby concede 
that these common law principles apply to this situation. 
Instead, they assert new legal issues. They claim the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, 
Idaho Code § 6-2501 et seq., (NORA) is a legislative enactment that eliminates the contractual 
privityrequirement in civil actions brought against any person within the purviews ofNORA. They 
also attempt to raise waiver and estoppel issues due to purported settlement activities that occurred 
prior to the filing of this lawsuit. 
This Reply will first address the facts submitted by Plaintiff and then the legal issues they 
present. 
PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVITS 
The Affidavit of Scott Davison submits testimony about the summer home he and his wife 
own in McCall and he establishes the underlying contractual arrangement for the remodel of that 
home. His testimony confirms the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs hired Gilbert Gould of Gould 
Custom Builders, Inc. to remodel and renovate their "cabin facility." It confirms the undisputed fact 
that Gould engaged DeBest to provide plumbing services required for that remodel, including 
plumbing to the upstairs bathroom. 
Davison also states that he discovered the leak from the upstairs bathroom after the remodel 
was completed. He then contacted his contractor Gould to resolve the situation. On July 26, 2013, 
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Gould then contacted an employee ofDeBest to assist in resolving the water leak, and that employee 
accompanied Gould to the cabin and corrected the leak. The DeBest employee assisted in the 
remediation and repair. The employee purportedly admitted the leak was his fault and his company 
was responsible for repairs and restoration. He also testifies that Gould remained involved in the 
repairs, which involved replacing everything that was water damaged. 
He then adds hearsay conclusory opinions, and evidence related to compromise and offers to 
compromise that are inadmissible as evidence, and which will be discussed below pertinent to the 
Motion to Strike filed concurrently herewith. 
The Affidavit of Gilbert Gould provides testimony confirming that he agreed to remodel and 
restore Plaintiffs summer cabin under a verbal agreement. His company Gould Customer Builders, 
Inc. hired De Best to undertake necessary plumbing work and he confirms that a plumber working for 
De Best installed and furnished faucet connections in the upstairs bathroom in June 2013. These are 
all undisputed facts that support Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment under the common law 
principles discussed above. 
Gould also testifies in his Affidavit that on July 26, 2013, he received an email from 
Davisons notifying him of the leak with standing water downstairs below the upstairs bathroom. 
Gould contacted the DeBest plumber who had done the work and they met at the cabin to locate and 
stop the leak. The DeBest employee did correct the leak and then assisted Gould with removal of 
damaged ceiling and water soaked materials downstairs, as well as sheetrock and other insulation 
and materials. 
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Gould testifies that he witnessed the plumber identify a loose fitting that caused the leak and 
the plumber admitted his fault. The plumber also "admitted" that his employer would accept full 
responsibility and stand liable for the repairs and the damages. 
Gould also discusses his own legal conclusions about who has direct responsibility to a 
homeowner under such circumstances and how he insists responsible subcontractors be primarily 
responsible. He outlines how this process proceeded in this instant matter until DeBest's insurer 
became involved. This is all not admissible evidence. 
Both Davison and Gould further attest to inadmissible evidence purportedly establishing the 
DeBest insurance adjuster's estimate was far less than the actual cost incurred in the restoration, 
concluding that it was unreasonably below the actual cost, was "wholly inadequate," and Gould even 
states that he was "stunned" by the damage estimate. These statements and this testimony is 
inadmissible and subject to the Motion to Strike discussed below. 
Both Affidavits establish that there is no dispute that DeBest did its work at the Davisons 
residence under an agreement with Gould, that there was no agreement between DeBest and 
Davisons, and that the only notice of the claim given to DeBest was by Gould on the morning the 
leak was discovered. 
There was no written notice by Davisons to DeBest as contemplated under NORA. Idaho 
Code§ 6-2503. That procedure was not even contemplated in this situation. At best, presenting it at 
this time is a desperate measure to preclude summary judgment of this lawsuit. 
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MOTION TO STRIKE 
Pursuant to Rule of Procedure 56( e) opposing Affidavits on summary judgment "shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts that would be admissible evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." It is well 
recognized in Idaho that the threshold question which must be addressed before applying the liberal 
construction and reasonable inferences allowed under the IRCP 56( c ), is whether the information in 
the Affidavits is admissible under IRCP 56(e). Kolln v. Saint Luke's Regional Medical, 130 Idaho 
323,331, 940 P.2d 1142, 1150 (1997). Testimony that is speculative, conclusory or unsubstantiated 
by the facts is inadmissible. Id. 
A glaring problem with the testimony of Gil Gould is his opinion on Idaho legal 
arrangements and responsibilities between contractors and subcontractors. He has no foundation to 
so opine. That opinion is conclusory in nature. Such conclusory testimony is inadmissible for 
summary judgment purposes. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 
1007 (1986). 
Furthermore, all statements in the Affidavits of Davison and Gould attesting to any effort to 
compromise and the purported settlement offers by the DeBest employee or the adjuster for DeBest 
insurance company is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or the amount of the claim or 
any other claim. Idaho Rule of Evidence 408. 
In addition, any activities or statements of the claims adjusters for Defendant's insurer 
constitute inadmissible hearsay. A claims adjuster is not an agent of the Defendant. Sanchez v. 
Galey, 112 Idaho 609,620, 733 P.2d 1234, 1245 (1986). 
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Defendant respectfully requests this Court to rule on the Motion to Strike so as to exclude 
these inadmissible statements in the Affidavits of Scott Davison and Gilbert Gould. 
NORA DID NOT ELIMINATE THE CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY REQIDREMENT TO 
CREATE A DIRECT CAUSE OF ACTION BETWEEN DA VISONS AND DEBEST 
Plaintiffs argue that the Idaho Legislature has made the determination that residential 
construction litigation in Idaho must first undergo, as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation, the settlement provisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, Idaho Code § 6-
2501 et seq. This is entirely accurate. However, the terms of this act do not change the common law 
regarding the need for privity of contract as a legal basis to bring a cause of action for breach of 
contract. 
As a general rule, changes in the common law by the adoption of a statute are not to be 
presumed, but must be clearly intended before they will be given effect. Rook v. Trout, 113 Idaho 
652, 656-657, 747 P.2d 61, 65-66 (1988), overruled on other grounds, Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 
246,805 P.2d 452 (1991). 
NORA does create a condition precedent for the filing oflawsuits for construction defects in 
residential construction. NORA also limits the remedies available for such construction defect cases. 
NORA also specifically states that statements made by a claimant or construction professionals 
required in compliance with NORA are not an admission ofliability and are inadmissible in actions 
subject to NORA. § 6-2503(6). 
However, nowhere in NORA is there any expression of an intent to change the common law 
so that privity of contract be eliminated as a basis for any action for construction defect. At best, 
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NORA does clarify that it applies to subcontractors because they have a right to lien under Idaho 
Code § 45-501, but this can be explained because there are times when subcontractors file their lien 
and the only defense that the landowner has to that lien claim is defective construction. That may 
give the landowner a defense to the lien. However, it does not mean that the landowner can sue the 
subcontractor directly in an action where the general contractor is directly responsible to the owner. 
The reasoning in Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., supra., which was decided in 2004 and 
after NORA was enacted, supports this continuing privity of contract requirement. A subcontract is 
made to enable the principal contractor to perform his obligations to the owner. The performance of 
the subcontractor does not in itself discharge the principal contractor's contractual duty to the owner. 
Contracts entered into by the contractor with subcontractors or suppliers merely enable the contractor 
to fulfill his obligation to the owners. The owners are no more than incidental beneficiaries of the 
agreement between the contractor and the subcontractors and have no right to recover directly against 
the subcontractors. 
The procedures set forth in NORA facilitate a procedure for notice and resolution of a dispute 
over construction defects. In no way does it overrule or change the substantive common law 
requirements that there be privity of contract for suit. Davisons have a right of remedy against their 
contractor Gould. Their claim against DeBest is unfounded and without basis under Idaho law. 
THERE IS NO WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL IN THIS SITUATION 
Plaintiffs claim that because DeBest undertook direct negotiations through their insurance 
adjuster, there is a waiver of any contractual privity defense. They also randomly refer to estoppel. 
The entire basis for this argument is based upon the inadmissible testimony subject to the Motion to 
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Strike. There is absolutely no legal authority that indicates that a party who attempts to negotiate a 
dispute to settlement prior to litigation waives or is estopped to assert subsequently its substantive 
rights under law. No cases Plaintiffs cites establish this. No case law establishes this. 
A PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE STANDARD IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS 
MATTER 
In attempt to oppose Defendant's position that no negligence claim can be stated against a 
subcontractor in a construction project, whose only purpose on the owners premises is to perform 
contractual obligations, Plaintiffs cite authority from malpractice cases, involving attorneys and 
realtors. Those cases have no bearing on the conduct of a plumber. 
They do refer to older cases in which there is some general discussion of underlying 
principles of negligence in plumbing cases. However, the case law Defendant places before the 
Court is recent. Negligence as a cause of action does not arise from a failure to meet a standard of 
workmanship required under a subcontract to provide plumbing fixtures and services. None of the 
cases Plaintiffs present so hold. The legal theory they present should not be expanded to change 
what is a sound application ofldaho case law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Davisions' cause of action directly against the subcontractor who provided plumbing 
services must be dismissed by summary judgment. There is no privity of contract. The only basis 
for their negligence theory is a breach of the plumber's contractual duties. Davisons have a remedy 
against Gould's nonperformance of his contractual obligations. Gould in turn has privity of contract 
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with the plumber, but Davisons have no direct claim against DeBest. As this matter is now aligned, 
it is not consistent with the common law principles under Idaho law. 
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to grant summary judgment dismissing all 
Plaintiffs' claims against DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
DATED This 28th day of March, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:_~-~~-=-~-----"'p _,.______~-
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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[X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
- -
Case No. lnTu};°' 
Filed, ____ A.M. _if> J P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
) 





COMES NOW, Defendant, by and through its attorneys ofrecord, CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS 
CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP, and moves this Honorable Court for an order allowing Defendant's 
Motion to Strike to be heard on the 4th day of April, 2016 at 3:00 p.m. on the grounds and for the 
reasons that there is not sufficient time to give the usual notice of hearing of said motion, and if 
Defendant's motion is not heard at the time requested, the parties may suffer irreparable damage, as 
the Motion to Strike directly pertains to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. This motion is 
to be heard on April 4, 2016. A proposed Order is submitted herewith. 




DATED Thi~dayofMarch, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
"""'-1..i~~SEN LLP 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2-, ~ay of March, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME - 3 
~ Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
- DOUG~ER,CLERK 8Y---,,.,....~----Deputy 
MAR 2 9 2016 
Case No ____ , N nst. o. __ _ 
Filed A.M.Jc),:01P_M, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT.OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-1 78C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
VS. ) MOTION TO STRIKE 
) 





COMES NOW Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc., pursuant to Rule 56(e), moves to strike all 
or part of the Affidavit of Gilbert Gould and the Affidavit of Scott Davison upon the basis that they 
set forth therein opinions, facts and conclusory statements as would not be admissible in evidence. 
This motion is supported by the Reply Memorandum submitted currently herewith. 




DATED This2-?day of March, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN LP 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2' ~ay of March, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffe 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 3 
~ Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
-
Case No. lnr~~·-:::::r 
Filed, ___ A.Ml£Ju__P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 





YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant's will call on for hearing Defendant's 
Motion to Strike before the Honorable Jason Scott on the 4th day of April, 2016 at 3:00 p.m., or as 
soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 




DATED This.2,.~ay of March, 2016. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
&--:7/4SOREN ~S~ 
By: ___ / {P(5--=---= {_=------------
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ...2.-~ay of March, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 3 
ff~acsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
g~ 
Robert D. Lewis 
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Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
ISB 1365 
-
Telephone (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
-~~! 
MAR 3 1 2016 
Case No, ___ lnst. No __ _ 
Filed A.M,,Pd :E): P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 














Case No. CV 15-178C 
RESPONSE TO MOTION 
TO STRIKE 
COMES NOW The Plaintiffs above named, through their counsel, Vernon K. 
Smith, and in response and objection to the request made to this Court by the Defendant above 
named, through their counsel, Robert Lewis, regarding their motion to strike portions of the 
affidavits of Gilbert Gould and Scott Davison, the following response is submitted to the Court. 
The Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., through their counsel, has submitted their Reply 
Memorandum which incorporates their argument to support their Motion to Strike portions of 
affidavits, essentially seeking to strike limited portions of excerpts contained in the affidavits that 
have been filed in opposition to Defendant's Motion for summary judgment. The Motion to 
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Strike and their Memorandum as presented, seeks to confront the issue of admissibility of certain 
facts contained in statements set forth in these affidavits. 
It is apparent that DeBest Plumbing had completely disregarded the application of NORA 
to this matter until they received Davisons' response to the Motion for summary 
judgment. DeBest has not contested the fact that NORA does apply to this situation; they, 
however, instead argue that NORA does not dispense with the common law concept of privity in 
contractual settings. Their Reply Memorandum appears to concede the fact that NORA is a 
condition precedent to bringing a civil action of this nature, and further concede that the 
Davisons' did provide the required written notice -- as required by NORA -- to their construction 
contractor, Gould Custom Builders, Inc, through the email notice immediately presented to its 
agent and representative, Gilbert Gould, the very morning following their evening arrival at the 
cabin on July 25, 2013. The issues of fact to prevent summary judgment have been created by 
these affidavits and the application of the mandatory provisions of NORA. This case contains 
course of events as to what happens when the general contractor defers the statutorily-required 
NORA settlement procedure to the responsible subcontractor that admitted direct liability, and 
that subcontractor not only admits the responsibility, but also undertakes the statutorily-required 
NORA settlement procedures. Can that subcontractor, who admits liability, responsibility, and 
engages its agents and representatives to engage in the NORA settlement process, then still claim 
the shield of contractual privity with the Claimant/homeowner, if the settlement efforts are a 
failure and the issue of privity was previously lacking? NORA is supposed to provide a basis 
upon which the "claimant" (homeowner) is entitled to a civil action remedy once its settlement 
procedures fails. That is the specific intent of the statutory provisions, and these construction 
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professionals were engaged in that very process, with the purpose of a good faith attempt to find 
a resolution before any civil action was commenced, but as revealed, the actual settlement offer 
was not extended by DeBest's agents or representatives, but instead couched only in terms of 
their estimate of damage, and that amount of damage estimate would not be offered, unless their 
estimate of damage and repair was accepted as presented to the Davisons. The intended process 
and remedy forthcoming through NORA, requiring good faith negotiations at reaching a 
settlement before a lawsuit were to be initiated, has taken place, and as contemplated under 
NORA, due to this event of a non-settlement with the responsible construction professional, a 
civil action is then authorized, but if we are to embrace the position presented by DeBest, then 
the right to file the lawsuit against the responsible construction professional, being the only 
professional that admitted liability, accepted full responsibility, and has entered into the 
settlement negotiations through their authorized agents and representatives under NORA, would 
become defeated, and the suit dismissed, under their theory of a lack of contractual privity, and 
the right to initiate civil proceedings to recover upon the damages sustained would not be 
available to the homeowner against that construction professional ( despite the intent of the 
statute), under DeBest's theory of this case, as the failure of privity, they argue, still remains 
available to them as a defense. 
With respect to DeBest' s motion to strike, the focus for the Court should be on the fact 
that the issue of 11/iability", which is the basis for those objections, is not directly at issue on this 
motion for summary judgment, but rather the questions raised and placed at issue are the 
satisfaction of the NORA condition precedent to commencing a civil action. DeBest requested 
summary judgment for lack of contractual privity with the Davisons. The Davisons opposed that 
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motion on the clear statutory basis that DeBest voluntarily entered into dispute resolution and 
undertook satisfaction of the statutorily-required NORA settlement procedures, as a condition 
precedent to the commencement of a civil action, and because of that event, DeBest is no longer 
entitled to claim any shield of contractual privity, both under the terms of NORA itself, and as a 
matter of waiver and estoppel. 
Because only the question of satisfying the NORA condition precedent -- and not actual 
"liability" -- is what is presently at issue, DeBests' motion to strike is mis-directed to the 
questions ofliability. (See pg. 6 ofDeBest's Reply memorandum): 
1. Gil Gould only opined to the basis upon which he personally worked as a subcontractor and 
his own business relationship with his own subcontractors, while engaging as a general 
contractor -- not as to any general relationship between all contractors and subcontractors as a 
matter of general Idaho law. 
2. The efforts to compromise are not barred under Rule 408, IRE, since that rule "does not 
require exclusion, if the evidence is offered for another purpose." The evidence is offered to 
prove compliance with NORA's condition precedent, and is admissible for that purpose. 
3. Likewise, the statements made by the adjuster, are only offered to prove compliance with the 
NORA condition precedent. They are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, 
(Rule 801(c), IRE) and those statements therefore are not hearsay (i.e., the fact that he made an 
estimate to structure their offer, not whether it was a valid offer). Instead, these statements 
were offered to establish the fact that the statements were made, and nothing more. 
The question as to the admissibility of evidence, contained in affidavits, depositions and 
verified pleadings, is a question to be answered upon review of the statutes and rules of evidence, 
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and relevancy is always a threshold question under Rule 401 IRE, to determine whether the 
evidence present is relevant to the purpose for which it is offered. 
Defendant seeks to strike certain portions of the Gould and Davison affidavit in the 
following particulars: 
1 ). Regarding the Davison Affidavit, DeBest argues on page 5 of their Reply 
Memorandum: 
"He then adds hearsay conclusory opinions, and evidence related to compromise and 
offers to compromise that are inadmissible as evidence, and which will be discussed below 
pertinent to the Motion to Strike filed concurrently herewith." (Reply Memo. Pg. 4) 
The statements as to these compromise discussions are not being offered to establish the 
admitted liability, but rather to confirm that the settlement discussions and potential of a 
compromise solution did, in fact, take place, as required by NORA. What prought to situation to 
that stage was the admission and acceptance of liability as was made to both Mr. Davison and 
Mr. Gould by the employee of DeBest Plumbing, namely Torn Peterson, and those statements 
were not hearsay nor conclusory, as Mr. Peterson was DeBest's authorized agent and employee 
to make the initial plumbing installations and conduct the repairs and commence restoration on 
behalf of DeBest, and his statements as to issues of fault, liability, and restoration being made 
under their warranty and liability coverage, constitutes an admission against interest, and an 
admission of fault, liability, and responsibility of the construction professional that created the 
involvement of DeBest in settlement negotiations. The reference by Mr. Davison to the 
settlement negotiations he had agreed to undertake and participate with DeBest and their agents 
and representatives, is admissible for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with NORA, and 
under that statutory enactment of NORA, those discussions would be admissible only to 
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establish the fact that the condition of settlement negotiations was undertaken by the responsible 
construction professional with the homeowner. Those discussions taking place in that process 
are not admissible, and do not constitute admissions for liability purposes, under the provisions 
contained in NORA, as addressed below. Rules 801, 802, IRE, regarding the definition of 
hearsay, and what is not hearsay, and Rules 803 and 804, IRE, relate to the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. 
This journeyman plumber, Tom Peterson, came to the residence on July 26, 2013, 
because he was called and given the information from Mr. Gould as to the leaking condition, 
since he installed the plumbing components initially, and he inspected the situation and made 
the repairs to the plumbing fixtures and assisted in removal of some of the damaged sheetrock 
and assisted in the initial efforts at restoring some immediately visible damage, and settlement 
discussions went from there between Davisons and Debest. Without debate, Mr. Peterson was 
DeBest's agent, representative, employee and spokesman relating to what work had been done 
by him, on behalf of DeBest, and that installation what was found to be faulty, and was the 
cause of the leak and the extent of the resulting damages, and he took steps to correct the 
defective plumbing installations, and confirm the extent of the restoration involved, and that 
began the process that followed, meeting the conditions of NORA. 
2). With respect to the Gould affidavit, DeBest Argues on page 5 and 6 of their Reply 
Memorandum: 
"Gould also discusses his own legal conclusions about who has direct responsibility to a 
homeowner under such circumstances and how he insists responsible subcontractors be 
primarily responsible. He outlines how this process proceeded in this instant matter until 
DeBest's irisurer became involved. This is all not admissible evidence." (Reply Memo. Pg. 5); 
and 
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"A glaring problem with the testimony of Gil Gould is his opinion on Idaho legal 
arrangements and responsibilities between contractors and subcontractors. He has no foundation 
to so opine. That opinion is conclusory in nature. Such conclusory testimony is inadmissible for 
summary judgment purposes. Corbriduev. Clark Equipment Co .. 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 
1005, 1007(1986). (Reply Memo. Pg. 6) 
Mr. Gould has merely expressed the basis upon which he personally worked as a 
subcontractor, and with respect to his own business activities and relationship, who he relates 
with his own subcontractors in situations where he is engaging as a general contractor, and that 
was his practice, expressed by him from his own personal knowledge and what has been his 
practice and the on-going conduct in these construction defect situations, and how he engages the 
correct and responsible construction professionals to participate in the direct settlement 
negotiations with the homeowner, just as it was processed in this situation. Liability was 
admitted; responsibility was accepted, and DeBest entered into the settlement process, and 
ultimately enlisted the liability carrier and the assigned adjusting agency, Intermountain Claims 
ofldaho, and their senior adjuster, Ronald Egland, to become directly involved to resolve the 
matter, but to no avail. Mr. Gould was not opining what any general relationship is always found 
to be between all contractors and all subcontractors, as a matter of general Idaho law, but rather 
his expression as to his personal practice, to reveal what he does, what he did here, and explains 
why that is what has transpired in this process of these NORA settlement negotiations. 
3). As to both the Gould and Davision affidavits, DeBest then argues on page 5 and 6 of 
their Reply Memorandum: 
"Both Davison and Gould further attest to inadmissible evidence purportedly establishing 
the DeBest insurance adjuster's estimate was far less than the actual cost incurred in the 
restoration, concluding that it was unreasonably below the actual cost, was "wholly inadequate," 
and Gould even states that he was "stunned" by the damage estimate. These statements and this 




"Furthermore, all statements in the Affidavits of Davison and Gould attesting to any 
effort to compromise and the purported settlement offers by the DeBest employee or the 
adjuster for DeBest insurance company is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or 
the amount of the claim or any other claim. Idaho Rule of Evidence 408." (Reply Memo. Pg. 6) 
The purpose of this testimony was to make clear the parties-claimants-construction 
professional(s) engaged in the NORA process, and both Messers. Gould and Davison were made 
aware of the adjuster's damage estimate, based upon the inspection of the premises as requested 
by DeBest liability carrier personnel, and whether Intermountain agents be regarded as "agents" 
of the liability carrier only, and not DeBest, it is to be noted that the adjuster never made any 
written offer to compromise or settle the claim with any monetary payment to satisfv the actual 
costs of restoration. despite the former acknowledgment liability had been admitted and 
accepted, and the responsibility for those costs of restoration had been accepted by DeBest, who 
had requested the progress billings be sent to DeBest for payment. The issue of liability had 
been previously determined and openly accepted by DeBest, and what was left to address was 
the extent of damages and the costs of restoration incurred in repairing the Davisons' premises. 
No written settlement was ever made or offered, so there was nothing to accept or reject by the 
Davisons, and with many months having then passed since the inspection had been conducted by 
DeBest's authorized activities (the statute actually provides the construction professional a 
period of"fourteen days" after the inspection, referenced in §6-2503 (4)(b), Idaho Code,), the 
Davisons were left ultimately to determine legal assistance may be their only recourse, once 
having paid the full costs of restoration themselves, and more than adequate time had elapsed 
for someone to make an offer after Davisons' participation in the resolution process, since the 
provisions of §6-2503 (4)(c), Idaho Code, expressly stated the homeowner-claimant was 
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allowed "to bring an action against the construction professional for the claim described in 
the notice of claim without further notice." 
The damage estimate presented by DeBest agents was never thereafter increased, 
following the revelation of the of the actual costs incurred in the restoration process, despite the 
fact Intermountain's estimate did constitute a figure less than one-fourth of what had already 
been repaired and billed out for the repairs completed when the estimate was presented, with 
more work yet required to be done before the restoration process would be completed. As NORA 
specifically provides, in §6-2503 (7), Idaho Code: 
"(7) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a claimant from commencing 
an action on the construction defect claim described in the notice of claim if the construction 
professional fails to perform the construction agreed upon, fails to remedy the defect or fails to 
perform by the timetable agreed upon pursuant to subsection (4)(b) or (5)(b) of this section." 
With no formal offer presented, with no settlement in reach, with no performance through 
indemnification or reimbursement forthcoming from DeBest, then knowing that Davisons had 
advanced the costs of restoration to avoid any potential lien filings, and with the insurance 
carrier-adjusting agency unwilling to advance the negotiation-mediation-settlement process, and 
will all costs of restoration then having been paid by the Davisons and disbursed to in full 
settlement of those restoration billings, the right to initiate a civil action was properly exercised 
against the responsible "construction professional" that caused the damage, who had admitted 
liability, and had accepted responsibility for the damages and costs of restoration, all of which 
was clearly expressed from the inception of the discovery of the leak and resulting water 
damages, pursuant to the provisions of §6-2502 (1), Idaho Code, wherein it provides the 
claimant can file the civil action, and it can be a civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort for 
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damages or indemnity. That is what has now taken place in the on-going journey of this 
controversy. 
The statutory provisions in NORA are specific on the issue that the written and oral 
statements made by the DeBest, its agents or representatives, following the inspection made by 
Ronald Egland from Intermountain Claims of Idaho, and expressed during their settlement 
negotiations process under NORA, are not themselves admissible as "an admission of liability", 
and will not be used in any trial proceeding, but nonetheless, such statements are admissible for 
the purpose of demonstrating that DeBest, the construction professional, did participate in the 
course of complying with the settlement procedures authorized by NORA, as identified in §6-
2503 (6), Idaho Code, wherein it provides: 
"(6) Written or oral statements made by a claimant or by a construction professional in 
the course of complying with the procedures required or authorized by this section shall not be 
considered an admission of liability and shall not be admissible in an action subject to this 
section." 
Those references regarding those statements of the inspection, the estimates, the damage 
valuations, and any references to the costs of restoration in the affidavits of either Gould or 
Davision, to the extent it relates to what has been forthcoming after the NORA proceedings were 
commenced, were contained and stated in those affidavits to establish the participation of the 
construction professional and the compliance by the Davisions with the provisions of NORA, 
and the statements are admissible for that limited purpose in these proceedings, as NORA is the 
controlling statute that dictates the process of settlement before litigation, and that has taken 
place in this matter before suit was initiated. Those statements are not offered for the purpose of 
establishing any further admissions ofDeBest's liability, as that had been established initially, by 
the statements and admissions expressly made by Tom Peterson on July 26, 2013, and the days 
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following thereafter, and it was that initial acceptance ofliability that gave rise to the settlement 
efforts that were then undertaken, as required, by NORA. 
DeBest's counsel has made the statement, within the context of his argument regarding 
the motion to strike ( Reply Memo. Pg. 5): 
"There was no written notice by Davisons to DeBest as contemplated under NORA. 
Idaho Code § 6-2503. That procedure was not even contemplated in this situation. At best, 
presenting it at this time is a desperate measure to preclude summary judgment of this lawsuit." 
With all due respect to Mr. Lewis, that was the purpose of the email sent the early 
morning hours on July 26, 2013, sent by Scott Davison to Gilbert Gould, his immediate contact, 
who then immediately contacted Tom Peterson, shared and reviewed the content of that notice-
email that he had received, and all parties, either personally or through their agents, employees, 
and/or representatives (including Gould (contractor), Davison (homeowner), Peterson 
(DeBest's agent and employee), and eventually Ronald England (agent for Intermountain 
Claims, acting on behalf of the liability carrier, pursuant to the authorization from DeBest) 
either immediately or subsequently inspected the premises, beginning initially that morning of 
Juky 26, 2013, by Messers. Gould, Davison and Peterson, who together addressed the leak, 
aspects of the damage, discussed the issue of liability, and make some immediate repairs. That 
was the initial notice that brought the parties together, from which DeBest, the responsible 
construction professional, admitted liability and accepted responsibility, and DeBest then 
wanted the progress billings on the course of the repairs to be submitted to DeBest for payment, 
and once confronted with the extent of the damage and repairs in the progress reports and 
billings, DeBest brought in their liability carrier to cover the damages, and that resulted in the 
further inspections and estimates undertaken by Intermountain Claims, who was brought in by 
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the liability carrier for the express purpose of determining a range of damage, and presumably 
to structure a resolution over the claim for damages resulting from the leak. 
Of interest in these NORA proceedings, the case law has declared that the parties did not 
even have to realize they were performing their actions under the provisions of NORA, they just 
had to engage in this negotiation process before commencing civil action by the homeowner 
against the responsible construction professional. To say "the procedure was not even 
contemplated in this situation" would only serve to make one wonder what DeBest thought it 
was doing when they brought in their liability carrier and the adjusting agency to assume the 
role of inspection, estimating damages, and ultimately intend to pay the damages under their 
liability policy of coverage. If DeBest thought they were not engaged in some form of a 
settlement proceeding, the reasoning or basis for them engaging in the process would otherwise 
become irrelevant under the law; and whatever you want to call the process, such an attempt at 
settlement must take place in these homeowner-construction-remodel proceedings, as required 
by NORA, as a pre-requisite to filing suit, and that process did take place, and it took place in 
compliance with the provisions of NORA, as that process was fulfilled by the notice of the 
damages and claim, the contact, the inspections, the damage estimates, and the involvement of 
the liability carrier and its assigned adjusting agent(s). 
The only "desperate measure" about which the Davisons are aware was their final 
decision, out of frustration, to file the civil action to recover their damages, as the Davisons had 
fully cooperated with the process in which DeBest, their agents and/or representatives were 
willing to engage, and the Davisons did what was expected or required of them. To now suggest 
that the liability carrier, and more notably, Intermountain Claims of Idaho, the assigned adjuster, 
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had no idea there was an Act in existence in Idaho, despite having been enacted in 2003, 
referred to as the Notice and Opportunity To Repair Act, being enacted in the very State 
where Intermountain Claims is located, and to say they were completely unaware of this 
NORA settlement process required under the Act, well knowing this claim was over a 
homeowner-construction professional controversy, and they were called in through DeBest's 
liability carrier to inspect and estimate damages over water leakage that related to the Davison 
premises, under their notice and claim for damages made by the Davisons over a plumbing leak 
in their vacation residence, resulting in substantial damages that included costs of $91,716.76 
when Intermountain's inspection estimate was presented in the amount of $24,005.06 to the 
Davisons, with a final completion cost of $123,345.64; one could only say it would appear to 
be a rather "interesting position" for Intermountain Claim's personnel to represent their state of 
mind to have been completely oblivious to the existence of NORA ( despite the fact case law 
holds that a state of mind, reason for, or awareness of the settlement process is immaterial, as 
you don't even have to be aware the Act exists- see Plaintiffs Responsive Memo.), while they 
were engaged in this exercise of inspections, estimations, and assessing a potential of settlement 
efforts. The fact this statutory enactment has been in effect since 2003, over thirteen years ago, 
with case law existing in published Supreme Court Decisions; such a position would serve only 
to leave one to wonder how a local (Idaho) adjusting agency could have been completely 
unfamiliar with such a statutory mandate and developing case law in their very area of claims 
expertise. This Enactment presumably was brought into the law to compel homeowner-
construction professionals to attempt to resolve the many and frequently surfacing homeowner-
construction professional disputes that arise within the building industry. 
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In Conclusion, Plaintiff's would respectfully object to any motion to strike any portion of 
either affidavit filed in opposition to Defendant's Motio 
Evidence. 
Dated this 31st day of March, 2016. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of March, 2016, I served a true ~d correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
PO Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CASE NO. CV-2015-178C 
PLAINTIFFS' COMMENTS ON 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM 
DISCUSSION OF REPLY MEMORANDUM ARGUMENTS 
1. The essence of a Negligence Cl&im 
·cjted at page 2 ofDeBests' Reply Memorandum, reference is made to Gagnon v. Western 
Bldg. Maintenance; inc., 155 Idaho 112, 306 P .3d 197 (2013), as standing for the proposition that~ 
"Idaho law does not recognize breach of contract creating tort liability.'; Their actual direct 
argument, located ·on page 9. is much shorter, and does not again cite Gagnon, supra. 
Plaintiff' Comments on Defendant's Reply M$IO.ora.ndw:n 
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If I were a plumber, and I offered you three alternative versions of a bathroom sink fixture 
package; and described those sink fixtures to be among the following: 
Version A - Granite composite sink Fixture (Best) 
Version B- Vitreous China sink Fixture (Good) 
· Version C - Standard stainless Steel sink Fixture (Modest) 
In each of the. three versions offered; each version would require that the sanitary sewer be 
properly.cmmected by the standard of care required by the State Plumbing Code and by applicable 
local building codes. · ff you were to select Version A, but I mistakenly installed Version B, and 
then charged you for Version A, the difference upon completion would be rather obvious, as I 
failed to install the chosen version. and I charged for what I failed to deliver. However, if I then 
failed to properly connect the sanitary sewer according to the State Plumbing Code and the local 
building codes, and the crawl space of your home fills with raw sewage~ we are confronted with 
the potentiatofboth a·contract breach and a negligence action. Luther v. Howland, IOI Idaho 373, 
613 P.2d 666 (1980). 
You would have an action for breach of contract against me as a result of my failure to 
install your . chosen · version of the bathroom sink package, and you also have an action in 
negligence against me for my breach of the applicable duty of care in failing to properly install 
that ver.sion ~ or any version - of the required and applicable plumbing and building codes . 
. The· decision upon which DeBest has chosen to rely, Gagnon v. Western Bldg. 
Maintenance; Inc., 155 .idaho 112, 306 P.3d 197 (2013), is not to the contrary. but instead is 
consistent with the entire line of authority Plaintiffs' have cited from professional malpractice, as it 
Plaintiff' Comments on Defendant's Reply Memorandum 
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relates to Realtors, and to tradesmen - such as plumbers, carpenters, and electricians. Gagnon 
states the applicable rule no differently than the seminal Idaho decision upon which Plaintiffs' 
have relied, Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 664, 669 (1971). The Court in 
Gagnon declared as follows: 
The source of a tori duty simply does not arise from the duty of contractual performance. A duty 
can arise, however, from undertaking a duty which induces reliance. In Baccus, Ameripride had 
agreed pursuant to a contract with the employer of Baccus to place mats in the entry to certain 
buildings as a safety measure to prevent slipping due to bad weather. It failed to do so on 
December 17. The Court simply held that Baccus's reliance on Ameripride's previous acts of 
placing .the mats was the source of the duty, not the contractual obligation to do so. In other 
words, the existence of a contractual duty is irrelevant to the legal analysis. The contract simply 
creates the circumstances for the commission of a tort by failing to perfonn a duty that induced 
reliance by others on its performance. In other words, reliance on the duty is a required element 
of a claim by third parties. Here, it is undisputed that Western did not spread ice melt on the 
Hayden branch parking lot during the winter of 2007~2008 and therefore it is inconceivable that 
Gagnon cmtld have relied upon it to do so. 155 Idaho at 115,306 P.3d at 200. 
The lawyers.in the courtroom - including the Judge - are most familiar with the context of 
professional mal.pr~ctice. Attomey~client relationships have at their foundation a contractual basis, 
but liability in the performance of that contract is founded on negligence. As pointed out in the 
Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc. decision, the "professional malpractice'' negligence category is 
limited to just 1 s· professions which require higher education, the passage of exam to practice the . . 
profession, continuing education, etc.. . Nonetheless, negligence liability was imposed in the 
Sumpter case involving a Realtor, who was not required to obtain such a high level of education 
end training~ .. Because the duties owed by Holland were clearly statuto:r:y, the Sumpters must 
deal with these breaches in tort. not contract". ( emphasis added) As such, the Court affinned 
the district judge's determination that the foux-year statute of limitations period of LC. § 5-224 
applied in. the case.' Likewise, as it was pointed out that while the trades - being plumbers, 
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electricians, carpenters, and so on, though they may not require as much education, they do require · 
intense years, of trai.P,ing, the passing of tests, and also have imposed upon them independent · 
standards of licensure and applicable building codes upon which negligence liability may arise. 
It's all on.a contiriuwn. · It all involves the provision of services to the public under standards of 
care, which if breached, give rise to an action for negligence. 
2. The Essence Of The Operation of NORA 
The first alternative, as reflected in the Responsive Memorandum submitted by Plaintiffs, 
the Court is invited to take one of tw-o options with respect to the interpretation ofNORA. Fil-st, 
either that NORA itself constitutes a waiver of contractual privity. by authorizing a direct action 
against a subcontractor. This is how the Plaintiffs have made their argument in the response brief: 
"As declared above, the Da-visons are proceeding on the basis that ultimately DeBest failed to 
adequately·iespond to their claim under NORA. as provided by I.C. § 6-2503(3)(a): 
(a) If the sonstruction professional disputes the claim or does not respo:o.d to the claimant's 
notice of claim within. the time stated in subsection (2) of this section, the claimant may bring an 
action against the construction prof essioual for the claim described in the notice of claim 
without further notice .. (Emphasis added). 
(4) "Construction professional'' means any person with a right to lien pursuant to section. 
45-501, Idaho . Code. an architect, subdivision owner or developer, builder, contractor, 
subconn-actor~ · engineer or inspector, performing or furnishing the design, supervision, 
inspection,. construction or observation of the construction of any improvement to residential. real 
property, whether · operating · as a sole proprietor, partnership, corporation, limited liability 
company .or other business entity. (Emphasis added). 
The second 'alternative, as reflected in the Responsive Memorandum, is that if NORA 
itself does not authorize a direct action against a subcontractor by waiving contractual pdvity, then 
DeBest actually waived that contractual privity requirement in this case, and therefore should be 
. Plaintiff'. Comments on Defendant's Reply Memorandum 
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estopped · from asserting such requirement of contractual privity, due to the fact that DeBest 
engaged in the NO:RA settlement procedures. If neither of these two alternatives applies, then it 
would in effect allow DeBest to become characterized as having ":free bites at the apple/' DeBest 
gets the benefit of participating in the requirements of settlement negotiations under NORA, but 
has no risk of a subsequent civil action, because it will just claim immunity to that action, using the 
affirmative defense of ~ontractual privity. That clearly is not what the Idaho Legislature intended~ 
' . 
and if the· settlement provisions in NORA are to be required, then whichever subcontractors elect 
to participate, being a construction professional, they must be subject to direct suit. 
These legislative enactments changed the existing common law. which is a result that 
DeBest has argued against, within their Reply Memorandum. The contrary rule is expressed in 
Statewide Construction, Inc. v. Pietri, 150 Idaho 423,429,247 P.3d 650,656(2011) ("Where the 
clear implication of a legislative act is to change the common law rule, we recognize the 
modification because the legislature has the power to abrogate the common law."); and see also 
Michelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 149,153,280 P.3d 176, 180 (2012). 
As this Court reads the NORA statutes, as Plaintiffs have cited previously, and as set out 
above, it should do so in the context that the rule of statutory construction is that a statute is to be 
construed so as to give every word, clause, phrase, and sentence. meaning. Farmers National 
Bank v. Green RiverDairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853,859,318 P.3d 622, 628 (2014). So. it becomes a 
rather direct qtJ.estion: is a homeowner/claimant entitled to sue a construction professional 
subcontractor under the provisions of the Act or not? 
CONCLUSION 
At this stage of the case, there remains genuine issues and substantial questions of fact, and 
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a very important.issue oflaw that precludes DeBest' s motion for summary judgment. Therefore as 
requested in the Responsive Memorandum, Defendant's m 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of March, 
Vernon K. Smi 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Scott and Anne Davison 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31st day of March, 2016 a true and correct copy ofthe 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On April 4, 2016, this Court heard oral argument on Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter is fully briefed, the parties were able to present their 
position, and the Court has considered the issues; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Summary Judgment is granted in 
favor of DeBest Plwnbing, Inc. against the causes of action based upon breach of contract, breach of 




express warranty, and breach of implied warranty. The basis for this ruling was stated on the record 
at the April 4, 2016 hearing. 
The Court denies the Motion for Summary Judgment on the cause of action based upon 
negligence. This case will proceed forward to trial on a negligence theory. The basis for the Court's 
decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment was stated on the record from the bench at the 
hearing. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
+"' 
DA TED This _l_ day of April, 2016. 
able Jason Scott 
ct Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1 'ft'-- day of April, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Robert D. Lewis 
Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, 
LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
Boise, ID 83716 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[~U.S.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[~ U.S.Mail 
Attorneys for Defendant 
~4 D~ 
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VERNON K. Sl'vHTH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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Boise, Idaho 83702 
-
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
'·./ERNIJM K i::IMITH PAGE 02 
DI GLAS ~~LER, CL.ERK 
By ~}r\K?f Deputy 
APR 2 0 2016 
Case No. ____ ,Jnst w------
Fi!ed, ____ ,A.M. ___ -r,M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davbon and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 













COMES NOW the Plaintiffs above named, Scott Davison and Anne Davison, by and 
through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, and do move this court, pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 12(b), IAR, for permission to appeal the Court's order of dismissal of the 
contract claims identified in Plaintiffs' complaint, as dismissed upon the Court's granting of 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment due to a lack of the common law requirement of 
privity bet'\veen the homeo"vner, Plaintiffa herein and the subcontractor/Defendant, DeBest 
Plumbing, Inc.; that ~aid order of dismissal entered by the District Court was filed of record on 
April 7. 2016. 
The subject matter in this dispute, forming the topic of concern in this request for 
Permission to Appeal, is \Vhether the common law concept of "privity", being a contractual 
l'v10TTON FOR PERMlSSIVE APPEAL P. l 
00000168
Et4/ 20/ 2015 14: 4'3 20:3345112'3 - \/ERHOrl ,< SMITH -
PAGE 
concept traditionally required as a pre-requisite to the formation of any binding ru1d enforceable 
"contractual" relationship benveen and among various parties, is still required to be proven to 
exist before then: can be a '"cause of action for breach of contract", in those relationships 
identified and controlled by the statutory enactment entitled Notification and Opportunity To 
Repair Act, referred to as N.O.R.A., which involves those ;'inter-relationships" between 
"residential homeowners" and ·'construction professionals", as defined and addressed in that said 
Notice And Opportunity to Repair Act, adopted and enacted by the Idaho legislature in 2003? 
Within N.O.R.A. is the reference to "subcontractors", who are included within the definition of 
"constrnction professionals", who are those who have a right to file a claim of lien against the 
homeowner 's real property, for payment of services perfonned and/or materials furnished at the 
instance or request of the home owner, or the request of the o~ner's agent. These "sub-
contracting agents" are recognized under common law to be in a "contractual relationship", with 
the general contractor, but not viewed as being in "'privity of contract" with the homeowner, 
though their sole purpose for contracting with the general contractor is for the rendition of their 
specialized services performed for the benefit of the residential construction and/or remodel 
project, thus giving the subcontractors the right to file a claim of lien, if not paid. 
Consequently, the question must be addressed whether, as a matter of this statutory 
enactment, by virtue of the adoption of the legislative enactment referred to as the l.fotice And 
Opportunity To Repair Act, Title 6, Chapter 25, Statutes of the State ofidaho, §§6-2501 through 
§§6-2504, Idaho Code. (referred to as N.O.R.A) has the common law ·'privity of contract" 
requirement, essential to the establishment of a contractual relationship betvveen contracting 
par1ics, been elfoctively abrogated, abolished, and/or superseded, with respect to those situations 
involving .. residential home owners" and "construction professionals, that includes both general 
1v10'TI()N. FOR PERi\1JSSlVE APPEAi.. P~2 
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contractors and subcontractors, who have come within and under the jurisdiction and mandates 
of the provisions of N.O.R.A .. , being those situations involving residential homeo,.vners, their 
general contractor(s) hired to conduct and manage the construction, and to coordinate the 
necessary installations of those various components, materials, and services, at various stages of 
the construction/remodel project, who, in turn, hire subcontracting agents, being sub.contractors 
hired tu render services, at the instance and request of the general contractor, for the benefit of 
the residential homem.vner. These "subcontractors" consist of those specialized tradesman, 
including concrete specialists, electricians, plumbers, cabinetry installers, window installers, 
heating and air conditioning specialists, and etc., each of whom are recognized to be a specialist 
in their filed of construction trade, and are reco~rnized as a "construction professional" both 
under N.O.R.A, and in their particular field of trade; being agents and employees trained and 
qualified in their particular area of expertise and trade cratl to render services as an expert in 
residential construction industry. 
The lower court's order of dismissal was based upon the fundamental reasoning as set 
forth .in open Court and announced orally from i:he bench on April 4, 2016, therein essentially 
ruling to the effect that the above cited legislative enactment (N.O.R.A.) has not abrogated or 
abolished the essential requirement for the existence of the common law concept of "privity of 
contract" betv,,een parties before a contractual relationship is found to exist, from which 
relationship a party can assert a cause of action for breach of contract. This Court has 
dctem1ined that privity of contract remains a common law criteria in any and all contractual 
relationships, including those bet\veen residential homeowners and any and all construction 
professionals rendering services in relation to the construction and/or remodel of a residential 
MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL P.3 
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dwelling, notwithstanding the provisions of the Notice And Opportuniry To Repair Act, Title 6 
Chapter 25, Statutes of the State of Idaho, §6~2501-2504, Idaho Code. 
The fundamental issue to be raised upon such a Permissive Appeal allowed by the Court 
would be whether the Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act, commonly and herein referred to 
as N.O.R.A., has effectively abrogated, abolished, suspended, and/or .superseded the common 
law requirement of "privily of contract", by vfrtue of that statutory enactment, such that "privity 
of contract" is statutorily suspended or no longer required in those relationships involving 
residential homeowners and construction professionals (including a subcontractor), for purposes 
of maintaining a cause of action for breach of contract in a dispute between the res1dential 
homeowner and a "subcontractor", -.vhose only "privity" is with the "general contractor", 
Plaintiffs would assert, through counsel. that the appeal of this interlocutory order, 
involves a controlling question of law as to which there does appear to be substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion regarding the requirement of the common law requirement of privity in 
such contractual matters, when considering the purpose and application of the provisions set 
forth within the Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act; that a genuine issue and substantial 
public interest exists in determining the implications of the enactment, and to secure a decision 
as tc> a detennination whether N.O.R.A. abrogates, abolishes, suspends, and/or supersedes the 
common law defense and requirement of ·'privity of contract", when the elements of N.O.R.A. 
and being pursued. implemented, and mutually undertaken by the residential homeowner and 
subcontracting agent, such that the statutory enactment precludes the application of the 
affirmative defense of lack of privity, as was raised by the Defendant in this case, despite the 
parties having fully participated in those settlement proceedings as contemplated by the 
enactment and no settlement or resolution is reached that is satisfactory to the parties. 
rvtOTION FOR PERMISSlVE APPEAL P.4 
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These Plaintifts have submitted their memorandum of auth01ity, in response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. and the issue in this matter has been sufficiently 
framed by those memorandums of authority submitted by the parties, and is further 
supplemented by the memorandum of authority submitted in support of this i'vfotion for 
Pennissive Appeal, from which this lower court will be adequately apprised as to the issue and 
ba..<;is for the request for a Permissive Appeal of this issue, as it does constitute a controlling 
question as to the application of the statutory enactment that appears to be contradictory 
regarding the right of a subcontractor to raise the affirmative defense of lack of privity between a 
residential homemvner and a subcontractor rendering the professional services on his residential 
dwelling, despite having participated fully in the settlement proceedings contemplated under 
N.O.R.A., including the inspection and estimation process having being completed by the 
parties, and full awareness of the liability of the subc,ontractor, admitted im~ediately upon 
' ' 
discovery of the faulty workmanship in the installations_, 
causation of the damages. 
:>vIOTION FOR PER~.:HSSIVE APPEAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 20th day of April, 2016, f caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and fr.,regoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following 
addresses as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Valley 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, r daho 83611 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
( ) 






u. s. !\,fail 
Fax 208-345-7212 
Hand Delivered 
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ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
DOU·.S~/~LLER, CLERK 
By fki?~ Deputy 
APR 2 5 2016 
Case No ____ l'llilt,. No __ _ 
Filed A.M, ____ ,P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 




) Case No. CV 15-178C 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiffs above named, by and through their attorney of record, 
Vernon K. Smith, and do herewith submit this Supplemental Memorandum in support of their 
Motion for Permissive Appeal of that Decision of the District Court, the Honorable Jason B. 
Scott presiding, as reflected in that order so entered and filed of Record on April 7, 2016, therein 
granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the effect of which caused the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' contract claims as was being asserted by Plaintiffs in their Complaint filed against the 
subcontractor, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., for the alleged breach of contract, including breach of the 
express and implied warranties flowing therefrom, as a result of that faulty workmanship and 
improper installations of certain plumbing components, fixtures and accessories made to certain 
bathroom fixtures in the residential dwelling of the Plaintiffs. 




This authority is presented to supplement the previous memorandum(s) submitted to the 
District Court, filed in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the 
contract claim(s) filed by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., regarding 
those breach of contract claims raised in regard to the rendition of services relative to the 
installation of those plumbing components and accessories in Davisons' residence by their 
plumbing subcontractor, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., a "construction professional" rendering such 
services pursuant to the terms, conditions, provisions, mandates, and restrictions of the Notice 
And Opportunity To Repair Act, §6-2501-2504, Idaho Code. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court has entered an Order, granting dismissal of the contract claims set 
forth and contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint, pursuant to that Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by the Defendant, and now reflected in that Order dismissing those contract claims, as 
entered and filed of record on April 7, 2016. 
As a result of that order dismissing Plaintiffs contract claims against DeBest Plumbing, 
Inc., the Plaintiffs have now filed their Motion for Permissive Appeal, granting unto them the 
opportunity to seek a Permissive Appeal from the Idaho Supreme Court to address the issue as to 
whether or not the traditional common law concept of "privity of contract" is required to exist, 
and become a valid affirmative defense as to the lack of such privity of contract between a 
"residential homeowner" and a "construction professional" who renders services in the 
construction and/or remodel of the homeowners' residential dwelling, though under a contract 
entered into only between the general contractor and the subcontractor, when the lawsuit and 
cause of action is the consequence of the failed settlement proceedings, as allowed to occur 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PERMISSIVE APPEAL P.2 
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pursuant to the provisions as identified and contained in the Notice and Opportunity to Repair 
Act, otherwise known as "N.O.R.A.". 
As a general . rule, the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an 
appealable event, even when the appeal is from a subsequent final judgment. Lewiston Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 800,808,264 P.3d 907,915 (2011). However, 
the Supreme Court can grant permission to appeal an order that is otherwise not appealable when 
the Court determines that the order " involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the order or 
decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.AR. 12. See Taylor v. 
Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256, 2014. When the Supreme Court grants a motion for 
permissive appeal, they only address the precise issue(s) framed by the motion and ruled upon by 
the district court. Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 505, 509 
(2009). Consequently, Plaintiffs have sought to frame the issue that appropriately raises the 
statutory purpose, meaning, application, and interpretation of N.O.R.A., when it comes to the 
right of a residential homeowner to initiate a lawsuit against a construction professional, who is a 
subcontractor on the residential construction and/or remodel project for breach of contract 
claims, without having to establish the traditional common law requirement of "privity of 
contract" between the homeowner and the construction professional, a subcontractor on the 
project. 
In 2003, the Idaho Legislature enacted and adopted Title 6, Chapter 25, Statutes of the 
State of Idaho, and codified that legislation as §§6-2501-2504, Idaho Code. 
By definition, as contained in §6-2502, Idaho Code, the action or suit initiated means: 
any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort for damages or indemnity brought against a 
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construction professional to assert a claim. whether by complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim, 
for damage or loss of use of real or personal property caused by a defect in the construction of 
the residence or in substantial remodel ofthe residence. 
That "definition" as to the meaning of and right to file an "action" makes relatively clear 
that the right to file the action is conditioned upon the requirement that the residential 
homeowner conduct and otherwise undertake the mandatory provisions that comport to fulfill the 
purpose and requirements of N.O.R.A., before you can file suit in contract or tort against a 
construction professional. Starting with the right to file suit for a tort, there is apparently no 
dispute or question whether a tort action can be filed, as N.O.R.A. clearly allows a residential 
homeowner to sue a "construction professional" "in tort" for "damages or indemnity", once they 
have completed their participation in the required settlement proceedings, as contemplated by 
N.O.R.A., and as long as no resolution and settlement is reached between the parties. There 
appears to be no common law affirmative defense that would disrupt the right of the residential 
homeowner to file this tort claim against the subcontractor. being the construction professional 
performing services on the project, and notwithstanding whether or not there is any common law 
impediment, the statutory enactment specifically allows for the initiation of a tort action by the 
homeowner against the subcontractor. The case law appears well settled that statutory 
enactments may abrogate or modify common law. 
The "claimant" is defined to include a homeowner , and the homeowner is identified as 
among those who may assert a claim against a construction professional ( does not say "with 
whom he has entered into a contract") concerning the defects in the construction or substantial 
remodel of the residence. 
MEMORANDUM lN SUPPORT OF PERMISSNE APPEAL P.4 
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A construction professional is defined to mean and include any person who possesses ~ 
right to file a lien pursuant to §45-501, Idaho Code, and that definition of construction 
professional includes not just a contractor, but also any subcontractor. A "homeowner" includes 
not only a person who contracts with a construction professional, and a "homeowner" is also 
any person who is a subsequent purchaser of a residence from any homeowner. Clearly, a 
homeowner who is the subsequent purchaser would have NO privity of contract with any 
contractor or subcontractor whatsoever, as he would have no dealings or relationship of any of 
these construction professionals, yet the statute allows him the absolute right to file an action in 
tort or contract against the construction professional 
The above definitions begin to frame the context as to the meaning and purpose of the 
provisions ofN.O.R.A.. If a homeowner can include a subsequent purchaser of a residence from 
any homeowner, that clearly demonstrate that "privity" of contract has been abolished for 
purposes of the application of N.O.R.A., as a homeowner who purchases a residence from 
another homeowner would never had any privity whatsoever with the contractor or 
subcontractor, who were the construction professionals defined under the Act. 
Furthermore, if a subcontractor is defined as being among the construction 
professionals, and if the subsequent purchaser of the property can go after the contractor, with 
whom he has never had any contract or privity of contract, then it serves to demonstrate any 
homeowner may file an action against any construction professional, whether it be a contractor 
or a subcontractor, who performed services as a construction professional on the residential 
construction and/or remodel project, since if "privity of contract" is no longer statutorily required 
to file suit against a contractor, it is not necessary to have privity of contracxt with the 
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subcontractor. And if a subsequent purchaser can do it, then so can a residential homeowner, as 
they are both defined as homeowner. 
It therefore stands to reason that privity of contract has been abolished, or at least 
suspended, when it comes to the implementation and application of N.O.R.A. to the relationship 
between homeowners and construction professionals, given the criteria developed in the statute 
from those definitions that has knowingly and intentionally placed a contractor and a 
subcontractor in the same class, when the legislatures would clearly understand the existing 
common law would hold for the proposition that a homeowner would necessarily have a privity 
of contract with a contractor, but clearly would not have any privity of contract with a 
subcontractor. Furthermore, the legislators would have known that common law component 
when they elected to classify both a residential homeowner and a subsequent homeowner as 
being included in the definition of homeowner who may file any civil lawsuit or action in 
contract or tort against a construction professional. To add further meaning to the rationale 
that "privity of contract" has been abrogated through this statutory enactment, we also find that 
the legislators elected to define a "construction professional" to not only include both a 
contractor and a subcontractor, but also have defined them to be in a classification as being 
among those that have a right to file a lien under Idaho's Lien Statute. It is to be noted that a 
subcontractor is NOT in privity with the homeowner, yet he has a right to file a lien, just as does 
the contractor, who IS in privity with the homeowner. 
Consequently, if a subsequent purchaser of a residence from the homeowner has the 
unconditional right to sue either the contractor or subcontractor of the original homeowner, 
with whom the subsequent homeowner had NO privity of contract with the contractor or the 
subcontractor, it would only appear reasonable, logical, and common sense to conclude that the 
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intended interpretation of the entire text of the enactment has the expressed meaning, taken from 
the ordinary language used in the statute, that if the statutory language specifically eliminates 
privity for subsequent homeowners, thereby authorizing them to file a lawsuit in contract or 
tort, that elimination or suspension of the privity mandate would also apply, in consistent 
fashion, to an existing homeowner as well. 
If appears the legislative intent was adequately confirmed that they wanted to abrogate or 
suspend the common law requirement of "privity of contract", when the legislators adopted an 
enactment that authorizes and allows an action to be brought and go forward, when filed by a 
subsequent purchaser against a contractor or subcontractor, well knowing it would be impossible 
for that subsequent homeowner to be able to establish privity with either the contractor or 
subcontractor whatsoever. Using that clear and direct logic, if a subsequent purchaser of the 
residence has that right to sue in contract, then so too would the original homeowner have the 
same right, and from a statutory interpretation perspective, the right to file the action in contract 
or tort against the contractor or subcontractor is similarly accentuated by the specific definition 
and classification that the construction professional , who is being sued, is defined to include 
anyone that has a right to file a lien, and there lies another compelling correlation, as a 
subcontractor has NO privity whatsoever with the homeowner, yet the subcontractor is 
statutorily authorized to file a lien against the property under the statutory provisions of Title 45, 
Chapter 5, Statutes of the State of Idaho. The statutory provision is cited below: 
TITLE 45 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-501. RIGHT TO LIEN. Every person performing labor upon, or furnishing 
materials to be used in the construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, building, 
wharf, bridge, ditch, dike, flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road, aqueduct to 
create hydraulic power, or any other structure, or who grades, fills in, levels, surfaces or 
otherwise improves any land, or who performs labor in any mine or mining claim, and every 
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professional engineer or licensed surveyor under contract who prepares or furnishes designs, 
plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, surveys, estimates of cost, on-site observation or 
supervision, or who renders any other professional service whatsoever for which he is legally 
authorized to pe,form in connection with any land or building development or improvement, 
or to establish boundaries, has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or professional 
services or materials furnished. whether done or furnished at the instance of the owner of the· 
building or other improvement or his agent; and every contractor, subcontractor, architect, 
builder or any person having charge of any mining claim, or of the construction, alteration or 
repair, either in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be 
held to be the agent of the owner for the purpose of this chapter: provided, that the lessee or 
lessees of any mining claim shall not be considered as the agent or agents of the owner under the 
provisions of this chapter. 
For purposes of this chapter the term "furnishing material" shall also include, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, supplying, renting or leasing 
equipment, materials or fixtures as defined in section 28-12-309, Idaho Code. 
"Furnishing material" shall also include renting, leasing or otherwise supplying any 
equipment, materials, fixtures or machinery to any mine or mining claim. (emphasis added). 
If a subcontractor is authorized to file a lien, based upon his involvement because he was 
brought onto the project at the instance of the owner or his agent, and when the lien statute 
declares both a contractor and a subcontractor to be an agent of the owner, and when you read 
these statutes together, in the context of their intended scheme and purpose, it logically appears 
that N.O.R.A. has defined the constructional professional to be agents of the owner, because 
they are defined to be among those who are qualified to file a lien, and in the lien statute both the 
contractor and the subcontractors are specifically declared to be agents of the owner. Now, either 
that establishes some non-common law concept of "privity", by statutory creation, or it suspends 
or simply abolishes "privity" and any obligation or need to establish its existence. It appears the 
combined objective and purpose of these statutory enactments (taken together) is specifically 
designed to eliminate THE COMMON LAW DEFENSE of privity when a subcontractor is being 
being su.ed under the provisions ofN.O.R.A., and is estopped from asserting such an affirmative 
defense that privity is lacking between the homeowner and the subcontractor. If this Court 
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continues to harbor any lingering doubt about that logical interpretation, then the following 
example should emphasize the logic that clearly suggests that result. 
The homeowner enters into a contract for the construction or remodel of his residence. 
The contractor then hires a plumber and an electrician to perform their professional services in 
the construction or remodel project, and they are what we traditionally call "subcontractors". The 
plumber and electrician perform their subcontracting services, but from the perspective of the 
contractor, the rendition of their services were not in accordance with the express terms of his 
contract, and being disappointed, the contractor refuses to pay either of them. Likewise, the 
homeowner was informed of the dispute, and the owner declines to pay them either. Both 
subcontractors then independently file their statutory liens; the plumber then files suit against the 
homeowner for payment of the labor and materials furnished by him under the contract he had 
with the contractor on the project. The homeowner files an answer, asserting the defense of 
breach of contract, · and also the affirmative defense of lack of privity of contract in the 
alternative, and files a counterclaim for setoff for those incurred expenses to correct and cure the 
improper installations by another plumber, and also claims damages to the premises, based upon 
a breach of contract claim, as an alternative cause of action. Does the defense of "privity" 
preclude the homeo-wner from advancing his counterclaim? Does the privity defense also estopp 
the plumber from filing suit for payment due for the materials and labor performed under his 
contract with the contractor, when the contractor is not a party to the action? 
Now the electrician, on the other hand, recognized the opportunity to resolve his 
misunderstanding with the contractor about the placement of the electrical outlets, the needed 
repairs caused from some of his other installations, and he elected to secure a list of what the 
corrections and need for repair would require to be made, seeking the compliance with the notice 
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requirements under N.O.R.A., and then agreed to enter into the settlement process with the 
homeowner and the contractor, as contemplated by N.O.R.A. and consequently, the electrician 
withholds filing suit upon his claim of lien, but thereafter will take action to file suit upon his 
lien rights before they expire, if he determines he cannot settle with the homeowner' s concerns. 
The electrician understands that he is entitled to negotiate directly with the homeowner also, as 
the contractor is the declared to be an agent of the homeowner, and therefore the homeowner is 
properly regarded to be the principal in their relationship, under the lien statute. 
As the electrician continues to engage in a settlement, he soon realizes he cannot come to 
an agreement on what the initial bid covered under the original subcontract, and what the 
electrician considered to be an extra, or what they could agree upon as the costs to correct the 
damages and make repairs, and from the electrician's perspective, he declines to enter into any 
form of a settlement, and from the homeowner's perspective, he refuses to make any payment, 
and tells the contractor to get another electrician to make the needed corrections and required 
restoration to the facility, for those workmanship flaws thought to be caused from the contract 
breach of the original electrician. The contractor gets another electrician to correct the damage 
and complete the intended installations, and upon the proper completion of the work, the 
homeowner receives a payment draw request, including the invoice submitted by the contractor 
for the new electrician for his electrical work, which was significantly more than the original 
contract bid and commitment from the original electrician, and after the homeowner pays the 
contractor, who in tum pays the new electrician, the homeowner files suit for contract breach 
under N.O.R.A., seeking restitution for the costs of repair and completed installations that were 
to have been performed under the commitment from the subcontracting electrician who arguably 
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breached his subcontract. The homeowner seeks reimbursement for the increased costs that he 
had to pay to the new electrician for the corrective work he did. 
In the meantime, the electrician files suit under lien statute, seeking payment for the labor 
and materials performed under his contract he had with the homeowner's agent, the general 
contractor. The.homeowner files his answer, alleges the same affirmative defenses as he did with 
the plumber, and files a similar counterclaim for recovery of the costs of repairs, and recovery of 
the additional costs expended to get the contracted services properly performed, and sought 
restitution in general as a result of the electrician's breach of contract. Additionally, the 
homeowner filed a motion to consolidate the two actions, that being the complaint for breach of 
contract claim filed against the electrician under N.O.R.A., and the counterclaim contained in the 
pleadings in the foreclosure of lien claim filed against the homeowner by the electrician under 
the lien statute; and the cases should be consolidated, as afterall, they are the same parties, 
(homeowner and the electrician/subcontractor), the same claims (contract disputes), and a final 
disposition under one judgment would serve the interests of judicial economy and society, and 
prevent possible claims of res judicata in the future. Now we have the same questions being 
raised about the issue of privity! ! ! Does the defense of "privity" preclude the homeowner from 
advancing his counterclaim against the electrician? Does the privity defense estopp the 
electrician from filing suit for payment due for the materials and labor performed under his 
contract with the contractor, when the contractor is not a party to the action? Where does the 
N.O.R.A./lien foreclosure motion for consolidation do to the claims? Remember, N.O.R.A. says 
the residential homeowner may file a lawsuit in contract or tort, and specifically describes the 
action or suit to be initiated in the following manner: any civil lawsuit or action in contract or 
tort for damages or indemnity brought against a construction professional to assert a claim, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PERMISSIVE APPEAL P.11 
00000184
whether by complaint, counterclaim. or crossclaim, for damage or loss of use of real or 
personal property caused by a defect in the construction of the residence or in substantial 
remodel of the residence. Here, we have suits or claims now filed by the homeowner, both as a 
complaint and as a counterclaim, filed in different lawsuits, and properly subject to being 
consolidated pursuant to a Motion for Consolidation. 
This example serves to put into perspective the already existing relaxation of the "privity 
of contract" concept, and its application as an affirmative defense in the lien foreclosure statute, 
and it dovetails perfectly into N.O.R.A. not only by analogy, but by virtue of the cross-over use 
of the definitive considerations of what is meant by a construction professional; he is a 
contractor, he is a subcontractor, and he also anyone who has the right to file a claim of lien 
under the lien statute, which statute is specifically identified. That "lien statute" says the 
homeowner is the principal, and both a contractor and a subcontractor are the agents of the 
homeowner, thereby effectively authorizing the work to be done, just as though it was at the 
homeowner's instance and request, and arguably, either creating privity by statutory enactment, 
or suspending the common law concept when it comes to contractors, subcontractors, and 
homeowners. That statute specifically states: 
"and every contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder or any person having charge of 
any mining claim, or of the construction, alteration or repair, either in whole or in part, of any 
building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the 
purpose of this chapter. (emphasis added). 
Therefore, it does appear the effect ofN.O.R.A. is to relax the privity requirement so as 
to make this an even playing field; if the subcontractor (as an agent) can sue his principal, the 
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homeowner, to recover payment, without the requirement of proving privity, then a homeowner 
(as the principal) should be able to sue his agent, the subcontractor, for damages, without being 
saddled with the burden of the affirmative defense of the common law concept of privity, given 
the conceptual objective being expressed by reading those two statutes in unison, and given the 
extent of the interplay that is perceived from the incorporation of the "right to file a claim of 
lien" as within the definitions of "construction professionals as is incorporated into the statute, as 
long as the provisions ofN.O.R.A. are being met and satisfied. 
This court appears to have rendered the conclusion that privity of contract is still required 
under N.O.R.A.; does the Court believe privity of contract is required in the lien foreclosure 
statute? Does the Court believe the privity concept was suspended or abolished by the lien 
statute, or by virtue of the declarations that contractors and subcontractors are agents of the 
principal-homeowner, that privity is artificially established by that statutory modification as to 
the meaning of principal/agent for purposes of that chapter, and altered the historic definition of 
the common law concept? When the lien foreclosure statute is brought into the definition of what 
a construction professional is, does that not also bring into play the same principal/agent logic of 
a contractor/subcontractor to the homeowner/principal? This scheme of statutory purpose, from 
the language and overlap of the lien statute, suggests the definitions used, and the purpose sought 
to be achieved, has either abrogated, or abolished, or superseded, or modified the common law 
concept of privity of contract, such that the reasonable and logical interpretation and application 
of those definitions has accomplished that intent in implementing the provisions of the statutes. 
There is not currently any case known to Plaintiffs' counsel (and presumably will be 
acknowledged by Defendant's counsel as well) decided in Idaho that has ruled upon the 
requirement of privity between the homeowner and subcontractor, under either the lien statute or 
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N.O.R.A., that precludes filing any action in contract or tort by a homeowner against a 
construction professional, who possesses a right to file a claim of lien. 
The case initially cited by opposing counsel does not answer this question, and this issue 
will continue to surface in situations in which N.O.R.A. provisions are pursued, where the 
subcontractor participates in settlement proceedings, but then withdraws from the involvement, 
despite their liability and fault by virtue of their conduct, constituting their breach of the 
expressed and/or implied warranties under their contractual commitment for the rendition of 
services by performing labor and furnishing materials and components that were then installed 
within the residence, thereby giving rise to a breach of contract, as clearly recognized to be a 
breach of a contract under the lien statute by an "agent" (the subcontractor) to the "principal" 
(the homeowner), and that carries into the N.O.R.A. enactment, by virtue if the incorporated 
definitions, and this new arena (since 2003) subjects subcontractors, as well as contractors, to a 
direct civil action filed by the homeowner in contract or tort because of their performance, or 
lack thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue whether privity of contract is a required common law element before an action 
can be brought against a subcontractor in a "contract action" as authorized by N.O.R.A. is an 
issue that appears to be unsettled, and it becomes important to determine the right to initiate a 
claim for contract breach, as attorney fees and pre-judgment statutory interest may be regarded to 
be the proper subject to be addressed only in contractual matters, as contract claims may carry 
with it a measure of damage different from that which is available in a recovery under a tort 
action. Neither pre-judgment accrued interest under §28-22-104, Idaho Code, nor attorney fees 
under § 12-120, Idaho Code, appear to be recoverable, as a matter of right, in a tort action, though 
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may potentially be viable if the Court grants attorney fees and costs under §12-121, Idaho Code, 
and some form of punitive damage relief because of the gross nature of the tort claim, as allowed 
by law or statute. 
Of interest, under §6-2504, Idaho Code, referencing what are the limitation on damages 
in a N.O.R.A. action, subpart (l)(d) provides for reasonable and necessary attorney fees. Under 
Rule 54 LR.C.P., attorney fees are allowable only if provided for by statute or contract. In this 
instance, we have a statute that provides for attorney fees, apparently allowing such in both a 
contract action and in a tort action. This, in itself, appears to be an abrogation of the fundamental 
principle that attorney fees are not typically recoverable in tort claims. It suggests that if attorney 
fees are allowed in both a lawsuit initiated by a homeowner in a contract and/or tort action under 
N.O.R.A., and where attorney fees are allowed under the lien statute, for or against a 
homeowner, which typically involves a contract dispute in a lien foreclosure action, even in 
situations where there is no contract in writing, that serves to create a unique situation in 
themselves with the traditional common law, and when you inter-relate the statutes by cross-over 
references to rights and how the parties relate to each other by the applicable definitions, it again 
suggests another abrogation of the typical authority that attorney fees are awarded in "contract 
actions" where they are specifically provided for within a written contract, and where "privity" is 
traditionally present. Once again, it appears these statutory modifications of what can be 
described as either "common law" or traditional "civil law" have been modified by the 
provisions within these statutory enactments, and the common law requirement of privity of 
contract has been relaxed or fallen by the wayside, for the reasons stated above. 
If the construction professional fails to make a reasonable offer or a reasonable attempt to 
complete the repairs, the limitations on damages and any defense to liabilitv provided for in §6-
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2504(1) shall not apply. Now what is that intended to mean or imply? What is interesting with 
that provision is the statement that not only "the limitations" on damages, but also "the defenses 
to liability" do not apply. One of the more logical defenses that a "construction professional" 
under common law could raise would be the common law defense of lack of privity of contract, 
and if that be the true intention of this legislation, then that defense to liability is waived or 
removed. With each of these factors considered, it is reasonable to conclude these statutory 
provisions must be interpreted to mean the common law defense of privity of contract does not 
apply to the subcontractor/construction professional dispute that is not settled, and a lawsuit is 
filed, alleging a claim for contract breach provided for within the statutory language. For the 
above reasons, there lies the underlying issue that must be addressed by the appellate courts, and 
that is of controlling concern in this statutory enactment with respect to a "contract action" 
brought by the homeowner against a construction professional, such as DeBest Plumbing, Inc., a 
subcontractor who is authorized by statute to file a lien and initiate a contract claim against the 
homeowner, having been classified as being an agent of the owner. 
Consequently, it remains a genuine concern as to the extent of recovery available under 
the statute, as the realm of recoverable damages may vary in accordance with the nature of the 
action brought, and given that N.O.R.A. allows either a tort or contract claim to be brought, and 
if suit becomes necessary, any defenses to liability no longer apply, does that not include the 
suspension or abolishment of the privity of contract; afterall, the N.O.R.A. statute incorporates 
the lien statute, and by that reference, every "construction professional" includes what is called a 
subcontractor, and every subcontractor in the lien statute is defined to be an agent of the 
principal/homeowner, and that is by definition, once again, not by wishful thinking. 
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An Order entered by this Court, granting permission for Plaintiffs to appeal this issue 
regarding the unavailability of the common law defense of lack of privity of contract in 
N.O.R.A. disputes may be brought before the Idaho Supreme Court, will serve to allow this 
unsettled issue to be decided about the right of the homeowner to file suit against the 
subcontractor for a contract breach under N.O.R.A. without being subject to dismissal of the 
action upon the pretense there is a lack of privity of contract between the parties. A resolution of 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of April 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DIS1RICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison, etal. , 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-2015-0000178-C 
vs. 
ORDER RESETTING TRIAL 
Debest Plumbing, Inc, 
Defendant. 
Because of a calendar conflict, the jury trial of this action is reset for November 9, 2016 
at 9:00 o'clock a.m. If either or both of these new dates are unsuitable to the parties, they may 
contact the Court's clerk to discuss alternatives. 
All other dates and directives specified in the Court's Scheduling Order remain in effect. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Datedthis3''dayofMay,201~ f;)_ ~ 
J~D. Scott 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the 3rd day of May, 2016, I caused to be served one copy of the 
within instrument to in this cause as follows: 
Plaintiff's Counsel: 
Vernon Smith 
1900 Main St 
Boise ID 83702 
Defendant's Counsel: 
Robert Lewis 
PO Box 359 
Boise ID 83701 
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( ) Electronic Mail 
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( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Douglas A. Miller 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By:~L. 
Deputy Clerk '/> 
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Vernon K. Smith 
·~·n° "J4511 ')9 __ ,_,_, --
1900 W. ?\fain Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
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Case No ___ _. 
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Filed A.M-£/:: 51 :;M, 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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COMES NOW, Vernon K. Smith, attorney of record for Plaintif:li;, Scott Davison and r\nne 
Davison, and doc'S request this Court vacale and reset the Hl!aring scheduled for May 16, 2016 at 3 :00 
_, ... -,------ ---
p.m., and to reschedule the hearing to a later date, for rlJ.e~reasons and/uporr:~.grounds that 
(. ,,.,-' '\ ~~ 
I- / \ ,, 
Plaintiffs' counsel will be in the state of Kentucky, from Mrt~(.11, 2016 ,through 1vlay l 7,)2(5·~ 6. 
' • I 
,..._"-·,./' 
I ~ .. 
/ ---..... 
Dated this 5th day of 1vfay, 2016. 
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Valley 
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Cascade, Idaho 8361 l 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, ID 83 70 l 
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( X ) 
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Fax 208-3 82-7107 
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
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#995 P.002/009 
MAY O 9 2016 
Case No. ___ l~" ~~o., __ _ 
Filed _ .. , .AM __ ::-CJO P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83 70 l 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant De Best PJ um bing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-l 78C 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
COMES NOW Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. (DeBest) and hereby submits its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As stated by Plaintiffs, the Court may grant pennission to appeal an order that is otherwise 
not appea]able when the Court determines that the Order "involves a controlling question of Jaw 
as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal 
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from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." J.A.R. 
l 2{a). However, as stated in the rule, there must be "substantia1 f,l'fOunds for difference of opinion." 
Further, "Rule 12 appeals are only accepted in the most exceptional cases ... " Aardema v. U.S. 
Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785,789,215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009) citing Budell v. Todd, 105 
Idaho 2, 4, 665 P.2d 701, 703 (1983). TheBudell Court explained the limited application ofl.A.R. 
12 by stating: 
It was the intent of I.A.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from an 
interlocutory order if substantial Jegal issues of great public interest or legal 
questions of first impression are involved. The Court also considers such factors 
as the impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties, the effect of the delay of 
the proceedings in the district court pending the appeal, the likelihood or 
possibi1ity of a second appeal after judgment is finally entered by the district 
court, and the case workload of the appellate courts. No single factor is 
controlling in the Court's decision of acceptance or rejection of an appeal by 
certification, but the Court intends by Rule 12 to create an appeal in the 
exceptional case and does not intend by the rule to broaden the appeals which 
may be taken as a matter of right under I.A.R. 11. For these reasons, the Court 
has, over the six year experience of the use of Rule 12, accepted only a limited 
number of the applications for appeal by certification. 
Plaintiffs have failed to explain how their Motion for Permissive Appeal presents an 
exceptional case that could not adequately be resolved ]ater on by an I.A.R. 11 appeal. Further, as 
explained below, Plaintiffs fail to present an issue in which there is substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion. 
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT 
Applicability of NORA 
Plaintiffs argue that the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, Idaho Code § 6-2501 et seq. 
(''NORA") allows for a cause of action in contract by a homeowner against a subcontractor even 
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in the absence of privity of contract. However, before analyzing Plaintiffs' argument on NORA, 
it is important to note that Plaintiffs have not even made a showing that NORA applies to this case. 
An action that falls under the scope of NORA is "any civil lawsuit or action in contract or 
tort for damages or indemnity brought against a construction professional to assert a claim, whether 
by complaint, counterclaim or cross-claim, for damage or the loss of use of rea] or personal 
property caused by a defect in the construction Qf a residence or in the substantial remodel of a 
residence." Idaho Code§ 6-2502(1) emphasis added. A substantial remodel "'means a remodel of 
a residence, for which the total cost exceeds one-half of the assessed value of the residence for 
property tax purposes at the time the contract for the remodel work was made." Idaho Code § 6-
2502(9). 
In this case, it is clear that the construction project in question was a remodel or repair, not 
the construction of the residence. Plaintiffs have not made any demonstration that the total cost 
exceeds one-half of the assessed value of the residence. This burden should fall on the Plaintiffs 
to prove NORA's applicability to this matter as they are attempting to use NORA as a sword, 
rather than a shield to liability (as is most common with NORA). 
NORA Does Not Create an Action for Breach of Contract Absent Privity 
A claim for breach of contract requires the plaintiff to prove '"(a) the existence of the 
contract, (b) the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of those 
damages." Mosel/ Equities, UC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,278,297 P.3d 232,241 (2013) 
citing O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 813, 810 P .2d 1082, 1099 (1991 ). 11 It is axiomatic in the 
law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a contract." Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. 
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SEIZ Construction, 154 Idaho 45, 50, 294 P .3d 171, 176 (2012) citing Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 
267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984). "A party must look to that person with whom he is in a 
direct contractua] relationship for relief, in the event that his expectations under the contract are 
not met." Wing at 107 ldaho 272,688 P.2d 1177. 
The tenns of NORA do not change the common law regarding the need for privity of 
contract as a legal basis to bring a cause of action for breach of contract. The purpose of NORA 
"is to give contractors the opportunity to fix construction defects before a lawsuit is filed." 
Mendehall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436, 196 P .3d 352, 3 54 (2008). As a general rule, changes 
in the common law by the adoption of a statute are not to be presumed, but must be clearly intended 
before they will be given effect. Rook v. Trout, 113 Idaho 652, 656-657, 747 P.2d 61, 65~66 
( 1988), overruled on other grounds, Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P .2d 452 ( 1991 ). 
Nothing within NORA shows any intent to abrogate the common law requirement for 
privity of contract in a breach of contract claim. NORA is a procedural rule designed to limit the 
number of lawsuits against construction professionals by creating an opportunity to reso]ve 
disputes before suit is fi]ed. NORA certainly is not designed to create new causes of action or 
increase the number oflawsuits filed against construction professionals. 
Plaintiffs' argument that NORA gives a homeowner the right to bring a breach of contract 
claim absent privity is based on a false assumption. Plaintiffs assume that since "action" is defined 
as "any civil lawsuit or action in contact or tort ... " that then any homeowner ( or subsequent 
homeowner) can bring an "action" even without meeting all of the elements required for such 
claims. However, nothing in the statute says a homeowner has an unequivocal right to bring a 
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claim in contract without meeting the required element of privily of contract. The definitions 
section of NORA under Idaho Code § 6-2502 simply lay out the meaning of the tenns used in 
NORA. As such, a dear reading of the statute shows that NORA procedures apply to tort and 
contract actions against construction professionals, but it clearly does not create a new cause of 
action where one did not exist before. 
Simply because subcontractors are listed as one of the types of"construction professionals" 
in Idaho Code§ 6-2502(4}, also does not mean that there is a right to recovery from them without 
meeting al] of the required elements for a claim. Nothing in NORA says that homeowners may 
bring a claim against subcontractors in tort and contract. Rather, as previously stated, "action" is 
defined as a "civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort ... " Idaho Code § 6-2502(1) emphasis added. 
Therefore, a homeowner may have a right to pursue a claim against a subcontractor in tort, 
provided that all of the elements in such tort claim are met. 
Idaho Code § 48-501 only holds a subcontractor to be the agent of the owner for the 
purposes ofJdaho Code§ 48-501 et seq. This does not extend to other chapters of the Idaho Code, 
such as NORA. Just because Idaho Code§ 6-2502(4) identifies any person with a right to lien 
pursuant to § 45-501 as a "construction professional", does not mean that such construction 
professional is held to be an agent of the owner for the purposes of NORA. At most, NORA 
clarifies that it applies to subcontractors because they have a right to lien under Idaho Code§ 45-
501, but this can be explained because there are times when subcontractors file their lien and the 
only defense that the landowner has to that lien claim is defective construction. That may give the 
landowner a defense to the lien. However, it does not mean that the owner can sue the 
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subcontractor directly in a contract action where the general contractor is directly responsible to 
the owner. 
As to Plaintiffs' argument thatthe attomey fees provision under Idaho Code § 6-2504(1 )( d) 
suggests intent to abrogate common law, such argument again goes against the plain reading of 
the statute. First, Idaho Code § 6-2504 simply limits the type of damages that can be recovered in 
a suit subject to NORA. It does not increase the types of damages that may be recovered. Second, 
Idaho Code§ 6-2504(1) uses the permissive "may". It does not state that there is an unequivocal 
right to attorney fees under the statute. The statutes and rules governing attorney fees and costs in 
particular actions would still apply. 
To the extent Plaintiffs argue that Idaho Code § 6-2504(2) limits a construction 
professional's ability to raise any defense to a claim, such as lack of privity, such argument is again 
without merit. A plain reading of Idaho Code § 6-2504(2) makes is clear that such a claim is not 
true. Idaho Code § 6-2504(2) clearly states that if a construction professional fails to meet the 
requirements under NORA, "the limitations on damages and defenses to liability provided for in 
this section shall not apply" emphasis added. The legislature clearly only intended to take away 
the protections it granted within the section; not to take away every limitation or protection 
anywhere within the Idaho Code or in common law. Thus, a construction professional's failure 
(or choice) not to respond to a notice letter bas no effect on whether defenses not specifically 
provided for within NORA remain available. As such, all common law defenses would still apply, 
as would statutory defenses found outside of NORA, such as a statute of limitations defense. 
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CONCLUSION 
To assume that NORA removes the privity requirement from a breach of contract action 
against a construction professional makes no more sense than assuming it removes any other 
required element of a breach of contract claim. A breach of contract claim, first and foremost, 
requires the existence of a valid contract between the parties. Without this element, there is no 
claim for breach of contract. P1aintiffs are trying to convolute the issue, when a plain reading of 
NORA demonstrates that it does not abrogate common law or other statutes. A breach of contract 
action, whether against a construction professional, or any other party, still requires privity of 
contract. 
Due to Plaintiffs' failure to show that there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion 
on this matter, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for 
Permissive Appeal. 
DATED this 9th day of May, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:_&~-/t~N, ~--~-
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 911 day of May, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaint([fs 
[X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208)345-7212 
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FACSIMILE COVERSHEET 
Clerk of the Court 
Valley County Courthouse 
208-3 82-7184 
Robert D. Lewis 
Davison v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
Valley County Case No.: CV 15-178C 
Pages 9 
(including this page) 
Please fax file the attached: Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Pennissive Appeal. Thank you. 
IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS IN RECEIVING, PLEASE CALL (208) 344-8035 
OUR FACSIMILE PHONE NUMBER IS (208) 345-7212 
The documents being transmitted by facsimile are confidential or attorney work product or both and are for the exclusive use of 
the addressee fo,1ed above. Any use or disclosure of the documents except by the addressee is prohibited. If you have received 
this facsimile. in error, please notify us by collect telephone call immediately and return the documents to us by U.S. Mail. 
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT OP' THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ~TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 













ORDER TO VACA TE At\iD 
RESCHEDULE HEARING DATE 
ON PENDING MOTION 
Upon reading the Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing Dat~ on Pending 
Motion, and for good cause appearing therefore, 
rr IS HEREBY ORDERED, A:ND THIS DOES ORDER. That the Hearing 
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VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORN"EY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
-
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
-
Case No. ____ ,lnst. No,, __ _ 
Fik.>d A.M , ___ _.PM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 




) Case No. CV 15-l 78C 
) 
) PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE AND 
) SUPPLEMENTALMEMORANDUM 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 





COMES NOW the Plaintiffs above named, by and through their attorney of record, 
Vernon K. Smith, and do herewith respond to the Objection filed by DeBest Plumbing, Inc, 
reflected within "Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Permissive 
Appeal", as submitted by Defendant's attorney of record, Robert D. Lewis on May 9, 2016. 
Plaintiffs submitted a Memorandum previously, setting forth reasons a Permissive 
Appeal of that April 7, 2016 Order should be granted, as that Order dismissed Plaintiffs' contract 
claims asserted in their Complaint against the subcontractor, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., filed under 
the provision of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, hereinafter referred to as N.O.R.A., 
by virtue of which contract claims for damages are allowed to be filed by claimants 
(homeowners) against subcontractors ( construction professionals). This Response and 
Supplemental Memorandum is being submitted in opposition to the Objection filed by 
Defendant, addressing matters expressed in Defendant's Objection. 
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A permissive appeal of this Order directly focuses upon whether the fundamental concept 
of traditional contract law, -"Privity of Contract"- a concept existing in traditional "common 
law", continues as a material requirement in the "relationship" existing among certain identified 
parties in N.O.R.A., enacted in 2003. 
In this case, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against the Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, 
Inc., being a construction professional plumbing sub-contractor on this remodel project, and this 
suit was filed after the settlement proceedings failed to produce a resolution or even generate the 
required response under the provisions of N.O.R.A.. An inspection was undertaken, and an 
opinion regarding a "damage estimate" was expressed, but no settlement offer was submitted to 
resolve the damages. The Complaint alleged causes of actions for damages in both contract and 
in tort, as provided for by the provisions of the N.O.R.A.. The "contract claims" related to the 
rendition of professional services by a DeBest employee, Tom Peterson, pertaining to installation 
of plumbing components made pursuant to the sub-contracting arrangements DeBest Plumbing, 
Inc. had with the general contractor, Gould Custom Builders, Inc., concerning that remodeling 
project of Plaintiffs' residence, undertaken by DeBest as a "construction professional" rendering 
services under circumstances that specifically implicate the provisions of the Notice And 
Opportunity To Repair Act, §6-2501-2504, Idaho Code. 
This Court's Order of April 7, 2016 dismissed the contract claims, ostensibly 
upon a determination there being a lack of the traditional common law concept of "privity of 
contract" between Plaintiffs and Defendant, a concept the court believes must be present even 
with respect to a contract claim asserted in a lawsuit filed by a "residential homeowner" against a 
"construction professional" under N.O.R.A., regarding professional services rendered in the 
construction and/or remodel of a homeowners' residence under arrangements created by the 
general contractor for the performance of the necessary professional installations by a 
"construction professional" sub-contractor. This lawsuit was brought upon the consequence of 
the failed settlement proceedings mandated by N.O.R.A., perceived as the statutory pre-requisite 
to any lawsuit under the enactment that allows a residential homeowner to file suit upon the 
provisions identified and contained in N.O.R.A .. 
The Court's Order was neither a certified Order under Rule 54(b), LR.C.P. for appeal, nor 
a "final judgment" entered under Rule 54(a), LR.C.P., so the Order may be reviewed only upon 
Permission granted initially by the District Court, and then accepted or rejected by the Appellate 
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Court, (Rule 12, I.A.R.). The essential consideration given by the Appellate Court to grant a 
permissive appeal involves the question whether the order "involves a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and in which an immediate 
appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." 
See Rule 12, I.A.R.; See also Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256, 2014. When the 
Supreme Court grants a motion for permissive appeal, the issue addressed is the precise issue(s) 
framed by the motion, and ruled upon by the district court. Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 
Idaho 785,789,215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009). 
These Plaintiffs have framed the issue in a fashion that appropriately raises the statutory 
purpose, meaning, application, and interpretation ofN.O.R.A., regarding the right of a claimant, 
a "residential homeowner" to initiate a lawsuit against a subcontractor, a "construction 
professionar', who performed professional services on a residential construction and/or remodel 
project, alleging breach of contract claims, seeking damages, absent a traditional common law 
contractual concept of "privity of contract" between the residential homeowner and the 
subcontractor-construction professional performing services on the project. 
The Defendant, DeBest, has cited authority addressing Rule 12, I.A.R., presented in their 
effort to stress the point "substantial grounds for difference of opinion" must exist in the ruling 
upon which the permissive appeal is based. It remains the Appellate Court that will make such a 
determination whether they believe there is "substantial grounds for difference of opinion" to 
justify their acceptance of the Permissive Appeal, once the request for permission reaches the 
Supreme Court. It appears rather elementary at this stage of the proceedings, by reviewing the 
respective positions of these parties, that there clearly exists substantial grounds for difference of 
opinion as between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, and the essence of this supplemental 
memorandum is to emphasize the clear existence of such "substantial grounds" for purposes of 
procuring the Order from this lower court to allow the Supreme Court to make that final 
determination. This "Permissive Appeal" is a two-step process; the court entering the order must 
grant approval that its Order be submitted to the Appellate Court for such consideration, and 
once approved, the moving party must file the Motion For Permissive Appeal with the Appellate 
Court, from which filing the Supreme Court determines if the interlocutory order presents 
"substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of first impression are 
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involved", as identified in Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 
505, 509 (2009). With respect to such permissive appeals, the Aardema Court has stated: 
"Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory order 
or decree of a district court in a civil or criminal action, or from an interlocutory order of an 
administrative agency, which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion 
and in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the 
orderly resolution of the litigation. I.A.R. 12. " [T[he intent of I.A.R. 12[iil to provide an 
immediate appeal from an interlocutory order if substantial legal issues ofgreat public interest 
or legal questions offirst impression are involved." Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 4, 665 P.2d 
701, 703 (1983) ( per curiam ). A permissive appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 12 is " an unusual 
posture." Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 501, 777 P.2d 722, 723 (1989). Due to" the unusual 
posture of the case, we are constrained to rule narrowly and address only the precise question 
that was framed by the motion and answered by the trial court." Id. " Such appeal, [ after 
acceptance by this Court,] shall proceed in the same manner as an appeal as a matter of right, 
unless otherwise ordered by [this Court]." I.A.R. 12(d)." 
"ANALYSIS Rule 12 appeals are only accepted in the most exceptional cases with 
the intent to resolve " substantial legal issues ofgreat public interest or legal questions of first 
impression(.(' Budell, 105 Idaho at 4, 665 P.2d at 703. Due to confusion regarding the 
application of the economic loss rule. this Court accepted this permissive appeal and offers 
this opinion. per the district court's request.fl I on the application of economic loss rule." 
( emphasis added). 
Whether "privity of contract" must exist between the "residential homeowner" and 
"subcontractor", as a condition precedent before a cause of action for damages alleging a 
contract claim can be filed by the "residential homeowner" against a "sub-contracting" 
"construction professional", upon failure of the settlement provisions mandated under the 
provisions ofN.O.R.A. is an issue that justifies this request, as it presents 1). A substantial legal 
issue; 2). Of great public interest; 3). A legal question of first impression; 4). A controlling 
question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion; and 5). 
Materially able to advance the orderly resolution of this and other similar aspects of litigation. 
1). As to "privity of contract" being A substantial legal issue: 
In 2003, the Idaho Legislature enacted Title 6, Chapter 25, Statutes of the State of Idaho, 
codified as §§6-2501-2504, Idaho Code. The legislature always retains the right and the 
authority to abrogate, modify, suspend, or eliminate aspects of "common law". 
The doctrine of privity is a fundamental part of the common law of contract, and as such 
it provides that a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising under it onto any 
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persons except the parties to it. The premise is that only the identified parties should be able to 
sue to enforce their rights or to claim damages as a result of any breach of its terms. The 
doctrine, over the years, had proven problematic in several aspects, and has impacted its strict 
application, beginning with those implications upon contracts that were essentially made for the 
benefit of third parties, who were then "contractually" unable to enforce the obligations of the 
contracting parties. 
The strict application of this privity concept did not readily allow third parties to go 
against the particular parties to the contract, and never beyond the entitlement of a third party to 
a benefit. The age old example cited in various references that identified the limitation was that 
reference made to manufacturers who sell products to distributors, who sells the product to 
merchandising retailers, who, in turn, sell to consumers. Under a technical application of "privity 
of contract", there was no contractual arrangement between the original seller, manufacturer, and 
the final purchaser, consumer. Consequently, modifications began to be made in the law, 
beginning with creation of the "duty of care" that served to transcend the privity limitation, and 
brought about the evolution and formation of "implied warranties" of "fitness and 
merchantability", and then came the statutory creations of "lemon laws" and formation of 
"product liability" legislation that created claims by statutory enactments against manufacturers 
by consumers who had damage claims that developed during what was referred to as the "useful 
life" of the product. Of interest, the product liability statute (Title 6, Chapter 14), and the 
N.O.R.A. enactment (Title 6, Chapter 25), are statutory creations identified in the Idaho Code 
under "Actions In Particular Cases", being statutory creations that have served to alter or change 
the traditional application of common law by legislative enactments. 
The right to alter common law was addressed in the case of Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 
594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944), where the question whether "common law'' could be changed by a 
legislative enactment was discussed, as being also cited in Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389,462 
P.2d 54 (1969). In the Moon case, the question was whether the enactment of the Wrongful 
Death Act had created a cause of action for tortious conduct that survived the death of the tort-
feasor, not sanctioned in common law. The Moon Court said: 
'If the courts are thereby commanded to create a remedy for a wrong where no remedy 
existed theretofore; or if they are to recognize a cause of action which abated by reason of the 
death of a necessary party to it, they would in many instances be called upon to legislate; it 
would often require them to modify or entirely override positive and well-established rules and 
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laws. The books are full of instances where the courts have had to admit that existing law-
statutory or common-did not do exact justice, or did not meet with our revised ideas of justice, 
but that the remedy lay, not with the courts, but with the Legislature. "Reverting, then, to our 
own state, we recognize that no ligislative [sic] adoption is necessary to affirm the existence of 
the common law, but the statutory enactment is essential to repeal. abrogate or change the 
rules or doctrine of the common law. The rules of the common law are not to he changed by 
doubtful implication. (Citing cases.) But where the implication is obvious it cannot be ignored. 
No statute is to be construed as altering the common law farther than its words and 
circumstances import. " As the Meade Court then stated: "This then brings us to the final 
determination regarding whether this Court should, in the absence of statute, declare a change in 
the common law. We think the answer must be in the negative. Our answer does not depend on 
our unwillingness to indulge in change. We are aware, as the commentators tell us, that the 
strength of the common law lies in its capacity to adapt itself to ever changing circumstances. 
Although traditionally hesitant to change, it should not fail to do so when a hoary doctrine loses 
its raison d'etre. We are aware that a minority of courts have acted as requested by appellants 
here. We are convinced that such courts are basically unable to disenthrall themselves of the 
lurking suspicion that liquor in and of itself is evil. This, in spite of the fact that the legislature 
here, as in almost every other state, has determined as public policy that liquor is part and parcel 
of our social scene. Abused it may be; evils it may produce; accidents, injury and death it may 
cause; marriages and homes it may rupture; unemployment, insolvency and degradation may 
result from its over use-but legitimate the selling and consuming of it is declared. Indeed both 
state and federal governments indulge in the taxation and/or wholesaling of it, from which flow 
great sums of money into governmental treasuries. We are being asked to single out a particular 
type of business, which in every other aspect is legitimate and respectable, for the imposition of a 
liability otherwise unknown in the law. This, for the purpose of alleviating a major social ill in 
this country, that of mixing the two ingredients-alcohol and automobile. If such is to be done, it 
should be done by the legislature wherein all of the policy considerations can and should be 
carefully weighed and from which, per chance, liahilitv of the tvpe sought here will become a 
realitv with the enactment ofa dram shop act." See Meade v. Freeman, supra. 
It appears that the doctrine of "privity of contract" emerged alongside the doctrine of 
"consideration" in common law, where the rule became that "consideration" must exchange from 
the promisee to the promisor. The theory was that if nothing is given for the promise of 
something to be given in return, the promise was not legally binding. Because of the doctrine of 
Privity of Contract, that very defense served to play a key role in the manner in which various 
courts began to address, treat and develop the law of negligence over the following years. For 
example, in the matter of Winterbottom v. Wright (1842), Mr. Winterbottom, a postal service 
wagon driver, was injured because of a faulty wheel, and when he attempted to sue the 
manufacturer of the wagon for his injuries, the courts concluded no privity of contract between 
manufacturer and the driver, so his case was dismissed. This issue of "privity" and 
"consideration" survived well until MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), came about, when a 
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case virtually analogous to Winterbottom involved a defective wheel on a car instead of on a 
wagon. In that case Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals decided that privity was 
NOT required when a manufacturer knows a product could be potentially dangerous when 
defective, or third parties could be injured by a defective condition, and from that case came the 
doctrine of "foreseeable causation", "foreseeable injuries", and "foreseeable uses, and with that, 
liability was created, absent privity or consideration. This may have been the beginning of what 
became the expression of "claims sounding in tort", and were evolving more in the theory of tort 
liability than in contractual liability, and this "hybrid" of a contract claim came into existence, 
essentially endorsed in case development or in some instances picked up by subsequent 
legislation that altered or removed the common law concept, eroding away the age old defense of 
"privity of contract". 
As time progressed, the problems brought forth by such doctrines of "privity of contract" 
and "lack of consideration" caused them to be eroded, either by a continuing process of this 
"judicial metamorphosis" or, more commonly, through legislative creations resulting in the 
aberration, abrogation, abolition or deviation of these common law doctrines and traditions in 
our evolving modern day society. As the occasions arose, legislative enactments altered and 
changed the common law doctrines, and one such statutory enactment has abrogated the common 
law "privity" by the "morphing" effects when the legislature undertook the artificial creation of 
an "agency relationship" with the lien statute that never existed at common law. This relevant 
example of a deviation from the common law "privity of contract" and "consideration" 
requirements was undertaken by the Idaho legislature when formulating the Mechanic's lien 
statute in Title 45, Chapter 5, Statutes of the State of Idaho, by the artificial creation of an 
agency relationship between subcontractors and the building and real property owners as 
defined by §45-501, Idaho Code, (as addressed hereafter). It is this same legislative process that 
Plaintiffs' counsel sees to be the legislative intent regarding claimants ("homeowner") right to 
initiate a lawsuit against that very same "subcontractor" (who is identified as the claimant's 
agent in the lien statute, now referred to as a construction professional in N.O.R.A.) for 
damages by alleging a contract or tort claim (or both) under the circumstances and provisions of 
N.O.R.A. as a result of damages caused by defective installations under the subcontract entered 
into with the general contractor. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE AND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL P.7 
00000211
L 
The interpretation of a statutory enactment is a question of law over which appellate 
courts exercise free review. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 46 P.3d 18 (2002). An 
analysis of a statute begins with the literal words of the statute, Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 13 7 
Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); those words used in a statute must be given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning; and statutes must be construed as a whole. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 25 
P.3d 850 (2001). If the statute is not ambiguous, the appellate courts do not construe it, but 
follows the law as written. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 
974 (1987). See also Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 
502, 506 (2011) (quoting specifically State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003)). Unless the result is palpably absurd, the appellate courts assume the legislature means 
what is stated in the statute. Miller v. State, I 10 Idaho 298, 715 P .2d 968 (1986). If the statute as 
written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial. 
Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987). A statute is 
ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction. Jen-Rath 
Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 48 P.3d 659 (2002). Ambiguity is not established 
merely because differing interpretations are presented. If the statute is ambiguous, it must be 
construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean. Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 
715 P.2d 968 (1986). To determine legislative intent, appellate courts examine not only the 
literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy 
behind the statute, and legislative history. Lopez v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 
174, 30 P.3d 952 (2001);Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602,990 P.2d 1213 (1999). 
InA&B Irr. Dist. V IDWR, 153 Idaho 500,284 P.3d 225 (2012), the Court said: 
"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed 
as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the 
law as written.' " Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502, 
506 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). "We have 
consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other 
extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent 
of the legislature." Id. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 
P.2d 961,963 (1993)). [W]e have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground 
that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written, and we do 
not have the authority to do so. 'The public policy of legislative enactments cannot be questioned 
by the courts and avoided simply because the courts might not agree with the public policy so 
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announced.' Id. at 896,265 P.3d at 509 (quoting State v. Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 
525,265 P.2d 328,334 (1953)). 
The interpretation and application of a statute is "a substantial legal issue". as the review 
is important to determine whether the statute is to be applied and enforced specifically as it 
reads, or if it has some other intended meaning, or is ambiguous, all of which may ultimately 
require a review of its legislative history, or other statutory enactments that have meaning and 
relevance to the objective sought to be accomplished to determine its intended application and 
scope of abrogation of any common law aspects it may have impacted. 
Therefore, the analysis of a statute begins with the literal words used in the statute, and 
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. These "literal words" take us directly to the definitions contained in 
N.O.R.A., §6-2502, Idaho Code, wherein it states the action or suit may be initiated by the 
claimant ("residential homeowner"), and that action or suit means: any civil lawsuit or action in 
contract or tort for damages or indemnity brought against a construction professional to assert 
a claim, whether by complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim, for damage or loss of use of real or 
personal property caused by a defect in the construction of the residence or in substantial 
remodel of the residence. 
That "definition" of a right to file an "action or suit" is conditioned upon the requirement 
that the "residential homeowner" undertake the requirements under the provisions that comport 
to fulfill the purpose and requirements of N.O.R.A.. These Plaintiffs specifically did that; they 
gave a notice, there was an authorized inspection, there was an estimation of damages, but no 
proper response from the construction professional, as was their duty under the provisions, 
giving right to file the suit without further notice (§6-2503(4)(c), Idaho Code). 
The nature of the claim envisioned with respect to the right to file suit is either a 
contract claim, or a tort claim, or both, and the question then arises: may the Claimant 
("residential homeowner") file a suit alleging a contract claim for damages directly against the 
subcontractor, who is defined as within the class of "construction professionals" that are 
statutorily allowed to be sued in contract or tort, in the absence of a direct "privity of contract" 
between the claimant and subcontractor? The Defendant argues the Claimant cannot bring a 
claim against the subcontractor sounding in contract, absent the common law requirement of 
"privity of contract". Plaintiff believes the plain, ordinary, and common words and definitions 
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used within the statute has established that absolute right, along with the inclusion of the 
legislative history that is reflected in the mechanic's lien statute that specifically creates a right 
of action by a subcontractor against a residential homeowner for payment of his professional 
services (who has absolutely no "privity of contract" with the owner), because of the artificial 
creation of their agency relationship that has statutorily created a cause of action by the lienor 
under an agency type contract, and the lien claimant's right to file a lawsuit, alleging the 
performance of services at the instance or request of the owner ... ( established under an agency 
concept) the effect of which has abrogated the common law concept of "privity of contract" and 
"consideration" so as to statutorily create an agency relationship upon which to allow a 
subcontractor to directly sue a homeowner under a contract claim for recovery for the 
performance of his services, and that right of action is a contract claim, not accomplished by any 
hybrid of a "tort claim" for recovery for services performed. The right of a lien claimant exists 
only through an abrogation of the common law "privity of contract" requirement, as no privity 
exists, as they had no contractual relationship, other than as artificially created. 
The statutory language utilized in N.O.R.A., along with the lien statute reference that 
creates a contract-agency-relationship between a homeowner and a subcontractor, is made Part 
of the very reference in defining "who" and "what" constitutes a "construction professional", and 
is specifically inclusive of subcontractors, and these "subcontractors" are "performing services 
at the instance or request of the owner. . . . or agent, and that lien statute is incorporated into 
N.O.R.A., by definition of "construction professionals", and those providers are deemed to be 
agents of the homeowner or property owner for purposes of creating that cause of action under 
that lien chapter. This creation of "agency" is merged into N.O.R.A. in the definition of who may 
be, and what is, a lien claimant, and who or what possesses the right to file a claim of lien and 
initiate a suit for recovery under the lien statute. N.O.R.A. serves to include this very same 
subcontractor within the "construction professional" classification that can be sued for contract 
damages by the homeowner under N.O.R.A .. It is this language and this reference, in itself, that 
serves to constitute "A controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion" in the community regarding whether that right of action is subject to the 
application of the common law defense of "privity of contract" when addressing a "N.O.R.A." 
contract claim suit filed against this very same subcontractor who holds a right to file a lien, now 
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defined as a "construction professional" who causes damages by virtue of defective installations 
in the substantial remodel of the residential homeowner's residence. 
The statute does NOT limit the right to file a "contract claim" by the residential 
homeowner only against the "general contractor", as the specific language used in the statute 
allows a contract claim or tort claim to be brought against the "construction professional". and 
that definition specifically includes general contractors and all sub-contractors in its scope of 
reference. N.0.R.A. allows a "residential homeowner" to sue a "construction professional" "in 
contract or tort' for "damages or indemnity", once they have completed their participation in the 
required settlement proceedings contemplated under N.O.R.A., when no settlement is reached 
between the parties. There is no preservation of the common law affirmative defense of privity, 
as the N.O.R.A. enactment specifically allows for a contract cause of action to be filed by the 
"claimant", who is defined to include residential homeowner, and the homeowner is among 
those who may assert a claim against the construction professional, and the specific language 
defines a construction professional to include not only contractors and sub-contractors alike, but 
also brings into the equation the language employed in the mechanic's lien statute, where the lien 
statute defines contractors and sub-contractors to be agents of the owner, which is directly 
incorporated by reference into N.O.R.A. with the direct implication the agency interrelationship 
between constructional professionals and residential homeowners, as the right to file a lien 
pursuant to §45-501, ldaho Code, is part of the defining language describing who construction 
professionals are, and that specifically includes subcontractors, who are agents o[the owner. 
If the legislation were intended to preserve the common law defense of "Privity of 
contract" to protect sub-contractors from suit, the Legislators could have done that, as addressed 
hereinafter. They could have simply not included contractors and subcontractors in the same 
definition as "construction professionals" subject to being sued by the "residential homeowner" 
in "contract or tort", and just as important as that aspect, the Legislators would include the 
definition of"construction professionals" to be those who qualify to file a claim of lien under the 
lien statute, as there is where the agency relationship is artificially created in the lien statute, 
where lien claimants are statutorily defined as being "agents" of the property owner, and that 
places "contractors" and "subcontractors" who perform work or render professional services 
upon the real property to be in an "agency relationship" with the owner of the real property, and 
that statutory language serves to abrogate the historic application of the common law defense of 
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"privity of contract". That lien statute says: " ... who renders any other professional service 
whatsoever for which he is legally authorized to perform in connection with any land or building 
development or improvement, .... , has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or 
professional services or materials furnished, whether done or furnished at the instance of the 
owner of the building or other improvement or his agent: and every contractor, subcontractor 
..... , shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the purpose of this chapter:... "This 
chapter", being the lien statute, is specifically incorporated into N.O.R.A., for the specific 
purpose of defining what "construction professionals" are, and they are now defined as agents of 
the owner of the property, authorized to perform services at the instance of the owner of the 
building .... or his agent, Our subcontracting plumber, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., was specifically 
authorized to render professional services at the instance or request of the owner's agent, Gould 
Custom Builders, Inc., so the right to file a lien exists with the subcontractor. 
Not only by virtue of the definition of who "construction professionals" are, and not only 
by the incorporation of the lien statute designating them as "agents" of the owner, but the 
legislative intent to abrogate common law privity as an affirmative defense is not preserved in 
N.O.R.A. situations, because a "contract" cause of action is bestowed upon a "homeowner", and 
if the cause of action is granted in N.O.R.A., it is abandoned, as discussed hereafter. 
What also becomes rather telling about the abrogation of the common law concept of 
"privity of contract" is the inclusion within the definition of claimant to include not only the 
existing "homeowner", who is the only person who has contracted with or authorized the 
rendition of professional services, but also includes any person who is a subsequent purchaser 
ofa residence from any homeowner. When the Claimant can be a subsequent homeowner, is 
there anyone who believes a subsequent purchaser of a residence from any homeowner is in 
"privity of contract" with any construction professional? By all accounts, a subsequent purchaser 
has NO "privity of contract" be it with any contractor or subcontractor who was involved in the 
rendition of any services in the building or remodel project of the residence, so given the plain 
and ordinary language used once again, and the specific intent to classify the qualifying 
members of Claimants to also include subsequent purchasers of the residence as being within the 
definition of "homeowners". who clearly have no "privity of contract", that results in the 
reasonable and logical conclusion that if someone who clearly has no privity with anyone, then 
none of the members are required to have any privity of contract with a particular construction 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE AND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FORPERMISSNE APPEAL P.12 
00000216
professional, as to do otherwise would render a contradictory and absurd application of the 
enforcement of the rights intended under the statute. 
To add further emphasis to demonstrate the point, if the current homeowner could only 
file suit against his contractor, because that would be his only "privity of contract", then that 
"homeowner" need only "assign" his interest in the residence to a "subsequent purchaser" most 
likely his best friend, who may then directly sue the subcontractor under the definitions and 
provisions of N.O.R.A. To require that assignment to take place to obtain that desired result in 
qualifying a Claimant, by becoming a subsequent purchaser, in order to file a contract claim, that 
would be an unreasonable and absurd requirement, inconsistent with the other definitions in the 
enactment, and the intended effects of the cross-over reference that implements the inclusion 
within the definition of "construction professionals" as agents from the definition in the lien 
statute. 
The composite of these compelling aspects serve to indicate the legislature intent to alter, 
suspend, or eliminate the requirement as to the needed preservation of the legal concept of 
"privity of contract" in lawsuits filed by "homeowners" against "construction professionals", 
when the statute specifically authorizes a residential homeowner the absolute right to file an 
action in tort or contract against a construction professional, that, by definition, includes a 
subcontractor. 
The above definitions frame the context as to both the meaning and purpose of the 
N.O.R.A. legislation. When homeowner includes a subsequent purchaser of a residence from a 
homeowner, that demonstrates "privity of contract" as an affirmative defense has been 
abolished or abrogated for purposes of the application of N.O.R.A., as the Legislature would 
clearly understand a homeowner who purchases a residence from another homeowner would 
never be in "privity of contract" with either the contractor or subcontractor, and these individuals 
are specifically included in the definition of construction professionals under the Act. 
This "difference of opinion" reflected in the briefing between these parties to this dispute 
constitutes a substantial legal issue when confronted with the controversy whether the common 
law defense of "privity of contract" is to be allowed and applies under N.O.R.A. , given a statute 
defining subcontractor and contractor within the same class of construction professionals who 
can be sued in contract or tort/or damages by homeowners, who, under that same statute, have 
"existing" residential homeowners and "subsequent" residential purchasers defined in the 
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same class as the residential homeowners who can file suit against construction professionals 
for damages in contract or tor. When "privity of contract" is missing partially or entirely within 
the application of that definition of residential homeowners and construction professionals, ther 
legislative intent becomes apparent There is no room for debate when a subsequent purchaser of 
residential property can file the lawsuit against the contractor or subcontractor, with whom 
there has never been any contractual privitv. and that serves to demonstrate any homeowner 
may file the suit against any construction professional, whether contractor or subcontractor 
performing professional services on the residential construction project or remodel project, when 
undertaken by the homeowner under the provisions of N.O.R.A.. If "privity of contract" is 
unnecessary to file suit against a subcontractor by a subsequent homeowner of the residence in 
the one instance, it becomes absurd and illogical to argue the existing homeowner cannot file 
that same suit because he lacks "privity of contract" with his subcontractor. The plain and 
ordinary meaning of this Statutory Language requires an interpretation that applies uniformly, 
logically and achieves the meaning and purpose of resolving these disputes between home 
owners and construction professionals, and for that reasoning, if a subsequent purchaser can sue 
in contract or tort, so can the existing residential homeowner, as they are both defined as 
homeowners. 
2). O[great public interest: 
When a substantial legal issue is being raised whether "privity of contract" has been 
statutorily modified regarding implementation of N.O.R.A. when the language in the statute 
defines the relationship and confers the right to file a lawsuit by homeowners against 
construction professionals, under criteria developed by the statute intentionally placing 
contractors and subcontractors in the same class as construction professionals. when legislators 
clearly understood existing common law would hold a homeowner in "privity of contract" with 
the contractor only, but not the subcontractors, and those same legislators understood a 
subsequent homeowner had no "privity of contract" with either the contractor or 
subcontractor, it serves to raise a question of great public interest as to the application of the 
statute in these construction/remodel projects. The legislators would have known that common 
law component of a privity defense would be impacted if they classified both a residential 
homeowner and a subsequent homeowner in the same class of those having the conferred right 
to file any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort against construction professionals. 
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The rationale that "privity of contract" was specifically modified by statute, and intended 
to be abrogated through this statutory enactment, when the legislators deliberately incorporated 
reference to the "agency relationship" that exists within the lien statute further supports the 
deliberate intention, as the legislators were not only aware of their lien statute, but chose to 
include the lien statute's concept of agency within part of the definition of "construction 
professionals". They not only lumped contractors and subcontractors into the same 
classification, but incorporated reference to their lien statute, and brought forth the definition, 
calling them lien claimants, since these contractors and subcontractors are defined to be those 
who have a right to file a lien under Idaho's Lien Statute. and those who qualifv to file a lien 
are statutorily made the the agents of the owner. 
Consequently, if a subsequent purchaser of a residence from and existing homeowner has 
the unconditional right to sue the contractor and subcontractor of the original homeowner, 
with whom there is NO "privity of contract", it becomes reasonable and logical (using the 
common meaning of the words), that the intended statutory interpretation of both N.O.R.A. and 
the Lien Statute, given the definition of "construction professionals" includes lienholders who 
are treated as agents of the owner by statutory decree. then those enactments, taken together, 
express a clear meaning that specifically eliminates the requirement of "privity of contract" for 
lien claimants by the creation of an agency relationship by definition, and when it is legally 
impossible for a subsequent homeowner to have "privity of contract" with any of the 
construction professionals, the abrogation of the privity mandate is emphasized from the 
statutory authorization for all homeowners to file a lawsuit in contract or tort against these 
construction professionals that are also defined as agents of the homeowners. 
The common law defense of "privity of contract" cannot be applied in any consistent 
fashion under the plain and ordinary language used in these two statutes. To allow it to be 
applied against one homeowner (the existing homeowner), but not to be applied against the other 
class of homeowner (subsequent purchaser of a homeowner), would result in an absurd and 
unequal application of the statutory objective(s), and would result in an absurd interpretation of 
the statutory enactments that creates a right of action in contract or tort for damages against a 
construction professional, who is also an agent of the homeowner by virtue of the lien statute. 
3). A legal question offirst impression: 
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A statutory interpretation of N.O.R.A. would suggest the legislative intent has been to 
either create a statutory form of "privity by Proxy" (by virtue of the lien claimant-agency status), 
or wanted to abrogate or suspend the common law requirement of "privity of contract" as a 
common law affirmative defense in N.O.R.A. situations, when undertaken within the process 
established by the enactment ofN.O.R.A .. That issue has not been determined by the Courts, and 
therefore would be treated as an issue of first impression. The two appellate cases that address 
aspects ofN.O.R.A. ( addressed below) only presented matters concerning notice in the one case 
and the response required from the construction professional, upon such notice, in the other. 
The Supreme Court will be asked to either apply the words as used in the enactment, 
given their common and ordinary usage, or analyze the enactment for any ambiguity, and 
ascertain the statutory intent when enacted by the legislature. The enactment says the legislators 
adopted an enactment to authorize and allow an action in contract or tort to go forward, when 
filed by either an existing homeowner or a subsequent purchasing homeowner, against either a 
contractor or a subcontractor, or both, as they are specifically characterized as the parties in the 
lawsuit by defining homeowners and construction professionals as they did, well knowing the 
Legislature is fully aware of "affirmative defenses" (as addressed hereinafter), and aware a 
subsequent homeowner could never be in "privity of contract" with either a contractor or 
subcontractor who performed any work on the residence. Using that direct logic, the plain and 
ordinary language of the lien statute that is incorporated into the definition, and from an 
interpretative perspective, the right of a homeowner to file the action in contract or tort against 
either a contractor or subcontractor (who are each declared to be agents of the owner by virtue of 
their lien status), is either immune to the application of the defense of"privity of contract", or the 
implication of the "agency" concept into that "relationship" serves as the formation of a "Privity 
by Proxy", and nothing further in their relationship is needed to allow the litigation to go forward 
between any of those parties. 
"Agency" is created in N.O.R.A. by the cross-over reference to the lien statute, where 
the statutory reference that anyone who possesses a right to file a claim of lien is statutorily 
defined as an agent of the owner, and by that inclusion of a lien claimant into the definition of 
"who" construction professionals are, the legislative intent of the N.O.R.A. enactment was to 
make all construction professionals automatically included in an "agency relationship" to the 
residential homeowner, a clear intent from reference to the lien right. Such inclusion, as part of 
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the definition of who construction professionals are, makes the contractor- subcontractor-
homeowner agency relationship a form of statutory proxy between the parties, and there lies a 
compelling correlation the common law defense has been relaxed, altered, abrogated, abolished, 
transformed, or artificially created through this "agency relationship" into a form of "statutory 
privity", or the common law "privity of contract" is nullified under N.O.R.A. altogether. This 
concept of "agency" between the homeowner, and the subcontractor, statutorily defined as a 
lienholder-agent, is cited in the provisions of Title 45, Chapter 5, Statutes of the State of Idaho. 
The statutory provision states: 
TITLE 45 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-501. RIGHT TO LIEN. Every person performing labor upon, or furnishing 
materials to he used in the construction, alteration or repair of any ... , building, ... , or any 
other structure, ... , or who renders any other professional service whatsoever for which he is 
legally authorized to perform in connection with any land or building development or 
improvement, ... , has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or professional services 
or materials furnished, whether done or furnished at the instance of the owner of the 
building ..• or his agent: and every contractor, subcontractor, ... or any person having charge ... 
of the construction, alteration or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building or other 
improvement, ... , shall be held to he the agent of the owner for the purpose ofthis chapter: ... 
( emphasis added). 
Since a subcontractor is authorized to file a lien against the homeowner's property, upon 
furnishing materials and rendering professional services on a project, and since the lien statute 
declares contractors and subcontractors the statutory agents of the owner, and since the 
provisions of N.O.R.A. expressly make constructional professionals lien claimants, being 
defined as having the lien right, such defining reference automatically makes construction 
professionals the statutory agents of the homeowner, since all lienors are declared statutory 
agents ofthe owner. 
This "lien claimant-agency status" within the definition of construction professionals 
serves to establish the possibility of a statutory form of the concept of "Privity" by "Proxy", by 
virtue of the statutory creation, or the legislative intent was to simply abolish the "privity of 
contract" concept altogether (as discussed hereafter) as a component of their traditional privity 
relationship. 
THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE N.O.R.A. ENACTMENT 




N.O.R.A. first "debuted" in the appellate courts in 2008, addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 196 P.3d 352 (2008). The issue was limited to the 
contents required in the notice given to the construction professional regarding defects or 
damages caused in the construction or remodel process. The court expressed the fact the 
enactment was new, and acknowledged the issue over notice was a subject of first impression 
with the court, stating: 
"NORA is a relatively new piece of legislation, and interpretation of the statute is a 
matter of first impression for this Court. The Act was passed in 2003. The Idaho Building 
Contractors Association sponsored the bill in an effort to curb litigation against building . 
contractors by homeowner. The purpose of the law is to give contractors the opportunity to fix 
construction defects before a lawsuit is filed. . . . . Mendenhall's March 11 letter satisfies the 
notice requirements of NORA for the construction defects he alleges therein. His letter 
sufficiently identified the nature and location of the defects. The letter stated, among other 
things, "water problem with north roof of great room, east spouting leaks in four places." [2] This 
surely provided enough detail and pertinent information to permit the Aldouses to inspect the 
home and determine "the general nature of the defect[s]." (emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court was not presented an issue addressing the statutory language 
whether the common law "privity of contract" had been altered with a "statutory agency 
relationship" by virtue of the lien statute, or substituted with a "privity by proxy relationship" by 
virtue of the lien statute, or had been eliminated altogether by statutory design in situations 
where a "homeowner" (whether the original homeowner or a subsequent homeowner) sues a 
"construction professional", whether the "contractor" or "subcontractor" on the residential 
project. 
In Mendenhall the homeowner was seeking contract damages against his contractor, 
with whom traditional "privity of contract" existed, so no lack of privity defense was raised. 
The next inquiry came in 2011 in Perception Construction Management, Inc. v. Bell, et 
al, 151 Idaho 250,254 P.3d 1246 (2011). In that case, the homeowner and his contractor became 
involved in a dispute. The Bells hired their contractor, Perception Construction Management, 
Inc. (PCM) to build their log home. The parties' relationship deteriorated, and Bells terminated 
the contract before construction was complete. The Bells refused to pay final invoices, and PCM 
filed their lien and then filed suit to enforce their lien for the amounts claimed owing. The Bells 
filed several counterclaims, including claims over construction defects and breach of contract. 
The only issue presented in relation to N.O.R.A. was again limited to notice, and what 
corresponding duty arose regarding a construction professional 's responsibility to respond. 
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Given the limited exposure N.O.R.A. in the judicial system, our case would serve to 
present an issue of first impression regarding the common law "privity of contract" concept, and 
whether it is an available affirmative defense in a N.0.R.A. lawsuit filed by a "homeowner" 
against a "construction professional" who performed professional services in the capacity as a 
subcontractor in the remodel project. 
This court's Order serves to render the legal conclusion "privity of contract" is required 
m lawsuits filed by homeowners against construction professionals where there is alleged 
contract damages under N.0.R.A .. There is not any case known where the specific issue has 
been raised, or that has held "privity of contract" must exist between the homeowner and a 
subcontractor, in a lawsuit for contract damages, or holds that a homeowner is precluded from 
filing any action in contract against a construction professional, who is performing professional 
services in the capacity as a subcontractor and possesses a lien right under the lien statute. 
This issue will continue to surface in situations in which N.O.R.A. provisions are utilized, 
where the subcontractor participates in settlement proceedings, yet no resolution is reached, or 
no proper response is given as required under the ruling in the Mendenhall case, thereby giving 
rise to a right to file a lawsuit, as clearly recognized to be a direct civil action filed by the 
homeowner, in contract or tort, against either or both the contractor and subcontractor, because 
of the damages caused by their acts, or lack thereof. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES REFERENCED IN N.O.R.A .• AND THE RIGHT TO 
RECOVERY UNDER N.O.R.A. 
The issue of "affirmative defenses" as we find is specifically addressed in N.0.R.A. was 
referenced in passing commentary in the above presentation, and further review of the 
provisions within N.O.R.A. specifically address whether "privity of contract" is a common law 
element recognized as applying in an action brought by a homeowner against a subcontractor in 
a "contract action" authorized by N.O.R.A. 
Before turning to that commentary, it remains important to understand who are the 
proper parties and the defined cause of actions in the litigation in a N. OR.A. dispute, and what 
are their rights of recovery? The typical right of recovery in a contract claim may be different 
than what is allowed in N.O.R.A., and when compared to what is recoverable in a tort claim, that 
may also be different than what is allowed in N.0.R.A.. N.O.R.A. initially defines the range of 




damages that may be recovered, and grants the right to attorney fees under §6-2504, Idaho Code, 
referencing the limitation on damages and recovery of attorney fees in a N.O.R.A. action. 
Under Rule 54 I.R.C.P., attorney fees are allowable only if provided by statute or 
contract. In this instance, the statute addresses the damages, and provides for attorney fees, and 
to emphasize the point, N.O.R.A. allows that recovery of damages and attorney fees in both a 
contract action and in a tort action. This statutory creation regulates the damage award and the 
fee award. This statute creates a form of damage recovery, creates an attorney fee award, and 
creates causes of action not before existing in common law, and it suggests there was a clear 
intent in what is to be accomplished by these enactments. Once again, it appears these statutory 
modifications of what is described as either "common law" or traditional "civil law", regarding 
the categories of damage recovery, attorney fees, and the claims being alleged, has been 
modified by the provisions within this statutory enactment, and the common law requirement of 
"privity of contract" is actually "removed" as a necessary element to these rights of recovery. 
This N.0.R.A. enactment specifically states if the construction professional fails to make 
a reasonable offer, or reasonable attempt to complete the repairs, or fails to complete the repairs, 
then the "limitations on damages" and any "defense to liability" provided for in §6-2504(1) shall 
not apply. The statute specifically states: 
TITLE 6 
ACTIONS IN PARTICULAR CASES 
CHAPTER 25 
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT 
6-2504. LIMITATION ON DAMAGES. (1) In a suit subiect to section 6-2503, Idaho 
Code, the claimant· may recover only the following damages proximately caused by a 
construction defect: 
(a) The reasonable cost of repairs necessary to cure any construction defect, ... ; 
(b) The reasonable expenses of temporary housing reasonably necessary during the repair 
periodi 
(c) The reduction in market value, if any, to the extent that the reduction is due to structural 
failure; and 
( d) Reasonable and necessary attorney's fees. 
(2) If a construction professional fails to make a reasonable offer as required under 
section 6-2503, Idaho Code, or fails to make a reasonable attempt to complete the repairs 
specified in an accepted offer, or fails to complete, in a good and workmanlike manner, the 
repairs specified in an accepted offer, the limitations on damages and defenses to liability 
provided for in this section shall not apply. 
(3) .. .. 
(4) .. .. 
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(5) A builder, under the principles of comparative fault pertaining to affirmative 
defenses, may be excused, in whole or in part, from any obligation, damage, loss or liability if 
the builder can demonstrate any of the following affirmative defenses in response to the claimed 






(f) .... . 
(g) .... . 
(6) All applicable affirmative defenses are preserved for causes of action to which this 
chapter does not apply. 
History: 
[6-2504, added 2003, ch. 133, sec. 1, p. 389.] (redactions made and emphasis added) 
There are several provisions of interest identified in the above statute: 1. Under certain 
circumstances the limitations on damages and the application of defenses to liabilitv provided 
for shall not apply; 2. The legislature was specifically aware of the subject of affirmative 
defenses; and of significant interest, 3. Under paragraph (6), All applicable affirmative defenses 
are preserved for causes of action to which this chapter does not apply. 
As to the first statement, the construction professional made no response as required 
under N.O.R.A., and according to Mendenhall, that failure is a breach of the construction 
professional's duty under the provisions of N.O.R.A.. Consequently, !l!l!!:.£ of the damage 
limitations would now apply in our case, and none of the enumerated affirmative defenses apply 
in our case. As to the second statement, the legislature has made it patently clear that they were 
well aware of various affirmative defenses that could exist in the situation envisioned by the 
enactment, and made specific reference to what could apply as an affirmative defense, and as to 
the third statement, the legislature awareness of affirmative defenses would clearly make them 
aware of the common law affirmative defense of "privity of contract", as they were specifically 
including the right of a homeowner to initiate a lawsuit, alleging a contract claim and suit for 
contract damages against subcontractors, who the legislature would have known no traditional 
privity of contract existed between them; that the legislature was thinking about specific 
affirmative defenses when formulating this piece of legislation within the provisions of subparts 
(5) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), & (g); that the legislature knew it was within their authority to 
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abrogate various common law defenses, as well as to preserve any affirmative defenses, and in 
light of that statutory authority, the legislature elected to preserve all affirmative defenses to any 
"causes of action to.which this chapter does not apply". Thus the question arises: what parties 
and what causes of action does this chapter apply? This chapter applies to the parties who are 
the homeowners, being the Claimants; it applies to construction professionals, which specifically 
includes subcontractors as parties; it applies to lawsuits filed by Claimants against contractors 
and subcontractors, who are construction professionals, alleging causes of action for damages or 
indemnity in contract or tort. caused by the rendition of professional services. Consequently, 
none of the common law affirmative defenses apply to these parties for these lawsuits for these 
causes of actions for those damages established by this chapter 25 of Title 6, statutes of Idaho. 
The statutory Chapter includes the section that specifically states: 
TITLE 6 
ACTIONS IN PARTIC0LAR CASES 
CHAPTER 25 
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT 
6-2502. DEFINITIONS. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, as used in this 
chapter: 
(1) "Action" means any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort for damages or 
indemnity brought against a construction professional to assert a claim, whether by complaint, 
counterclaim or cross-claim, for damage or the loss of use of real or personal property caused by 
a defect in the construction of a residence or in the substantial remodel of a residence. "Action" 
does not include any civil action in tort alleging personal injury or wrongful death to a person or 
persons resulting from a construction defect. 
(2) "Association" means a homeowner's association, condominium management body, 
unit owner's organization or a nonprofit corporation created to own and operate portions of a 
planned community which has the power to assess unit owners to pay the costs and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the association's obligations. 
(3) "Claimant" means a homeowner or association that asserts a claim against a 
construction professional concerning a defect in the construction of a residence or in the 
substantial remodel of a residence. 
(4) "Construction professional" means any person with a right to lien pursuant to section 
45-501, Idaho Code, an architect, subdivision owner or developer, builder, contractor, 
subcontractor, engineer or inspector, performing or furnishing the design, supervision, 
inspection, construction or observation of the construction of any improvement to residential real 
property, whether operating as a sole proprietor, partnership, corporation, limited liability 
company or other business entity. 
( 5) "Homeowner" means: 
(a) Any person who contracts with a construction professional for the construction, sale, or 
construction and sale of a residence; and 
(b) An association as defined in this section. 
"Homeowner" includes a subsequent purchaser of a residence from any homeowner. 
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( 6) "Person" means an individual, an association as defined in this section, or a 
corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, joint venture or 
other legal business entity. 
(7) "Residence" means a single-family house, duplex, triplex, quadraplex, condominium 
or a unit in a multiunit residential structure in which title to each individual unit is transferred to 
the owner under a cooperative system. 
(8) "Serve" or "service" means personal service or delivery by certified mail to the last 
known address of the addressee. 
(9) "Substantial remodel" means a remodel of a residence, for which the total cost 
exceeds one-half (1/2) of the assessed value of the residence for property tax purposes at the time 
the contract for the remodel work was made. 
History: 
[6-2502, added 2003, ch. 133, sec. 1, p. 386.] 
The common law defense of lack of "privity of contract" cannot be raised, as this Chapter 
applies to a cause of action in contract, filed by a claimant (homeowner) against a subcontractor 
( construction professional) for damages or indemnity, and therefore, by statutory abrogation, that 
defense to liability is waived or removed. 
With each of these factors considered, these statutory provisions must be interpreted to 
mean the common law defense of privity of contract does not apply to the 
subcontractor/construction professional dispute that is not settled, and a lawsuit filed by a 
Claimant, alleging a claim for damages for a contract breach provided for within the statutory 
language. For the above reasons, there lies the underlying issue that must be addressed by the 
appellate courts, and that is of controlling concern in this statutory enactment with respect to a 
"contract action" brought by a homeowner against a construction professional, such as DeBest 
Plumbing, Inc., a subcontractor who, by statute, is authorized to file a lien and initiate a right to 
payment for the rendition of professional services under a contract claim against a homeowner, 
classified as an agent of the owner. 
An Order entered by this Court, granting permission for Plaintiffs to appeal this issue 
regarding the unavailability of the common law defense of lack of "privity of contract" in 
N.O.R.A. disputes may be brought before the Idaho Supreme Court, as that will serve to allow 
this unsettled issue to be considered by the appellate courts if a permissive appeal should go 
forward and determine the right of the homeowner to file suit against a subcontractor for a 
contract breach under N.O.R.A. without being subject to dismissal of the action upon the 
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preforming their services in a subcontract classification under com 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of May 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 20th day of May, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following 
addresses as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Valley County 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 







) U.S. Mail 
) Fax 208-382-7107 
) Hand Delivered 
) /ill.~ -~ 
/ Fax 208-3\5-7212 , 
) Hand Delivered 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




DEBEST PLUMBING, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV2015-178C 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
Plaintiffs Scott Davison and Anne Davison claim Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
botched a plumbing job it performed in connection with a remodel of their home. DeBest was a 
subcontractor and had no contractual relationship with the Davisons. The Davisons nevertheless 
sued DeBest on contract theories, as well as in negligence. 
DeBest moved for summary judgment. The Court denied summary judgment against the 
Davisons' negligence theory. The Court granted summary judgment, however, against their 
contract theories, given the absence of a contractual relationship between them and DeBest. The 
Davisons had argued that the common law's privity-of-contract requirement was abrogated by 
the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA"), LC. §§ 6-2501 to -2504. For reasons 
stated on the record on April 4, 2016, the Court rejected that argument, ruling that NORA neither 




abrogated the privity requirement nor created contract causes of action that don't exist under 
other law for homeowners to pursue against subcontractors. 
The Davisons move under LA.R. 12 for permission to file an interlocutory appeal of the 
order granting summary judgment against their contract theories. That motion was argued on 
June 6, 2016. The Court denied the motion at the end of the hearing but told the parties to expect 
a written order setting forth its reasoning, as LA.R. 12(b) requires. This is that order. 
Permission to appeal an interlocutory order is appropriately granted if the order "[l] 
involves a controlling question oflaw [2] as to which there is substantial grounds for difference 
of opinion and [3] in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially 
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." LA.R. 12(a). This three-pronged test is, by 
design, not easily satisfied. That is because, to avoid piecemeal appeals, "Rule 12 appeals are 
only accepted in the most exceptional cases with the intent to resolve substantial legal issues of 
great public interest or legal questions of first impression." Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 
147 Idaho 785,789,215 P.3d 505,509 (2009) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
The test's first prong may well be satisfied. Whether NORA abrogates the privity 
requirement or creates contract causes of action that don't exist under other law for homeowners 
to pursue against subcontractors are legal questions that are dispositive of the Davisons' contract 
theories, if answered the way the Court answered them. 
The second prong, however, is not satisfied. The notion that NORA abrogates the privity 
requirement or creates contract causes of action that don't exist under other law for homeowners 
to pursue against subcontractors isn't well grounded in NORA's text, nor is it consistent with 
NORA's principal purpose, which is simply "to give contractors the opportunity to fix 
construction defects before a lawsuit is filed." Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436, 196 
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P.3d 352, 354 (2008). The Court should not and will not infer a legislative intention to abrogate 
the common law's privity requirement for homeowner suits against subcontractors in the absence 
of clear statutory language indicating the legislature intended that result. See Callies v. 0 'Neal, 
147 Idaho 841,847,216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009) ("[W]hen interpreting a statute, this Court 
presumes the Legislature did not intend to change the common law unless the language of the 
statute clearly indicates otherwise."). The Court perceives no substantial grounds for difference 
of opinion as to whether NORA has the effect for which the Davisons argue. It doesn't. 
The third prong isn't satisfied either. There is little Idaho case law on what it means for 
an interlocutory appeal to "materially advance" the litigation's orderly resolution. But 
essentially the same legal standard applies under federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and 
federal authorities help shed light on that phrase's proper application. They suggest (i) that 
"[i]mmediate appeal may be found inappropriate if there is a good prospect that the certified 
question may be mooted by further proceedings, if the character of the trial is not likely to be 
affected, or if an essentially collateral matter such as attorney fees is involved," (ii) that "[i]f trial 
of the case can be had in a few days, the possibility of saving relatively small amounts of trial-
court time is not thought sufficient to justify immediate appeal," and (iii) that a judicial 
estimation that an interlocutory appeal might cause (rather than avoid) delay is "good ground" 
for refusing permission to appeal. 16 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3930 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated April 2016). The Davisons' negligence theory 
remains alive for trial. The contours of that rather short trial-which is set to take three days 
starting on November 9, 2016--seemingly would be about the same with or without the 
Davisons' contract theories. The Davisons may well prevail on their negligence theory at trial, 
in which case it is unclear why it would matter if they also could prevail on the contract theories 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL - 3 
00000231
supposedly authorized by NORA. Thus, the upcoming trial has a good prospect of mooting the 
need to ever resolve the Davisons' contentions about NORA. And an interlocutory appeal, if 
allowed, almost certainly would not be decided by the time the November 2016 trial date arrives, 
meaning an interlocutory appeal is likelier to cause delay than avoid it. 
For these reasons, proper grounds for an interlocutory appeal aren't present here. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Davisons' motion for permission to appeal the interlocutory 
order granting summary judgment against their contract theories is denied. 
:\,\, 
Dated this _b_ day of June 2016. 
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DOUGLAS A. MILLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
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Case No. CV 15-178C 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE THIRD-
p ARTY COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc., by and through its attorneys of record, 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP and hereby moves this Court for leave to file 
and serve a Third-Party Complaint upon Gould Custom Builders, Inc., pursuant to Rule 14(a). A 
true and correct copy of the proposed Third-Party Complaint is attached hereto. 
To the extent that DeBest Plumbing, Inc., may be found liable for all of the costs of water 
remediation and damage repair alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint, Gould Custom Builders, Inc., is 
responsible in whole or in part for those damages because services provided by Gould Custom 




Builders, Inc., were not performed in a reasonable time, water remediation protocol was not 
followed, and Gould Custom Builders, Inc. billed excessive amounts for those services. 
Defendant requests oral argument on this Motion, but does not intend to file a brief unless 
this Motion is disputed by Plaintiffs. 
DATED This Ydayof June, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
&:??/ ;_ 
By: __ +~...-.,c.--=------="---(=--~~-=--~-------
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Zday of June, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Honorable Jason D. Scott 
Valley County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~.S.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
X' Email: gknapp@co.valley.id.us 
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Ilobert D. Lewis 
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Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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DEBEST PLUMBING, INC. an Idaho 
corporation. 
Defendant. 




GOULD CUSTOM BUILDERS, INC. an 
Idaho corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 15-178C 
DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST 
GOULD CUSTOM BUILDERS, INC. 
Category: K3 
Fee: $14.00 
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COMES NOW Third-Party Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc., by and through its 
undersigned counsel, CANTRILL SK.INNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP, and hereby 
files this Third-Party Complaint against Gould Custom Builders, Inc. as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. (hereinafter "DeBest") is an Idaho Corporation 
doing business in McCall, Valley County, Idaho. 
2. Gould Custom Builders, Inc. (hereinafter "Gould") 1s an Idaho 
corporation, with its principal place of business located in McCall, Idaho. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3. Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Idaho Code§ 5-514(a) because 
Third-Party Defendant Gould provided services for pecuniary benefit to real property at 
issue in the underlying litigation in Valley County, Idaho, and venue is proper in the 
Court under Idaho Code§ 5-404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. Gould is in the business of building custom homes and performing custom 
remodeling services in Valley County, Idaho. 
5. Beginning in January 2013, Gould provided remodeling services as 
general contractor to Plaintiffs Scott and Annie Davison to repair extensive water damage 
in their Idaho vacation home located at 2109 Water Lily, McCall, Idaho. 
6. Gould engaged DeBest as a subcontractor to provide plumbing services 
for the repair and replacement of damaged pipes and fixtures that occurred over the 
freezing winter of 2012/2013. 
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7. On or after July 11, 2013, DeBest received shipment of a Cheviot tub filler 
with goose neck and hand shower for installation with the claw foot bathtub in the 
upstairs bathroom of the Davisons vacation home. 
8. DeBest installed the Cheviot faucet sometime between July 11 and July 
25, 2013. 
9. On or about July 25, 2013 Plaintiff Scott Davison arrived in McCall, went 
to the vacation home and discovered a leak from the plumbing in the upstairs bathroom. 
Water was collecting in the ceiling of the bedroom immediately below the upstairs 
bathroom. Plaintiff notified Gould of the leak and requested that the ceiling be fixed so 
the cabin could be used for guests coming within the next week. Gould joined Plaintiff 
Scott Davison at the vacation home. 
10. Gould notified DeBest that the plumbing in the upstairs bathroom had 
leaked and requested immediate assistance in stopping the leak and remediating the water 
damage to the vacation home. 
11. A DeBest employee did respond to Gould's request, joined Gould and 
Davison at the vacation home, and discovered a leak in the connection of the Cheviot 
faucet to the upstairs plumbing. The connection was corrected by the DeBest employee 
and the leak resolved. 
12. Gould assessed the water damage and determined the scope of the water 
damage remediation. The DeBest employee assisted Gould as directed with the removal 
of wet insulation in the bedroom ceiling and damaged ceiling sheetrock, as well as 
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removal of surface water in the upstairs crawl space and below where it had puddled in 
the bedroom and hallway. 
13. After about three hours, Gould no longer needed assistance from the 
DeBest employee and dismissed him. Before they parted, Gould agreed with the DeBest 
employee that Gould would complete the water damage remediation, and agreed with 
DeBest that he would complete the water damage repairs. Gould agreed to send a bill for 
its work to DeBest. 
14. Between July 26 and July 31, 2013, Gould provided water damage 
remediation and repair services to the vacation home owned by Plaintiffs Davison, 
including the removal of wet insulation and sheetrock, removal of excess moisture in the 
bedroom by use of its dehumidifier, replacement of insulation and sheetrock, texturing 
sheetrock and painting the bedroom ceiling and walls. 
1 S. Gould had prior experience with water damage and water remediation 
work at the vacation home and knew or should have known that proper water remediation 
required proper protocol to effectively and successfully address the water damage. Gould 
did not follow proper water damage remediation protocol in the response to the water 
damage and subsequent remediation. 
16. Gould elected to mitigate the water damage without the immediate 
assistance of a water remediation service and elected not to fully and immediately 
investigate, remediate and repair the water damage. Instead, it waited until after 
scheduled summer and fall use of the vacation home. Gould did not begin identification 
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of the full scope of water damage, repair and remediation efforts unitl December 18, 
2013. 
17. Gould was responsible for and Plaintiffs paid Gould for the decision to 
delay remediation of the water damage, and for all materials, work and services on repair 
of Plaintiffs' vacation home. 
18. On July 21, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Case No.; CV 2015-
178C against Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff DeBest, alleging that DeBest is liable for 
all costs to remediate and repair water damage caused by the faulty connection and 
resulting water leak at the water tub faucet in the upstairs bathroom of Plaintiffs' vacation 
home. 
19. The cost of remediation and repair of the vacation home was not 
reasonable because the full scope of damage and repair work was not undertaken for 
more than four months after the leak was discovered, because proper water damage 
remediation protocol was not followed, and because Gould billed excessive amounts for 
its work. 
COUNT ONE - INDEMNIFICATION 
20. DeBest incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-
19 above. 
21. Gould owed Plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care to perform legal and 
contractual duties. 
22. Gould owed a duty to Plaintiffs to perform its responsibilities m a 
workmanlike manner. 
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23. In addition to general duties owed individually by Gould, Gould assumed 
an obligation to DeBest to stand primarily responsible for proper remediation and repair 
of the Plaintiffs vacation home. 
24. To the extent that allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint against DeBest 
may be proven, Gould breached its duties to DeBest. 
25. To the extent that allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint are proven, 
Gould caused the damages in whole or in part. 
26. DeBest is entitled to indemnification from Gould. 
COUNT TWO - CONTRIBUTION 
27. DeBest incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 
through 26 above. 
28. Gould owed Plaintiffs and DeBest a duty of reasonable care and legal and 
contractual duties. 
29. Gould owed a duty to Plaintiffs and DeBest to perform his responsibilities 
in a workmanlike manner. 
30. To the extent that allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint against DeBest 
may be proven, Gould breached its duties to Plaintiffs and DeBest. 
31. To the extent that allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint are proven, 
Gould caused the damages in whole or in part. 
32. DeBest would not be subject to the Plaintiffs' suit, in whole or in part, but 
for the acts and/or omissions of Gould, as well as breaches of legal and contractual duties 
Gould owed Plaintiffs and DeBest. 
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33. DeBest is entitled to contribution from Gould for its pro rata share of 
damages under Idaho Code § 6-803. 
COUNT THREE - NEGLIGENCE 
34. DeBest incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 
through 33 above. 
35. Gould owed Plaintiffs and DeBest a duty of reasonable care and a duty to 
perform services in accordance with the applicable standard of care and in a workmanlike 
manner. 
36. To the extent that Plaintiffs' claims against DeBest may be proven, it will 
be because Gould has breached its duties owed to Plaintiffs and DeBest. 
WHEREFORE DeBest prays for relief as follows: 
1. To the extent that the Plaintiffs' allegations against DeBest are proven, 
that judgment be entered in favor of DeBest and against Gould for some or all damages 
proven by Plaintiffs relative to the water damage remediation and repair, pursuant to the 
process of determining comparative responsibility allowed under Idaho Code § 6-803(3). 
2. That DeBest be indemnified for all claimed damages, attorneys' fees, and 
costs pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121; Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; 
and for such other relief as the Court deems just. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
DeBest hereby demands a trial by jury on all contested matters contained herein 
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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DATED this __ day of June, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & 
SORENSEN, LLP 
Robert D. Lewis-Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party 
PlaintiffDeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of June, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
V emon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Honorable Jason D. Scott 
Valley County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Email: gknapp@co.valley.id.us 
Robert D. Lewis 
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DEBEST PLUMBING, INC., an ldaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV2015-178C 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
Plaintiffs Scott Davison and Anne Davison claim Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
botched a plumbing job it performed in connection with a remodel of their home. DeBest was a 
subcontractor and had no contractual relationship with the Davisons. The Davisons nevertheless 
sued DeBest on contract theories, as well as in negligence. 
DeBest moved for summary judgment. The Court denied summary judgment against the 
Davisons' negligence theory. The Court granted summary judgment, however, against their 
contract theories, given the absence of a contractual relationship between them and DeBest. The 
Davisons had argued that the common law's privity-of-contract requirement was abrogated by 
the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA"), LC. §§ 6-2501 to -2504. For reasons 
stated on the record on April 4, 2016, the Court rejected that argument, ruling that NORA neither 
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abrogated the privity requirement nor created contract causes of action that don't exist under 
other law for homeowners to pursue against subcontractors. 
The Davisons move under I.AR. 12 for permission to file an interlocutory appeal of the 
order granting summary judgment against their contract theories. That motion was argued on 
June 6, 2016. The Court denied the motion at the end of the hearing but told the parties to expect 
a written order setting forth its reasoning, as I.AR. l2(b) requires. This is that order. 
Permission to appeal an interlocutory order is appropriately granted if the order "[1] 
involves a controlling question of law [2] as to which there is substantial grounds for difference 
of opinion and [3] in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially 
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.A.R. 12(a). This three~pronged test is, by 
design, not easily satisfied. That is because, to avoid piecemeal appeals, "Rule 12 appeals are 
only accepted in the most exceptional cases with the intent to resolve substantial legal issues of 
great public interest or legal questions of first impression." Aardema v. US Dairy Sys., Inc., 
147 Idaho 785,789,215 P.3d 505,509 (2009) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
The test's first prong may well be satisfied. Whether NORA abrogates the privity 
requirement or creates contract causes of action that don't exist under other law for homeowners 
to pursue against subcontractors are legal questions that are dispositive of the Davisons' contract 
theories, if answered the way the Court answered them. 
The second prong, however, is not satisfied. The notion that NORA abrogates the privity 
requirement or creates contract causes of action that don't exist under other law for homeowners 
to pursue against subcontractors isn't well grounded in NORA's text, nor is it consistent with 
NORA's principal purpose, which is simply "to give contractors the opportunity to fix 
construction defects before a lawsuit is filed." Mendenhall v. Aldous, l 46 Idaho 434, 436, 196 
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P.3d 352, 354 (2008). The Court should not and will not infer a legislative intention to abrogate 
the common law's privity requirement for homeowner suits against subcontractors in the absence 
of clear statutory language indicating the legislature intended that result. See Callies v. 0 'Neal, 
147 Idaho 841,847,216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009) ("[W]hen interpreting a statute, this Court 
presumes the Legislature did not intend to change the common law unless the language of the 
statute clearly indicates otherwise."). The Court perceives no substantial grounds for difference 
of opinion as to whether NORA has the effect for which the Davisons argue. It doesn't. 
The third prong isn't satisfied either. There is little Idaho case law on what it means for 
an interlocutory appeal to "materially advance" the litigation's orderly resolution. But 
essentially the same legal standard applies under federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and 
federal authorities help shed light on that phrase's proper application. They suggest (i) that 
"[i]mmediate appeal may be found inappropriate if there is a good prospect that the certified 
question may be mooted by further proceedings, if the character of the trial is not likely to be 
affected, or if an essentially collateral matter such as attorney fees is involved," (ii) that "[i]f trial 
of the case can be had in a few days, the possibility of saving relatively small amounts of trial-
court time is not thought sufficient to justify immediate appeal," and (iii) that a judicial 
estimation that an interlocutory appeal might cause (rather than avoid) delay is "good ground" 
for refusing permission to appeal. 16 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3930 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated April 2016). The Davisons' negligence theory 
remains alive for trial. The contours of that rather short trial-which is set to take three days 
stru1ing on November 9, 2016--seemingly would be about the same with or without the 
Davisons' contract theories. The Davisons may well prevail on their negligence theory at trial, 
in which case it is unclear why it would matter if they also could prevail on the contract theories 
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supposedly authorized by NORA. Thus, the upcoming trial has a good prospect of mooting the 
need to ever resolve the Davisons' contentions about NORA. And an interlocutory appeal, if 
allowed, almost certainly would not be decided by the time the November 2016 trial date arrives, 
meaning an interlocutory appeal is likelier to cause delay than avoid it. 
For these reasons, proper grounds for an interlocutory appeal aren't present here. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Davisons' motion for permission to appeal the interlocutory 
order granting summary judgment against their contract theories is denied. 
~\. 
Dated this _b_ day of June 2016. 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE 
APPEAL BEFORE THE IDAHO 
SUPREME COURT 
INTRODUCTION 
The district court in the above entitled action has entered an Order dismissing the 
contract claims contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint filed pursuant to the provisions of the Notice 
and Opportunity to Repair Act, entered upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which 
dismissal is reflected in that Order entered and filed ofrecord on April 7, 2016. 
As a result of that Order dismissing Plaintiffs contract claims against DeBest Plumbing, 
Inc., the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Pem1issive Appeal with the district court, seeking approval 
from the district court to advance a Permissive Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court to address the 
issue whether the traditional common law concept of "Privity-of-Contract" is a viable defense in 
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relation to this particular legislation, when a lawsuit alleging contract claims for damages is 
brought by the homeowner against a construction professional, upon the failure of those 
settlement proceedings undertaken pursuant to the provisions contained in the Notice and 
Opportunity to Repair Act, referred to as "N.O.R.A.". Said another way, is a construction 
professional, rendering his services in the capacity as a subcontractor, allowed to assert the 
affirmative defense of the lack of privity-of-contract to a contract claim brought by the 
homeowner against that "subcontracting" construction professional, when the provisions of 
N.O.R.A. are implemented, upon the theory that the only "contract" upon which suit can be 
initiated is that contract entered into between the general contractor and the homeowner, as no 
"contractual relationship" exists between the "homeowner" and the "subcontractor". 
DISCUSSION 
A permissive appeal of this interlocutory Order directly focuses upon whether the 
fundamental concept of the common law defense of "Privity of Contract" - a concept existing in 
traditional "contract law", continues as a material requirement in those "relationships" and 
lawsuits created and existing an1ong certain parties under N.O.R.A., legislation enacted in 2003. 
In this case, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
(hereafter referred to as DeBest), a construction professional plumbing sub-contractor rendering 
professional services on this remodel project, and this suit was filed under N.O.R.A., after the 
settlement proceedings failed to produce a resolution or even generate the required response 
under the provisions of N.O.R.A.. An inspection was undertaken, and an opinion regarding a 
"damage estimate" was expressed by DeBest's agent, their liability carrier, but no settlement 
offer was submitted to resolve the damages. The Complaint filed by the homeowner alleged 
causes of actions for damages in both contract and in tort, as provided for by the provisions of 
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N.O.R.A .. The "contract claims" related to the rendition of professional services by DeBest's 
employee, Tom Peterson, a journeyman plumber employed by DeBest, pertaining to the 
installation of plumbing components, pursuant to the sub-contracting arrangements between 
DeBest and the general contractor, Gould Custom Builders, Inc., concerning that remodeling 
project of Plaintiffs' residence, undertaken by DeBest as a "construction professional" rendering 
services that appear to be rendered under circumstances that specifically implicate the provisions 
of the Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act, §6-2501-2504, Idaho Code. 
The lower court's Order of April 7, 2016 dismissed the contract claims, upon a 
determination there was a lack of the traditional common law concept of "privity of contract" 
between the Plaintiffs and Defendant, a concept the lower court perceived must be present even 
with respect to a contract claim asserted in a lawsuit filed by a "residential homeowner" against 
a "construction professional" under N.O.R.A., regarding professional services rendered in the 
construction and/or remodel of a homeowners' residence under arrangements created by the 
general . contractor for the performance of the necessary professional installations by a 
"construction professional" sub-contractor. This lawsuit was brought upon the consequence of 
the failed settlement proceedings mandated by N.O.R.A., perceived as the statutory pre-requisite 
to any lawsuit under the enactment that allows a residential homeowner to file suit against a 
construction professional upon the provisions identified and contained in N.O.R.A.. 
The lower court's Order was neither a certified Order for appeal under Rule 54(b), 
I.R.C.P., nor a "final judgment" entered under Rule 54(a), I.R.C.P., so the Order may be 
reviewed only upon Permission to be granted or rejected by the Appellate Court, (Rule 12, 
I.AR.). The essential consideration given by the Appellate Court to grant a permissive appeal 
involves the question whether the order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there 
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is substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and in which an immediate appeal from the order 
or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." See Rule 12, I.AR.; 
See also Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256, 2014. When the Supreme Court grants a 
motion for permissive appeal, the issue addressed is the precise issue(s) framed by the motion, 
and ruled upon by the district court. Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 
P.3d 505, 509 (2009). 
These Plaintiffs have framed the issue in a fashion that appropriately raises the statutory 
purpose, meaning, application, and interpretation of N.0.R.A., regarding the right of a claimant, 
a "residential homeowner" to initiate a lawsuit against a subcontractor, a "construction 
professional", who performed professional services on a residential construction and/or remodel 
project, alleging breach of contract claims, seeking damages, absent a traditional common law 
contractual concept of "privity of contract" between the residential homeowner and the 
subcontractor-constrnction professional performing professional services on the project. 
The Appellate Court that will make the ultimate determination whether there is 
"substantial grounds for difference of opinion" to justify their acceptance of Motion For 
Permissive Appeal, once the request reaches the Supreme Court. 
It appears rather apparent at this stage of the proceedings that there clearly exists 
substantial grounds for difference of opinion as between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, by 
reviewing the respective positions of these parties, and the essence of this memorandum is to 
emphasize the clear existence of such "substantial grounds" for purposes of procuring the 
permission to appeal from the Supreme Court, who must make that final determination. This 
"Permissive Appeal" is a two-step process; the court entering the order must grant or deny 
approval for permission to appeal, and upon entry of its Order to grant or deny such approval, the 
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matter may be submitt.ed to the Appellate Court for such final consideration, and from which 
filing the Supreme Court determines if the interlocutory order presents "substantial legal issues 
of great public interest or legal questions of first impression are involved", as identified in 
Aardema v. US. Dairy Systems Inc., 147 Idaho 785,789,215 P.3d 505,509 (2009). With respect 
to such permissive appeals, the Aardema Court has stated: 
"Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory order 
or decree of a district court in a civil or criminal action, or from an interlocutory order of an 
administrative agency, which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, hut wf;iich involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion 
and in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially· advance the 
orderly resolution of the litigation. I.A.R. 12. " {T[he intent of I.AR. 12[ru to provide an 
immediate appeal from an interlocutory order if substantial legal issues ofgreat public interest 
or legal questions of first impression are involved." Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 4, 665 P.2d 
701, 703 (1983) ( per curiam ). A permissive appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 12 is " an unusual 
posture." Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 501, 777 P.2d 722, 723 (1989). Due to "the unusual 
posture of the case, we are constrained to rule narrowly and address only the precise question 
that was framed by the motion and answered by the trial court." Id. " Such appeal, [after 
acceptance by this Court,] shall proceed in the same manner as an appeal as a matter of right, 
unless otherwise ordered by (this Court]." I.AR. 12(d)." 
"ANALYSIS Rule 12 appeals are only accepted in the most exceptional cases with 
the intent to resolve "substantial legal issues ofgreat public interest or legal questions of first 
impression/.[" Budell, 105 Idaho at 4, 665 P.2d at 703. Due to confusion regarding the 
application· of the economic loss rule, this Court accepted this permissive appeal and offers 
this opinion, per the district court's request.fl[ on the application of economic loss rule." 
(italic and underlining emphasis added). 
Whether "privity of contract" must exist between the "residential homeowner" and 
"subcontractor", as a condition precedent before a contract claim cause of action for damages 
can be filed by the "residential homeowner" against a "sub-contracting" "construction 
professional", upon failure of the settlement provisions mandated under the provisions of 
N.O.R.A, is an issue. that justifies this permissive appeal, as it presents 1). A substantial legal 
issue; 2). Of great public interest; 3). A legal question of first impression; 4). A controlling 
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question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion; and 5). 
Materially able to advance the orderly resolution of this and other similar aspects of litigation. 
1). As to "privity of contract" being A substantial legal issue: 
In 2003, the Idaho Legislature enacted Title 6, Chapter 25, Statutes of the State of Idaho, 
codified as §§6-2501-2504, Idaho Code. The legislature always retains the right and the 
authority to abrogate, modify, suspend, or eliminate aspects of "common law". 
The doctrine of privity is a fundamental part of the common law of contract, and as such 
it provides that a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising under it onto any 
persons except the parties to it. The premise is that only the identified parties should be able to 
sue to enforce their rights or to claim damages as a result of any breach of its terms. The 
doctrine, over the years, had proven problematic in several aspects, and has impacted its strict 
application, beginning with those implications upon contracts that were essentially made for the 
benefit of third parties, who were then "contractually" unable to enforce the obligations of the 
contracting parties. 
The strict application of this "privity of contract" concept did not readily allow third 
parties to go against the particular parties to the contract, and never beyond the entitlement of a 
third party to a benefit. The age old example cited in various references that identified the 
limitation was that reference made to manufacturers who sell products to distributors, who sells 
the product to merchandising retailers, who, in turn, sell to consumers. Under a technical 
application of "privity of contract", there was no contractual arrangement between the original 
seller, manufacturer, and the final purchaser, consumer. Consequently, modifications began to be 
made in the law, beginning with creation of the "duty of care" that served to transcend the 
privity limitation, and brought about the evolution and formation of "implied warranties" of 
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"fitness and merchantability", and then came the statutory creations of "lemon laws" and 
formation of "product liability" legislation that created claims by statutory enactments against 
manufacturers by consumers who had damage claims that developed during what was referred to 
as the "useful life" of the product. Of interest, the product liability statute (Title 6, Chapter 14 ), 
and the NOR.A. enactment (Title 6, Chapter 25), are statutory creations identified in Idaho Code 
under "Actions In Particular Cases", being statutory creations. that have served to alter or 
change the traditional application of common law by legislative enactments. 
The right to alter common law was addressed in the case of Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 
594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944), where the question whether "common law" could be changed by a 
legislative enactment was discussed, as being also cited in Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 
P.2d 54 (1969). In the Moon case, the question was whether the enactment of the Wrongful 
Death Act had created· a cause of action for tortious conduct that survived the death of the tort-
feasor, not sanctioned in common law. The Moon Court said: 
'If the courts are thereby commanded to create a remedy for a wrong where no remedy 
existed theretofore; or if they are to recognize a cause of action which abated by reason of the 
death of a necessary party to it, they would in many instances be called upon to legislate; it 
would often require them to modify or entirely override positive and well-established rules and 
laws. The books are full of instances where the courts have had to admit that existing law-
statutory or common-did not do exact justice, or did not meet with our revised ideas of justice, 
but that the remedy lay, not with the courts, but with the Legislature. "Reverting, then, to our 
own state, we recognize that no ligislative [sic] adoption is necessary to affirm the existence of 
the common law, but the statutory enactment is essential to repeal, abrogate or change the 
rules or doctrine of the common law. The rules of the common law are not to be changed by 
doubtful implication. (Citing cases.) But where the implication is obvious it cannot be ignored. 
No statute is to be construed as altering the common law farther than its words and 
circumstances import. " As the Meade Court then stated: "This then brings us to the final 
determination regarding whether this Court should, in the absence of statute, declare a change in 
the common law. We think the answer must be in the negative. Our answer does not depend on 
our unwillingness to indulge in change. We are aware, as the commentators tell us, that the 
strength of the common Jaw lies in its capacity to adapt itself to ever changing circumstances. 
Although traditionally hesitant to change, it should not fail to do so when a hoary doctrine loses 
its raison d'etre. We are aware that a minority of courts have acted as requested by appellants 
here. We are convinced that such courts are basically unable to disenthrall themselves of the 
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lurking suspicion that liquor in and of itself is evil. This, in spite of the fact that the legislature 
here, as in almost every other state, has determined as public policy that liquor is part and parcel 
of our social scene. Abused it may be; evils it may produce; accidents, injury and death it may 
cause; marriages and homes it may rupture; unemployment, insolvency and degradation may 
result from its over use-but legitimate the selling and consuming of it is declared. Indeed both 
state and federal governments indulge in the taxation and/or wholesaling of it, from which flow 
great sums of money into governmental treasuries. We are being asked to single out a particular 
type of business, which in every other aspect is legitimate and respectable, for the imposition of a 
liability otherwise unknown in the law. This, for the purpose of alleviating a major social ill in 
this country, that ofmixing the two ingredients-alcohol and automobile. If such is to be done, it 
should be done by the legislature wherein all of the policy considerations can and should be 
carefully weighed and from which, per chance, liability of the type sought here will become a 
reality with the enactment of a dram shop act." See Meade v. Freeman, supra. 
The doctrine of "privity of contract" originally emerged alongside the doctrine of 
"consideration" within the common law, where the rule became that "consideration" must 
exchange from the promisee to the promisor. The theory was if nothing is given for the promise 
of something to be given in return, the promise was not legally binding. Because the doctrine of 
"privity of contract", it served to play a key role in the manner in which various courts began to 
treat and develop the law of negligence in the following years. For example, in Winterbottom v. 
Wright (1842), a postal service wagon driver, Mr. Winterbottom, was injured because of a faulty 
wheel, and when he attempted to sue the manufacturer of the wagon for injuries, the courts 
concluded no "privity of contract" between manufacturer and the driver, so his case was 
dismissed. The issue of "privity" and "consideration" survived rather well until MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor Co. (1916), when a case virtually analogous to Winterbottom involved a defective 
wheel on a car instead of on a wagon. In that case, Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of 
Appeals decided "privity" was NOT required when a manufacturer knows a product could 
potentially be dangerous when defective, and third parties as well could be injured by a defective 
condition, and from that case c~e the doctrine of "foreseeable causation", "foreseeable 
injuries", and "foreseeable uses, and with that, liability was created, absent any contractual 
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privity or consideration. This may have been the beginning of what became the expression of 
"claims sounding in tort", and were evolving tort liability and contractual liability, and this 
"hybrid" of a contract/tort claim came into existence, essentially endorsed in case development 
or in some instances picked up by subsequent legislation that altered or removed the common 
law concept, eroding away the age old defense of "privity of contract". 
As time progressed, the problems resulting from the doctrines of "privity" and "lack of 
consideration" caused their erosion further, either by a continuing process of this 'judicial 
metamorphosis" or, more commonly, through legislative creations resulting in the aberration, 
abrogation, abolition or deviation from these common law doctrines and traditions in our 
evolving modem day society. As the occasions arose, legislative enactments altered and changed 
common law doctrines, and one such statutory enactment that has abrogated the common law 
"privity" by the "morphing" effects occurred when the legislature undertook the artificial 
creation of an "agency relationship" with the establishment of the "lien" statute that never 
existed at common law. This relevant example of a deviation from the common law "privity of 
contract" and "consideration" requirements was undertaken by the Idaho legislature when 
formulating the Mechanic's lien statute in Title 45, Chapter 5, Statutes of the State of Idaho, by 
the artificial creation of an agency relationshil!, between subcontractors and building and real 
property owners as defined by §45-501, Idaho Code. 
It is this same legislative "creativity" that appears to be the legislative intent when 
regarding claimant's ("homeowner's") right to initiate a lawsuit against that very same 
"subcontractor" (who is identified as the claimant's agent in the lien statute, who is now referred 
to and defined as a construction professional in N.O.R.A.) for damages by alleging a contract or 
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tort claim under the circumstances and provisions ofN.O.R.A., as a result of damages caused by 
defective installations in the construction or remodel project. 
The interpretation of a statutory enactment is a question of law over which appellate 
courts exercise free review. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 46 P.3d 18 (2002). An 
analysis of a statute begins with the literal words of the statute, Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 
Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); those words used in a statute must be given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning; and statutes must be construed as a whole. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 25 
P.3d 850 (2001). If the statute is not ambiguous, the appellate courts do not construe it, but 
follows the law as written. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 
974 (1987). See also Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 
502, 506 (2011) (quoting specifically State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003)). Unless the result is palpably absurd, the appellate courts assume the legislature means 
what is stated in the statute. Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986). If the statute as 
written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial. 
Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987). A statute is 
ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction. Jen-Rath 
Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 48 P.3d 659 (2002). Ambiguity is not established 
merely because differing interpretations are presented. If the statute is ambiguous, it must be 
construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean. Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 
715 P.2d 968 (1986). To determine legislative intent, appellate courts examine not only the 
literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy 
behind the statute, and legislative history. Lopez v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 
174, 30 P.3d 952 (2001); Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 990 P.2d 1213 (1999). 
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In A&B Irr. Dist. V IDWR, 153 Idaho 500,284 P.3d 225 (2012), the Court said: 
"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed 
as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the 
law as written.' " Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 
506 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). "We have 
consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other 
extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent 
of the legislature." Id. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 
P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). [W]e have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground 
that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written, and we do 
not have the authority to do so. 'The public policy of legislative enactments cannot be questioned 
by the courts and avoided simply because the courts might not agree with the public policy so 
announced.' Id. at 896, 265 P.3d at 509 (quoting State v. Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 
525, 265 P.2d 328, 334 (1953)). 
The interpretation and application of a statute is "a substantial legal issue", as the review 
is important to determine whether the statute is to be applied and enforced specifically as it 
reads, or if it has some other intended meaning, or is ambiguous, all of which may ultimately 
require a review of its legislative history, or other statutory enactments that have meaning and 
relevance to the objective sought to be accomplished to determine its intended application and 
scope of abrogation of any common law aspects it may have impacted. 
Therefore, the analysis of a statute begins with the literal words used in the statute, and 
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. These "literal words" take us directly to the definitions contained in 
N.O.R.A., §6-2502, Idaho Code, wherein it states the action or suit may be initiated by the 
claimant ("residential homeovmer"), and that action or suit means: any civil lawsuit or action in 
contract or tort for damages or indemnity brought against a construction professional to assert 
a claim, whether by complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim, for damage or loss of use of real 
or personal property caused hv a defect in the construction of the residence or in substantial 
remodel of the residence. 
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That "definition'' of a rig/it to file an "action or suit" is conditioned upon the requirement 
that the "residential homeowner" undertake the requirements under the provisions that comport 
to fulfill the purpose and requirements of N.O.R.A .. These Plaintiffs specifically did that; they 
gave a notice, there was an authorized inspection, there was an estimation of damages, but no 
proper response from the construction professional, as was their duty under the provisions, 
giving Plaintiffs the right to file suit without further notice (§6-2503(4)(c), Idaho Code). 
The nature of the claim envisioned with respect to the rig/it to file suit is either a 
contract claim, or a tort claim, or both, or in the alternative, and the question then arises: may 
the Claimant ("residential homeowner") file a suit alleging a contract claim for damages directly 
against the subcontractor, who is defined as within the class of "construction professionals" that 
are statutorily allowed to be sued in contract or tort, in the absence of a direct "privity of 
contract" between the claimant and subcontractor? The Defendant has argued, and thus far the 
district court has agreed, that the Claimant cannot bring a claim against the subcontractor, 
sounding in contract, absent the presence of the common law requirement of "privity of 
contract". 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are of the opinion that the plain, ordinary, and common 
words and definitions used within the lien statute has established that absolute right, along with 
the inclusion of the legislative history reflected by the very language used in the meclianic's lien 
statute, as that lien statute specifically creates a right of action by a subcontractor to file suit 
against a residential homeowner for payment of his professional services (who clearly had no 
"privity of contract" with the homeowner), and because of that artificial creation of their agency 
relations/tip, the legislature has statutorily created a cause of action by a lienor under an agency 
theory of a contractual relationship, and the lien claimant's right to file a lawsuit, alleging a 
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claim to a right of payment directly from the homeowner, pursuant to the performance of 
services that may have only been at the request of the general contractor. The statute make the 
subcontractor an agent, just as though it was performed at the instance or request of the owner. .. 
(privity being established only under an agency concept, if at all). The effect of this lien claimant 
legislation has abrogated the common law concept of "privity of contract" and "consideration" 
with respect to a subcontractor's right to pursue payment from the homeowner, instead of the 
general contractor, where there exists the only contractual relationship between anyone. This 
statutorily created agency relationship allows a subcontractor to directly sue a homeowner under 
a contract claim for payment of his services performed under contract with the general 
contractor, and that right of action is a contract claim, not accomplished by any hybrid of a "tort 
claim" for recovery for services perfo1med. The right of a lien claimant to sue the homeowner 
exists only through an abrogation of the common law "privity of contract" requirement, as no 
privity exists since there is no contractual relationship with the homeowner, and the 
"relationship" if any, exists only to the extent it is being artificially created. 
The statutory language in N.O.R.A., incorporates the lien statute language and effect, 
through reference to it that serves to create a contract-agency-relationship between a homeowner 
and a subcontractor, and the lien statute, by virtue of the lien right reference, is made Part of the 
very meaning .as the legislature defines "who" and "what" constitutes a "construction 
professional", and that definition is specifically inclusive of subcontractors, and these 
"subcontractors" are "performing services at the instance or request of the owner. ... or agent, 
and that lien statute is incorporated into N.O.R.A., by definition of "construction professionals" 
are, and those providers are deemed to be ggents of the homeowner or property owner for 
purposes of filing a cause of action in contract or tort for damages under that specific chapter. 
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This creation of "agency" within the lien statute is merged into N.O.R.A. as part of the definition 
of who may be, and what is, a construction professional, who, by definition, is also a lien 
claimant, as the construction professional possesses the right to file a claim of lien and initiate a 
suit for recovery under the lien statute. N.O.R.A. serves to include this very same subcontractor 
within the "construction professional" classification that can be sued for contract damages and 
tort damages by the homeowner under N.O.R.A.. It is this language and this reference, in itself, 
that would appear to. constitute "A controlling question of law as to which there appears to be 
substantial grounds for difference of opinion" (a fourth district court judge and a subcontracting 
construction professional) who renders legal decisions and renders professional plumbing 
services, respectively, in the community that concludes a right of action is subject to the 
application of the common law defense of "privity of contract", even when addressing a 
"N.O.R.A." contract claim filed against this very same subcontractor who holds a right to file a 
lien, but now defined as a "construction professional" who causes damages by virtue of defective 
installations in the substantial remodel project of the residential homeowner's residence. 
The N.O.R.A. legislation should not be construed to limit the right to file a "contract 
claim" by the residential homeowner only against the "general contractor", as the specific 
language used in the statute allows a contract claim or tort claim to be brought against the 
"construction professional". and that definition includes all subcontractors as well as general 
contractors in its scope of reference. N.O.R.A. allows a "residential homeowner" to sue a 
"construction professional" "in contract or tort" for "damages or indemnity", once their 
participation in the required settlement proceedings is contemplated under N.O.R.A., and no 
performance is forthcoming or settlement reached between the parties, as contemplated by the 
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required response from the construction professional, as announced in Perception Construction 
Management, Inc. v. Bell, et al, 151 Idaho 250, 254 P.3d 1246 (2011). 
There is sufficient language used in the N.O.R.A. legislation to convey the intention there 
was no preservation of the common law affirmative defense of privity, as the N.O.R.A. 
enactment specifically addressed affirmative defenses (as addressed hereinafter), and the 
specific language created a contract cause of action to be filed by the "claimant", who is defined 
to include residential homeowner, and the homeowner is among those who may assert a claim 
against the construction professional, and the specific language defines a construction 
professional to include contractors and sub-contractors alike, and also brings into the equation 
the language employed in the mechanic's lien statute, where the lien statute defines contractors 
and sub-contractors as being agents of the owner, directly incorporated by reference into 
N.O.R.A. with the direct implication there is a specific agency interrelationship between 
constructional professionals and residential homeowners, as it is recognized the right to file a 
lien pursuant to §45-501, Idaho Code is made part of the defining language describing who 
construction professionals are, which specifically includes subcontractors, being regarded as 
being among the agents of the owner. 
If the legislation were intended to preserve the common law defense of "Privity of 
contract" thereby protecting "sub-contractors" from suit, the Legislators certainly could have 
done that, as they dwelled quite extensively on affirmative defenses, as addressed hereinafter. 
They could have simply chosen not to include subcontractors within the same definition 
of "construction professionals" that included general contractors. Instead, the definition and 
language used made both general and subcontractors subject to being sued by the "residential 
homeowner" in "contract or tort", and just as important as that aspect, the Legislators would 
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include within the definition of "construction professionals" those who qualify to file a claim of 
lien under the lien statute. That makes the "agency relationship" now part of this artificially 
created relation established in the lien statute, where lien claimants become statutorily defined as 
"agents" of the property owner, and that establishes the "agency relationship" between and 
among the "contractors", "subcontractors", and owners of the real property where the 
professional services are rendered and performed, and that statutory language serves to abrogate 
the historic application of the common law defense of "privity of contract". 
That lien statute says: " ... who renders any other professional service whatsoever for 
which he is legally authorized to perform in connection with any land or building development 
or improvement, .... , has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or professional 
services or materials furnished, whether done or furnished at the instance of the owner of the. 
building or other improvement or his agent; and every contractor, subcontractor ..... , shall be 
held to be the agent of the owner for the purpose ofthis chapter: ... 
"This chapter", being the lien statute, is specifically incorporated into N.O.R.A., for the 
specific purpose of defining what "constiuction professionals" are, and they are now defined as 
agents of the owner of the property, authorized to perform services at the instance of the owner 
of the building .... or his agent., In our case, the subcontracting plumber, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 
was specifically authorized to render professional services at the instance or request of the 
owner's agent, Gould Custom Builders, Inc., so the right to file a lien exists with the 
subcontractor. 
Not orily byviriue of the definition of who "construction professionals" are, and not only 
by the incorporation of the lien statute designating them as "agents" of the owner, but the 
legislative intent to abrogate common law privity as an affirmative defense is clearly not 
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preserved in N.O.R.A. because a "contract" cause of action is bestowed upon a "homeowner", 
who is defined to include subsequent homeowners, who clearly have no "privity of contract". 
This definition becomes rather telling as to the intent to abrogate the common law 
concept of "privity of contract", as the definition of "claimant" includes not only the existing 
"homeowner", who · would have at least contracted with or authorized the rendition of 
professional services with a general contractor, but specifically includes any person who is a 
subsequent purchaser of the residence from any homeowner. When the Claimant can be a 
subsequent homeowner, who has no privity with anyone, is there any reasonable basis to believe 
a subsequent purchaser ofa residence from any homeowner could ever establish some "privity 
of contract" with any construction professional involved in the project? By all accounts, a 
subsequent purchaser has NO "privity of contract" be it with any contractor or subcontractor who 
was involved in the rendition of any services in the building or remodel project of the residence, 
so given the plain and ordinary language used, once again the specific intent was to classify the 
qualifying members of Claimants to include subsequent purchasers of the residence within the 
definition of "homeowners", who clearly have no "privity of contract". That situation establishes 
a reasonable and logical basis to conclude that if someone within the definition clearly has no 
privity with anyone whatsoever, and qualifies to file a lawsuit alleging a claim for damages in 
contract or tort, then no "claimant" within the definition of "homeowner" is required to have any 
"privity of contract" with a particular construction professional who rendered professional 
services on the project, as to do otherwise would render a contradictory and absurd application of 
the enforcement of the rights intended under the N.0.R.A. statute. 
To add further emphasis to demonstrate the point, if a "current homeowner" could only 
file suit against his "general contractor", because that would be his only "privity of contract", 
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then that "homeowner" need only "assign" his interest in the residence to a "subsequent 
purchaser" most likely· his best friend, who may then directly sue the ''subcontractor" under the 
definitions and provisions of N.O.R.A.. To require such an act of assignment to take place 
merely to qualify a Claimant as a "subsequent purchaser", in order to file a contract claim, that 
would be an unreasonable requirement, and the intended effects of the cross-over reference that 
implements the inclusion within the definition of "construction professionals" as "agents" by 
implication of the definition in the lien statute, taken together, makes that procedure unnecessary. 
The composite of these compelling aspects serve to indicate the legislature intent to alter, 
suspend, or eliminate the requirement as to any need or desire to preserve the concept of "privity 
of contract" in lawsuits filed by "homeowners" against "construction professionals", when the 
statute specifically authorizes a residential homeowner the absolute right to file an action in tort 
or contract against a construction professional, that, by definition, includes a subcontractor. 
The above definitions frame the context as to both the meaning and purpose of the 
N.O.R.A. legislation. When homeowner includes a subsequent purchaser of a residence from a 
homeowner, that demonstrates "privity of contract" as an affirmative defense has been 
abolished or abrogated for purposes of the application of N.O.R.A., as the Legislature would 
clearly understand a homeowner who purchases a residence from another homeowner would 
never be in "privity of contract" with either the contractor or subcontractor, and these individuals 
are specifically included in the definition of construction professionals under the Act. 
This "difference of opinion" reflected in the lower court's order denying the permissive 
appeal,aiong with Defendant's perception of the statute, should constitutes a substantial legal 
issue when confronted with the controversy whether the common law defense of "privity of 
contract" is to be allowed to exist under N.O.R.A. , given a statute defining subcontractor and 
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contractor within the same class of construction professionals who can be sued in contract or 
tort for damages by homeowners, who, under that same statute, have "existing" residential 
homeowners and "subsequent" residential purchasers defined in the same class as the 
residential homeowners who can file suit against construction professionals for damages in 
contract or tort. 
When "privity of contract" is missing partially or entirely within the application of that 
definition of residential homeowners and construction professionals, the legislative intent 
becomes apparent There is no room for debate when a subsequent purchaser of residential 
property can file the lawsuit against the contractor or subcontractor, with whom there has never 
been any contractual privity, and that serves to demonstrate any homeowner may file the suit 
against any construction professional, whether contractor or subcontractor performing 
professional services on the residential construction project or remodel project, when undertaken 
by the homeowner under the provisions ofN.O.R.A.. 
If "privity of contract" is unnecessary to file suit against a subcontractor by a subsequent 
homeowner of the residence in the one instance, it then becomes absurd and illogical to argue 
the existing homeowner cannot file that same suit against the same construction professional 
because he lacks "privity of contract" with that subcontractor. The plain and ordinary meaning of 
this Statutory Language requires an interpretation that applies the definitions uniformly, logically 
and achieves the meaning and purpose of resolving these disputes between home owners and 
construction professionals, and for that reasoning. When a subsequent purchaser can sue in 
contract or tort, so can the existing residential homeowner, as they are both defined as 
homeowners. 
2). Ofgreat public interest: 
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When a substantial legal issue is being raised over whether "privity of contract" has 
been statutorily modified by the enactment of N.O.R.A., it becomes a matter of language 
analysis to determine in what fashion the enactment seeks to define the statutorily created 
relationship between the parties. The statute specifically confers the right to file a lawsuit by 
homeowners against construction professionals, under criteria developed in the statute that 
intentionally places contractors and subcontractors in the same class that are defined as 
construction professionals. The legislators clearly understood the existing common law aspects 
of what is regarded to be affirmative defenses, as they dedicated a substantial portion of one 
section to that topic in the chapter (as addressed hereafter), and they could have conveniently 
declared a homeowner to be in "privity of contract" with the homeowner's contractor only, and 
specifically excluded the subcontractors from the definition of construction professionals. 
Those same legislators understood a subsequent homeowner clearly had no "privity of 
contract" with either the contractor or subcontractor, and recognizing the legislature defined 
both existing and subsequent homeowners to be included in the meaning of "claimants", it serves 
to confirm there is a question of great public interest as to the application of the statute in these 
construction/remodel projects, when it comes to the survivability of the common law defense of 
"privity of contract". The legislators would have known that the common law component of a 
"privity" defense would be impacted if they chose to classify both a residential homeowner and 
a subsequent homeowner in the same definition of "claimant" that have the conferred right to 
file any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort against these construction professionals. 
The rationale that "privity of contract" was specifically considered and modified by 
statute, and was intended to be abrogated by this statutory enactment, is rather apparent by their 
reference to the "agency" statute, as the legislators deliberately incorporated reference to the 
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"agency relationship" provisions that exist within the lien statute, by the inclusion of that 
language by definition. That incorporation supports the deliberate intention, as the legislators 
were not only aware of their prior lien statute, but chose to include the lien statute's concept of 
agency within part of the definition of "construction professionals". They not only lumped 
contractors and subcontractors into the same classification, but then incorporated reference to 
their lien statute, and brought forth that definition, calling them rightful lien claimants, since 
these contractors and subcontractors are defined as those who have a right to file a lien under 
Idaho's Lien Statute, and those who qualifv to file a lien are statutorily made agents of the 
owner, and under tis statute, that would be the homeowner. 
Consequently, if a subsequent purchaser of a residence from and existing homeowner has 
the unconditional right to file suit against the contractor and subcontractor of the original 
homeowner, with whom there is NO "privity of contract", it becomes logical to conclude (using 
the common meaning of the words), that the intended statutory interpretation of both N.O.R.A. 
and the Lien Statute makes these "construction professionals" lienholders, who are treated as 
agents of the owner by statutory decree. These enactments, taken together, express a clear 
meaning that specifically eliminates the requirement of "privily of contract" for lien claimants 
by the creation of an agency relationship by definition, and when it is legally impossible for a 
subsequent homeowner to have "privily of contract" with any of the construction 
professionals, the abrogation of the privity defense is emphasized from the statutory 
authorization for all homeowners to file a lawsuit in contract or tort against any construction 
professionals that are the agents of the homeowners. 
The common law defense of "privity of contract" cannot remain viable when analyzed in 
light of this language, as it cannot be applied in any consistent fashion under the plain and 
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ordinary language used in these two statutes. To allow it to be applied against one homeowner 
(the existing homeowner), but not applied against the included class of homeowner (subsequent 
purchaser of a homeowner), the effect of that inconsistency would result in an absurd and 
unequal application of the statutory objective(s), and would result in an absurd interpretation of 
the statutory enactments that creates a right of action, in contract or tort, for damages against a 
construction professional, who is the agent of the homeowner, existing or subsequent, by virtue 
of the lien statute. 
3). A legal question of first impression: 
A statutory interpretation of N.O.R.A. would suggest the legislative intent has been to 
either create a statutory formthat is a "privity by Proxy" (by virtue of the lien claimant-agency 
status), or a complete abrogation or suspension of the common law requirement of "privity of 
contract" altogether, as being an available common law defense in the application of N.O.R.A. 
situations, when engaged within the process established by the enactment of N.O.R.A .. This 
issue of "privity of contract" has not been determined by the Courts, and therefore would be 
eligible for treatment as an issue of first impression. 
There are two appellate cases that currently address any aspect of this N.O.R.A. 
legislation. The issue concerning notice was addressed in the one case, and the issue regarding 
the response required from the construction professional, was addressed in the other case. 
The Supreme Court, upon acceptance of this permissive appeal, will apply the words as 
used in the enactment, given their common and ordinary usage, or analyze the enactment for any 
ambiguity, and ascertain the statutory intent when the legislature enacted this process. The 
enactment appears to authorize filing an action in contract or tort, when filed by either an 
existing homeowner or a subsequent purchasing homeowner, against either a contractor or a 
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subcontractor, or both, as they are each identified and characterized as the proper parties in the 
lawsuit by defining homeowners and construction professionals as they did, well knowing the 
Legislature was aware of "affirmative defenses" by their dedicated reference to it (as addressed 
hereinafter), and the legislature was well aware that a subsequent homeowner could never be in 
"privity of contract" with either a contractor or subcontractor who performed any work on the 
residential project. Using that direct logic, the plain and ordinary language of the lien statute that 
is incorporated into the definition, and from an interpretative perspective, the right of a 
homeowner to file the action in contract or tort against either a contractor or subcontractor, who 
are each agents of the owner by virtue of their lien status, is either exempt from the application 
of a defense of "privity of contract", or the inclusion of the "agency" concept into that 
"relationship" serves as the formation of a "Privity by Proxy'\ and nothing further in their 
relationship is needed to allow the litigation to go forward between any of those parties. 
This "agency" concept is created in N.O.R.A. by the cross-over reference to the lien 
statute, wherein the statutory reference that anyone who possesses a right to file a claim of lien 
is also being statutorily defined as the agent of the owner, and by that inclusion of a lien 
claimant into the definition of "who" construction professionals are, the legislative intent of the 
N.O.R.A. enactment was to declare all construction professionals automatically included in an 
"agency relationship" with any residential homeowner. Such inclusion, as part of the definition 
of who construction professionals are, makes the contractor- subcontractor-homeowner agency 
relationship a form of "statutory proxy" in developing the relationship between the parties, and 
there lies a compelling correlation that the common law defense of "privity" has been altered, 
transformed, or artificially created through this "agency relationship" into a modified form of a 
"statutory privity", and the common law "privity of contract" is nullified under N.O.R.A .. This 
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concept of "agency" between the homeowner, and the subcontractor. statutorily defined as a 
lienholder-agent, is specifically cited and created in the provisions of Title 45, Chapter 5, 
Statutes of the State of Idaho. The statutory provision states: 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-501. RIGHT TO LIEN. Every person performing labor upon, or furnishing 
materials to be used in the construction, alteration or repair of any ... , building, ... , or any 
other structure, ... , or who renders any other professional service whatsoever for which he is 
legally authorized to perform in connection with any land or building development or 
improvement, ... , has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or professional services 
or materials furnished, whether done or furnished at the instance of the owner of the 
building ... or his agenti and every contractor, subcontractor, ... or any person having charge ... 
of the construction, alteration or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building or other 
improvement, ... , shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the purpose of this chapter: ... 
(italic, dark lettering, and underlining emphasis added). 
Since a subcontractor is authorized to file a lien against the homeowner's property, upon 
furnishing materials and rendering professional services on a project, and since the lien statute 
declares contractors and subcontractors to be the statutory agents of the owner, and since the 
provisions of N.O.R.A. expressly make constructional professionals lien claimants, defined as 
having the lien right, such defining reference makes construction professionals the statutory 
agents of the homeowner, since all lienors are declared statutory agents of the owner. 
This "lien claimant-agency status" within the definition of construction professionals 
serves to establish the creation of a statutory form of the concept of "Privity" by "Proxy", by 
virtue of the statutory creation, or the legislative intent was to simply abolish the "privity of 
contract" concept altogether (as discussed hereafter) as a component of their traditional privity 
relationship. 
JUDICIAL HISTORY OF N.O.R.A. 
N.O.R.A. was enacted in 2003, and first "debuted" in the appellate courts in 2008, 
addressed by the Supreme Court in Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 196 P.3d 352 (2008). 
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The issue was limited to the contents required in the notice given to the construction 
professional regarding defects or damages caused in the construction or remodel process. The 
court expressed the awareness that the enactment was new, and acknowledged the issue over 
notice was a subject of first impression with the court, stating in the analysis: 
"NORA is a relatively new piece of legislation, and interpretation of the statute is a 
matter of first impression for this Court. The Act was passed in 2003. The Idaho Building 
Contractors Association sponsored the bill in an effort to curb litigation against building 
contractors by homeowner. The purpose of the law is to give contractors the opportunity to fix 
construction defects before a lawsuit is filed. . . . . Mendenhall's March 11 letter satisfies the 
notice requirements· of NORA for the construction defects he alleges therein. His letter 
sufficiently identified the nature and location of the defects. The letter stated, among other 
things, "water problem with north roof of great room, east spouting leaks in four places." [21 This 
surely provided enough detail and pertinent information to permit the Aldouses to inspect the 
home and determine "the general nature of the defect[ s ]." ( emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court was not presented the issue whether the comi11on law "privity of 
contract" had been altered entirely or modified with a "statutory agency relationship" in its 
application to construction/remodel disputes. In Mendenhall the homeowner was seeking 
contract damages against his contractor, with whom "privity of contract" would not have been 
an issue, as the concept of privity would have existed between the homeowner and his general 
contractor, so lack of privity was not an issue to be raised. 
The next inquiry within the appellate process came in 2011 in the case of Perception 
Construction Management, Inc. v. Bell, et al, 151 Idaho 250,254 P.3d 1246 (2011). In that case, 
the homeowner and his contractor became involved in a dispute. The Bells hired Perception 
Construction Management, Inc. (PCM) to build their log home. The parties' relationship 
deteriorated, and Bells terminated the contract before construction was completed. The Bells 
refused to pay final invoices, and PCM filed a lien and then filed suit to enforce their lien for the 
amounts claimed owing. The Bells filed several counterclaims, including claims over 
construction defects and breach of contract. The issue presented, in relation to N.O.R.A., was 
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again limited to what takes place after notice, and the appellate court addressed the 
corresponding duty of a construction professional regarding the responsibility to respond. 
Given the limited exposure that N.O.R.A. has had in the judicial system, our case would 
serve to present an issue of first impression regarding the common law "privity of contract" 
concept, and whether "privity" is an available affirmative defense in a N.O.R.A. lawsuit filed by 
a "homeowner" against a "construction professional" who performed professional services in the 
capacity as a subcontractor in the remodel project. 
The lower court's Order in our case serves to render the legal conclusion "privity of 
contract" to be a required element that must exist in lawsuits filed by homeowners against 
construction professionals, where there is an allegation of contract damages being claimed under 
the application of the N.0.R.A. provisions. There is no authority currently available in our 
analysis where the specific issue has been raised, or where it has been held "privity of contract" 
must exist · between the homeowner and a subcontractor in a lawsuit for contract damages 
undertaken in the application of the provisions of N.O.R.A., or holds that a homeowner is 
precluded from filing any action in contract against a construction professional, when that 
construction professional is performing professional services only in the capacity as a 
subcontractor. 
This issue will continue to surface in all situations where N.O.R.A. disputes arise and the 
provisions of this legislation are to be utilized, and it will be more likely than not a subcontractor 
will be among the construction professionals that directly participates in any settlement 
proceedings, as the disputed defect may center solely around the professional services rendered 
by the electrical subcontractor, or the plumbing subcontractor, or the heating system specialist or 
the inadequate ducting installations in the circulation systems, or a failure in the sealing process 
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of specialized glass components installations by technical subcontracting installers. Quite often, 
the general contractor's liability coverage specifically provides exclusions for failures in the 
performance of the subcontracting agents, thereby necessitating the involvement of the 
subcontractor or the liability carrier addressing their performance failures. That is precisely what 
this case presents, and that is why the liability carrier of the subcontractor took the active role 
that it did. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ADDRESSED IN N.O.R.A., AND RIGHTS OF 
RECOVERY UNDER N.O.R.A. 
The existence of "affirmative defenses" is specifically recognized and addressed in 
N.O.R.A. It does appear that the legislature was infinitely aware of the concept of affirmative 
defenses and their potential application, unless N.O.R.A. specifically expressed an intention to 
exclude such defenses to the cause of actions created in that legislation. It would appear that the 
legislature was aware that "privity of contract" was a common law element that would otherwise 
be recognized as applying in an action brought by a homeowner against a subcontractor in a 
"contract action", unless it was intentionally excluded as it regards those parties and those cause 
of actions authorized by the enactment ofN.O.R.A. 
It remains fundamental to understand who the proper parties are, and what the defined 
cause of actions are in the litigation provided for in a N O.R.A. dispute, and what the rights of 
recovery are? The right of recovery in a contract claim may be different from that which is 
allowed in N.O.R.A. dispute, and when compared to what is recoverable in a tort claim, that may 
also be different than what is allowed in N.O.R.A. dispute. N.O.R.A. initially defines a 
classification and range of damages that may be recovered in a dispute initiated under its 
provisions, and specifically withdraws that limitation under certain circumstances, and 
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furthermore grants the right to recovery of attorney fees under §6-2504, Idaho Code, where both 
the limitation on damages and the recovery of attorney fees in a N.O.R.A. action are discussed. 
Under Rule 54 I.R.C.P., attorney fees are allowable only if provided for by statute or 
contract. In this enactment, the statute addresses creates both a classification of recoverable 
damages, as well as the right to recover attorney fees, and the N.O.R.A. legislation allows 
recovery of those specified damages and attorney fees in both a contract action and in a tort 
action. This statutory creation specifically regulates the damage award and provides the fee 
award. So, this statute creates 1) a form of damage recovery, 2) an attorney fee award, and 3) 
creates both contract and tort causes of action that were not necessarily in existence before in a 
common law setting, and the language suggests it was a clear intent to do as it did, and those 
were authorized and to be accomplished by that enactment. Once again, it appears this statutory 
modification regarding "categories" of damage recovery, attorney fees, and right to file contract 
and/or tort claims has modified, altered, or created those aspects by the provisions within this 
statutory enactment, and it would not be unreasonable to accept the fact that the common law 
requirement of ''privity of contract" may have been intentionally "removed" as a necessary 
element to these rights of recovery under those causes of actions initiated under this statute. 
This N.O.R.A. enactment also specifically provides that if the construction professional 
fails to make a reasonable offer, or does not make a reasonable attempt to make the repairs, or 
fails to complete the repairs, then the "limitations on damages" and any "defense to liability" 
provided for in §6-2504(1) shall not apply. The statute specifically states: 
TITLE 6 
ACTIONS IN PARTICULAR CASES 
CHAPTER 25 
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT 
6-2504. LIMITATION ON DAMAGES. (1) In a suit subiect to section 6-2503, Idaho 
Code, the claimant may recover only the following damages proximately caused by a 
construction defect: 
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(a) The reasonable cost of repairs necessary to cure any construction defect, ... ; 
(b) The reasonable expenses of temporary housing reasonably necessary during the repair 
periodi 
( c) The reduction in market value, if any, to the extent that the reduction is due to structural 
failure; and 
( d) Reasonable and necessary attorney's fees. 
(2) If a construction professional fails to make a reasonable offer as required under 
section 6-2503, Idaho Code, or fails to make a reasonable attempt to complete the repairs 
specified in an accepted offer, or fails to complete, in a good and workmanlike manner, the 
repairs specified in an accepted offer, the limitations on damages and defenses to liability 
provided for in this section shall not apply. 
(3) ... . 
(4) ... . 
(5) A builder,. under the principles of comparative fault pertaining to affirmative 
defenses, may be excused, in whole or in part, from any obligation, damage, loss or liability if 
the builder can demonstrate any of the following affirmative defenses in response to the claimed 






(f) .... . 
(g) .... . 
(6) All applicable affirmative defenses are preserved for causes of action to which this 
chapter does not applv. 
History: 
[6-,2504, added 2003, ch. 133, sec. 1, p. 389.] (redactions made, and all italic, dark 
lettering, and underlining emphasis added) 
Several provisions are of particular interest in the above statute: 1 ). under certain 
circumstances the limitations on damages and the application of defenses to liability shall not 
{!;J!J]]Jz_; 2). the legislature was specifically aware of the subject and substance of affirmative 
defenses; and.(the most important provision), 3). under paragraph (6), All applicable affirmative 
defenses are preserved for causes of action to which this chapter does not applv. 
As to the first provision, the construction professional must make the required response, 
or the damage limitation is removed. Though not relevant to this permissive appeal, in our case, 
the construction professional made no required response under N.O.R.A., and according to 
Mendenhall, that failure constitutes a breach of the construction professional's duty under the 
mandatory provisions that requires the homeowners and construction professionals to utilize the 
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mandatory provisions ofN.O.R.A.. Consequently, the application of that provision would serve 
to remove the damage limitations in our case, and !!!!!!ft. of the enumerated affirmative defenses 
would now apply in·. our case. As to the second provision, the legislature made it patently clear 
they were aware of what is referred to as affirmative defenses, and identified certain defenses 
and made reference as to what could apply as an affirmative defense, and as to the third 
provision, and directly related to this pennissive appeal, the legislature expressed awareness as to 
the existence of affirmative defenses in general, which obviously would be inclusive of the 
defense of "privity of contract" are all preserved, except as to any cause of action to which the 
N. O.R.A. Chapter applies. This Chapter applies to a homeowner initiating a lawsuit against a 
construction professional in contract or tort for damages, which specifically includes a contract 
claim against a subcontractor, as the legislature specifically stated affirmative defenses are 
preserved except as to the causes of action provided for under that Chapter. The legislature was 
thinking about specific affirmative defenses when formulating this piece of legislation within the 
provisions of subparts (5) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), & (g); the legislature knew it was within their 
authority to abrogate various common law defenses, as well as their right to preserve any 
affirmative defenses, as well as their right to abolish common law defenses in those actions they 
create under their legislation, just as they had done with the lien statute. When the legislature 
elected to preserve all affirmative defenses to any "causes of action to which this chapter does . 
not apply", that expresses an intent that affirmative defenses do not apply to those causes of 
action to which the Chapter does apply, and that is contract and tort claims initiated by 
homeowners against any subcontractors rendering professional services in relation to the 
construction or remodel project where defects and damages have been suffered from their 
performance, or lackthereof. 
Thus the question arises within this permissive appeal: what parties are identified in this 
Chapter, and whatcauses of action are identified in this Chapter, and to whom does this chapter 
apply? It would.appear this chapter applies to the parties who are referred to as claimants, who 
are specifically identified as the homeowners, which Claimants can be current homeowners or 
subsequent homeowners; it applies to the parties who are identified as construction 
professionals, which. specifically includes subcontractors; it applies to those lawsuits filed by 
homeowners against contractors and subcontractors, alleging any causes of action for damages 
or indemnity in contract or tort, relating to the rendition of professional services. 
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Consequently, none of the common law affirmative defenses apply to these parties for 
these lawsuits for these causes of actions for those damages established by Chapter 25 of Title 
6, Statutes of Idaho. 
This statutory Chapter includes the specific section that expressly states: 
TITLE 6 
ACTIONS IN PARTICULAR CASES 
CHAPTER 25 
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT 
6-2502. DEFINITIONS. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, as used in this 
chapter: 
(1) "Action" means any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort for damages or 
indemnity brought against a construction professional to assert a claim, whether by complaint, 
counterclaim or cross-claim, for damage or the loss of use of real or personal property caused by 
a defect in the construction of a residence or in the substantial remodel of a residence. "Action" 
does not include any civil action in tort alleging personal injury or wrongful death to a person or 
persons resulting from a construction defect. 
(2) "Association" means a homeowner's association, condominium management body, 
unit owner's organization or a nonprofit corporation created to own and operate portions of a 
planned community which has the power to assess unit owners to pay the costs and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the association's obligations. 
(3) "Claimant" means a homeowner or association that asserts a claim against a 
construction professional concerning a defect in the construction of a residence or in the 
substantial remodel of a residence. 
( 4) "Construction professional" means any person with a right to lien pursuant to section 
45-501, Idaho Code, an architect, subdivision owner or developer, builder, contractor, 
subcontractor, engineer or inspector, performing or furnishing the design, supervision, 
inspection, construction or observation of the construction of any improvement to residential real 
property, whether operating as a sole proprietor, partnership, corporation, limited liability 
company or other business entity. 
(5) "Homeowner" means: 
(a) Any person who contracts with a construction professional for the construction, sale, or 
construction and sale of a residence; and 
(b) An association as defined in this section. 
"Homeowner" includes a subsequent purchaser of a residence from any homeowner. 
(6) "Person" means an individual, an association as defined in this section, or a 
corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, joint venture or 
other legal business entity. 
(7) "Residence" means a single-family house, duplex, triplex, quadraplex, condominium 
or a unit in a multiunit residential structure in which title to each individual unit is transferred to 
the owner under a cooperative system. 
(8) "Serve" or "service" means personal service or delivery by certified mail to the last 
known address of the addressee. 
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(9) "Substantial remodel" means a remodel of a residence, for which the total cost 
exceeds one-half (1/2) of the assessed value of the residence for property tax purposes at the time 
the contract for the remodel work was made. 
History: 
[6-2502, added 2003, ch. 133, sec. 1, p. 386.] 
The legislative creation appears to clearly express the intention that the common law 
defense of lack of "privity of contract" is excluded from any application in a N.O.R.A. 
proceeding, as this Chapter unconditionally applies to a cause of action sounding in contract, 
filed by a homeowner against a subcontractor for damages. With this exclusionary factor 
considered, the statutory provisions must be interpreted to prohibit the common law defense of 
privity of contract in proceedings initiated under N.O.R.A. involving disputes with any 
construction professional where the controversy is not settled, and a lawsuit is then filed by a 
Claimant, alleging a claim for damages for a contract breach provided for within the statutory 
language. 
For the above reasons, there lies the issue as to whether the common law defense of 
"privity" has any application in a N.O.R.A. dispute, and this underlying issue must eventually be 
addressed by the appellate courts, and that is of controlling concern to the entire general public 
involved in the construction and remodeling industry, such as the continuing involvement of 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc., a subcontracting construction professional, who, by statute, is authorized 
to file a lien and initiate a right to payment for the rendition of professional services under a 
contract claim against a homeowner, classified as an agent of the owner, who is now subject to 
being sued under the provisions ofN.O.R.A .. 
CONCLUSION 
An Order entered by this Supreme Court, thereby granting permission for these 
Plaintiffs to pursue &n appeal of this issue addressing the unavailability of the common law 
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defense of lack of "privity of contract" in N.O.R.A. disputes would serve the public interest and 
will allow this unsettled issue to be considered by the appellate courts to determine the right of 
the homeowner to file suit against a subcontractor for a contract breach under N.O.R.A. without 
being subject to dismissal of the action upon the assertion there is a lack of "privity of contract" 
between the parties. A resolution of this issue 
claimants/homeowners so situated in these dispute 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiffs above named, Scott Davison and Anne Davison, by and 
through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, and do herewith request the Idaho Supreme 
Court, pursuant to .Idaho Appellate Rule 12(c)(l), IAR, for permission to appeal the district 
court's interlocutory Order of Dismissal of the contract claims identified in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, dismissed pursuant to the District Court's grant of Defendant's motion for smnrnary 
judgment as it relates to Plaintiffs' contract clairn(s), due to the court's perceived application of 
the affirmative defense of lack of common law "Privity-of-Contract" between the homeowner, 
Plaintiffs herein, and the subcontractor/Defendant, DeBest Plmnbing, Inc., notwithstanding what 
is believed by Plaintiffs to be the application of the Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act, Title 
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6, Chapter 25, Statutes of the State of Idaho, §§6-2501 through §§6-2504, Idaho Code, (referred 
to herein as N.O.R.A). 
That Order of Dismissal was entered and filed of record with the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley, on April 7, 
2016, a copy of which is attached to this Motion, pursuant to the provisions of Rule l 2(c )(1 ), 
I.AR; that Plaintiffs timely filed their Motion for Permissive Appeal with the district court on 
April 20 2016; that the district court thereafter heard the matter and denied the Motion, entering 
and filing of record the written Order Denying Motion For Permissive Appeal on June 6, 2016, a 
copy of which order of denial of permissive appeal is attached to this Motion as also required, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12( c )(1 ), I.AR .. 
The subject matter in this dispute, forn1ing the topic of concern in this request for 
Permission to Appeal, is whether the common law concept of "Privity-of Contract", being a 
contractual concept traditionally required as a pre-requisite to the formation of any binding and 
enforceable "contractual" relationship between and among various parties, is still required to be 
proven to exist before there can be a "cause of action for breach of contract", in those 
relationships identified and controlled by the statutory enactment entitled Notification and 
Opportunity To Repair Act, referred to herein as N.O.R.A, which involves those "inter-
relationships" between "residential homeowners" and "construction professionals", as defined 
and addressed in that Notice And Opportunity to Repair Act, adopted and enacted by the Idaho 
legislature in 2003. Within N.O.R.A is the reference to "subcontractors", who are included 
within the definition of "construction professionals", who are those who have a right to file a 
claim of lien against the homeowner 's real property, for payment of services performed and/or 
materials furnished at the instance or request of the home owner, or the request of the owner's 
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agent. These "sub-contracting agents" are recognized under common law to be in a "contractual 
relationship", with the. general contractor, but not viewed as being in "Privity-of-Contract" with 
the homeowner, though their sole purpose for contracting with the general contractor is for the 
rendition of their specialized services performed for the benefit of the residential construction 
and/or remodel project, thus giving the subcontractors the right to file a claim of lien, if not paid. 
Consequently, the question must eventually be addressed whether, as a matter of this 
statutory enactment, by virtue of the adoption of the legislative enactment referred to as the 
Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act, Title 6, Chapter 25, Statutes of the State of Idaho, §§6-
2501 through §§6-2504, Idaho Code, has the common law "Privity-of-Contract" requirement, 
essential to the establishment of a contractual relationship between contracting parties, been 
effectively abrogated, abolished, and/or superseded, with respect to those situations involving 
"residential home oWners" and "construction professionals", that, by definition, includes both 
general contractors and subcontractors, who have come within and under the jurisdiction and 
mandates of the provisions of N.O.R.A., being those situations involving residential 
homeowners, and their general contractor(s) hired to conduct and manage construction and/or 
remodel projects, and to coordinate the necessary installations of those various components, 
materials, and services at various stages of the construction/remodel project, who, in tum, hire 
subcontracting agents, being sub-contractors hired to render professional services, at the instance 
and request of the general contractor, for the eventual benefit of the residential homeowner. 
These "subcontractors" consist of those specialized tradesman, including concrete 
specialists, electricians, plumbers, cabinetry installers, window installers, heating and air 
conditioning specialists, etc., each of whom are recognized to be a specialist in their field of. 
construction trade, and are recognized as a "construction professional" both under N.O.R.A., and 
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in their particular field of trade; being agents and employees trained and qualified in their 
particular area of expertise and trade craft to render services as an expert in the residential 
construction and remodel industry. 
The lower court's order of dismissal was based upon the fundamental reasoning to the 
effect that the above cited legislative enactment (N.O.R.A.) has not abrogated or abolished the 
essential requirement for the existence of the common law concept of "Privity-of-Contract" 
between parties essential to establish a contractual relationship, from which relationship a party 
can assert a cause of action for breach of contract. This Court has determined that Privity-of-
Contract remains a common law criteria in any and all contractual relationships, including those 
between residential homeowners and any and all construction professionals rendering services in 
relation to the construction and/or remodel of a residential dwelling, notwithstanding the 
provisions of the Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act, Title 6 Chapter 25, Statutes of the State 
of Idaho, §6-2501-2504, Idaho Code. 
The fundamental issue to be raised upon such a Permissive Appeal is whether the Notice 
And Opportunity To Repair Act, commonly and herein referred to as N.O.R.A., has effectively 
abrogated, abolished, suspended, and/or superseded the common law requirement of "Privity-of-
Contract", by virtue of that statutory enactment, such that the common law concept of "Privity-
of-Contract" is no longer required in those relationships involving residential homeowners and 
construction professionals (including subcontractors), for purposes of maintaining a cause of 
action for breach· of contract in a dispute between the residential homeowner and a 
"subcontractor", whose only common law "privity" is with the "general contractor". 
Plaintiffs would assert, through counsel, that the appeal of this interlocutory order, 
involves a controlling question of law as to which there does appear to be substantial grounds for 
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difference of opinion regarding the requirement of the common law requirement of "privity" in 
such contractual matters, when considering the purpose and application of the provisions set 
forth within the Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act; that a genuine issue and substantial 
public interest exists in determining the implications of the enactment, and to secure a decision 
as to a determination whether N.O.R.A. abrogates, abolishes, suspends, and/or supersedes the 
common law defense and requirement of "Privity-of-Contract", when the elements ofN.O.R.A. 
are being pursued, implemented, and mutually undertaken by the residential homeowner and 
subcontracting agent, such that the statutory enactment precludes the application of the 
affirmative defense of lack of privity, as was raised by the Defendant in this case, despite the 
parties having fully participated in those settlement proceedings as contemplated by the 
enactment, and no settlement or resolution is reached that is satisfactory to the parties. 
These Plaintiffs have submitted their memorandum(s) of authority to the district court, 
and have prepared and submitted their memorandum of authority in support of this Motion for 
Permissive Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, from which this Appellate Court will be 
adequately apprised as to the issue and basis for the request for a Permissive Appeal of this issue, 
as it does constitute a controlling question as to the application of the statutory enactment that 
appears to prevent a subcontractor from raising the common law affirmative defense of lack of 
"Privity-of-Contract" between a residential homeowner and a construction professional, who has 
rendered professional services on the residential dwelling in the capacity of a subcontractor, and 
participated fully in settlement proceedings contemplated under N.O.R.A., including the 
inspection and estimation process having being completed by the parties, and full awareness of 
the liability of the subcontractor, admitted immediately upon discovery of the faulty 
workmanship in the installations, confirming the nature, extent, and causation of the damages. 
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Dated this 14th day of June, 2016. 
Vernon K. Srmth 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On April 4, 2016, this Court heard oral argument on Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter is fully briefed, the parties were able to present their 
position, and the Court has considered the issues; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Summary Judgment is granted in 
favor ofDeBest Plumbing, Inc. against the causes of action based upon breach of contract, breach of 
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express warranty, and breach of implied warranty. The basis for this ruling was stated on the record 
at the April 4, 2016 hearing. 
The Court denies the Motion for Summary Judgment on the cause of action based upon 
negligence. This case will proceed forward to trial on a negligence theory. The basis for the Court's 
decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment was stated on the record from the bench at the 
hearing. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED This.£._ day of April, 2016. 
/s/ Jason D. Scott 
Honorable Jason Scott 
District Judge 
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) Case No. CV 15-178C 
) 
vs. ) RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 
an Idaho corporation 
Defendant. 
) DEBEST'S MOTION FOR 
) LEA VE TO FILE A 
) THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
) AGAINST GOULD CUSTOM 
) BUILDERS, INC. 
) 
) 
INTRODUCTION AND CASE HISTORY 
On July 21, 2015, the above named Plaintiffs, Scott Davison and Anne Davison, filed suit 
against the Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., for damages sustained to their vacation residence 
as a result of defects in plumbing installations performed by DeBest, the subcontracting 
plumbing specialist rendering services on this remodel project of Plaintiffs' vacation residence 
located at 2109 Water Lily, McCall, Idaho. 
The suit was initiated after the parties' participation in mandatory requirements set forth 
in the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("N.O.R.A."), codified under §§6-2501-2504, Idaho 
Code. Plaintiffs sued DeBest because, as the construction professionals, they were responsible 
for installing defective plumbing components and/or defective installations, causing the leak(s) 
that introduced water throughout the interior of Davisons' vacation home. DeBest had no 
common law "privity of contract" with Davisons, as their services were performed as 
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subcontractors on the remodel project, brought there under contract with Gould Custom Builders, 
Inc. (hereafter GCBI), the general contractor on the project. Pursuant to summary proceedings 
initiated by DeBest, the district court dismissed the breach of contract claims filed against 
DeBest, concluding the absence of "privity of contract" between Davisons, the homeowners, and 
the subcontracting construction professional, DeBest, effectively served to insulate DeBest from 
a direct claim for breach of contract by Davisons as a result of any failure in their plumbing 
services rendered in their capacity as subcontracting agents. 
Plaintiffs challenged that ruling, and preserved that issue for eventual review by the 
appellate courts. Because of that decision, Plaintiffs are currently precluded from suing DeBest 
under a "contract theory" for recovery of their damages, leaving Plaintiffs the right to recover 
their damages through a negligence claim established in tort law, a concept recognized both in 
common law, as well as provided within the provisions of N.O.R.A., upon which this lawsuit 
was initiated, and damages pursued in accordance with that statutory enactment. 
Upon dismissal of the contract claims, Plaintiffs filed for permission to appeal that 
dismissal Order with the district court, and on June 6, 2016, the District Court denied that 
Motion, stating the common law "privity of contract" requirement for contract claims had not 
been abrogated by N.O.R.A., and N.O.R.A. did not create, by that enactment, any "contractual" 
cause of action that did not exist under other law.for homeowners to pursue subcontractors. 
Following that determination, on June 8, 2016, DeBest filed their Motion for leave to file 
a Third-Party Complaint (hereinafter TPC), seeking to initiate claims against GCBI, the general 
contractor, upon the pretext that GCBI had a "duty" to both Plaintiffs and DeBest, and by virtue 
of that "duty", GCBI was now responsible to DeBest under such theories as indemnification 
(Count One), contribution (Count Two), and negligence (Count Three), and therein alleging, in 
conjunction with other assertions, that GCBI had "prior experience with water damage and water 
remediation" (1 15); that GCBI did not follow proper protocol to effectively and successfully 
address the water damage (1 15); that GCBI "elected not to fully and immediately investigate, 
remediate, and repair the water damage" (116); that GCBI "waited until after scheduled summer 
and fall use of the vacation home" by Davisons before commencing the major repairs (116); that 
GCBI was responsible "for the decision to delay remediation of the water damage, and for all 
materials, work, and services on repair of Plaintiffs' vacation home" (1 17); that because of 
GCBI's conduct, "the cost of remediation and repair of the vacation home was not reasonable 
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because the full scope of damage and repair work was not undertaken for more than four 
months after the leak was discovered, because proper water damage remediation protocol was 
not followed, and because Gould billed excessive amounts for its work" c, 19). 
DeBest had immediately admitted the defect was their fault, and was their responsibility 
to restore the damages. DeBest took no action to conduct or undertake the restoration, and left 
the matter to Davisons and GCBI to arrange to conduct the restorations, with DeBest committing 
to pay all costs incurred to restore the premises. 
BASIS FOR INDEMNIFICATION, CONTRIBUTION, AND NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS 
There has to be standing, existing by virtue of a statutory basis, contractual basis, or an 
equitable basis to have any claim for indemnification or contribution, and there must be a duty 
owed to an injured party before a negligence claim can proceed. 
BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO THE RESTORATION 
The water leaks and resulting damage was discovered July 25, 2013, and immediate 
implementation of the notification provisions of N.O.R.A. were undertaken on July 26, 2013, 
before 7:00 am, and months thereafter inspections and estimations of damage by agents of 
DeBest were undertaken. The issue of liability and responsibility for the damages had been 
acknowledged and accepted by DeBest back on July 26, 2013. 
Almost three years now passing, DeBest now wants to file a TPC for claims to a right to 
receive indemnification and contribution against GCBI, and to assert a direct action for 
negligence against GCBI, upon the pretext the "water damage remediation", the "repair services, 
and the "restoration service" performed by GCBI were either improperly conducted, 
unreasonably delayed, overcharged, or the completed restoration costs were unreasonable and 
excessive. 
How does DeBest establish standing to initiate claims of liability against GCBI under 
theories of indemnification or contribution, given the allegations in the proposed TPC, or 
establish a claim for negligence, under existing law, when there is no clear duty owed to DeBest? 
This district court must determine what factual basis supports any allegation that GCBI 
had any duty or standard of care owed to DeBest, as it relates to the remediation and restoration 
efforts undertaken through arrangements Davisons made with GCBI to restore their vacation 
residence. 
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The damage resulted solely from leaks caused by DeBest, who activated the water supply 
to allow water to flow into the residence after their installations were made, the effect of which 
allowed water to come into contact with everything within the recently remodeled interior, 
including sheetrock on the ceilings and walls, the ceiling crown and base moldings, all baseboard 
throughout, door jams, trimming, and subflooring throughout the residential interior. 
The arrangements made between Davisons and GCBI were known to DeBest, and 
DeBest had full opportunity to address all aspects of the restoration, since they had knowledge, 
awareness, and acceptance of those restoration arrangements. DeBest and its personnel were kept 
informed as to the expenditures made in the restoration and repair process, and were familiar 
with the progress, and had every opportunity to maintain contact regarding the restoration 
process with Davisons and GCBL 
When the arrangements were made for the restoration, it had been acknowledged the 
water damage had been so extensive throughout the interior of the residence that everything 
coming into contact with the water had to be removed and replaced, so temporary repairs only 
were undertaken to the ceilings and other areas in the bedroom, as that area had to be 
"cosmetically" addressed to allow Davisons to even remain in that room during their summer 
stay, and it was then decided the actual renovation work would be undertaken after Davisons 
vacated the residence and returned to California that Fall, and by doing that, there would be no 
need to incur temporary housing expenses, and GCBI could conduct the restoration process 
throughout the winter and spring months, as the situation may then require. 
The Davisons had every right under N.O.R.A. to seek temporary housing arrangements, 
the recovery of which expense was allowed under N.O.R.A., but Davisons were willing to 
continue to reside in their damaged residence, under those rather compromised conditions, as a 
courtesy and benefit to DeBest, in a good faith effort to reduce costs incurred from their liability. 
It was thought DeBest was appreciative of that decision, but their liability Carrier now chooses to 
sees it differently. 
Residential "vacation accommodations" in the McCall area are outrageously expensive, 
as the cost for alternative accommodations, on extended weekly and monthly rates, for 
comparable accommodations to what Davisons own, would exceed $1000.00 per day, and 
because restoration required months of interior demolition and restoration work, it would be 
unreasonable to reside in the residence while the work was being performed. Regardless when 
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the work commenced, no one could reside there as the work was underway, and Davisons would 
have been justified to secure temporary housing over the months of restoration, and the 
alternative housing would have likely "doubled" the liability of DeBest from the claim currently 
being made. The likely temporary housing costs could have equaled or exceeded $125,000.00, 
and it must be remembered that Davisons could not use their vacation home during the winter of 
2013-2014, which normally they would have during the skiing and winter carnival seasons in 
McCall. That aspect is still a viable right of recovery. 
If there was any desire by DeBest to expedite the restoration, it was never expressed to 
anyone, and the belief was everyone wanted to keep the costs down, rather than incur rental 
expenses for the alternative living arrangements, which was the result had DeBest chosen to 
express a desire to expedite the repair process, which never was proposed. 
De Best's agents are suggesting the cost of restoration was increased because of the delay 
in commencement of the restoration process, which position is both disingenuous, erroneous, and 
disappointing, as the timing repairs were to commence was irrelevant to what had to be done, as 
the extent of the damage was throughout the interior; as stated above, all interior structure that 
came into contact with the water had to be removed and replaced (there was standing water on 
the floors, with water dripping from collapsed ceilings when discovered on July 25, 2013). 
Irrespective when restoration commenced, whether expedited or delayed four months until 
Davisons returned to California, the extent of the restoration remained constant, and the extent of 
the restoration was known to be the entire interior. 
The "cost difference" resulting from expediting the restoration process would be the 
alternative housing expense, and that only served to expose DeBest to an additional obligation to 
reimburse Davisons for all temporary housing expenditures that would have then been incurred 
throughout the summer-fall season. 
DeBest agents need to verify such vacation rental costs with the rental agencies in the 
McCall area. Those "high end" accommodations are rather scarce on the rental market in the 
McCall area during the summer-fall season, and again as to availability in the winter skiing 
season. 
But for the on-going process of the restoration during the winter, Davisons would have 
been able to use their vacation residence throughout the winter months also, as were their plans 
each winter, but had to change those plans to allow the restoration to be completed. 
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Davisons have acted in extreme good faith throughout these events, and GCBI has acted 
in good faith throughout their efforts to restore the premises. 
What now appears is that DeBest, through their agents and representatives, are alleging 
with their proposed TPC that there was an "agreement" or "contract" between GCBI and DeBest, 
as they assert in 1 13 of the TPC: 
"13 .After about three hours, Gould no longer needed assistance 
from the DeBest employee and dismissed him. Before they parted, Gould 
agreed with the DeBest employee that Gould would complete the water 
damage remediation, and agreed with DeBest that he would complete 
the water damage repairs. Gould agreed to send a bill for its work to 
DeBest." (Par. 13, pg. 4, TPC (italic, dark lettering, and underlining 
emphasis added). 
What was this "agreement"? Was there any "Privity of Contract" created between DeBest 
and GCBI concerning this actual restoration process, including how and when it was to be 
performed? Was this an express agreement, or merely implied, being subject to the equitable 
principles of a contract implied in fact or in law? Was this "agreement" reduced to writing or 
only oral? If DeBset committed to pay all restoration costs, did DeBest then abandon their 
obligation and commitment to pay the costs to restore the premises and breach their commitment 
to Davisions and GCBI to pay all costs incurred in the restoration? If there was a contract or 
agreement, was there a right of indemnification or contribution created by that contract or 
agreement? How does the "factual basis" set forth in the TPC support a right to recovery under 
theories of indemnification and contribution against a general contractor, GCBI, who was 
handed the task by the homeowners to restore the mess created by DeBest, who promised to pay 
the costs, but DeBest then declined to discharge its commitment and responsibility altogether. 
These principles of law are addressed hereafter in detail for consideration by the court. 
DEPOSITION TAKEN OF GILBERT GOULD 
Mr. Gould has participated in a discovery deposition, and confirmed GCBI had 
accomplished the needed efforts at remediation, and GCBI removed all water that could be 
removed; used vacuums, circulating fans, mops, towels, and eliminated what standing water was 
present, and undertook every extent and benefit that could be gained from any de-humidification 
process with vacuums and air circulation. When all water soaked sheetrock and wood 
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installations eventually dry out, you are left with damaged materials that must be removed and 
replaced. 
Notwithstanding all efforts at "water remediation", the materials that water came into 
contact had rendered those materials unsalvageable, all of which had to be removed; everything 
was water stained and swollen; visual damage to the walls, ceilings, insulation, wooden 
floorings, sub-flooring, ceiling, crown, and base molding, all baseboards, doors, door jams, door 
trims etc., such that all materials soaked and saturated with water for that duration had to be 
removed and replaced. 
The wooden finished materials and all sheetrock materials on walls and ceilings had 
become swelled, were soggy, were sagging, had collapsed or twisted away from their fastened 
position; the sheetrock nails/screws pulled through all soft materials; wood materials warped and 
twisted out of their installed dimension, and nothing salvageable for re-use as finishing materials 
in this custom constructed residence, regardless when removal and restoration was commenced. 
When wood floorings, subflooring, ceiling and base moldings, baseboards, door jams, 
door trim and sheetrock materials expand, warp away from their installed placements and 
fastened positions, and wood items curl, warp, twist, buckle, split, crack, and separate from their 
dimensional positions, there was nothing to be performed differently in the water removal and 
drying process, as no additional or different "water remediation" process could alter the need for 
total removal and replacement of materials in the restoration process. 
Davisons had GCBI undertake only the immediate repair necessary to make the premises 
habitable, with the understanding the major restoration would be undertaken after Davisons 
returned to California that Fall. Any decision to expedite restoration would not change what 
needed to be done in the restoration process, as the method, manner, extent of demolition and 
effort required was established; the costs associated with the restoration process would become a 
function of purchasing the materials needed, and the extent of labor required to accomplish what 
had to be done. When restoration commenced would not affect those required components, 
whether undertaken immediately or following Davisons' departure. 
The above history and discussion identified the fact the existing damage from the water 
presence in the residence made the restoration process a complete removal and replacement 
project, and that is important to understand, as this TPC is claiming the decision to allow this 
"four month delay" before the renovation process began to constitute a breach of a duty owed to 
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DeBest, (apparently owed to it by GCBI) inferring that had Davisions elected to vacate the 
premises instead, and allow the commencement of the major restoration process to begin 
immediately upon their relocation, the extent of the restoration process would have been less 
extensive and less expensive. Not only is that proposition untrue, but the Davisons would have 
incurred a tremendous expense in securing alternative residential accommodations in the McCall 
area, for which Davisons would have been entitled to recover such expenses from DeBest while 
they remained in McCall. 
Those consecutive months of "alternative housing" accommodations are a recoverable 
cost under the provisions of N.O.R.A., and such relocation would have substantially increased 
Davisons' right of recovery for loss of use of their residence, and such inconvenience is 
specifically recognized to be recoverable under §6-2504, Idaho Code, which states: 
LIMITATION ON DAMAGES. (1) In a suit subject to section 6-2503, 
Idaho Code, the claimant may recover only the following damages proximately 
caused by a construction defect: 
(a) The reasonable cost of repairs necessary to cure any construction defect, ... ; 
(b) The reasonable expenses of temporary housing reasonably necessary 
during the repair period; 
With no benefit with salvageable materials or elimination of labor costs by an earlier 
commencement of the restoration process, and any attempt to start sooner would only result in 
more expense incurred by securing alternative living expenses for temporary housing during the 
restoration period, there is no logical basis for DeBest to now claim some undefined duty was 
owed to them on that issue, or that some undefined duty was breached, when there is no factual 
basis from which an identifiable increase in the restoration process can be supported, when all 
damage that had to be addressed had already existed upon discovery. 
This language in ,r 13 of the TPC, if it be true there was an agreement or contract between 
GCBI and DeBest for the performance of the remediation and restoration process, if it be 
DeBest's position that it was not performed or that it was breached, it would not be an 
indemnification or contribution claim, but rather a breach of performance claim under a 
breach of contract. 
Requesting the submission of billings and the anticipation of payment forthcoming from 
DeBest more realistically supports a claim by GCBI against DeBest for breach of contract. At the 
very least, it suggests there was acquiescence and acceptance of all responsibility by DeBest, 
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who had committed to pay the costs to accomplish that process, and it would then follow that 
DeBest would be directly responsible to GCBI for the costs incurred in this process under a 
contractual arrangement apparently made with GCBI. Payment would be due from DeBest 
directly to GCBI, and with that understanding, interest at the rate of 12% is due on the entire 
unpaid sums, pursuant to §28-22-104, Idaho Code. 
As the deposition testimony of Mr. Gould confirmed, GCBI was instructed by the DeBest 
home office personnel, as well as through Tom Peterson, that Mr. Gould was to submit copies of 
all GCBI billing invoices and statements directly to DeBest, so DeBest could make payment 
directly to GCBI, as DeBest had acknowledged liability for the damages and sole responsibility 
for the restoration costs, and in keeping with that understanding, the billing invoices and 
statements for all material, labor and assessed costs were submitted and presented throughout the 
restoration process to the Davisons and to DeBest, and once DeBest saw the extent of the 
restoration required, through the billing invoices and statements submitted to them, DeBest 
turned the bills over to their liability insurance carrier for payment, and upon receipt of that 
claim, the carrier instead assigned the claim to Intermountain Claims of Idaho. Notwithstanding 
the delay and withheld payment, there has never been any objection, dissent, reservation, or 
challenge voiced to Davisons or to GCBI by DeBest or their agents or representatives concerning 
the accuracy, correctness, or necessity of the work that was performed, and the assessments 
identified in the billing invoices and statements that had been presented to DeBest, and they were 
accepted and the obligation for payment was never denied. 
Following the inspection made by Intermountain, the adjuster, in behalf of the liability 
carrier, presented an adjuster's "cost estimate" to Davisons on or about April 30, 2014, stating 
their estimated cost of restoration was $24,005.06. By that date, the "actual costs" that had 
already been incurred in the restoration process had reached $91,716.76, and the final billings, 
reflected in the invoices and assessments thereafter submitted, came in at $123,345.64. The 
Davisons did engage in discussions with the adjuster, but the adjuster never made any offer(s) of 
settlement, leaving it to be understood, however, that if Davisons were willing to offer to accept 
their "estimate" of $24,005.06, the insurance company would consider their offer to settle the 
matter. 
Though continuing billings and statements were submitted to Davisons and DeBest and 
their agents, still no one voiced any objection, dissent, reservation or dispute about the nature or 
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extent of what was done, or that what was done was not needed, or that any of the assessments 
regarding the labor, materials, and supervision expenditures incurred throughout the restoration 
process were either unreasonable or excessive. Whether it is through assent, acknowledgement, 
acceptance or acceptance by implication, those billing invoices and statements become approved 
for payment by someone, be it DeBest or their liability carrier, and arguably that unpaid account 
status and liability was attained under the concept of an "account stated" status. 
DeBest' s TPC suggests it was a direct obligation for them to pay GCBI, a fact reinforced 
by their prior acceptance of liability and claim to their liability carrier for payment. The 
statements, however, were neither paid, nor rejected, nor was the obligation denied, and no one 
made any reasonable offer to settle the liability and financial obligation of DeBest in this matter. 
Because of non-payment, the situation left Davisons with a justified concern about the 
on-going delay in the payment, as the outstanding account had to be satisfied, or there could be 
material and labor liens filed, and Davisons were unwilling to wait any longer to receive 
payment from DeBest or from their liability carrier, so the Davisons paid all billing invoices and 
statements in full, avoiding need for lien to be filed by the material suppliers, repair personnel, 
and service technicians. 
When no expression of any dissent, objection, or reservation is made to the accuracy, 
correctness, and necessity of the assessments that had been submitted by GCBI, and with 
Davisons paying the bills upon their belief there was full awareness and acceptance of the 
charges by all parties involved, it would appear the law regards the bills having reached the 
"account stated" status, as there was an acknowledgment and admission of the sum due, and 
there was an assent, express or implied, as to the accuracy, correctness, and necessity in the 
charges owing and paid by Davisons 
That subject as to what an "account stated" constitutes was addressed in Tolmie v. San 
Diego Fruit and Produce Company, 57 Idaho 631, 68 P.2d 61 (1937), wherein the Idaho 
Supreme Court quoted from the case of American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Chicago-Los 
Angeles Building Corp., 88 Cal. App. 300, 263 P. 297, the rule as to the meaning of "account 
stated" to be as follows: 
"Our courts have uniformly held that: 'An account stated presupposes an absolute 
acknowledgment or admission of a certain sum due or adjustment of accounts 
between the parties, the striking of a balance, or an assent, express or implied, to 
the correctness of the balance. If the acknowledgment or admission is qualified 
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE A 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT P.10 
00000302
and not absolute, or if there is but an admission that something is due without 
specifying how much, there is no account stated, nor does an account stated exist 
if there is but a partial settlement of accounts without arriving at a balance or if 
there is a dissent from the balance as struck.' 1 C. J., p. 695, par. 287; Coffee v. 
Williams, 103 Cal. 550, 556, 37 P. 504; Craig v. Lee, 36 Cal.App. 335,171 P. 
1089." In 1 C. J., page 685, sec. 263, the rule is stated that: "To constitute an 
account stated, the correctness of the balance must receive the assent, express or 
implied, of both parties, a certain fixed sum must be admitted by the one party to 
be due to the other, and where there are mutual or cross demands, the parties must 
come to an agreement as to the allowance or disallowance of the items composing 
the account; there must be an adjustment, a balance struck, and an assent to the 
correctness of the balance. For this purpose, it is said, there must be an 
examination by the parties of the accounts between them." See also: Gunn v. 
Perseverance Min. etc. Co., 23 Idaho 418, 130 P. 458; Petrosino v. Wakefield, 
138 Cal.App. 336, 31 P.2d 1056; Stinson v. Stallsmith, 178 Wash. 383, 34 P.2d 
1117; Rogers v. Burnham, 140 Cal.App. 336, 35 P.2d 329; Hansen v. Fresno 
Jersey Farm Dairy Co., 220 Cal. 402, 31 P.2d 359; Klein-Simpson Fruit Co. v. 
Hunt, Hatch & Co., 65 Cal.App. 625, 225 P. 14; Ough v. Ansonia Oil Co., 99 
Cal.App. 769,279 P. 481; Masters v. Walker, 99 Ore. 299, 195 P. 381. 
Prior to that case, in Naylor & Norlin v. The Lewiston & Southeastern Electric Railway 
Company, Limited, Corporation, and The Commercial Trust Company, 14 Idaho 789, 96 P. 573 
(1908), the Idaho courts had earlier stated: 
"4. Where the owners of a railroad right of way authorize contractors to put a 
crew of men to work upon such right of way, and agree to pay such contractors 
the amount actually expended in labor and material, and in addition thereto 
twenty per cent, and a certain sum for the use of the tools used in such work, and 
the contractors present a bill to the railway company for such labor, which is 
audited and approved by such company, it becomes an account stated, to secure 
and support which a lien may be filed upon the property for which said labor was 
performed ..... 5. The rendering ofan account for labor performed and material 
furnished. for work upon a railway right of way, which account is accepted and 
apProved by the railway company, is sufficient proof of the performance of such 
labor and the furnishing of the material ..... 9. An account stated cannot be 
impeached or contradicted except by averring and proving fraud or mistake; and 
where there is no averment of fraud or mistake, or proof to support the same, the 
account stated becomes a contract as to the amount due and an action may be 
maintained thereon without proving the original items entering into such 
account ...... By reason of its being an account stated we did not have to show 
the amount we had expended in the work, other than was shown by the account 
stated itself. nor did we have to show by other evidence the expenditure of any 
money. We are willing to concede that the stating of the account is not in itself 
proof of the performance of the labor, but we contend that it is conclusive proof 
of the value of the labor ...... The only way to destroy the effectiveness of an 
account stated is to impeach it on the ground of fraud or mistake. (1 Cyc. 454; 
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Jewell v. Ketcham, 63 Wis. 628, 23 N.W. 709; Keller v. Keller, 18 Neb. 366, 25 
N.W. 364; Fleischer v. Kubli, 20 Ore. 328, 25 P. 1086.) ..... Upon the trial of the 
case the defendant offered certain evidence attempting to impeach and contradict 
the account as stated, but did not offer to show that there was any mistake or 
fraud in said account. The account rendered became an account stated, and 
when assented to, either expressly or impliedly, it became a new contract, and 
an action upon it was founded upon such new contract and not upon the 
original items entering into the same. The general rule, .... , is that when the 
stated account is admitted it can only be avoided on proof of fraud, mistake, etc. 
Coffee v. Williams, 103 Cal. 550, 37 P. 504.) ..... "In an action on an account 
stated, it is not necessary to prove the account, or any of its terms, but the proof 
in such a case is directed to the fact that the parties have accounted together, 
and agreed upon the balance due; .... In an action to foreclose a lien filed in 
support of an account stated, the plaintiff is not required to prove the items which 
make up said account. In this case the railway company could not call in 
question the account stated, except upon the grounds of fraud or mistake ...... 
"But an account stated becomes a contract. As was said by the court, per Shafter, 
J., in Carey v. Petroleum Co., 33 Cal. 694: 'An account stated alters the nature 
of the original indebtedness, and is itself in the nature of a new promise or 
undertaking. Fossatt v. Allanson, 2 Term. R. 479; Holmes v. De Camp, 1 Johns. 
34, 3 Am. Dec. 293.) ..... An action upon an account stated is not founded upon 
the original items, but upon the balance ascertained by the mutual consent of 
parties.' ..... (italic, black lettering, and underlining emphasis added) 
THE BASIC LAW ON INDEMNIFICATION 
The basis for recovery upon a concept of "indemnification" can be founded within a 
statutorv scheme regarding a statutory obligation to indemnify, which can be enforceable in 
some factual settings, or found to be against public policy in other situations, (see, for example, 
§6-804(2); §6-1407(2); §55-2404(2); §29-114, Idaho Code) If not established or preserved by 
statute, it can be established by a contractual agreement, and if not contractually established, 
there are occasions it may also be founded within certain aspects of common law, under a theory 
of equitable or implied indemnification, which again, becomes fact sensitive to the particular 
situation before receiving the benefit of any such application. It is well established that it can be 
found to exist within a contractual setting within the surety law, as the principle of surety has 
received consistent endorsement in the case law throughout the nation. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co. v. Jones, 87 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1937); National Surety Corp. v. Peoples Milling 
Co., 57 F.Supp. 281 (6th Cir. 1944); English v. Century Indemnity Co., 342 S.W.2d 366 
(Tex.Civ.App.1961); Central Surety & Insurance Corporation v. Martin, 224 S.W.2d 773 
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(Tex.Civ.App.1949); Russell v. Lemons, 205 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.Civ.App.1947); Massachusetts 
Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Gautieri, 69 R.I. 70, 30 A.2d 848 (1943). 
Upon review of the proposed TPC, the contents does not readily identify a factual or legal 
basis that would serve to establish a claim upon either a statutory basis to a right of 
indemnification, or a contractual basis to a right of indemnification. The relevant parties 
involved in this matter are the Davisons, GCBI, and DeBest. There must be some factual basis 
upon which some legal or equitable basis exists to assert such a right of indemnification, and 
then to assert what the scope of that indemnification is, either to have been created by statute, 
contract, or by equitable implications. 
There is simply no specific allegation in the TPC to identify what legal theory or factual 
basis serves to support such a claim; and such a claim can only be founded upon a statutory 
basis, a contractual basis or some identifiable equitable basis. 
In reading 113 contained in the TPC, it suggests there was an "oral contract" entered 
into between GCBI and DeBest (at least suggested to have been made through the agency of 
Tom Peterson), suggesting that GCBI was contracting to do, or agreeing to do, all remediation 
and restoration services on the Davisions' residence, thereby contracting to perform the 
obligation owed by De Best to Davisons. If this allegation is to be construed as an assertion there 
was a performance contract created for the rendition of services, then it would serve to 
establish a direct contractual relationship with DeBest, who, in turn, would be directly 
responsible to pay to GCBI the costs of all remediation and restoration services they performed, 
and if that claim now be that DeBest and GCBI were in a contractual relationship, it would not 
be an indemnification claim, but rather in the nature of a non-performance claim under a contract 
theory, essentially being a breach of contract claim, a remedy that is readily available in the law, 
and not an indemnification action under what could only be founded on an equitable claim, as 
there has not been alleged any statutory basis, or any indemnity agreement within any 
contractual basis, and that leaves only an equitable basis, as indicated by the authority cited 
below. It is always to be remembered that as a matter of law, when a right of recovery is capable 
of being remedied through a claim available in the law, there is no recovery available under any 
equity claim or equitable doctrine. 
Nothing contained in the TPC alleges a statutory basis for indemnification by DeBest 
against GCBI. Furthermore, there is nothing alleged in the TPC to demonstrate GCBI ever 
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contracted or agreed to indemnifv DeBest, by the creation of an indemnity or surety agreement, 
whereby DeBest was indemnified regarding the failure in their performance of the initial 
plumbing installations, under the original subcontract between GCBI and DeBest, or that GCBI 
had agreed to indemnify DeBest from those costs incurred in restoring the premises from the 
defective installation, leaks, and extensive water damage to Davisons' residence. There was no 
"indemnity agreement" upon any contractual basis in any aspect of their discussions or dealings 
to support any theory of indemnification under a contract transaction. 
Consequently, since there is no statutory basis, and no known contractual basis of 
indemnity that is found to be contained in any written or oral agreement to support any 
"indemnification" claim by DeBest against or from GCBI asserted under any contract theory, 
the only remaining concept recognized is a common law concept referred to as "equitable 
indemnification", which appears to find its application only within a negligence setting, and as 
between tortfeasors. The question becomes whether any factual allegations support a theory that 
DeBest has a claim to a right of indemnification from GCBI upon an equitable indemnity theory 
resulting from some act of "ioint" negligence? In order to get to an equitable right of 
indemnity in negligence, it appears there must be some ioint participation in causing the iniurv 
or damage to a third party. It is difficult to visualize, let alone allege, any situation where GCBI 
would be found or regarded to be in a "joint tortfeasor" relationship with DeBest. 
In Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 766 P.2d 751 (1988), the Court 
addressed the equitable theory of indemnification when rejecting arguments regarding the 
adoption by Idaho's comparative negligence statute (I.C. § 6-801), stating, to the effect, that the 
comparative negligence enactment did not abrogate the "equitable indemnity" theory founded in 
common law. That court concluded "equitable indemnity" is founded on common law notions of 
justice, and unless there is explicit statutory language to abrogate that common law concept, it 
remains viable. See also Beitzel v. City of Coeur d'Alene, et al, 121 Idaho 709, 827 P.2d 1160 
(1992). 
The Idaho Courts before held when a city was liable to an injured party for negligence, 
by allowing an obstruction to take place along a sidewalk or street, the person who placed the 
obstruction was also liable to the city for whatever damages the city had to pay, under the 
concept of equitable indemnity. See Baillie v. City of Wallace, 24 Idaho 706, 718, 135 P. 850, 
854 (1913). In Williams v. Johnston, 92 Idaho 292, 442 P.2d 178 (1968), the Court reviewed the 
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application of "equitable indemnity" in the relationship between ioint tort-feasors. The Court 
concluded unless liability to a third party is established, a right to indemnification against a joint 
tortfeasor does not arise. Id. at 298, 442 P.2d at 184. The concept of equitable indemnity arises 
when a party seeking indemnity is liable to the third party. (essentially defining tortfeasors). 
In Industrial Indem. Co. v. Columbia Basin Steel & Iron Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 471 P.2d 
574 (1970), the Court summarized a concept of equitable indemnity stating that it was 
established common law that a person, who without fault on his part, is compelled to pay 
damages occasioned by the negligence of another, is entitled to indemnity. Id. at 723, 471 P.2d 
at 578. DeBest is not being compelled to pay any damages that were occasioned as a result of the 
negligence of another. Their obligation to pay Davisons is based upon their negligent installation 
of plumbing components, performed by them as plumbing professionals. 
In May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319, 543 P.2d 1159 (1975), 
the Court noted that a party seeking indemnity may base the claim on theories, including: (1) The 
indemnitee may claim that [the indemnitee's] liability was based on passive neglect, while the 
indemnitor was guilty of recklessness. (joint tortfeasor liability) (2) The indemnitee owed only a 
secondary duty to the injured party while the indemnitor was primarily responsible, where a 
municipal corporation has the primary duty to keep the streets in a safe condition, and a 
landowner has a secondary duty. (again joint tortfeasor liability) (3) The indemnitee [employer] 
may be vicariously liable for the actual negligence of [the indemnitee's] employee and may seek 
indemnity (again joint tortfeasor liability). Id. at 321,543 P.2d at 1161. 
These concepts appear based solely upon a "ioint tortfeasor" factual situation between 
two parties having "participating liability". 
In Borchard v. Wefco, Inc., 112 Idaho 555, 733 P.2d 776 (1987), the Court refined the 
formulation of equitable or implied indemnity, by stating: "where the fault of each /party[ is 
equal in grade and similar in character, the doctrine of implied indemnity is not available 
since no one should be permitted to base a cause of action on {that party's I own wrong." Id. at 
558, 733 P.2d at 779. 
The general rule governing "implied indemnity" is founded in tort liability, and appears to 
relate to a ioint tortfeasor, whose liability is secondary as opposed to primary, or is based upon 
"imputed or passive negligence", as opposed to "active negligence", or is "negative negligence" 
as opposed to "positive negligence", as in those situations, one may be entitled, upon an 
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equitable consideration, to shift responsibility to include another joint tort feasor, but with this 
refinement, if the fault of each is equal in grade and similar in character, the doctrine of 
implied indemnity is not available since no one is permitted to base a cause of action on their 
own wrong. 
In Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering B. V., et al, 148 Idaho 89,218 P.3d 1150 (2009), the 
court referred to the doctrine of equitable indemnity, and stated for it to apply, there must be 
some basis for tort liability against the proposed indemnitor, citing 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 
20 (2005), and stating: "Here, the district court erred in granting equitable indemnification for 
two reasons. First, there was no basis for tort liability in this case since the Golds did not have 
an implied contractual right to indemnification. In addition, the Golds had an adequate remedy 
at law. ... .. . Thus, the Golds had an adequate remedy available to them under the contract for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is well-established that 
equitable remedies will not be allowed if adequate remedies are available at law. Meikle v. 
Watson, 138 Idaho 680, 683, 69 P.3d 100, 103 (2003). 
In Farmers Nat. Bank v. Wickham Pipeline Const., 114 Idaho 565, 759 P.2d 71 (1988), 
the Court stated: 
"For over 200 years it has been recognized "that suits in equitv shall not 
be sustained ... in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy 
can be had at law." Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Co., 
67 U.S. (2 Black) 545, 551, 17 L.Ed. 333, 337 (1863), quoting Judiciary 
Act of 1789, § 16. "During the development of the jurisdiction of courts of 
equity, it came to be recognized that equitable relief would not be granted 
if the award of damages at law was adequate to protect the interests of the 
injured party." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359 comment a 
(1981 ). Accordingly, there is no need to entertain an equitable cause of 
action for indemnification when Scona and CNS, a fortiori, had a legal 
cause of action against Beall for breach of contract. "[R]elief in equity 
will never be available to secure the same judgment that could be obtained 
at law. The possibility of equity jurisdiction is present only when the 
plaintiff seeks some form of relief that he cannot obtain at law. By 
traditional theory the assertion of equity power in such cases is dependent 
on the inadequacy of the remedies at law .... " G. Palmer, The Law of 
Restitution§ 4.7 (1978)." (italic, dark lettering, and underlining emphasis 
added) 
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It is interesting to note that DeBest states in the TPC, in several Paragraphs (21, 22, 23, 
24) in reference to the indemnity claim, the following reference to a "duty" to Plaintiffs, as well 
as to DeBest: 
21 Gould owed Plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care to perform 
legal and contractual duties. 
22 Gould owed a duty to Plaintiffs to perform its 
responsibilities in a workmanlike manner. 
23 In addition to general duties owed individually by Gould, 
Gould assumed an obligation to DeBest to stand primarily responsible 
for proper remediation and repair of the Plaintiffs vacation home. 
24 To the extent that allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint 
against DeBest may be proven, Gould breached its duties to DeBest. 
It does not appear that DeBest has standing to allege claims in behalf of Davisons against 
GCBI, or on behalf of Davisons against Gould individually, upon any theory of a duty of care, as 
that appears to be founded upon a negligence claim, and there is no joint tortfeasor relationship 
seen to exist, upon which any equitable indemnity would apply. 
DeBest cannot advance a claim to a right of indemnification from GCBI (Count One in 
the proposed TPC), upon an alleged claim there was a duty of reasonable care to perform legal 
and contractual duties owed to DeBest, as there was no duty owed to DeBest by GCBI existing 
under any relationship or engaged activity under any negligence theory, and in any event, there is 
no joint tortfeasor relationship, regardless. Since the indemnification theory is not founded to 
exist by virtue of any statute, or upon any contractual indemnification agreement, and cannot fit 
within any equitable principles within the negligence law that requires joint tortfeasors, the claim 
to a right of indemnification is without foundation in law or in fact, and Count One of the 
proposed TPC should be denied. 
If there was any contractual relationship between DeBest and GCBI for the remediation 
and restoration of the Davisons' residence, the nature of any such claim, based upon that 
alleged relationship, would be upon a claim of a contractual breach in the required performance, 
or a claim for non-performance, either of which is a remedy at law , recognized as a breach of 
contract, not founded upon an equitable claim for indemnification that does not apply under the 
facts of the controversy, and when a remedy at law is available, equitable principles are not 
allowed to be the basis of recovery. 
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In the absence of a statutory basis, a contractual basis, or an equitable basis (stemming 
from a joint tortfeasor liability situation), there is no legal or factual basis to advance such a 
claim of indemnification within this proposed TPC, and the objection to the proposed filing of 
this TPC should be sustained. 
be: 
THE BASIC LAW ON CONTRIBUTION 
In Shattuck v. Ellis, 49 Idaho 330, 288 P. 162 (1930), the court defined contribution to 
"When there are two or more parties bound in the same degree by a 
common burden, equity demands, as between themselves, that each shall 
discharge a proportionate share, and when one of such parties has 
actually paid or satisfied more than his fair share of the burden, he is 
entitled to a contribution from each and all of the others similarly 
bound, in order to reimburse him for the excess paid over his share, and 
thus to equalize their common burden." (5 Pomeroy's Equity 
Jurisprudence, 4th ed., sec. 2338, p. 5169.) And while the right was 
originally exclusively cognizant by courts of equity, the principle was 
later enforced in the courts of law. In equity, the right is not based upon 
contract, but upon the principle that the law demands equality, which is 
equity~ on the other hand, the law courts have enforced the right upon the 
doctrine of implied contract. (5 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., 
sec. 2338, pp. 5169, 5170; 13 C. J., p. 821 et seq.; Waters v. Waters, 110 
Conn. 342, 148 A. 326.) "To entitle one to contribution, the payment must 
be compulsory in the sense that the party paying was under legal 
obligation to pay." (13 C. J., pp. 823, 824.) 
But it is not necessary, in order to entitle one to contribution, that a suit 
should have been commenced, or judgment rendered, against the one 
making payment, provided there is an actual liability to pay. (5 Pomeroy's 
Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., sec. 2340, pp. 5176, 5177; 13 C. J., p. 824; 
Pixley v. Gould, 13 Ill.App. 565; A. Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. v. Kann, 
243 Pa. 75, 89 A. 807; Hotham v. Berry, 82 Kan. 412, 108 P. 801; Waters 
v. Waters, supra. See Wright v. Rumph, 238 F. 138, 151 C. C. A. 
214.)...... Clearly, the purpose of this statute is to permit one of 
several judgment debtors, bound by the same judgment, who pays the 
judgment, to enforce contribution against his cojudgment debtors without 
resorting to another action. The provisions of this section are not 
exclusive, however, but cumulative, as to the right to contribution between 
judgment debtors. (Dunn v. Stujjlebeam, 17 Idaho 559, 106 P. 1129.) 
(italic, black lettering, and underlining emphasis added) 
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In the context of negligence law, Idaho adopted the 1939 version of the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. LC. §§ 6-805 and 6-806 conform to §§ 4 and 5 of the 
Act, with a sentence added to LC. § 6-806 to conform to Idaho's comparative negligence scheme. 
The version of§ 6-803, Idaho Code, currently provides: 
TITLE6 
ACTIONS IN PARTICULAR CASES 
CHAPTER& 
ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE 
6-803. CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS -- DECLARATION OF 
RIGHT -- EXCEPTION -- LIMITED JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY. (1) The right of 
contribution exists among ioint tort{easors, but a joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money 
judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid 
more than his pro rata share thereof. 
(2) A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled 
to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not 
extinguished by the settlement. 
(3) The common law doctrine o[ioint and several liability is hereby limited to causes 
of action listed in subsection (5) of this section. In any action in which the trier of fact attributes 
the percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility to persons listed on a special verdict, 
the court shall enter a separate judgment against each party whose negligence or comparative 
responsibility exceeds the negligence or comparative responsibility attributed to the person 
recovering. 111e negligence or comparative responsibility of each such party is to be compared 
individually to the negligence or comparative responsibility of the person recovering. Judgment 
against each such party shall be entered in an amount equal to each party's proportionate share of 
the total damages awarded. 
(4) As used herein, "joint tortfeasor" means one (1) of two (2) or more persons iointly or 
severallv, liable in tort for the same iniury to person or property, whether or not iudgment has 
been recovered against all or some of them. 
(5) A party shall be jointly and severally liable for the fault of another person or entity 
or for payment of the proportionate share of another party where they were acting in concert or 
when a person was acting as an agent or servant of another party. As used in this section, 
"acting in concert" means pursuing a common plan or design which result,,; in the commission 
of an intentional or reckless tortious act. (italic, dark lettering, and underlining emphasis added) 
History: 
[6-803, added 1971, ch. 186, sec. 3, p. 862; am. 1987, ch. 278, sec. 4, p. 578; am. 1990, ch. 120, sec. I, p. 290; am. 2003, 
ch. 122, sec. l, p. 370.] 
Consequently, in negligence law, (1) A right of contribution exists among ioint 
tortfeasors, but a joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has 
discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share; (2) If one joint 
tortfeasor enters into a settlement with the injured person, but does not extinguish the liability of 
the other joint tortfeasor, the settling tortfeasor is not entitled to recover contribution from the 
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other tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement; (3) If there is disproportion 
of fault among joint tortfeasors, rendering inequitable an equal distribution of the common 
liability by contributio11i the relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in 
determining contribution among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured 
person at common law; and (4) Joint tortfeasor means two (2) or more persons jointly or 
severally liable in tort for the same iniury to person or property. whether or not judgment has 
been recovered against some or all of them. 
In the present controversy, there IS NOT two or more parties bound in the same degree 
by a common burden, or any judgment entered against two or more individuals upon joint and 
several liability, for which they are obligated to pay, and there is no common liability existing 
from the fault ofioint tortfeasors under any theory of the negligence law, so contribution is not 
supported by any factual allegations to constitute a proper claim. 
It is again interesting to note that DeBest states in the TPC, in several Paragraphs (28, 29, 
30) in reference to the contribution claim, the following reference to a "duty" to Plaintiffs. as 
well as to DeBest: 
28. Gould owed Plaintiffs and DeBest a duty of reasonable care and legal 
and contractual duties. 
29 Gould owed a duty to Plaintiffs and DeBest to perform his 
responsibilities in a workmanlike manner. 
30 To the extent that allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint against DeBest may be 
proven, Gould breached its duties to Plaintiffs and DeBest. 
It does not appear that DeBest has the fundamental standing to allege claims in behalf of 
Davisons against GCBI, or attempt to allege any claim, on behalf of Davisons, against Gould, 
individually or otherwise, and not upon any theory of a "duty of care", as that appears to be 
founded only within and upon a negligence claim to be asserted by Davisions, if at all, as there is 
no joint tortfeasor relationship seen to exist between DeBest and GCBI, upon which any theory 
of contribution would apply. 
DeBest cannot advance a claim to a right of contribution from GCBI (Count Two in the 
proposed TPC), upon an alleged claim there was a duty of reasonable care and legal and 
contractual duties owed to DeBest, as there was no duty owed to DeBest by GCBI existing 
under any relationship or engaged activity under any negligence theory, and once again, there is 
no joint tortfeasor relationship, regardless. Since there is no duty of reasonable care. there is no 
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legal duty, and there is no "surety"contractual duties alleged to exist by statute, by common 
law equitable principles, or by negligence law, the claim to a right of contribution is without 
foundation in law or in fact, and Count Two of the proposed TPC has no factual or legal basis, 
and the objection to the proposed filing of the TPC should be sustained. 
If there were to have been any contractual relationship between DeBest and GCBI, 
regarding the subject of remediation and restoration of the Davisons' residence, the nature of that 
claim would be one for non-performance, and would be advanced through a legal remedy under 
contract law, alleging a breach of contract, and not a claim for contribution. 
THE BASIC LAW ON NEGLIGENCE 
The law regarding negligence rests upon a finding that a duty is imposed upon a person, 
who must meet a standard of care owed to another, the breach of which duty resulted in injuries 
to that party, and that breach of that standard of care and engaged conduct was the proximate 
cause of the injuries sustained by that party. 
Negligence has been defined also as a failure to exercise the care which a reasonable or 
prudent person would do in the circumstances, or the act of taking action which a reasonable 
person would not. Negligence is "accidental" as distinguished from "intentional" torts. In making 
a claim for damages based on negligence, the injured party must prove: a) the party alleged to be 
negligent had a duty to the injured party; b) that the person's action ( or failure to act) was a 
negligent act or failure to act prudently, and was not what a reasonably prudent person would 
have done; c) that damages were "proximately caused" by the negligence, and the damages were 
"reasonably foreseeable" or "within the risk of harm" at the time of the alleged act or failure to 
act prudently. 
This duty and standard of care exists in common law, case law, codified in statutory law 
relating to comparative and contributory negligence, and addressed in Idaho's jury instructions 
wherein we find in IDJI 2.00.1, it defines the Duty of care by stating: 
"It was the duty of the defendant, before and at the time of the occurrence, to 
use ordinary care for the safety of the plaintiff and for the plaintiff's property." 
DeBest has sets forth in the proposed TPC, paragraphs 35 and 36, the following reference 
to a "duty" allegedly owed to Plaintiffs, as well as to DeBest: 
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35. Gould owed Plaintiffs and DeBest a duty of reasonable care and a duty to 
perform services in accordance with the applicable standard of care and in a 
workmanlike manner. 
36. To the extent that Plaintiffs' claims against DeBest may be proven, it will 
be because Gould has breached its duties owed to Plaintiffs and DeBest. 
Once again, it does not appear DeBest has standing to allege a negligent claim on behalf 
of Davisons against GCBI, or attempt to allege any claim, on behalf of Davisons, against either 
Gould, individually, or against GCBI, an entity, or otherwise, and there is no allegation there has 
been any claim of damage to the person or property o(DeBest, so there has been no breach of 
any duty owed to DeBest. The theory of a "duty of care", must be owed to the person or entity 
asserting the claim, and no identifiable duty of care is readily seen to be owed to DeBest by 
GCBI, regarding any restoration to the property of another, and as importantly, there is no claim 
of damages to the person or property of DeBest from any breach of any duty, proximately 
causing injury that was reasonably foreseeable to the person or property of DeBest. 
DeBest cannot advance a negligence claim against GCBI (Count Three in the proposed 
TPC), upon an alleged claim there was a duty of reasonable care and legal and contractual 
duties owed to the Plaintiffs and to DeBest, as there is no standing regarding Davisons, and there 
is no recognized duty owed to DeBest by GCBI, existing under any relationship or engaged 
activity, and since there is no duty of reasonable care owed to DeBest, which was breached and 
from which it caused damages to the person or property of DeBest, as must be established under 
negligence law, the negligence claim is without foundation in law or in fact, and Count Three of 
the objection to the proposed TPC should be sustained. 
Once again, if there were to have been any contractual relationship between DeBest and 
GCBI, regarding the subject of remediation and restoration of the Davisons' residence, then the 
nature of that claim would be one for non-performance, and would be advanced through a legal 
remedy under contract law, alleging a breach of contract, and not a claim of actionable 
negligence. 
THE BASIC LAW ON STANDING 
A fundamental issue that must first be addressed by the Court, is to determine De Best's 
standing to assert any claim for indemnification, contribution, and/or negligence, when there is 
no statutory basis, not contractual basis, and no equitable basis that allows for that legal concept 
to be applied to any reasonable interpretation of the factual history of this controversy. The 
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concept of standing is critical to the validity and survivability of any claim, separate and apart 
from the issue of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Most evident from DeBest's 
proposed TPC is the lack of any factual basis to demonstrate any elements that invoke those 
principles of law essential to establish the fundamental basis required for the necessary standing 
to bring a claim for indemnification, or a claim for contribution, or a negligence action, as set 
forth above. 
In the case of Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104-105, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159-
1160, (2002) the Court noted the significance and fundamental importance of standing: 
It is a fundamental tenet of American Jurisprudence that a person wishing to 
invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing. Standing is a preliminary question 
to be determined by this court before reaching the merits of the case. The doctrine 
of standing is a subcategory to justiciability. As this court has previously noted, the 
doctrine is imprecise and difficult to apply. Standing focuses on the party seeking 
relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. To satisfy the case 
or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate an 
injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or 
redress the claimed injury. This requires a showing of a distinct palpable 
[perceptible, plain, obvious, readily visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, manifest] 
injury and fairly traceable casual connection between the claimed injury and the 
challenged conduct. (italic emphasis added) See also Martin v. Camas County, 150 
Idaho 508,248 P.3d 1243 (2011), where standing was again addressed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court and reiterated in 2011. 
Our Appellate Courts again undertook to emphasize this fundamental issue in the 
following year, in McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425, 283 P.3d 742 (2012), 
wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the fundamental need for a litigant to establish and 
demonstrate standing, before a claim can proceed It stated: 
"In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, the petitioner must allege or 
demonstrate a distinct palpable injury in fact, that the injury is fairly traceable to 
the challenged conduct, and that there is a substantial likelihood that the judicial 
relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury". 
With the introduction of 1 13, being asserted as an allegation within the proposed 
TPC, it serves to assert what would appear to be the element or nature of the standing that 
would serve to establish a claim for a breach of contract regarding the nature of the 
required performance of the alleged agreement between DeBest and GCBI, and nothing 
within the proposed TPC asserts any "factual" basis to get DeBest within the elements of 
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a claim to demonstrate STANDING necessary to establish any claim against GCBI for 
indemnification, contribution, or negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
This current Motion for leave to file a third party complaint serves to epitomize what 
complexity can be "tmearthed" when an entwined inter-relationship between homeowners and 
construction professionals encotmters defective installations that subsequently require major 
restoration, where claims arise, from which a flurry of legal questions arise, not just over the 
right of a homeowner to file a lawsuit in contract and tort against the responsible subcontractor 
who admitted liability and responsibility for the damages, but thereafter intmdated with this 
questionable array of contentious positions concerning assertions over duties, standards of care, 
and whether a right of indemnification or contribution exists, and whether a general contractor 
has any duty of care or liability to the responsible party who declined to directly make the repairs 
that his defects in the.performance of his professional expertise had caused. When a homeowner 
contracts to make the needed restorations, and they are performed at the request of and to the 
satisfaction of the homeowner, where is the duty or an imputed duty fotmd to be owed to the 
responsible party that caused the damage and did not perform the work, but committed to pay for 
the costs incurred in the restoration? If there is a duty, to what extent is that duty, and for what 
purpose, and upon what basis were any of the parties aware of any such duty and exposure was 
owed to or among them, or to the party that caused the problem? Is the law not clear enough to 
confirm that the wrongful party bears the liability? Is notification of the costs that were incurred 
sufficient to meet any duty? 
This proposed pleading, if for no other purpose, provides much opportunity for 
controversy, for which these Plaintiffs have contrib 
Dated this 23rd day of June, 2016. 
is particular third 
ustained. 
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Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Valley County 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box359 
Boise, ID 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ,JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 




) Case No. CV 15-1 78C 
) 
) MOTION TO CONFIRM 
) IMPLEMENT ATTON OF THE 
) PROVISIONS OF THE NOTICE AND 
) OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT 
) APPLY TO PENDING LAWSUIT 
) 
) 
COMES NOW the Plaintitls above named, Scott Davison and Anne Davison, by and 
through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, and do here,'v1th move this Court to enter an 
Order thereby confirming that the provisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, 
codified under §§6-2501-2504, Idaho Code, refen-ed to generally as ''N.O.R.A", is the statutory 
enactment that applies to, and has been implemented in this lawsuit currently filed by said 
plaintifts against the Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., for which said Plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover their allowed damages, costs, and attorney fees as provided for and set fi)rth therein. 
Plaintiffs do furthermore request this Cmu1 to confinn, upon such entry of its Order, tJ1at 
the Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc. has waved any right to assert any challenge to any aspect 
regarding the p~rformance or compliance with any conditions precedent, as set lxmh within the 
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provisions of N.O.R.A., by virtue of the fact the parties have fully engaged in those intended 
activities that lead up to the requirement for Defendant to submit a proper and sufficient response 
under the provisions of N .0 .R.A., for which the Defendant, its agents and representatives, have 
either failed or declined to do, giving rise to this lawsui~.,_Avrif~i;-~;esen~;-~i}piite4~!~l a tort 
I /~ "' '----" 
claim against said Defendant, as a result of those damages\1Jstained tr"om the defocth'>e ph.mi~ing 
installations, and entitled to full recovery under the provisions:~~ ! J) 
Dated this 24'" day of J unc, 20 l 6. /~ -------~ 
~;;£~~-~ .. -~, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs "' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ~ 
/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 24th day of June, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing rvlotion to be delivered to the following persons at the fiJllowing 
addresses as follows:· 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Valley 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 




) Case No. CV 15-l 78C 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO CONFIRM 
) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
) PROVISIONS OF THE NOTICE 
) AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR 





On July 21, 2015, the above named Plaintiffs, Scott Davison and Anne Davison, filed suit 
against the Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc. (hereafter "DeBest"), for damages sustained to 
their vacation residence as a result of defects in plumbing installations performed by DeBest, the 
subcontracting plumbing specialist rendering services on this remodel project regarding 
Plaintiffs' vacation residence located at 2109 Waterlily, McCall, Idaho. 
The suit was initiated after the parties' participation in settlement proceedings set forth in 
the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("N.O.R.A."), codified under §§6-2501-2504, Idaho 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONFIRM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT APPLY TO 




Code. Plaintiffs sued DeBest because they, as construction professionals, were the entity 
responsible for installing the defective plumbing components and/or performing the defective 
installation with their professional services, causing the leak(s) to occur that enabled the water to 
be introduced throughout the entire interior of Davisons' vacation home. The lawsuit Davisions 
initiated against DeBest alleged claims in both contract and tort, as a review of the provisions set 
forth in N.O.R.A. authorized a suit to be filed by homeowners against a construction professional 
whose professional services were found to be defective, and the homeowners suffered damage or 
loss of use of their real or personal property caused by such defects in a substantial remodel 
being made to their residence. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND GIVING RISE TO THIS LAWSUIT 
The Davisons commenced this action because of the defective plumbing work performed 
by DeBest, involving the installation of those plumbing components and fixtures installed 
between June 15-17, 2013, undertaken by them as part of their final stage regarding their fixture 
installations in this remodel project of the Davisons' vacation residence in McCall, Idaho. 
Because the vacation residence was undergoing this extensive remodel, it would not be used 
until the Davisons arrived in July, so a period of about 40 days elapsed from the date of the 
leakage resulting from the defective work by DeBest, before this plumbing leak was discovered 
by the Davisons on July 25 2013. The leak was rather significant, and in the intervening 40 day 
period (June15-17, 2013 to July 25, 2013), the continuing flow of water caused extensive 
damage to the interior of the structure, damaging walls, ceilings, and flooring throughout the 
interior of the residence, effectively destroying the entire remodeled interior project. 
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The damage commenced when DeBest activated the water supply to allow water into the 
plumbing system of the residence, after their installations were completed. The water emanating 
from the defective installation contacted virtually everything in the recently remodeled interior, 
including sheetrock on the ceilings and walls, the ceiling crown and base moldings, all baseboard 
installations throughout, the door jams, trimming, and subf1ooring in the residential interior. The 
water flowed and accumulated everywhere within the interior, causing everything to be soaked 
throughout during that extended 40 day period of time. 
As required by Idaho law, and deemed to be a condition precedent to bringing any civil 
action to recover damages, it was confirmed that written notice of the defective work had been 
provided to the general and subcontractor, as Davisons had immediately given written notice to 
the general contractor, Gould Custom Builders, lnc.(hereinafter GCBI), the very next morning of 
July 26, 2013, and then Mr. Gould immediately gave notice to DeBest, for purposes of 
compliance with the notification provisions under the Idaho Notice and Opportunity to Repair 
Act ("NORA"), LC. § 6-2501 et seq. See initial Affidavit of Gilbert Gould. The general 
contractor, according to the terms of its own agreement with its subcontractor, deferred the 
responsibility for restoration of the damages to the subcontractor, DeBest, the professional 
construction specialist that did the plumbing installations, and ultimately the claim was tendered 
by DeBest to DeBests' liability insurer, seeking to have the carrier pay for the needed repairs to 
the Davison residence, and to ultimately settle for the losses to avoid need for judicial 
intervention. 
Because the statutory provisions of N.O.R.A. include "subcontractors," and those with a 
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"right to a lien" under LC. §45-501, within the definition of"Construction professional," LC. §6-
2502(4), it was perceived that any construction professional rendering professional services on 
the remodel project, regardless of the capacity (general or sub) in which the services were being 
rendered, by definition a subcontractor was a qualifying party in a lawsuit, and it was determined 
that DeBest could be directly named in an action commenced under the provisions of that Act, 
LC. § 6-2503(3), to recover damages caused by their defective work. 
In this case, as a consequence of the general contractor's deferral - and the 
subcontractor's (DeBest) acceptance - the statutorily-required negotiations and settlement efforts 
required by N.O.R.A. were properly tendered to and accepted by DeBest, and its eventual agents 
and representatives took the matter into their own hands, performing what was perceived to be 
the condition precedent to undertake settlement efforts, before the homeowner was then 
authorized by statute to institute an action to recover the costs incurred in restoring the premises. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS CONCERNING 
DeBEST'S DIRECT OBLIGATION OWED TO DA VISONS 
Scott and Anne Davison own this residential- vacation residence- custom built-remodeled 
Mountain cabin, located at 2109 Water Lily, Pilgrim Cove, McCall, Idaho. The Davisons used 
this residential facility seasonally, during the summer-fall, and then typically winter skiing, 
holidays, and during the Carnival season held in McCall, and on other occasions should the 
desire arise throughout the year. There was this period of time the residence would be 
unoccupied during their extensive remodel project, until that coming July, 2013, when the 
Davisons were scheduled to arrive on July 25, 2013, with all remodeling completed. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONFIRM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT APPLY TO 
PENDING LAWSUIT P4 
00000323
Their custom vacation residence is fully insulated and suitable in all respects for year-
round use, and was fully fitted with all modem heating and plumbing accessories, making it most 
convenient and accommodating for year-round use. In 2012, the Davisons developed plans to 
conduct substantial renovations and upgrades to their vacation residence, and they hired Gilbert 
Gould's construction entity, Gould Custom Builders, Inc. (GCBI), to undertake that extensive 
remodel project to be undertaken that winter and into the spring-early summer months of 2013. 
It was an extensive renovation project, and would take a period of time to complete. 
Within the scope of this remodel project, DeBest was brought in to perform the plumbing 
installations, and DeBest had their employee, Torn Peterson, their licensed plumber, perform the 
installations, and he made the final installations-hookups during the period between June 15-17, 
2013, as he then finalized the installation of the final faucet fixtures on the claw-foot bathtub 
located in an upstairs bathroom. The hookup process involved water lines from the tub, 
traversing through the wall and into an access area located behind the bathroom wall, where the 
connections were made to the water system. Upon completing those connections, Mr. Peterson 
activated the water supply system that allowed the water to flow into the water lines within the 
interior of the residence. Mr. Peterson left the residence, and no one else was present until Scott 
Davison and his family arrived in the evening hours of July 25, 2013. 
Upon arrival, Scott Davison discovered water leaking through the ceiling into the 
bedroom located below the upstairs bathroom where Torn Peterson installed the faucet and line 
connections on June 15-17, 2013. As a result of this leakage, the bedroom ceiling was sagging 
and portions collapsed from the water saturated materials and the weight of accumulated water, 
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dripping onto the hardwood floors and water standing throughout the other interior rooms, 
leaving standing water on all interior hardwood floors, causing all wood components and 
sheetrock materials in this finished remodel interior to be stained, swollen, twisted, buckled and 
warped throughout the interior of this vacation residence, virtually destroying the entire remodel 
project. 
Scott Davison immediately e-mailed notice, initially to Gilbert Gould about 7 :00 am the 
following morning, July 26, 2013, who in tum immediately notified Mr. Tom Peterson ofDeBest 
Plumbing, then still located in the McCall area. On that day, July 26, 2013, Mr. Peterson, Scott 
Davison, and Mr. Gould undertook immediate measures at the Davison residence to locate and 
stop the leak behind the upstairs bathroom wall, and begin removal of damaged sheetrock, water 
soaked insulation, and damaged materials in the bedroom below. Davisons had "GCBI" 
undertake the immediate repairs necessary to the bedroom to make that room habitable, with the 
understanding the major restoration work required throughout would be undertaken later, once 
the Davisons returned to California that Fall, as the entire interior now had to be replaced again. 
It was decided it made no economic sense to expedite the restoration process, as 
Davisons had be unable to use the residence during the renovation process, and if they were to 
start all over again, Davisions would need to seek alternative housing accommodations while 
they remained in the McCall area, which accommodations would be obtained at a tremendous 
expense, and to expedite the restoration work would not change the full extent of what needed to 
be done to accomplish another renovation project to restore the damaged interior, as the method, 
manner, extent of demolition and effort required to remove and replace what had just been the 
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comp]eted renovation of the interior would require virtually a 100% make-over of the renovation 
project that had just been completed when the water was introduced back into the residence by 
DeBest. 
The costs associated with the restoration process was now a function of again purchasing 
the replacement materials needed, and furnish the same labor and expertise that had been 
required to before accomplish the demolition and replacement of the entire interior in the 
remodel project. No one, including DeBest, ever once thought or expressed the belief the 
commencement of the restoration process would lessen the cost of renovation; it was obvious 
timing would not affect the extent of the restoration that had to eventually be undertaken. 
Once Mr. Peterson, Gilbert Gould, and the Davisons had inspected, identified, and 
determined the cause of the leak (see initial affidavit of Gilbert Gould), DeBest office personnel 
and Tom Peterson immediately acknowledged responsibility for the plumbing failures and the 
damage it had caused, and from that time forward, the Davisons, along with the assistance of Mr. 
Gould and Tom Peterson had discussions with the DeBest office personnel, never denied the 
obligation or questioned the method of the restoration process, which thereafter came to include 
the involvement of DeBest's liability insurer, and their assigned adjuster, the Intermountain 
Claims of Idaho, including a senior adjuster, Ronald Egland. 
The restoration actually began that late fall, after the Davisons returned to California, and 
by that following spring, DeBests' insurer (through their adjusting agent) undertook a 
determination of their perception of costs, and submitted a statement the claim's adjuster 
perceived the damage value to be, and submitted that calculation to Davisons on April 30, 2014. 
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That calculation was $24,005.06, a sharp contrast to what billing invoices and statements 
had already been submitted to Davisons and DeBest, as costs incurred to that point had already 
reached $91,716.76, representing actual costs incurred for the labor and materials, and the final 
billing invoices and statements upon the completed restoration was for $123,345.64. The parties 
failed to reached any acceptable settlement of their valuation as to the extent of damages and the 
reasonable costs of restoration, and Davisons had no alternative but to resort to filing this civil 
action authorized and provided for under the provisions of N.O.R.A .. 
ARGUMENT FOR IMPLIMENTATION OF N.O.R.A. 
A. The Notice And Opportunitv To Repair Act (N.O.R.A.) Expressly Permits A Direct 
Action Against Construction Professionals, which includes Subcontractors Such As 
DeBest, Once The Provision Of That Act Had Been Addressed 
As a condition precedent to commencing any civil action for damages under N.O.R.A., a 
"claimant," as defined at LC. §6-2502(3) of Idaho's Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act 
("N.O.R.A." or "the Act") must provide written notice to a "construction professional," as 
defined at LC. § 6-2502(4), regarding "damage or the loss of use of real or personal property 
caused by a defect in the construction of residence or in the substantial remodel of a residence." 
LC. §6-2502(1). N.O.R.A. states that, "Any action commenced by a claimant prior to 
compliance with the requirements of this section shall be dismissed by the court without 
prejudice and may not be recommenced until the claimant has complied with the requirements of 
this section." IC§ 6-2503(1). 
A "Claimant,", defined in subpart (3) of I.C.§6-2502 is defined as follows: 
(5) "Homeowner" means" 
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(a) Any person who contracts with a construction professional for the 
construction, sale, or construction and sale of a residence; and 
(b) An association as defined in this section. 
"Homeowner" includes a subsequent purchaser of a residence from any 
homeowner. LC.§ 6-2502(5). 
The defective work at issue was performed by De Best Plumbing about June 15-17, 2013. 
The leak arising from that defective work was first discovered by the homeowner, Scott Davison, 
on July 25, 2013, after an intervening period just short of 40 days. Mr. Davison promptly 
contacted Gilbert Gould, the construction professional with whom he had contracted, who 
immediately notified Mr. Tom Peterson and DeBest home office personnel, the construction 
professional who did the work. Thereafter, there was much on-going contact between all parties 
and entities. Mr. Gould and DeBest's employee, Tom Peterson, undertook immediate removal 
of damaged materials that day, including termination of the leak and removed sheetrock, water 
soaked insulation, and damaged materials in the bedroom below the upstairs bathroom. 
DeBest always acknowledged throughout discussions their defective performance caused 
the damages to the Davison residence. Consequently, Davisons, spoke to DeBest, who accepted 
full liability and responsibility, and entered into direct discussions that ultimately led to the 
involvement of the liability carrier and their subsequent inspection and rather short-sited damage 
estimation that failed in any "settlement negotiations" with DeBest's liability carrier and claim's 
adjuster. 
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As required by the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("N.O.R.A.") the written 
notice was undertaken to initiate the Act's requirements that were submitted by Davisons 
through a series of emails. See e.g., Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 437, 196 P.3d 
352, 355 (2008). 
In that case, it was determined that Mendenhall's March 11 letter satisfies the 
notice requirements of NORA for the construction defects he alleged. "His letter 
sufficiently identified the nature and location of the defects. The letter stated, among 
other things, 'water problem with north roof of great room, east spouting leaks in four 
places.". 
Here, the parties appeared to move forward in good faith for months, waiting for 
the restoration to get underway after Davisons left for California that fall, so the potential 
of any settlement discussions could not take place until the spring of 2014, and no 
meaningful attempt to advance the restoration or reach a settlement was ever advanced by 
DeBest agents and representatives. 
Ultimately, DeBest and its adjusting agents never actually make a settlement 
offer. Instead only an estimate of damage or remaining damage was submitted, in the 
amount of $24,005.06 and that was tendered April 30, 2014 accompanied by the limiting 
language: "This is an estimate of damage only and not an offer of settlement. This 
estimate is not an authorization for repair, nor is it a guarantee of payment." (See Scott 
Davison Affidavit) The restoration had already been in progress for months, and 
DeBest' s agent never authorized any repair, yet they now choose to say the restoration 
was umeasonably delayed!!! Obviously the Davisons found themselves essentially 
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abandoned by DeBest, and no different was their position than what was found to be the 
situation in Mendenhall v. Aldous, supra, where the Builder failed to tender a valid 
response under LC. § 6-2503(2). Absent the required response, Mendenhalls were held to 
bwe entitled to file suit without further notice, as provided by LC. § 6-2503(3) (a). 
As a matter of "public policy," (as it was defined in Bakker v. Thunder Spring-
Wareham, L.L.C., 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 (2005)), the Legislature has 
made the determination residential construction litigation in Idaho must first undergo the 
attempt at the settlement provisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, LC. §6-
2501 et seq., before litigation can proceed. The Court in Mendenhall v. Aldous, supra, 
observed the underlying purpose of the Legislature was the following: 
"The Act was passed in 2003. The Idaho Building Contractors 
Association sponsored the bill in an effort to curb litigation against 
building contractors by homeowners. The purpose of the law is to give 
contractors the opportunity to fix construction defects before a lawsuit is 
filed. In furtherance of this goal, NORA requires a claimant to "serve 
written notice of claim on the construction professional," prior to filing an 
action alleging a construction defect." 146 Idaho at 436, 196 P .3d at 354. 
Davisons had undertaken to satisfy that condition precedent to this civil action by 
their on-going good faith cooperation in the inspection process, which did not come about 
until after DeBest submitted their claim to their carrier, who assigned it to their adjuster, 
which thereafter resulted in the untenable estimation, and the subsequent failed settlement 
efforts undertaken through DeBest agents and representatives, who elected to come in 
after demolition and months of work already completed, after $91,716.76 had already 
been incurred in the restoration process, suggesting the damage was worth only 
$24,005.06, despite the billing invoices and statements having before been delivered to 
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Davisons and DeBest. 
Once the statutorily-mandated settlement efforts had gone its extended course, 
and neither DeBest or its agents were of a disposition to seriously address the costs of 
restoration, and for all intents and purposes the settlement process had been determined a 
failed endeavor, there was nothing left but for Davisons to secure the assistance of 
counsel and then file suit and secure a judicial decree for restoration and loss of use 
damages, attorney fees, and accruing interest on the funds that had been disbursed by 
Davisons, paid by them to prevent liens from being filed against their residence. 
After suit was filed, DeBest then elected to challenge the contract claim, raising 
the defense there was a lack of privity of contract between DeBest and the Davisons, as 
DeBest had directly contracted with GCBI, hired to undertake the plumbing work in the 
residence. DeBest then challenged the tort claim as well, stating that because there was a 
contract between DeBest and GCBI, there was no basis for a negligence action by 
Davisons against DeBest. Essentially, DeBest's counsel wanted to ignore the litigation 
rights vested by N.O.R.A. and instead force Davisions to instead sue GCBI, under their 
contract, yet GCBI had done nothing wrong and acted only in extreme good faith 
throughout this entire ordeal. 
Davisons were proceeding on the basis DeBest was liable; DeBest was 
responsible: DeBest had conducted the inspection and estimation and DeBest then failed 
to adequately respond to the damages and cost of restoration, and it was DeBest and its 
agents and representatives that had failed to settle their damage claim under N.O.R.A., as 
provided by LC. § 6-2503(3)(a), which states: 
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(a) If the construction professional disputes the claim or does not 
respond to the claimant's notice of claim within the time stated in 
subsection (2) of this section, the claimant may bring an action 
against the construction professional for the claim described in 
the notice of claim without further notice. (Italic, dark lettering, 
and underlining emphasis added). 
The Act provides definitions for "claimant,", for "construction professional", and 
for the nature of the claim ( contract or tort), and those definitions do not appear to be 
narrowly limited to only those individuals or persons in contractual privity with the 
homeowner. Those definitions, as stated in LC. §6-2502, declare as follows: 
(3) "Claimant" means a homeowner or association that 
asserts a claim against a construction professional 
conceming a defect in the construction of a residence or 
in the substantial remodel ofa residence. 
( 4) "Construction professional" means any person with a right 
to lien pursuant to section 45-501. Idaho Code. an 
architect, subdivision owner or developer, builder, 
contractor, subcontractor. engineer or inspector, 
performing or furnishing the design, superv1s1on, 
inspection, construction or observation of the construction 
of any improvement to residential real property, whether 
operating as a sole proprietor, partnership, corporation, 
limited liability company or other business entity. (Italic, 
dark lettering, and underlining emphasis added). 
The · Legislature's choice of language in defining a claimant as being a 
homeowner who can be either the original contracting homeowner, or a subsequent 
homeowner of the residence, and defining a "Construction professional," as "any person 
with a right to a lien pursuant to section 45-501." (which specifically includes a 
"subcontractor"), are deliberate expressions of intent that undertakes to emphasize the 
inclusion of "subcontractor" in the complete definition, which intent is not insignificant, 
or superfluous wording by its inclusion of the phrase, and the cause of actions in any 
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lawsuit are defined to include a claim for both contract and tort is no insignificant 
reference either. 
It was a "subcontractor" hired and authorized to perform the plumbing services on 
this remodel project, and DeBest was certainly within that statutory category of persons 
entitled to claim a lien under I.C. §45-501, and when Privity has been recognized not to 
be a required element in actions involving those with a right to lien under LC. §45-502. 
In that regard, the Idaho Supreme Court determined in, Weber v. Eastern Idaho Packing 
Corp., 94 Idaho 694, 496 P .2d 693 (1972), wherein it states: 
However, the Idaho lien statute, I.C. §45-501, permits a subcontractor to 
independently file his lien; the workman's classification is unimportant in 
this regard, for the purpose of the lien is to protect the one who expends 
his labor to improve the land. Hill v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land and 
Water Co., 22 Idaho 274, 125 P. 204 (1912). See 94 Idaho at 697,496 P2d 
at 695 ( all emphasis added). 
Likewise, it was the intent of the Idaho Legislature, by its reference to those 
persons entitled to file mechanics and materialmens' liens, and other construction 
professionals that otherwise might not be in direct contractual privily with a general 
contractor was to allow individuals and entities within those classifications to be directly 
sued by homeowners, if the N.O.R.A. settlement provisions were unsuccessfully 
concluded, as that remains the civil remedy to homeowners from licensed construction 
professionals that might otherwise not be in a direct privity relationship with that 
professional that was liable for the services performed. 
It was an undisputed fact DeBest had no common law "privity of contract" with 
Davisons (the homeowners), as the services performed by DeBest were performed in the 
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capacity as subcontractors on the initial remodel project, brought into the project under 
contract with GCBI, the general contractor on the project. 
This district court has taken the position, upon the summary proceedings initiated 
by DeBest, that in the absence of any "privity of contract" between Davisons and the 
subcontracting construction professional, that absence effectively serves to insulate this 
subcontractor (DeBest) from a direct claim for breach of contract by Davisons, stating the 
common law "privity of contract" requirement for contract claims had not been abrogated 
by N.O.R.A., and N.O.R.A. did not create, by that enactment, any "contractual" cause of 
action that did not exist under other law for homeowners to pursue subcontractors. That 
issue has been preserved for appellate review. 
DeBest then took the position in those summary proceedings that a negligence 
claim did not exist under the facts of the case either, as there was a contractual 
relationship between DeBest and the general contractor, GCBI, so there should be no 
negligence-based claims asserted by Davisons against DeBest. The district court, 
however, did not endorse that position, and declined to dismiss the tort based claims 
against DeBest, and concluded that Davisons had a cause of action in tort against DeBest 
for the damages occurring as a result of the defective installations made to their 
residence. 
Because of the law of the case at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiffs are 
precluded from suing DeBest under a "contract theory" for recovery of their damages 
under N.O.R.A., leaving Plaintiffs the right to recover their damages through a tort claim 
for negligence established in tort law, a concept recognized both in common law, and 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONFIRM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT APPLY TO 
PENDING LAWSUIT Pl 5 
00000334
-
from Plaintiffs' perspective, authorized and provided within the provisions of N.O.R.A., 
upon which this lawsuit was being pursued in accordance with that statutory enactment. 
These Plaintiffs now request a ruling from this district court that this lawsuit is 
proceeding under the statutory provisions and authority contained in N.O.R.A., so as to 
provide the Davisions with a right of recovery under their tort action against DeBest for 
all damages sustained from the defective installation or rendition of the plumbing 
services by DeBest; recovery of all costs of restoration of the residence; recovery of all 
loss of use of the premises during the period of restoration; recovery of all statutory 
interest from the date of the losses; and recovery of all attorney fees and litigation costs, 
all of which is a recovery provided by the provisions ofN.O.R.A. 
B. DeBest, Through Its Actions, Has Waived, And Therefore Should Be 
Estopped From Asserting Any Defense As To The Sufficiency Of 
Notice; The Requiring Of Evidence On The Percentage Of Damages 
To The Value Of The Remodel Project; The Proceedings Undertaken 
In The Settlement Process; Or The Insufficient Nature Of Debest's 
Response The Davisons' Claims for Damages In This Civil Action 
During prior hearing(s) conducted in this controversy, DeBest's attomey(s) has 
alluded, either in open court or to Plaintiffs' counsel in discussions, that there may be a 
potential challenge to the sufficiency of the notice of the damage given by Davisons, or 
the percentage of damage in relation to the value of the remodel project, or that the 
settlement process was not actually completed before suit was filed, and may therefore 
choose to challenge the application of N.O.R.A. to the basis for and right to recovery 
under those provisions in this lawsuit. 
Once the settlement provisions of that Act, expressly authorized under the 
provisions of NORA, undertaken as a condition precedent to the initiation of a civil 
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action, have been allowed to occur and no proper response or settlement is reached, the 
lawsuit can be filed. The conduct of DeBest, in undertaking to engage in an inspection, 
an estimation, and then the direct negotiations with the Davisons, involving their 
insurance carrier and adjusting agent, that engaged process must be construed as 
constituting a waiver of any other challenge to the notice sufficiency, damage percentage, 
or perception as to the state of the settlement proceedings, and DeBest must be precluded 
from challenging the sufficiency of any conditions precedent to the application of the 
rights of recovery under the provisions of the enactment. 
In Pocatello Hospital, LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 
330 P.3d 1067 (2014) the Idaho Supreme Court provided the following description of 
what constitutes the "waiver" of any known right of a party: 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known 
right or advantage .... " Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 
457, 259 P.3d 595, 603 (2011) (quoting Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 
820, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006)). "Waiver is foremost a question of 
intent" and the party proving waiver is required to show a clear intent to 
waive. Id. (quoting Seaport Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 
735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct. App. 1987)). Waiver will not be inferred from 
the parties' conduct absent "a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an 
intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel." Id. at 458, 259 
P.3d at 604 (quoting Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 
256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993)). Importantly, the party asserting waiver 
must also "show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon [the waiver] and 
that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment." Id. at 457, 259 
P.3d at 603 (quoting Fullerton, 142 Idaho at 824, 136 P.3d at 295) (silence 
insufficient to show intent to waive); see also Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. 
Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 788, IO P.3d 734, 737 (2000) 
(concluding waiver was not established when seller failed to show 
detrimental reliance on buyer's waiver of payment term); Panorama 
Residential Protective Assoc. v. Panorama Corp. of Wash., 97 Wn.2d 23, 
640 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Wash. 1982) (concluding that when lease called 
for rent adjustments every two years and landlord failed to adjust rent for 
many years by the terms of the lease, the landlord waived the right to past 
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adjustments but not future adjustments). 156 Idaho at 719, 330 P.3d at 
1077. 
As noted above, from the time this "leaking event began on June 15-17, 2013, 
resulting from the plumbing defects of DeBest's installations, and the eventual discovery 
of the damages about 40 days later on July 25, 2013, the notice given, the discussions 
undertaken, the awareness of the damage, the demolition, the commencement of the 
restoration, the subsequent involvement of the liability carrier, the inspection, the 
estimate(s) of damage and restoration costs, and the attempted but failed settlement 
efforts had taken place. As to the response submitted by DeBests' insurer and adjuster, 
their statement of calculated damages, submitted on April 30, 2014, had the statement 
that declared: "This is an estimate of damage only and not an offer of settlement. This 
estimate is not an authorization for repair, nor is it a guarantee of payment." (see also 
Scott Davison affidavit), it becomes readily apparent there would be no reasonable 
settlement forthcoming, as there had been no sufficient response given as statutorily 
required, and absent a proper and qualifying response, no further notice was required 
before suit could be initiated for recovery of the damages. 
When the response is insufficient, or the settlement attempts failed, the 
homeowner was entitled to "bring an action against the construction professional." If that 
construction professional is then allowed in that subsequent civil action to interpose, as a 
defense, the adequacy of the conditions precedent to the litigation, then that earlier 
attempt (and very essence of NORA) at any settlement endeavor, has all been for nothing, 
and becomes a meaningless exercise of patience and committed good faith efforts by 
homeowners, because there was no incentive for the construction professional to perform 
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as required under the Act, if then allowed to challenge the sufficiency of the prior 
proceedings settle, having remained silent throughout the extended passage of time. If the 
parties were required to start over, do we really see the possibility of any change in the 
attitude of a claim's adjusting agency that some believe have a known history of this style 
of under-estimating damages in loss claims. 
As also noted above, the very existence of these settlement requirements that have 
been imposed by NORA are described to be a matter of public policy in Idaho, enacted 
by the Idaho Legislature in hopes of reducing the frequency of construction professional 
lawsuits. DeBest could have stood aloof from the inception, and simply declared that any 
and all remedies available to the Davisons must be derived only through their general 
contractor and their restoration agent, GCBI, but instead stepped in immediately and 
accepted liability and responsibility, only later to be undermined by the insurance carrier, 
by their choice of claim's adjusters. As the Davisons had believed, and properly-so, they 
had undertaken settlement efforts with whom the responsible construction professional 
wanted them to speak with, not inconsistent with any of the requirements declared and 
defined by NORA, and we find DeBest came forward with the display of honor and 
professional integrity, and immediately shouldered its proper responsibilities as the 
"construction professional", undertook the initial repair to their defective workmanship, 
and assisted in physical removal of materials in certain areas of the residence to 
accommodate the continued habitability until restoration efforts were to be commenced 
in the fall, to accommodate the seasonal period of the residence of the Davisons while 
staying in Idaho, and directed GCBI to submit all billing invoices, statements and 
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progress billings to DeBest as well, and they would be paid (thereafter discovering a 
liability claim was instead filed and the billings forwarded on to the insurance carrier). 
Having so acted as they did, and having directed GCBI and the Davisons to do as they 
did, , DeBest's conduct has required they accept direct liability under the Act, now being 
pursued as a tort claim only, and accept the fact their conduct has constituted a waiver of 
any potential challenge to the pre-requisites under the Act, characteristic to that in Profits 
Plus Capital Management, LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873, 332 P.3d 785 (2014), as it is 
perhaps characterized in the nature of a promissory estoppel arising out their engagement 
in the NORA settlement process: 
This Court has described promissory estoppel as: "A promise 
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forebearance on the part of a promisee or a third person and which does 
induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise." Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, 
Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 67, 625 P.2d 417, 421 (1981) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts§ 901(1) (1973)). The elements required to support 
such a claim are: "(1) one party's reliance on a promise creates a 
substantial economic detriment, (2) the reliance was or should have been 
foreseeable, and (3) the reliance was reasonable and justified." Grover v. 
Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 64, 205 P.3d 1196, 1200 (2009). "Promissory 
estoppel is simply a substitute for consideration, not a substitute for an 
agreement between parties." Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 
362, 367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005). Thus, where there is evidence of 
adequate consideration, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is of no 
consequence. Id. at 368, 109 P.3d at 1110. 156 Idaho at 891, 332 P.3d at 
803. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, both under the express terms of NORA, and by application of the 
doctrines of waiver and estoppel, the applicable law would require that DeBest is 
precluded from raising or asserting any reason to defeat the unconditional application of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONFIRM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT APPLY TO 
PENDING LAWSUIT P20 
00000339
the provisions and rights of recovery under the provisions ofN.O.R.A. to this remaining 
. tort claim made against DeBest by the Davisons in this action, and this district court shall 
affirm the provisions of N.O.R.A. apply to this lawsuit, so as to provide the Davisions 
with a right of recovery under their tort action against DeBest for all damages sustained 
from the defective installation or rendition of the plumbing services by DeBest; recovery 
of all costs of restoration of the residence; recovery of all loss of use of the residence 
during certain periods during which the restoration prevented their use during certain 
winter and spring months; recovery of all statu 
and recovery of all attorney fees and lif 
N.O.R.A. 
Dated this 24th day of June, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 24th day of June, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing Memorandum In Support Of The Motion To Confirm 
Implementation Of The Provisions Of The Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act To Pending 
Lawsuit to be delivered to the following persons at the following addresses: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Valley County 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise,ID 83701 
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Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
DeBesl Plumbing, Inc. 
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) 







YOU AND EACH OF YOO, Will please take Notice that on the 15th day of August, 
~~, .. -•••- • ,,._, ., "''-••-,v,,,., 
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e 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 8th day of July, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy 
oflhe above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persQns at the following addresses as 
follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
i: ourth Judicial District 
Valley 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
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From:Can tr Ill Skinner -
Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB #7754 
2083457212 07/W"" !Xi~~l:11l~.~RK 
By · 1 S. A · Oaputy 
JUL 11 2016 
C N . ,_., ~'lo ase 0--····-·-''·vr;·"·SC-( 
Filed A.M .. -"=-"' · P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV l 5-178C 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc., by and through its attorneys of record, 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP and hereby submits this Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
a. LR.C.P. 14{a) 
Based on information discovered during the deposition of Gil Gould on May 5, 2016, 
Defendant determined that a third-party complaint against Gould Custom Builders, Inc. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT - 1 
00000344
From:Can trill Skinner - 2083457212 07/.016 13:48 #115 P. 003/ 010 
("GCBI") was appropriate and subsequently filed its Motion for Leave to File a 3rd Party 
Complaint. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l4(a)(l) provides, "A defending party may, as third-party 
plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or 
part of the claim against it. But the third-party plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the court's leave 
if it files the third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its original answer." The 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the decision to grant or deny a Rule 14(a) motion rests with the 
discretion of the trial court. JSEEO v. State, 132 Idaho 559,567,976 P.2d 913,921 (1998). The 
ISEEO Court approved of the trial court's analysis of a Rule 14(a) motion, which stated that 
I.R.C.P. 14(a) "authorizes third-party claims against 'a person not a party to the action who is or 
may be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-
party plaintiff."' Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals explained: 
[The third-party claim] cannot simply be an independent or related claim but must 
be based upon plaintiffs claim against defendant. The crucial characteristic of a 
Rule 14 claim is that defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party 
defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff. The mere fact 
that the a1leged third-party claim arises from the same transaction or set of facts as 
the original claim is not enough. 
Harris v. Rasmussen, 106 Idaho 322, 324, 678 P.2d 114, 116 (Ct.App. 1984) quoting 6 C. 
Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1446 at 256-57 (1971) (footnote 
omitted). In explaining the purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)(l), which is 
identical to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)(l), the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal stated, "The 
purpose of this rule is to promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the necessity for the 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT - 2 
00000345
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defendant to bring a separate action against a third individual who may be secondarily or 
derivatively liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's original claim." Southwest 
Administrators, Inc. v. Rozay's Tramifer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1986). "[A] third-party 
claim may be asserted only when the third party's liability is in some way dependant [sic] on the 
outcome of the main claim and the third party's liability is secondary or derivative." U.S. v. One 
1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F .2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983 ). 
In the case before this Court, the proposed third-party complaint meets the above 
described criteria. Not only do the allegations in the proposed third-party complaint arise from 
the same set of facts, but GCBI's liabiJity is dependent on the outcome of the Davisons' claim 
against DeBest. DeBest was a subcontractor to GCBI in this case. DeBest and GCBI worked on 
the same remodel project and the alleged damages stem from the remodel project and subsequent 
repair and remediation. Based on the allegations contained in the proposed third-party 
complaint, DeBest relied on GCBI to properly and timely remediate any of the damage to the 
Davisons' property. DeBest is subject to the Davisons' suit, either wholly or in part, because of 
the acts and omissions of GCBI. In fact, DeBest alleges that GCBI caused a portion of the 
alleged damages incurred by the Davisons. As such, DeBest seeks indemnification or 
contribution from GCBI in its proposed third-party complaint. Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Leave to File a Third-Party Complaint is not only appropriate in this case, but it is also in the 
interest of judicial economy since the allegations are based on the same set of facts and are 
directly related to the work performed by GCBI and DeBest through their 
contractor/subcontractor relationship. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SlJPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT - 3 
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Additionally, a third-party complaint is appropriate when another party may be liable to 
the defendant for claims asserted by the plaintiff against the defendant. A defendant/third-party 
plaintiff does not need to demonstrate absolute Iiabi1ity on the party of the third-pa11y defendant 
at this point, but rather show that based on the allegations, the third-party defendant may be 
liable for part or all of the claims asserted against the defendant. Plaintiffs are arguing against 
the Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party Complaint as though they are answering the third-
party complaint In doing so, they are also relying on facts that are not in the record. 
Regardless, Defendant will briefly address Plaintiffs' arguments below. 
b. Standing 
As Plaintiffs' state in their Response and Objection to Defendant's Motion for Leave to 
File a Third Party Complaint, "In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, the petitioner must 
allege or demonstrate a distinct palpable injury in fact, that the injury is fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct, and that there is a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425, 431, 
283 P.3d 742, 748 (2012). "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not 
on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 
641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989) citing Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 
484, 102 S.Ct. 752, 765, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). "'In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, 
the petitioners must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the 
judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Schneider v. Howe, 142 
Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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Plaintiffs' argue that Defendant has not established a factual basis to demonstrate the 
elements of its claims and therefore, lack standing. However, in order to establish standing, 
Defendant has to allege an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and a 
substantial likelihood that judicial re1ief requested will prevent or redress the injury. Defendant 
does not need to prove the elements of its case in its third-party complaint. Defendant clearly 
alleges an injury (the liability to Plaintiffs for damage to the property), that is traceable to the 
acts or omissions of GCBI (GCBI's representations to repair the property and the subsequent 
failure to do so timely and properly), that can be redressed by judicial relief (a judgment that 
GCBI is partly or wholly responsible for the damage alleged by Plaintiffs). 
e. Indemnity 
Idaho law recognizes that indemnity obligations can arise by virtue of contract or by 
common law under theories of implied indemnity, also called equitable indemnity. Beitzel v. 
Orton, 121 Idaho 709, 717, 827 P.2d 1160, 1168 (1992). "It is well established that under 
common law, a person who is without fault on his part is compelled to pay damages occasioned 
by the negligence of another is entitled to indemnity." Id. quoting Industrial lndem. Co. v. 
Columbia Basin Steel & Iron, Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 471 P.2d 574 (1970). A party seeking 
indemnity may base the claim on a number of theories, including when '"[t]he indernnitee owed 
only a secondary duty to the injured party while the indemnitor was primarily responsible ... " 
Beitzel, 121 Idaho at 71 7, 82 7 P .2d at 1168 citing May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester 
Co., 97 ldaho 319,321,543P.2d1159, 1161 (1975). 
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In the case before this Court, Defendant's proposed indemnification c1aim against GCBI 
is weJI rooted in the above referenced law. Defendant alleges that GCBI, as the general 
contractor, was primarily responsible to Plaintiffs for the proper remediation and repair of the 
property. Further, Defendant al1eges that GCBI assumed an obligation to Defendant to be 
responsible for the remediation and repair. Defendant alleges that GCBI failed to perform its 
work properly, which led to a significant increase in alleged damages, and as such, GCBI should 
be responsible for the damages claimed against Defendant. 
d. Contributio11 
The theory of contribution is closely related to the theory of indemnity. Both 
contribution and indemnity are "based on the concept that a party should be held responsible for 
his own wrongs, and if another is compelled to pay damages caused by the wrongdoer, that party 
is entitled to recover from the wrongdoer." Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 284, 
766 P.2d 751, 754 (1988). "The terms 'indemnity' and 'contribution' are often used 
interchangeably. However, perhaps it is more appropriate to use the term 'indemnity' in 
referring to a claim for 100 percent reimbursement and the term 'contribution' in referring to a 
claim for partial reimbursement." Id. quoting Stephenson v. McClure, 606 S.W.2d 208, 210-211 
(Mo.App. 1980). 
Contribution is provided for under Idaho Code § 6-803. Plaintiffs argue that contribution 
cannot exist in this case because there is no joinMortfeasor relationship between GCBI and 
DeBest. However, Idaho Code § 6-803( 4) defines "joint tortfeasor" as "one (1) of two (2) or 
more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether 
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or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them." Defendant's allegations 
clearly establish that GCBI is a joint tortfeasor. Defendant alleges that GCBI is liable for the 
same injury to property that is being claimed by Plaintiffs and the two parties were acting in 
concert (in a contractor/subcontractor relationship) to remodel, repair, and remediate Plaintiffs' 
property. 
Again, as with its claim for indemnity, Defendant alleges that GCBI failed to perform its 
work properly and timely, which led to a significant increase in alleged damages, and as such, 
GCBI should be responsible for at least a portion of damages claimed against Defendant. 
Allowing Defendant leave to file its third-party complaint will eliminate the ''empty chair 
defendant" at trial by allowing the jury to assign fault proportionally among the parties. 
e. Negligence 
A negligence action requires "]) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to 
conform to a certain standard of conduct; 2) a breach of that duty; 3) a causal connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and 4) actual loss or damage. Black 
Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 
904 (1991) quoting Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irr. Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 (1976) 
Defendant's claim for negligence against GCBI, in regard to GCBI's duty to Plaintiffs, is 
the basis of its claims for indemnity and contribution. However, Defendant alleges that not only 
did GCBI owe a duty of care to Plaintiffs, but also to Defendant, since Defendant had agreed to 
accept responsibility for the costs of remediation. Defendant alleges that GCBI's performance in 
the repair and restoration of Plaintiffs' property was a breach of that duty and that said breach 
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caused the potential liability of Defendant to Plaintiffs. Defendant alleges the prima facie 
elements of negligence against GCBI. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant Defendant's Motion for Leave to 
File Third-Party Complaint. 
DATED this 11 th day of July, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP 
By: 0w{,,,u~ 
--T-y-ler__,-=.~->+--"'-N' --'ei,._H_, O_f_th_e ..... F1-·rm ______ _ 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 11 th day of July, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith [X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
1900 W. Main Street ( J Hand Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83702 [ ] U.S. Mail 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Honorable Jason D. Scott [ J Facsimile 
Valley County Courthouse [ ] Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1350 ( J U.S. Mail 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 [X] Email: gknapp@co. valley.id. us 
Honorable Jason D. Scott [ ] Facsimile 
Ada County Courthouse [X] Hand Delivery 
[ l U.S. Mail 
Tyler H. 
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VER.i"-JON K. SMITH 
A.TTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
SMIT. ?AGE 02 
~UGLAS mLEAJLERK 
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JUL f 9 2016 
C.No ___ _ 
Inst. No. __ _ 
Flad AM __ 2_'·~\1~P. - .M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND I•'OR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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) 
) ORDER DENYING MOTION 






TI1is matter having come before the Court on July 18, 2016, upon Defendant's 
Motion for leave to file a Third Party Complaint, and the Cou11 having heard the arguments 
of counsel and having reviewed the scheduling order previously entered in this matter, and 
for good cause appearing therefore, as addressed by the Court upon the record; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendant's moticm for leave of Court to amend the 
pleadings to include a Third Party Complaint is herev,rith denied. 
I qf"-. 
Dated·~ day of July, 2016. 
District. Judge Jason Scott 
ORDERP. I 
00000353
07/19/2016 10:31 2083451 l 2'3 • \lERH0H K SMITH -
PAGE 03 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the lqP'day of July, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following 
addresses as follows: 
ORDER P.2 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W + Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Robc1t D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
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::a,se No._""."""'T~-lnet. M.. )Ii 
-~lied.... I l : 3!lA.=;_ ·---_;,:~• 
.P.AJ, 
V. 
DEBEST PLUMBING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
PEIUvfISSIVE APPEAL 
Supreme Court l)ocket No. 44245-2016 
VaUey County No. CV-2015-178 
Ref. No. 16-288 
A MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL with attachments and a MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL BEFORE THE- IDAHO SUPREME 
COURT were filed by counsel for Plaintiffs on June 14, 2016, requesting this Court for permission 
to appeal from the district court's Order 011 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment file-
stamped April 7, 2016 in Valley County case number CV 15-178-C. Therefore, after due 
consideration, 
IT HEREBY JS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL be. and 
hereby is, DENIED. 
cc: 
DATED this /) July, 2016. 
Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge Jason D. Scott 
f3y Order of the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, cferk 





Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
20834S7212 
JUL 2 0 2016 
Case No. ___ Jnst. No. __ _ 
Flied _ ...J,.M .J~.:~iz7_ . ..._P.M 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV l 5- l 78C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF SERVICE 
) 





Pursuant to Rule 33(a)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned party 
has served certain discovery papers upon the opposing counsel (and opposing parties who have 
appeared for themselves without counsel) whose names and addresses where served are listed below: 
follows: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
The Discovery papers that were served with a copy of this Notice are described as 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1 
00000356
From:Cantrlll Skinner - 20B3457212 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO INSPECT THE PREMISES 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 34 
#13B P.003/004 
Unless otherwise indicated, all papers were served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid on 
the 19th day of Ju]y, 2016. 
DATED this 19th day of July, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
7~ \ 
By:~~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Film 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of July, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney.for Plaintiffs 
' 
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB #2713 
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~YOUG~~~?~~~~ 
JUL 2 7 2016 
Case N~-: Inst. No. 
Filed L• L/O A.M. ___ _.P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 





YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant's wil1 call on for hearing their Motion 
to Compel before the Honorable Jason Scott on the 15th day of August, 2016 at 1 :30 p.m., or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED This C?1ay of July, 2016. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - l 
r 
By:_-1-__:::___~~~~~==_,,.....==·.Jc.{ __ • ----
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~day of July, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiff/, 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
[X} Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ } Hand Delivery 
[ } U.S. Mail 
~ 
Robert D. Lewis 
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-
Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
-
DOUGLAS A~~LE~ERK 
By /4(\.p., Deputy 
JUL 2 7 2016 
Case No. ___ l,nst. No. __ _ 
RIAd A.M ____ PM. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV l 5- l 78C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
vs. ) 
) 





Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Tyler H. Neill, of the firm Cantrill 
Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, move this Honorable Court for an Order compelling Plaintiffs to answer the discovery 
propounded upon on Plaintiffs' counsel on June 9, 2016. This motion is supported by the Affidavit 
of Robert D. Lewis filed herewith. 




A true and correct copy of Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs is attached 
as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit ofRobertD. Lewis (hereafter "Aff. of Lewis"), and as evidenced by 
the Notice of Service previously filed herein. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P., Rule 37(a), counsel for Defendant sent a "meet and confer" letter to 
Plaintiffs' counsel on July 19, 2016, requesting responses. See Aff. of Lewis, Exhibit B. To date, no 
responses have been received from Plaintiffs. 
This motion is further based on the fact that Plaintiffs have refused to answer said discovery, 
and that this Court should further order the Plaintiffs to pay to Defendant a sum which the Court 
shall order as reasonable for expenses incurred in obtaining such Order, on the ground that said 
refusal is without substantial justification. 
Defendant requests oral argument on this motion pursuant to the provisions ofRule 7(b )(3) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this ~(l"dayof July, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP 
By: Tyl~~O~ 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of July, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL - 3 
M Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 




Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
.DOUGLASA.~I~ CLERK 
BY-----i~~i-J.J.-Deputy 
JUL 2 7 2016 
CaseNo ___ ,nst. No __ _ 
RIAd A.M, ___ _.P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV 15-178C 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO COMPEL 
I, Robert D. Lewis, being first duly sworn upon oath, does depose and say: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. in the above-referenced case, 
and as such have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
2. Attached hereto and identified as "Exhibit A" is a true and correct copy of Defendant's 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. LEWIS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL - 1 
00000364
-
Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs, propounded to Plaintiffs on June 9, 2016. 
3. On July 19, 2016, I spoke with Plaintiffs' counsel and requested Plaintiffs' responses. I 
informed counsel that if we did not receive responses by June 25, 2016, we would file a 
Motion to Compel. 
4. On July 19, 2016, I sent Plaintiffs' counsel a letter as a follow-up to our telephone 
conversation, confirming our request for Plaintiffs' responses. Attached hereto and identified 
as "Exhibit B" is a true and correct copy of the July 19, 2016 letter. 
5. As of the date of this Affidavit, I have not received Plaintiffs' responses. 
6. The delay in receiving the responses has forced Defendant's to delay filing a potential motion 
for summary judgment. 
7. On or about July 18, 2016, I had my assistant, Wendy Henman, contact this Court's clerk for 
available dates to have a summary judgment hearing, 54 days prior to the Court's deadline 
for summary judgment motions to be heard. 
8. On or about July 20, 2016, the Court informed Ms. Henman that the only available dates for 
a summary judgment hearing were August 15, 2016 and September 19, 2016. 
9. Due to the delay in receiving Plaintiffs' responses, and the limited availability of the Court's 
calendar, Defendant was unable to schedule the hearing on a motion for summary judgment 
within the scheduled cutoff date. 
10. Filed concurrently with this Affidavit is a Notice of Hearing on a Motion for Summary 
Judgment for September 19, 2016. 
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-
DATED this~ay of July, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the2b day of July, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 






Robert D. Lewis 
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-
Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 





DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFFS 





TO: PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, VERNON K. SMITH. 
Pursuant to Rules 26, 33, and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant DEB EST 
PLUMBING, INC. ("'DeBest") request that Plaintiffs SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON 
("Davison") respond under oath to the following Discovery Requests within thirty (30) days of 
service: 





INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of these Discovery Requests, the following Instructions are applicabJe: 
1. Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant DeBest 
hereby demands Plaintiffs Davison to answer under oath the Interrogatories hereinafter set forth 
within thirty (30) days of service. 
In answering these interrogatories furnish al1 information available to you, including 
information in the possession of your attorneys, investigators, employees, agents, representatives, or 
any other person acting on your behalf, and not merely information known of your own persona) 
knowledge. 
If you cannot answer the following Interrogatories in full after exercising due 
diligence to secure the information to do so, so state that fact and answer to the extent possible, 
specifying your inability to answer the remainder and stating whatever information and knowledge 
you have concerning the unanswered portion. 
2. These Interrogatories are deemed continuing interrogatories and requests and 
your answers thereto are to be supplemented as additional information and knowledge become 
available or known to you, as required by I.R.C.P. Rule 26(e). 
For purposes of these Discovery Requests, the following Definitions are applicable: 
A. "Person" refers to a natural person, corporation, limited and limited liability 
company, partnership, limited and limited liability partnership, sole proprietorship, unincorporated 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFFS - 2 
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association, state, political subdivision, municipal corporation, government agency, or other 
organization. 
B. "You" and "your" refer to the Plaintiffs Davison to whom these Discovery 
Requests are addressed. 
C. "Documents" mean, without limitation, the following items, whether printed 
or recorded or reproduced by any mechanical process, including digital and electronic data stored on 
computers, tapes, disks, punch cards, or printouts, or written or produced by hand: papers, books, 
lists, memoranda, summaries or records of telephone conversations, summaries or records of 
personal conversations or interviews, diaries, journals, objects, tangible things, correspondence, 
emails or electronic messages, telegrams, cables, telex messages, charts, graphs, maps, reports, 
notebooks, summaries or reports of consultants, photographs, videotapes, video recordings, 
photographic negatives, photographic slides, movies, microfilm, microfiche, brochures, pamphlets, 
advertisements, circulars, fliers, press releases, drafts, letters, and any marginal comments appearing 
on any document, and all other writings. 
D. "Remodel" means the entire work to remodel, renovate, or repair the 
Residence, as defined below, which is the basis of this lawsuit. 
E. "Residence" means the Valley County, Idaho vacation residence O\vned by 
Plaintiffs Davison, located at 2 J 09 Water Lily, McCall, Idaho, that is the subject of this lawsuit. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify the total cost of the Remodel of the 
Residence. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please identify the assessed value of the Residence 
for property tax purposes in 2012. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please identify the assessed value of the Residence 
for property tax purposes in 201 3. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please describe the complete basis for which you 
contend that the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (Idaho Code§ 6-2501 et seq.) applies to this 
litigation. 
DA TED this .3.!:::_ day of June, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP 
By: ___ /J_A,____1..,_(d.........,./l_,.,....c'"'-= 1.,.__ / ______ _ 
TylerfiN~Tu, Of~~rm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFJCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of June, 2016, J served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 




Facsimile 208-345-1 129 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
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CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
1423 TYRELL LANE P.O. BOX 359 
ROBERT D, LEWIS 
CLINTON O, CASEY 
DEAN C, SORENSEN 
DANIEL J, SKINNER 
TYLER H, NEILL 
Via Hand Delivery 
Vernon K. Smith 
The Law Office of Vernon K. Smith 
1900W. Main 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
WWW,CSSKLAW.COM 
(208) 344-8035 
July 19, 2016 
RE: Scott & Anne Davison v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
Claim No.: 2165550 
DOL: July 24, 2013 
Dear Vern: 
DAVID W. CANTRILL, 
OF COUNSEL 
GARDNER W, Sl(INNER, JR, 
(RETIRED) 
FACSIMILE (208) 345-7212 
CSSKLAW@CSSKLAW,COM 
This letter will serve as a follow up to our telephone conversation today about discovery in 
the above-entitled lawsuit. 
There were Interrogatories sent to the Plaintiffs with answers due on July 12, 2016. We 
discussed that today and you assured me that you have received that discovery and you will contact 
the Davisons and find out what their responses are. Please let this letter serve as a confirmation that 
we have met and conferred about that outstanding discovery. Ifl have not received answers on or 
before July 25, 2016, I will proceed with a Motion to Compel. 
In addition, we have asked the Davisons for all documents relevant to their claim that DeBest 
owes over a $120,000 for the repair of their McCall cabin. As we discussed, Mr. Gould testified at 
his deposition that he sent them invoices with all backup documents for materials and subcontractor 
charges that support the claim for over $120,000. I would like you to provide me with copies of all 
such invoices sent by Gil Gould to the Davisons. This request was earlier made at Mr. Gould's 
deposition and I am simply repeating that request now. 
I am going to send you a Request to Inspect the Premises, so that I can have my expert view 
and inspect the subject of this lawsuit. That will be sent along with this letter. Please let me know 




Vernon K. Smith 
July 19, 2016 
Pagel 
Finally, I would like to take the deposition of the Davi sons when they are in Idaho. Please 
provide me with some available dates. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
RDL/wh 
Enclosure 
Robert D. Lewis 
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08/04/2016 09:00 208:3451129 
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORJ"\JEY AT LAW 
1900 \ll. :Main St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
-
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345~1129 
VER~~IJH I< '::,MITH :='AGE 1J2 -
DOUGLAS~~ER, CLERK 
By Deputy 
AUG O ~ 2016 
Case No:----lnst. No __ _ 
FIIAd IF'-{ I A.M ___ _iPM. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ,JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 




) Case No. CV 15-178C 
) 







,..;----· --,._~-~ ....... 
~-. 
/~ ~, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 4th ~'.Y6f August, 2016, I provided a true and corree.\ 
copy of Plaintiffs" Response to Defondant'i\ccond Set of Intcrro~atones~·<.i~{ivery to) 
{ / ) / 
\ I ' ' De fondant's counsel. ''-... / 1 I 
·, I / 
' I 
Dated this 41" day of August, 2016. ~."": ,,, / / 
,.:::'~~ .,,// 
,f,,,;,., ,..., ~ 
've~~~it~fth .'.:'-~ 
NOTICE OF COl'vIPLIANCE P. l 
00000375
08/04/2015 09:00 208345112'3 - '•./ERHiJH t< SMITH F'AGE 03 -
CERIJFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 4th day of August, 2016 I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following 
addresses as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial lJistrict 
Valley 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, fD 83701 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE 
( ) 







- ~~LAsalLEA, CLERK 
Pf -Deputy 
Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
AUG O 5 2016 
Case No._ 
Filed..,,. ---.1lnst. No. __ _ 
---....... A.M ____ .JP.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
DUCES TECUM OF SCOTT 
DAVISON 
August 22, 2016 @ 9:00 a.m. 
TO: SCOTT DAVISON AND VERNON K. SMITH: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the Defendants will take the testimony on oral 
examination of SCOTT DAVISON, pursuant to Rules 26 and 30(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure before M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., a Notary Public, or in case of their inability to 
act or be present, before some other officer authorized to administer oaths, on the 22nd day of 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF SCOTT DAVISON - l 
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August, 2016, at the hour of9:00 a.m. of said day at the Holiday Inn Express & Suites, 210 N. 3rd 
Street, McCall, Idaho. 
Oral examination will continue from time to time until completed. You are respectfully 
requested to have said SCOTT DAVISON present for the purpose of taking such deposition at the 
time and place indicated, and bring with him the following: 
1. The deponent is required to bring to the deposition all records in his possession or 
under his control that are relevant to the claims asserted in this case against Defendant. 
The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to 
attend and cross-examine. 
DATED This lf day of August, 2016. 
CANTRILL SK.INNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:&~~~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF SCOTT DAVISON - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the_.!:{_ day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
M&M Court Reporting 
421 W. Franklin Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
[X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Email 
Robert D. Lewis 
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
• £OUGLASk--MJtLER,CLERK 
~p Deputy 
AUG O 8 2016 
Case No ___ -J,ftAl 
Flied. Hllfl,No,_~--
------A,~L l ; If ...P.~. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, 
INC.'S 2ND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Defendant by and through its attorneys of record, Cantrill Skinner Lewis 
Casey & Sorensen, LLP, and moves this court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for summary judgment in said Defendant's favor, dismissing Plaintiff's remaining claim 
of negligence against this Defendant, without prejudice, on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to 
comply with the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act under Idaho Code§ 6-2501 et seq., and that 
said Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC. 'S 2ND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
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This motion is made and based upon the records, files, pleadings in the above entitled 
action, together with the Affidavits of Darcy Neidigh, Tom Petersen, and Tyler H. Neill and 
supporting Memorandum filed concurrently herewith. 
Defendant requests oral argument on this motion pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this Stt--day of August, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP 
By: _ _L.::../Jwf~ JK..,:____,._&#d_' _,___ _ 
Tylerlf.Neill, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
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• ~UGLAS t;_~l.1.l!R, CU!RK 
ll4rt , Jeputy 
AUG O 8 2018 
CaseHo ____ _,lntt No 
Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 Fllltd A.M_ /-· /-q-_-P.-.M. 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, 
INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF 2ND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. (DeBest) presents this Memorandum to the Court in 
support of its 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs' remaining claim of 
Negligence. Based on the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act under Idaho Code§§ 6-2501-
2504 ("NORA"), Plaintiffs failed to provide written notice of the claim to DeBest, which bars 
their claim without prejudice. 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR 




Defendant respectfully requests that this Court consider and hear Defendant's 2nd Motion 
for Summary Judgment despite being scheduled for hearing on September 19, 2016, ten days 
after the deadline for summary judgment motions to be heard pursuant to the Court's Scneduling 
Order. Defendant was forced to delay filing its 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment due to the 
delay in Plaintiffs' responses to Defendant's discovery requests, which are germane to 
Defendant's argument. Defendant served Plaintiffs with discovery request on June 9, 2016. 
Plaintiffs did not serve their responses on Defendant until August 4, 2016. Regardless, 
Defendant contacted the Court on July 18, 2016 for available dates for a summary judgment 
hearing, 54 days prior to the Court's deadline. A.ff. Robert D. Lewis ,i 7, (July 26, 2016). On July 
20, 2016, the Court's clerk informed Defendant that August 15, 2016 and September 19, 2016 
were the only available dates for a hearing. Id. at ,i 8. At that time, August 15, 2016 was less 
than 28 days away. Defendant has filed its Motion for 2nd Summary Judgment within the time 
frame to be heard by the September 9, 2016 deadline, but due to the limited availability of the 
Court's calendar, and the delay in receiving Plaintiffs' discovery responses, Defendant was 
unable to get a hearing date within the scheduled cutoff date. Id. at ,i 9. Defendant respectfully 
requests that this Court allow Defendant to proceed with its 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment 
and hear oral arguments on September 19, 2016. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. In February 2013, DeBest entered into an agreement with Gil Gould dba Gould 
Custom Homes based upon a proposal to repair residential piping and plumbing fixtures at 2109 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR 
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Waterlily, McCall, Idaho (the "Residence"). Aff Darcy Neidigh, ff 3-4 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
2. DeBest had no agreement with the owners of the Residence where the work was 
performed. A.ff. Darcy Neidigh, ,r 5 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
3. There was no agreement by DeBest to supply any material or provide any services 
for the benefit of Plaintiffs, the owners of the residence. DeBest provided its services and 
materials for Gil Gould dba Gould Custom Builders. A.ff. Darcy Neidigh, ff 4-5 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
4. The remodel project on the Residence began in 2011, with Gil Gould acting as the 
general contractor for the project. A.ff. Tyler H. Neill, ,r 3, Exhibit B (Aug. 5, 2016) (Pis' 
Response to De f's 2nd Set of Interog., p. 2 (Aug. 3, 2016). 
5. The assessed property value of the Residence in 2011 was $38,960.00. A.ff. Tyler 
H Neill, ,r 3, Exhibit B (Aug. 5, 2016) (Pis' Response to Def's 2nd Set of Interog., p. 4-5 (Aug. 3, 
2016). 
6. The assessed property value of the Residence in 2012 was $98,250.00. A.ff. Tyler 
H. Neill, ,r 3, Exhibit B (Aug. 5, 2016) (Pis' Response to Def's rd Set of Interog., p. 4 (Aug. 3, 
2016). 
7. The assessed property value of the Residence in 2013 was $98,249.00. A.ff. Tyler 
H Neill, ,r 3, Exhibit B (Aug. 5, 2016) (Pis' Response to Def's rd Set of Interog., p. 4 (Aug. 3, 
2016). 
8. The total cost of the overall remodel project was $427,436.77. A.ff. Tyler H. Neill, 
,r 3, Exhibit B (Aug. 5, 2016) (Pis' Response to Def's rd Set of Interog., p. 2 (Aug. 3, 2016). 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC.'S MEMORANDUM Il~ SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
00000385
9. On or about July 25, 2013, Plaintiffs discovered leaking and water damage in the 
Residence. Pls' Complaint, ,r 5 (July 21, 2015). 
10. On or about July 26, 2013, Plaintiffs emailed Gil Gould, informing him of the 
leaking and water damage. Aff. Tyler H Neill, ,r 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 51 :8-
52:15 (May 5, 2016)). 
11. On or about July 26, 2013, Gil Gould called Tom Petersen, an employee of 
DeBest who had performed work on the residence, to inform him of the leaking and water 
damage of the residence. Aff. Darcy Neidigh, ,r 6 (Aug. 5, 2016), Aff. Tom Petersen, ,r 7 (Aug. 5, 
2016). 
12. On or about July 26, 2013, Tom Petersen met with Gil Gould at the residence and 
the two undertook efforts to repair the leaking and clean-up the water damage. Alf. Tom 
Petersen, ,r 8 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
13. Although Scott Davison may have been present at the Residence on July 26, 
2016, Tom Petersen did not have any conversation with him. Aff. Tom Petersen, ,r 11 (Aug. 5, 
2016). 
14. After working for several hours on clean-up at the residence, Gil Gould stated to 
Tom Petersen that he would finish up the clean-up work and repairs. Aff. Tom Petersen, ,r 9 
(Aug. 5, 2016). 
15. When Tom Petersen left the Residence on July 26, 2013, Gil Gould had no 
discussion or agreement with Tom Petersen or DeBest regarding when he would start work later, 
DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, INC. 'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
00000386
what work he would do, or how the billing should be handled. A.ff Tyler H. Neill, ,i 2, Exhibit A 
(Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depa., 106:14-25 (May 5, 2016)). 
16. It was DeBest's understanding that any additional clean-up effort and repairs 
would be undertaken and completed within a few days of July 26, 2013. A.ff Darcy Neidigh, ,i 8 
(Aug. 5, 2016), A.ff Tom Petersen, ,i 10 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
17. Gil Gould of Gould Custom Builders, Inc. completed repairs on the Residence by 
the end of July 2013, after which the Davisons occupied the Residence until early late autumn 
2013. A.ff Tyler H Neill, ,i 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depa., 86:11-87:3 (May 5, 
2016)). 
18. At the time clean-up and repairs were completed on the Residence by the end of 
July 2013, there was no indication that there was any further damage to the Residence. A.ff Tyler 
H Neill, il 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depa., 66:5-13 (May 5, 2016)). 
19. While occupying the Residence in August 2013, Anne Davison notified Gil Gould 
of previously undiscovered water damage on the upstairs bathroom floor, which Gil Gould 
inspected, but did not repair at that time. DeBest was not notified of this damage. Aff. Tyler H 
Neill, ,i 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depa., 65:11-66:16 (May 5, 2016)), A.ff Darcy 
Neidigh, ,i 9 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
20. After clean-up and repairs were made on the Residence between July 26, 2013 
and July 31, 2013, no further repairs were undertaken until around December 18, 2013. A.ff Tyler 
H Neill, ,i 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depa., 97:10-23 (May 5, 2016)). 
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21. When Gil Gould of Gould Custom Builders, Inc. inspected the Residence in 
December 2013 and tore off the ceiling, he discovered that there was water damage in the walls 
of the bedroom, in the closet, under the stairs, in the hallway and entrance, and partly in the 
utility room. Mold was discovered in the Residence at this time. A.ff. Tyler H. Neill, ,r 2, Exhibit 
A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 108:12-21 (May 5, 2016)). 
22. Gould Custom Builders, Inc. undertook major remodel and repair efforts on the 
Residence beginning around December 18, 2013 and concluding in the spring of 2014. A.ff Tyler 
H Neill, ,r 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 97:10-23, 129:4-8 (May 5, 2016)). 
23. DeBest had no contact with the Davisons or Gould Custom Builders, Inc. after the 
initial clean-up and repairs on July 26, 2013 until DeBest received an invoice from Gould 
Custom Builders, Inc. in February 2014 for the cost of repairs undertaken on July 26, 2013 and 
additional costs incurred after December 18, 2013. A.ff. Darcy Neidigh, ,r 9 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
24. DeBest had no knowledge that Gould Custom Builders, Inc. was undertaking 
additional and extensive remodeling and repairs until it received the February 2014 invoice. A.ff. 
Darcy Neidigh, ,r 11 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
25. DeBest's insurer was given the opportunity to inspect the Residence in April 
2014, but not until after the additional and extensive remodeling and repairs to the Residence 
was already completed or near completion. A.ff. Darcy Neidigh, ,r 13 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
26. At no point prior to or on July 26, 2013, did DeBest or any DeBest employee 
receive any written notice of the damage at the Residence or of an opportunity to repair the 
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alleged damage. Alf. Darcy Neidigh, ii 14 (Aug. 5, 2016), Alf. Tom Petersen, ii 13 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
27. At no point after July 26, 2013, did DeBest or any DeBest employee receive any 
written notice of the damage at the Residence or of an opportunity to repair the alleged damage. 
Alf. DarcyNeidigh, ii 15 (Aug. 5, 2016),Aff. Tom Petersen, ii 13 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
28. At no time prior to this litigation was DeBest aware of the Notice and Opportunity 
to Repair Act ("NORA") or its rights thereunder. Alf. Darcy Neidigh, ii 16 (Aug. 5, 2016), Alf. 
Tom Petersen, ii 14 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary Judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, 
together with the Affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. Rule 56( c ). 
The burden is on the moving party to prove an absence of genuine issues of material fact. 
Rees v. State, Department of Health & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 14, 137 P.3d 397,401 (2006). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element of the 
claim does exist. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002). 
The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in the 
pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by affidavits or otherwise to set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e). Failure to do so 
will result in an order granting summary judgment. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 
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1. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SERVE WRITTEN NOTICE TO DEFENDANT 
PRIOR TO FILING THIS LAWSUIT, PURSUANT TO I.C. § 2503(1) 
a. NORA applies to this case since it involves a "substantial remodel" of a residence 
Idaho Code§ 6-2502(1) defines an action under NORA as: 
any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort for damages or indemnity 
brought against a construction professional to assert a claim, whether by 
complaint, counterclaim or cross-claim, for damage or the loss of use of 
real or personal property caused by a defect in the construction of a 
residence or in the substantial remodel of a residence. 
Idaho Code § 6-2502(7) defines "residence" as "a single-family house, duplex, triplex, 
quadraplex, condominium or a unit in a multiunit residential structure in which title to each 
individual unit is transferred to the owner under a cooperative system." Idaho Code § 6-2502(9) 
defines "substantial remodel" as "a remodel of a residence, for which the total cost exceeds one-
half (1/2) of the assessed value of the residence for property tax purposes at the time the contract 
for the remodel work was made." 
The litigation before this Court concerns a substantial remodel of a residence for the 
purposes of NORA. The Residence is a single family house constructed upon leased land in 
McCall, Idaho. The total cost of the remodel project was $427,436.77, which began in 2011. 
The assessed property value of the Residence in 2011 was $38,960.00. The assessed property 
value of the Residence in 2012 was $98,250.00. The assessed property value of the Residence in 
2013, when DeBest was hired by Gil Gould, was $98,249.00. Therefore, the total cost of the 
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remodel at the time the contract for remodel work was made clearly exceeds the value of the 
Residence. 
b. Plaintiffs failed to serve written notice of opportunity to repair to Defendant prior to 
filing this lawsuit 
Idaho Code § 6-2503(1) states, 
Prior to commencing an action against a construction professional for a 
construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the 
construction professional. The notice of claim shall state that the claimant asserts 
a construction defect claim against the construction professional and shall 
describe the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature 
of the defect. Any action commenced by a claimant prior to compliance with the 
requirements of this section shall be dismissed by the court without prejudice and 
may not be recommenced until the claimant has complied with the requirements 
under this section. If a written notice of claim is served under this section within 
the time prescribed for the filing of an action under this chapter, the statute of 
limitations for construction-related claims is tolled until sixty (60) days after the 
period of time during which the filing of an action is barred. 
Idaho Code § 6-2502(8) defines "serve" or "service" as "personal service or delivery by certified 
mail to the last known address of the addressee." 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted the use of the term "shall" in NORA imposes "a 
mandatory obligation" when explaining the requirement of a construction professional to serve a 
written response once served with written notice from the claimant. Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 
Idaho 434, 438, 196 P.3d 352, 356 (footnote 4) (2008). Based on this interpretation, it is clear 
that the use of the term "shall" under Idaho Code 6-2503(1) creates a mandatory obligation on 
the part of the claimant to serve written notice to the construction professional. In Funk v. 
Landvik (Power County Case No. CV-2013-211), an Idaho 6th Judicial District case, the Court, in 
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granting summary judgment to a construction professional, stated that "verbal notice does not 
comply with NORA." See Aff. of Tyler H Neill, 1 4, Exhibit C (Aug. 5, 2016) (Memorandum 
Decision Granting Defendant Daniel Landvik's Motion/or Summary Judgment, p. 9 (Mar. 19, 
2015)). The Funk Court also held that a written notice that was served after the repair work had 
been completed was insufficient under NORA as the construction professional was deprived of 
any real chance to make repairs and remedy the defect. Id. 
Although DeBest was made aware of the leak and some of the damage to the residence 
based on a conversation with Gil Gould on July 26, 2013, the Davisons never provided any 
written notice to DeBest at any point. Further, prior to the extensive remodel and repair project 
that began on December 18, 2013, DeBest had no knowledge that such a project was taking place 
or that there was even still a need for construction on the Residence. It is clear and undisputed 
that the Davisons did not comply with the notice provisions of NORA. There was no written 
notice to DeBest detailing the alleged damage or giving DeBest an opportunity to repair, either 
before the initial repairs on July 26, 2013 or before the extensive remodeling and repairs that 
took place beginning December 18, 2013. The only writing that was sent was an email sent from 
Scott Davison to Gil Gould. The email was not sent to DeBest. 
To the extent that Plaintiffs claim DeBest had actual notice of the damage on July 26, 
2013, such notice does not satisfy the requirements under Idaho Code §§ 6-2503(1) and 6-
2502(8). NORA clearly and unambiguously states that "the claimant shall serve written notice 
of claim on the construction professional" and that serve or service means "personal service or 
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delivery by certified mail to the last known address of the addressee." Phone calls or 
conversations do not meet these requirements. Written notice was not given to DeBest in any 
form, let alone through personal service or delivery by certified mail. Further, it is undisputed 
that DeBest not only did not receive written notice regarding the December 18, 2013 remodel 
and repairs, but that they did not even have any notice or knowledge of the initiation of remodel 
and repairs. By the time DeBest was made aware of the December 18, 2013 remodel and repairs 
in the spring of 2014, there was no longer any meaningful opportunity to inspect or repair the 
Residence. The majority of the work had been completed. As such, it is clear that Plaintiffs did 
not comply with NORA prior to filing this lawsuit. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear and undisputed that Plaintiffs never provided written notice detailing the 
alleged defects or providing an opportunity to inspect and repair at any time relevant to this 
matter. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-2503(1), as a matter of law, summary judgment is 
appropriate and the Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this Stlay of August, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:/~~;__ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
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Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
~OUGLA~~,CLERK 
BY~--b'~-"Ft"----'Deputy 
AUG O 8 2016 
CaseNo, ___ Mt.No---
t:IIM A.M l'-i':f P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 










STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
) 
Case No. CV 15-178C 
AFFIDAVIT OF TYLER H. NEILL IN 
SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I, Tyler H. Neill, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state: 
1. I am an attorney for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. in the above captioned matter 
and, as such, have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 




2. Attached hereto and identified as "Exhibit A" is a true and correct copy of the 
relevant portions of the transcript of the Deposition of Gil Gould, dated May 5, 2016. 
3. Attached hereto and identified as "Exhibit B" is a true and correct copy of 
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Second Set oflnterrogatories. 
4. Attached hereto and identified as "Exhibit C" is a true and correct copy of a 
summary judgment decision in an Idaho 6th District Court Case entitled Funk v. Landvik (Power 
County Case No. CV-2013-311), dated May 19, 2015, that concerns notice requirements under the 
Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act. 
DATED this 5fl- day of August, 2016. 
~ . t1 ll+ui 
TylerH~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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1 GIL GOULD, 
2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to said 
3 cause, testified as follows: 























BY MR. LEWIS: 
Q. Mr. Gould, my name is Rob Lewis. We met before 
the deposition, and I want to take your deposition today. 
Are you familiar -- you are familiar with this lawsuit, 
are you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Give me your name and where you live, 
your address, for the record, please. 
A. I'm Gilbert R. Gould. I live at 291 Ashton 
Lane, McCall, Idaho, 83638. 
MR. SMITH: And, Rob, before you ask any 
further questions, can we just have a stipulation that all 
objections are reserved except as to the form of the 
question so I can just sit here like a --
VK. 
MR. LEWIS: Yeah. 
MR. SMITH: -- beautiful bump on a log? 
MR. LEWIS: I think that's what the rules say, 
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
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(208)345-961 l(ph) (800)234-9611 (208)-345-SS00(fax) 





1 more, work done February 8th of'13 to June 25, '13? Who 
2 put that then in with this? 
3 THE WITNESS: That was for the original for 
4 this. 
5 MR. LEWIS: Yeah, that was original billing. I 
6 think he dated this one back --
7 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
8 MR. LEWIS: -- and put the faucet in because it 
9 had broken and they didn't charge you for any of that 
10 work. 
11 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
12 MR. LEWIS: I don't think they charged you for 
13 this faucet. I don't know how it broke, but it looks like 
14 DeBest swallowed that. 
15 MR. SMITH: Was that a defective faucet? 
-
1 ask you some questions --
2 A. Okay. 
Gil Gould 
May 5, 2016 
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3 Q. -- and then we'll speed this up. But have you 
4 seen this email before? 
5 A. It was sent to me personally. 
6 Q. Okay. So you recall this email? 
A. Yes. 7 
8 Q. And is this the first notification that you had 
9 that the water faucet had broken after the job was 
10 complete and Mr. Davison found damage in the cabin? 





Q. Okay. And it's dated June 26th, correct? 
MR. SMITH: July. 
Q. (BY MR. LEWIS) July 26th, correct? 
A. Yes. 
16 MR. LEWIS: No. There was a wrong connection 16 Q. I apologize for that. If you look in 
17 between the tapered pipe or -- 17 Exhibit 6, again --
18 THE WITNESS: It was a stub that went through 18 A. Yeah. I had --
19 the wall -- 19 Q. Pull Exhibit 6 out. You actually have the 




THE WITNESS: -- that caused the problem. 
MR. LEWIS: Yeah. 
THE WITNESS: But all of this was from the 
24 initial freezing, not the second time from the thing 
25 leaking. 
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1 MR. LEWIS: Got you. Exactly. No question 
2 about that. Let me put one more thing in front of you as 
3 Exhibit 8 that may --
4 MR. SMITH: Confuse us more? 
5 MR. LEWIS: -- change your memory with regard 
6 to whether he had to fix the faucet after the work was 
7 complete. 
8 Q. (BY MR. LEWIS) This is an email from Scott 
9 Davison to chinadoll. Do you know whose email that is? 
10 A. That's my email address. 
11 Q. Okay. So this is an email dated July 26, 2013, 
12 from Scott Davison to you then, correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Do you remember seeing this? 
15 A. That was my first indication -- when we 
16 initially did this work, we expected the Davisons to come 
17 on the Fourth ofJuly, and we got everything done as quick 
18 as possible so it would be ready for them for the Fourth 
19 of July. But Scott didn't show up until -- I thought it 
20 was the twenty-fourth. 
21 But, anyway, this was the first indication that 
22 there was a problem. And as you can see, Scott was very 
23 appreciative of all the work we had done to the cabin 
24 except for the leak in the ceiling. 
25 Q. Let me just -- and I understand your -- I'll 
21 emailed me. You see that, the third paragraph there --
22 bottom of the third paragraph: Scott emailed me about the 
23 problem and I went there to see the damage on July 25th? 
24 That date is not correct, is it? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. Okay. This email is dated July 26th. So is 
2 that the first day that you went to look at the damage? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Do you know if Mr. Davison discovered it that 
5 day, or did he discover it the day before? 
6 A. The email looks like it was 7:00 o'clock in the 
7 morning. He got there late in the night prior to him 
8 sending me this. And that could be why I put the 
9 twenty-fifth down. 
10 Q. So it's your understanding that he arrived late 
11 on July 25th --
12 A. Right. 
13 Q. -- found the water damage, and then emailed you 
14 the next morning? 
15 A. Informed me the next morning. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. And I went there that same morning. And, 
18 fortunately, Tom Peterson was in the McCall area and 
19 assisted me in immediately taking care of that water 
20 problem. 
21 Q. The next paragraph of Exhibit 6 discusses Tom 
. 22 Peterson assisting you with the water problem? 
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. Is it accurate that that actually did happen on 
25 July 26th then? 
M & M Court Reporting Service 
(208)345-961 l(ph) (800)234-9611 (208)-345-8800(fax) 




1 A. Your subfloor, and then your two by four 
2 partition is nailed to that subfloor. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. And that's the wall facing where the tub is. 










May 5, 2016 
Yes. 
Is it after the repairs had been performed? 
This was after all repairs and the tub was 
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6 inch-and-a-half plate, which brings it up halfway, and 6 Q. Okay. And the way it's pictured here on 
7 then the vinyl, and then the tub is set on top of that. 7 April 28, 2014, is this the same way that it looked in 
8 Q. I get it. Let me see ifl understand what 8 July of2013? 
9 you're saying. You've got the four-foot wall. It is 9 A. Yes. The physical attachment and everything 
10 framed and the baseplate is a one by two? 10 stayed the same. 
11 A. Two by four. 11 Q. Same vinyl floor? 
12 Q. It's a two by four. On the left -- on the wall 12 A. It's a different vinyl floor because it was 
13 on the not bathroom side, the space where the piping is, 13 damaged and had to be replaced. 
14 you have only the OSB board as the floor? 14 Q. Bad question. Same type of vinyl floor? 
15 A. Right. 15 A. Same style, yes. 
16 Q. And then on the other side, on the bathroom 16 Q. Same style. The four-foot wall is back there 
17 side of the two by four baseplate, you have the particle 17 that you talked about? 
18 board on top of the OSB, and then the vinyl on top of the 18 A. That all was replaced, and the tile that was 
19 particle board? 19 above is all replaced. 
20 A. That's right. 20 Q. Similar to what it was in July 2013? 
21 Q. And the water leak was on the piping side of 21 A. Yes. Everything was put back basically the 
22 the wall and must have wet the OSB board, but it didn't go 22 same as what it was before, so ... 
23 out into the bathroom when you saw the water damage on 23 Q. Okay. And then look at the fixture there. And 
24 July 26th? 24 you talked about the fixture before. What was it you were 
25 A. Well, if you can picture the plumbing going 25 talking about when you referred to the cradle? 
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1 through the two by four wall, that fitting is inside of 
2 that two by four wall. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. So water is dripping inside the wall onto that 
5 baseplate running into the crawl onto that subfloor and 
6 as -- well, it was soaking into the particle board on the 
7 opposite side through the Sheetrock. But the initial 
8 visible damage wasn't evident inside the bathroom at that 
9 time. 
10 Q. Got you. Understand. Thank you. That's very 
11 helpful. Well, let's do it this way. 
12 MR. SMITH: You need a pen or not? Do you want 
13 him to draw or not? 
14 MR. LEWIS: I got a pen. I'm ready. 
15 Q. (BY MR. LEWIS) Okay. So the picture is 
16 Exhibit 9, correct? 
17 A. (Nonverbal response.) 
18 Q. And the drawing is Exhibit 10; is that correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Okay. Is Exhibit 9 an accurate copy of -- or 
21 picture of the clawfoot tub we're talking about in the 
22 upstairs bathroom? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And you can see the date on there. So this 
25 would have been after the water damage we're talking 
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l A. Well, if you look right behind the handle, 
2 you'll see a bigger nut before the flange that's against 
3 the Sheetrock. 
4 Q. Yeah. 
s A. Well, that bigger nut, it removes the faucet 
6 itself from the stub that goes through the wall. The 
7 stubs behind that nut and that flange that's against the 
8 Sheetrock is the chrome fitting that had the threads that 
9 weren't tapered. So that's the extension from that faucet 
10 through the wall. 
11 Q. Okay. On July 26 when you first saw the water 
12 damage, there was no indication of water damage --
13 A. No. 
14 Q. -- in the bathroom, correct? 
15 A. Actually it was after we had done the immediate 
16 repair in the bedroom below this faucet. And the Davisons 
17 were in the cabin. Anne called me and says, I think 
18 there's some problem in the upstairs bathroom floor 
19 because the vinyl is discolored and I can see some humps. 
• 20 So I went back over there and I realized that 
21 the particle board had swollen and the water had gone into 
22 that floor as well. So we didn't do anything there till 
23 after they had left somewhere around October of that same 
year. 
Q. Do you remember when it was that she called 
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2 A. Well, they were there probably -- I would guess 
3 probably sometime in August after they'd been there a 
4 while. 
5 Q. Okay. So between July when you did your work 
6 in response to the leak that Mr. Davison found and August, 
7 there is no indication that there was any further 
8 damage --
9 A. No. 
10 Q. -- other than what you'd fixed? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. There was no further indication of damage, 
13 correct? 
14 A. I hadn't noticed it myself until Anne notified 
15 me that the vinyl had discolored and noticed a hump in the 
16 floor, then I realized it had gone into that. 
17 Q. Here's what I want to do. I want to -- see 
18 Exhibit IO. Are these two -- are these fairly accurate 
19 drawings of the upstairs bathroom on the second page and 
20 the floor -- the plan for the downstairs below that 
21 upstairs bathroom? 
22 A. Yes. This is the entrance to the bedroom, 
23 closet, and this is under the stairs. 
24 Q. Okay. So what I'd like to do is have you draw 
25 in black ink the outline of the walls of the upstairs 
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l bathroom as it sits above the bedroom on the first page of 
2 Exhibit 10. Can you do that? You understand my question? 
3 A. I understand your question. 
4 MR. LEWIS: Let's go off the record while he 
5 draws. 
6 ( Off the record.) 
7 Q. (BY MR. LEWIS) Mr. Gould, on Exhibit 10, 
8 you've taken a black pen and drawn in the walls above the 
9 lower floor for the upstairs bathroom, correct? 
10 A. Correct. 
11 Q. And they extend through the red bedroom it's 
12 called on these plans, the closet, and the entry hallway, 
13 do they not? 
14 A. Actually, this wall would be back in here 
15 further because the doorway into the upstairs is right 
16 here, and there's a shower right here, then there's a 
17 closet, and the toilet is back here. 
18 Q. Okay. Where's the tub? Draw a tub for me. 
19 A. You have to come in here about four foot. This 
20 is access. 
'21 Q. That's the crawlspace you were talking about? 
:22 A. Right. And this goes the full length of that. 
23 Access door to go in here is right there to go in 
24 behind --
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A. -- in the closet. The clawfoot tub is right 
there. Pedestal sink. Pedestal sink. 
Q. Right. Let's do this. Write tub and draw a 
line to the tub you just drew in. Okay. And you've 
already written access on here. Can you make two circles 
for the piping that came up to the tub? Okay. Better 
yet, you've drawn it in. Put piping, and fixtures, and 
then draw a line to where you just did that. Can you do 
that for me? 
A. What do you mean by --
Q. I think you drew the pipes here coming up from 
the floor. 
A. This is rough plumbing. 
Q. Rough plumbing. I call those pipes. Maybe my 
mistake. You can put plumbing if you want. What did you 
write there? 
A. Trim. 
Q. Trim, not faucet. You put trim. Okay. Very 
good. So next what I want you to do is take this red pen 
and draw the area of visible damage that you and 
Mr. Peterson corrected, what you --
A. The first response. 
Q. -- what you did on July 26th. You can call it 
first response. That's a good way to put it. Red pen. 
Okay. What are you writing? 
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A. Shut off the water and fixed leak in this area. 
Q. Okay. Can you draw a circle around the whole 
area that you removed? 
A. Well, nothing was removed here. 
Q. I know. I understand that. But this is the 
bottom floor plan --
A. This is the --
Q. -- as though --
A. This is the upper floor. 
Q. The upper floor bathroom you put in on the 
lower floor -- on top of the lower floor for us, correct? 
MR. SMITH: He may need a new one. 
THE WITNESS: Well, this is the part that was 
damaged. 
MR. LEWIS: No. Okay. Let's go off the 
record. 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
MR. LEWIS: Okay. Back on the record. 
Q. (BY MR. LEWIS) All right. So on Exhibit 10 
after I asked you to do so, you put a red box over the 
area where the water damage was visible in the ceiling 
below the bathroom and you put an X in that box, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. This light fixture right in the center, 
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1 where you could paint it? 
2 A. That's when I painted it. 
3 Q. Okay. And these dates are accurate, to the 
4 best of your recollection, correct? 
5 A. We moved the bed and all the furniture and 
6 everything out of the room when the first damage was done. 
7 'Cause you couldn't work in there with all -- it's a 
8 fairly small bedroom. But the bed was a king size or a 
9 queen size, so it took up almost the whole room. That was 
10 stored out in the garage. 
11 Q. Is July 31st the last time you were there? 
12 A. Pardon? 
13 Q. Is July 31st the last time you were there for 
14 this first response? 
15 A. I wouldn't say it was the last time I was 
16 there. Might have been another day or two of follow-up 
1 7 after that to see if Scott and them were happy and any 
18 other thing that might need to clean up. 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. But the basic repair and work was done by the 
21 thirty-first. 
22 Q. So other than going back and making sure that 
23 the Davisons were happy with things, you didn't do any 
24 more cleanup or repairs after July 31st? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. How long did the Davisons use the cabin that 
2 season? 
3 A. They were there till late October. 
4 Q. And did you have occasion to go over and check 
5 up on the house and make sure --
6 A. Oh, I went over there --
7 Q. -- things were okay? 
8 A. -- several times. 
9 Q. Let me finish my question. 
10 A. Pardon me? 
11 Q. Let me finish my question. 
12 A. Okay. 
13 Q. Did you have occasion after July 31st to go 
14 over and visit the Davisons and make sure that things were 
15 acceptable to you and to them? 
16 A. I don't remember any exact dates, but I did go 
17 over there. They're not only customers, they're friends. 
18 So some of my visits aren't on business. Sometimes as a 
19 friend. So after Anne and her family showed up, I went 
2 o over probably to say hello to them just to be cordial, not 
21 necessarily to repair or do any follow up on the damages. 
22 I'm sure I went over there and apologized for 
23 the disaster after the full extent of fixing the whole 
24 cabin and then the first thing they see is the ceiling 
25 being blowed out, which is pretty devastating. Didn't 
• Gil Gould MayS, 2016 
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1 make them happy. 
2 As you can see from his email to me, he was 
3 pretty cordial and appreciative of the work we had done 
4 even though there was the damage, so ... 
5 Q. Did you have discussions with them after 
6 July 31st about what could happen when you start opening 
7 up walls, and what you might find, and how much extensive 
8 work could be required to fix the damage? 
9 A. There was no discussion on the extent of how 
10 much we'd find. I just assured them that once they left 
11 the cabin, that I would tear that ceiling out again and 
12 just follow the damage as far as it went and repair it. 
13 And they have full trust in me taking care of things as I 
14 see fit and leave that decision totally up to me. 
15 Q. Before you left on July 31st with all the basic 
16 work done, had you attempted to determine the full extent 
17 of the water damage? 
10 A. No. 
19 Q. And that was a conscience decision that you 
2 o made not to do that? 
21 A. No. It wasn't a conscience decision. It's 
22 just in the stress of getting the cabin so they could use 
23 it as quick as possible was the biggest priority at that 
24 time. 
25 Q. I get it. So their use of the cabin that they 
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1 owned and used as a summer residence was more important --
2 A. Every summer. 
3 Q. -- than completely fixing the full extent of 
4 the damage at that time? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. They use the cabin every year and they come in 
8 the winter for skiing and a few things. Just not too 
9 extensively in the winter, but almost the full summer 
10 until school started and then they'd be gone. 
11 Q. Okay. Now, was it your decision or their 
12 decision that the full extent of the damage wasn't going 
13 to be determined until after they were finished using the 
14 cabin? 
15 A. It was their decision 'cause they wanted to use 
16 the cabin. As I said before, they had a family reunion 
17 and a big get-together that they had already planned prior 
18 to knowing that there was damage. So our first goal is 
19 just to get the cabin back so they could use it, and we 
20 did that. 
21 Q. Okay. So it was their decision? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And their decision was made after discussion 
24 with you where you told them that if you don't take care 
25 of all the damage now, then we're going to have to come 
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1 the record. On Exhibit 6, page 2, you talked about two 
2 invoices dated February 4, 2014, that were sent to DeBest, 
3 correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And I've handed you what's been marked as 
6 Exhibit 12 and Exhibit 13. Are these true and correct 
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1 much time as I do if I'm not making some money for doing 
2 it. And that's the only profit that I make on a job is my 
3 commission and overhead. 'Cause I don't personally have 
4 labor involved or hands on. So that's my money. 
5 Q. On the second entry there it says, removal of 
6 damaged Sheetrock and insulation. Do you see that? 
7 copies of those two invoices? 7 A. Yes. 
8 A. Yes. 8 Q. Tom Peterson helped you with that, correct? 
9 Q. Between January -- or July 13, 2013, and 9 A. He did. 
10 February 4, 2014, did you have any contact with DeBest at 10 Q. Did he bill you for --
11 all about the Davison cabin? 11 A. Didn't bill me --
12 A. No. 12 Q. -- for his time? 
13 Q. Okay. So the first thing -- 13 A. He didn't bill me anything for his time. 
14 A. I may have -- I may have, but not to my 14 Q. So what does the $750 represent? 
15 recollection. 15 A. That's what I put in for my time, a dump fee, 
16 Q. You don't recall. Very good. That's fair. 16 and time to do all that, so ... 
17 All I can ask you is what you remember. So tell me what 17 Q. Okay. And that's incorporated in the total 
18 Exhibit 12 is. 18 bill to which the 5 percent and the IO percent are added? 
19 A. That's -- the first response work was done to 
2 o get the cabin usable for the Davi sons to use until they 
21 left in October. 
22 
23 
Q. Okay. Is this in your handwriting? 
A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. It says: First response expenses 
25 7/31/13. Doyouseethat? 
Page 95 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. So that would have included all the work you 
3 did between July 26 and July 31, as I understand it? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Okay. Tell me what 5 percent OH means. 
6 A. The OH stands for overhead. That's been my 
7 standard practice ever since I've been in business, 
8 5 percent overhead and 10 percent builder commission. 
9 Q. And what does overhead mean? 
10 A. I have vehicle expenses, insurances, office, 
11 maintenance, all those kind of things that any business 
12 has, taxes and licenses. 
13 Q. And so you charged 5 percent of those overhead 
14 expenses based on 5 percent of the amount of the bill, the 
15 1850? 
16 A. I charge 5 percent on the total of the bill and 
17 then 10 percent on the total of the bill not with the 
18 overhead added to it first. 
19 Q. Okay. I was going to ask you that next. What 
20 does the next line say, 10 percent something? 
21 A. Builder's commission. 
22 Q. Builder's commission. And what does that 
23 represent? 
24 A. Well, I'm a businessman. I have to make a 






A. If I'd hired somebody else to do that, I would 
2 2 have had to pay them. So I just -- I paid myself to do 
23 it. 
.24 Q. Okay. And you sent this to DeBest on 
25 February 4th, correct? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And then Exhibit 13, tell me what that is. 
3 A. That's a bill for work after we had started in 
4 December and accumulation of expenses up to that point 
5 when I billed them in February. 
6 Q. Okay. And you still have a 5 percent overhead 
7 and a 10 percent builder's commission on this bill also, 
a correct? 
9 A. That's right. 
10 Q. Okay. There's labor here from December 18, 
11 2013, to January 31, 2014, correct? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Do you see that's the second to last entry 
14 there? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Okay. Who from your company did labor? 
17 A. BG&D -- BD&G [sic] Construction. 
18 Q. Is that one of the backup documents here 
19 somewhere, I think? Is December 18th the date that you 
20 started this repair process? 
21 A. I may have been there doing some things myself 
22 personally before that. But that's when I had the crew 
23 come in and start demo and repairs. 
24 Q. Okay. So is BG&D [sic] somehow related to 
25 Gould Custom Builders? 
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1 A I've done an awful lot of repairs and work in 
2 this type that I didn't feel it was necessary to call in 
3 CTR or -- Disaster Response wasn't there at the time. But 
4 when the water damage in Pine Lakes Ranch to the 
s Weyhrich's home was so extensive and involved, that when 
6 the homeowner called me that he had a problem, I called 
7 CTR on my way there and they was about fifteen minutes 
a behind me. Because I knew they was going to have to put 
9 fans and dehumidifiers and a lot of things to mitigate the 
10 moisture. So I called them immediately because it was a 
11 point where I didn't feel I was qualified to do it myself. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A I do know my points of limitation. 
14 Q. When Tom Peterson left the premises in July of 
15 2013, did you have an agreement with him about when you 
16 would start work later, what work you would do, and how 
17 the billing should be handled? 
18 A. No discussion whatsoever with Tom at that time. 
19 Q. With anybody else at DeBest? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A The only discussion with DeBest was the 
2 3 original response saying what immediately needed to be 
24 done and that that wasn't the total extent of the repairs 
25 that would have to come later. 
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1 Q. Okay. The invoices that were marked as 
2 Exhibit 12 and 13 are the first communications you had 
3 with DeBest after Peterson left in July of 2013 about this 
4 damage, correct? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. What was DeBest's reaction when they received 
7 these? 
8 A. When they received this bill for 33,401.63 was 
9 when they decided that it had exceeded what they wanted to 
10 take care of in shop, and they was going to tum it over 
11 to the insurance. Up to that point, there was no 
12 discussion as to bill anybody else besides them for the 
13 work done. 
14 Q. And when DeBest did get this billing in the 
15 amount of over $33,000, did they seem surprised? Did they 
16 react surprised to you? 
17 A. Well, I had a discussion with Rick Garrett and 
18 he said he didn't realize it was going to be this 
19 extensive to repair, and that they normally would cover 
20 anything up to 5 or $6,000. But they was going to have to 
21 tum it over to the insurance company because it was far 
22 in excess of what they wanted to pay out of the shop. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. And that's when he suggested that the 
25 homeowners bring in their homeowners insurance, and I 
Gil Gould 
May 5, 2016 
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l discussed why they didn't before. 
2 Q. Yeah. I've got something on that from 
3 Mr. Davison here I'll talk to you about just to keep it in 
4 order here. 
5 Was there any understanding with De Best about 
6 how much you thought this would cost to repair when the 
7 repairs were started after July 2013? 
a A. I don't remember any lengthy discussion about 
9 what the extent of it was. I said, this is what it is 
10 right now. We haven't really got into the full depth of 
11 it. So there's going to be more money involved, so ... 
12 Q. So tell me what it was you discovered about the 
13 full extent of the damage in December when you began 
14 tearing things apart and doing the repairs? What 
15 additional damage did you locate that wasn't located in 
16 July of2013? 
1 7 A. Well, once we tore the ceiling off and started 
10 following the water, it involved the walls in that 
19 bedroom, completely in the closet, under the stairs, and 
20 out into the hallway and entrance, and partly into the 
21 utility room. 
22 Q. Let's look at Exhibit 10 and then -- and I want 
23 you to just point that out to me, please. Exhibit 10 is 
• 24 the floor drawing, and you put some nice notes on the 
2 5 first page of it for us. Tell me -- just maybe -- if 
Page 109 
l nothing else, point to the areas where the initial damage 
2 was found. 
3 A. After we started in December? 
4 Q. Yes. 
5 A Under the stairs. 
6 Q. Which is called the water heater room? 
7 A. Water heater room. 
8 Q. Okay. How extensive was the damage in there? 
9 A. It had completely gone through this wall and 
10 was actually -- this wall was adjacent to the living room. 
11 The stairs come down and go into the living room right 
12 here. But we only had to take the Sheetrock off from the 
13 inside of this room and not into the living room, which 
14 has Sheetrock and wood paneling on that side. 
15 So the extent of the damage was inside of here, 
16 out into this hallway, which is part of the kitchen. It 
17 involved -- there's a partition right here, and there's 
18 crown mold on all of these walls. So it involved this out 
19 here, and part of the kitchen, and all of this hallway, 
20 and a little bit into this utility room ceiling. 
21 Q. What about that bathroom? 
22 A. It's a bathroom and a utility room. 
23 Q. Okay. And then what about the rest of the 
24 walls --
25 A. Everything in this --
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1 page of Exhibit 17, which is the bill? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. The only emails that they received was from me 
5 directly to them. I didn't send any -- forward any of the 
6 comments from Davisons. 
7 Q. Okay. And for February work, you still had 
8 labor being done by BC&G [sic] Construction? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And you've told us who they are. 
11 A. There you have a bill from Energy Seal, which 
12 is partly for insulation and partly for materials that 
13 they supplied for the mold abatement. 
14 Q. Okay. Now, on Exhibit 13 we had some backup 
15 for the amounts that were billed from your subcontractor 
16 backup. Did you send the subcontractor backup to DeBest 
17 with page 2 of Exhibit 17? 
18 A. Subcontractor backup, where's that? 
19 Q. Well, everything attached to the first page 
20 here. So from page 2 on, on Exhibit 13, I understand is 
21 backup invoices from subcontractors. 
22 A. Well, these are invoices for material things 
23 that are bought at ProBuild or Franklin Building Supply. 
24 Q. Okay. And those back up the amounts that you 
25 state on the first page, correct? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Is that why you attached them to that bill? 
3 A. Every work I do for homeowners is cost plus. 
4 That's why there's 5 percent and 10 percent. That's the 
5 only markup I have. Everything else is actual cost. So 
6 when you're on a cost plus basis, you give the homeowner 
7 the exact copy of every invoice, supply, or subs. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. So that's the reason there's a copy of it 
10 there. 
11 Q. So when you sent Darcy Neidigh page 2 of 
12 Exhibit 17, which was the bill for February 2014, along 
13 with this invoice or bill, you would have had all of the 
14 backup for materials --
15 A. I didn't send --
16 Q. -- suppliers --
17 A. I didn't send them the backup invoices 'cause 
18 it's none of their business. 
19 Q. Oh. 
20 A. The homeowners get all that because they're the 
21 ones paying the bill. 
22 Q. Okay. Well, I want those. So I'll ask you for 
23 them. Can you get those for me, and give them to 
24 Mr. Smith, and he'll give them to me? 
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for all the material or not, but I have all those. 
MR. SMITH: My recollection, Rob, that you got 
everything I got from anybody. 
MR. LEWIS: Okay. I don't have them. 
MR. SMITH: I don't have them. 
MR. LEWIS: Can you give them to Mr. Smith? 
THE WITNESS: I don't think I gave Vern any of 
the backup invoices for each invoice that was billed out, 
so ... 
Q. (BY MR. LEWIS) Will you do that? 
A. I can do that. 
Q. Thank you. 
A. That's a hell of a lot of paperwork. 
Q. I understand. I've been going through looking 
at this stuff. I get it. 
A. I'll run copies of it all. 
Q. Okay. Or give it to him and --
A. How do you want me to give it to you? 
Q. You could give it to me and I'll copy it and 
I'll give it back to you. I promise I won't do anything 
wrong with it. But however is best for you. Okay? 
A. All right. 
Q. You decide. Okay. Let's talk about the first 
page of Exhibit 17 for a minute. It talks about the 
painting being done, it talks about the wood floor being 
Page 129 
worked on, and the sanding, and the trim wood, and 
according to this, you expected to be finished in March. 
Am I reading it right? 
A. Yeah. The bulk of it was finished in March, 
but there was just a little carryover into April, as I 
remember. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I think April was the final billings. 
Q. Here's Exhibit 18, which appears to be the 
April billing. Is that what Exhibit 18 is? 
A. Yeah. If you see the last sentence, it says, 
we should be done with this month as long as there is no 
unexpected delays. 
Q. Right. So Exhibit 18 is the March billing, 
correct? 
A. Yeah, it was for March. 
Q. Right. Did you --
A. Billed in April, but it was billed for March. 
Q. Billed April 11th? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. 2014, right? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Did you send a copy of this to DeBest? 
A. This was what I sent to DeBest. 
Q. Did you create this document? 
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Case No. CV 15-178C 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs above-named, through the assistance of counsel, Vernon K. 
Smith, and do respond to Defendant's Second Set ofinterrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify the total cost of the Remodel of the Residence. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: The "Residence" is the "dwelling" located on the 
premises, one of several permanent structures and improvements located upon the real property 
with the address of2109 Lily, McCall, Idaho. The Plaintiffs hold a long term leasehold interest in 
this parcel of real property pursuant to their long term leasehold arrangements with the State of 






Idaho, Department of Lands; Plaintiffs have had the exclusive rights to the occupancy, possession, 
use, dominion, and control of that parcel of real property for many years, and improvements 
located thereon have been made over an extended period of time, in accordance with the terms of 
the lease with the State of Idaho; Plaintiffs pay all taxes and assessments levied and assessed 
against the real property and improvements as provided for under their State leasehold interest 
with the Department of Lands. 
When De Best asks for the total cost of the "Remodel" of the Residence, the question arises 
whether DeBest is referring to the "renovation-remodel" proiect that began in late 2011, 
progressed through 2012, and deemed completed in the late spring 2013, or is DeBest instead 
referring to the "restoration-repair" proiect that came about because of the damages caused by 
DeBest, that cost Plaintiffs another $127,272.99 to remove and replace all damaged materials 
caused by the flowing water in the residence after DeBest completed their installations and turned 
the water on? 
With respect to the "Residence" "renovation-remodel" proiect, it was commenced in ]ate 
20 I I. that began with the footing, foundation, crawl space, and drainage system modifications, 
and progressed into the interior of the Residence, and deemed complete in the spring of 2013 (the 
last work being what was to have been that final trim and plumbing installations performed by 
DeBest on June 15-17, 2013). The "total cost" of that "renovation-remodel" proiect came in at 
$427,436.77. The above "total cost" is what was spent in the "renovation-remodel" on the main 
cabin which relates to the "Residence". The Plaintiffs utilized the services of Gould Custom 
Builders, Inc. (GCBI) to perform the work on each of these projects, and the work performed by 
GCBI is identified in the accounting materials compiled, summarized, and attached for your 
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review. As stated, the "renovation-remodel" proiect of 2011-2013 commenced Fall of 2011 (with 
the footing-foundation-crawl space, drainage system work), and regarded by Plaintiffs to be 
deemed finished late Spring, 2013, with the final installations by DeBest Plumbing Inc. on June 
15-17, 2013, after which DeBest activated the water system and left the premises. That work 
encompasses what is referred to as the "renovation-remodel" proiecl 
That "restoration-repair" proiect involved restoring the remodeled Residence after the 
water damages were discovered after the faulty plumbing installations performed by DeBest on 
June 15-17, 2013. The "restoration-repair" required removal and replacement of a11 water soaked 
and damaged materials from the flooded interior of the remodeled residence when Tom Peterson, 
DeBest's plumbing employee, completed his installations and turned the water valve on. The 
interior damage was discovered when Plaintiffs arrived at the remodeled Residence on July 25, 
2013, some 38 to 40 days and nights after the water was aJlowed to flow within the remodeled 
Residential interior. 
The "restoration-repair" proiect began July 26, 2013 with water removal and cosmetic 
repairs to the downstairs bedroom to make it habitable, with final restoration commencing Fall of 
2013, after Plaintiffs' departed the residence and return to California. The "restoration-repair" 
proiect was completed late spring, 2014, at a "total cost" of $127,272.99 for the repairs. The costs 
of each "project" were paid entirely by Plaintiffs, and those projects represent the work performed 
on the residential dwelling during the years 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. 
Referring to these projects as the "renovation-remodel" project and the "restoration-repair" 
project will enable the parties to discuss the work in relation to the occasion about which the 
services were being performed, during those years 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. To summarize the 
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costs, the total cost for the "renovation-remodel" proiect was $427,436.77 and the total cost for 
the restoration-repair proiect was $127,272.99. 
Plaintiffs confirmed and secured these "total costs" from the billings/invoices made 
available by Gilbert Gould, Gould Custom Builders, Inc., the entity contracting the work 
performed on this Residence, and Mr. Gould secured copies of the file billings, statements, and 
invoices from his accounting files, along with production of the summary attached hereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please identify the assessed value of the Residence for property tax 
purposes in 2012. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: The assessed value of the "Residence" is 
ascertained from a review of the tax assessment documents, wherein the County refers to 
"dwelling" ("D"), which is the "Residence". These documents are attached hereto, and identify 
their assessed values for the years 2011 through 2016, and include reference to the several 
structures (seven (7)) located upon the premises. These documents are true and correct copies of 
what the Valley County Assessor's Office has on file regarding this Land, and has provided these 
documents to Plaintiffs. These documents identify the assessed value of the "Residence" for tax 
purposes, as you have requested, for those two years, 2012 and 2013, which also includes reference 
to each year from 2011 to 2016, along with reference to the improvements located upon this Land. 
The "Residence" is the "Dwelling", and the letter "D" is used by the Valley County Assessor's 
Office within the documents to identify the dwelling. 
We have included the tax assessment values for the years 211, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 
and 2016. The "Residence" valuation ( excluding the land) for 20 I 2, for tax purposes, is 
$98,250.00. The "Residence" valuation for 2013, for tax purposes, is $98,249.00. It was 
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$38,960.00 for the year 2011, when the renovation-remodel was contracted and commenced. 
The County does not maintain copies of the tax billing invoices mailed out to taxpayers 
each year; they are removed from the computer data base, since they reflect the same information 
as these records provided by Valley County. The information sought by Defendant is sufficiently 
provided within these documents, which are attached hereto for review. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please identify the assessed value of the Residence for property tax 
purposes in 2013. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: That information is identified in the response to 
Interrogatory No. 14 above, showing the assessed value of the "Residence", for tax purposes, for 
the year 2013, to be $98,249.00. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please describe the complete basis for which you contend that the 
Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (Idaho Code§ 6-2501 et seq.) applies to this litigation. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Plaintiffs described the basis for why they believe 
N.O.R.A. applies to this litigation with the documents filed with the Court, entitled: MOTION TO 
CONFIRM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NOTICE AND 
OP PORTUNII'Y TO REPAIR ACT APPLY TO PENDING LAWSUIT, and MEMORANDUM in 
support thereof, which documents have before been served upon DeBest's counsel. 
In further response, Plaintiffs would confirm their remodel, referred to as the "renovation-
remodel" project, was a "substantial" renovation-remodel project that greatly exceeded the 
qualifying amount needed, as described in L C, §6-2502(3), wherein it states: "(3) ... .in the 
substantial remodel of a residence", further defined in I. C. §6-2502(9) wherein it states: 
"(9) "Substantial remodel" means a remodel of a residence, for which the total cost exceeds one-




half ( 1/2) of the assessed value of the residence for property tax purposes at the time the contract 
for the remodel work was made." This "Residence" had a tax assessed value, for property tax 
purposes, in the amount of $38,960.00 in the year 2011, the year the renovation-remodel was 
contracted and work began that Fall with the footing, foundation, crawl space, and drainage system 
work; the assessed value was increased to $98,250.00 for the next year, 2012, as the renovation-
remodel was substantially in progress, and for taxation purposes, the assessed value remained 
$98,249.00 in 2013, when the renovation-remodel was deemed finished with the plumbing 
installations to have been completed by DeBest during June I 5-17, 2013. 
Following completion of the renovation-remodel in 2013, the assessed valuation was 
increased throughout the following years because of on-site inspections of the remodel work, and 
the tax assessment documents reflect the 2014 assessed value went to $333,285.00; then to 
$360,105.00 for 2015; and then to $377,160.00 for 2016. 
The assessed value, for property tax purposes, to be used for this "remodel" under the statute 
for N.O.R.A. purposes, would be the tax assessed value for the year 2011, the year this contract 
for the remodel work was entered into and the work was actually started in the Fall of 2011, then 
ongoing through 2012, and then completed in 2013. For those years the assessed values were 
$38,960.00 for 2011, then $98,250.00 for 2012, and then $98,249.00 for 2013. 
Because 2011 was the "contracted" year for the "Renovation-Remodel" project, the statute 
would mandate use of the 2011 assessed value, that began with the footing-foundation-crawl space, 
drainage system renovations and then into the interior. That assessed value was $38,960.00, and 
by statutory terms, the renovation-remodel project would need to exceed the 50% threshold of that 
sum, being $19,480.00, which this remodel actually cost almost 22 times that amount. The invoices 
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were processed following the work being done, and summary of the invoices billed out and paid 
for the remodel and repair work are identified by Mr. Gould, for each year in the invoiced billings, 
reflected in the breakdown summary provided by Mr. Gould, and copies ofinvoices, enclosed with 
this response as an attachment, revealing the "total cost" for the ''renovation-remodel project to be 
$427,436.77, constituting a "substantial remodel" of this "Residence", which was almost 22 times 
the 2011 assessed value of the Residence, and almost 9 times the 50% threshold ($49,125.00) of 
either the 2012 or 2013 assessed values of the Residence ($98,250.00/$98,249.00). As you can 
see, the County increased the annual assessments as the renovation-remodel work was actually in 
progress and ongoing from 2011 to 2013. 
Technically, for statutory purposes, this remodel became a "substantial remodel", when the 
remodel cost exceeded $19,480.00; the cost of the remodel was obviously many times any of the 
annual tax assessed values, be it the 2011, 2012 or 2013 year, as the County wasted no time 
reflecting increased assessed valuations throughout the renovation-remodel process, with all work 
for all purposes then completed in 2014. This remodel greatly enhanced the assessed value, for tax 
purposes, from $38,960.00 in 2011, to what has ~ow become $377,160.00 in 2016, almost 10 times 
the assessed value, for taxation purposes. 
The other aspects (notice, inspection, discussions, etc.) took place as contemplated, and 
described in the Motion and Memorandum filed with the Court. The parties were performing under 
the notice given to Messrs. Gould and Peterson, the inspection was conducted as anticipated, and 
the discussions thereafter ensued within what was envisioned to be the meaning and intended 
purpose of N.O.R.A., though Intermountain Claims then choose not to finalize the statutory 




mandates, and declined to propose any resolution, and this 1 
statute as a result of that impasse that developed with Intermou 
Dated this :2;~ day of August, 2016. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Ada ) 
: ss. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
VERIFICATION 
I, Scott Davison, Plaintiff in the foregoing action, being first 
declare to the undersigned authority that I have read and examined 
' to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct and g_ompt 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this :3,tt-:: 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Ada ) 
ss. 
Notary Public for Idalio 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires:_.._..=._.o:i;;...=::......L....:>1 
VERIFICATION 
I, Anne Davison, Plaintiff in the foregoing action, being first duly sworn, do hereby 
declare to the undersigned authority that I have read and examined the foregoing document, and 













SWORN AND SUBSCR1BED TO before me this~. of Au 
·~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
l 
My Commission Expires:_._....._,,,_""'---_,_~ 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below upon: 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
'v emon K. Smith, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FlLE'O .B__:,_l9 · ! 5 TIME 3: J I 
:eftrt~~ 
IN THE DlSTRICT COURT OF THE SlXTH JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF POWER 
MONTY FUNK and CARO LENE FUNK, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DANIEL LANDVIK d.b.a. Custom Homes 
by Daniel Landvik Design & Construction, 
an individual; JD ENTERPRISES, INC., 
d.b.a. Butler Builders, an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
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) MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING 
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by Daniel Landvik Design & Construction, 
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This case comes before the Court on Defendant Daniel Landvik's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Having reviewed the facts and law, the Court issues this decision granting summary 
judgment for Defendant. 
FACTS1 
Plaintiffs Monty and Carotene Funk ("the Funks") hired Defendant Daniel Landvik 
("Landvik") and his company, Daniel Landvik Design & Construction, to build a house 
("House") in Power County around 2006. Landvik and the Funks made an agreement that 
Landvik would act as the general contractor. Landvik presented the Funks with a written 
instrument containing a list of materials and costs for construction of the House, which the Funks 
claim is a written contract for Landvik • s services. Lankvik hired several subcontractors to 
perform work on the House. The House was constructed be:tween March 14, 2006, the date of the 
building permit, and November 5, 2008, the date the Certificate of Occupancy was issued. The 
Funks moved into the House around Thanksgiving of 2008. 
In late spring of 2009, the Funks discovered water leaking at isolated areas of the House, 
including: three to four rear elevation windows, the base of the front entry door, and a ground 
level glass shower block. 2 They contacted Landvik several times to come to the House and 
address the leaks. During Landvik 's first visit to address the leaks, he performed or had someone 
else perform caulking to the exterior windows and ground level glass shower block and made 
repairs to the front entry door. The Funks assert that Landvik represented that those repairs 
would resolve the leaking. Afterward, Mrs. Funk noticed additional water leaking from the 
1 The following facts have been taken from the parties' pleadings, affidavits, and discussions during oral argument. 
2 During oral arguments for the Molion for Summary Judgment. both parties applied spring of 2009 as the initial 
discovery date for the water leaking from the windows into the House. 
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windows of the House and again contacted Landvik. Landvik, the window seller, and a window 
representative met with Carolene Funk at the House in late spring of2009 to inspect the 
problems. During that meeting, Landvik believed that the leaking was caused by the spaces in 
the interface between the windows (that he installed) and the trim and stucco (that were installed 
by David's Construction, LLC) and that it needed to be repaired in order to stop the leaking. 
Larry Barrett and the window representative performed water testing on the windows and they 
determined that the windows themselves were not the cause of the leaking. Subsequently, the 
Funks attempted to contact Landvik when water was continuing to leak into the House but he did 
not respond. 
In September 2010, the Funks hired Jeff Butler, owner of JD Enterprises, Inc. dba Butler 
Builders ("Butler"), to identify the cause of the leaking and perform any necessary repairs. Butler 
indicated that the exterior stucco and trim surrounding the windows needed to be removed before 
identifying the exact cause of the leaking but he suspected the windows were defective. Butler 
removed and replaced all of the windows and aU of the exterior trim in March 2011. In spite of 
Butler's repairs, the windows of the House continued to leak. In July 2013, the Funks hired 
Forensic Building Consultants ("Forensic") to review the condition of the House and identify the 
cause of the leaking. In August 2013, after review testing, Forensic issued a written report which 
identified construction defects pertaining to the windows, stucco, sealants, trim, roof, stone, 
gutters, and underlying weatherproofing components and resulting property damage associated 
with Landvik's original construction. The Funks maintain that prior to the Forensic's report, they 
were unaware of the cause of the water leaking and that the House had any construction defects 
and property damage. 
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On August 8, 2013, the Funks sent Landvik a letter pursuant to the Notice and 
Opportunity to Repair Act (NORA), I.C. §6-2503. On September 3, 2013, the Funks sent 
Landvik a second supplemental notice under NORA with an attached copy of the Forensic's 
report. Landvik did not respond to either notice. The Funks hired RAM Building and Stucco 
Repair, Inc. ("RAM") to start making repairs on the House on September 25, 2013. On October 
15, 2013, the Funks filed a Complaint against Landvik, alleging Negligence, Breach of Contract, 
Breach of Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Performance, Breach of Implied Warranty of 
Habitability, and Violation of the Consumer Protection Act, I.C. § 48-608. Defendant brought 
this Motion for Sumnuuy Judgment, asserting that Plaintiffs' claim ofNegligence is barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations and the economic loss rule. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs' 
other claims should be barred by their respective statutes of limitation. Additionally, Defendant 
argues that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failure to comply with the Notice and 
Opportunity to Repair Act. On January 8, 2015, oral argument on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was held. The Court allowed parties to submit supplemental briefing by 
January 22, 2015, following which the Court would take the matter under advisement. 
STANDARD QF REVIEW 
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."'3 The party moving for 
swnmary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of 
3 Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 101, 218 P .3d 1150, 1162 (2009) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). 
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material fact.4 A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact.5 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court "liberally construes the 
record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. drawing all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor."6 "If there are conflicting inferences contained in 
the record or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be 
denied.''7 However, "[i]t is well established that a party against whom a motion for swnmary 
judgment is sought 'may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must 
come forward and produce evidence by way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions 
of the moving party and establish a genuine issue of material fact. "'8 
ANALYSIS 
This Court wiH first review whether or not Plaintiffs and Defendant complied with the 
Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA") before moving into the individual causes of 
actions. Plaintiffs' assertions related to NORA must be decided in order to determine whether or 
not Defendant's statutes oflimitation defenses on the remaining claims are applicable. 
I. Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act 
Plaintiffs assert that pursuant to the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA"), 
LC.§ 6-2503, Defendant was provided written notice of the construction defects and that the 
notice described the claims in sufficient detail to identify the nature and location of the defects. 
Plaintiffs claim that Defendant failed or refused to repair the defects and did not comply with the 
4 Vreeken, 148 ldahoat IOI, 218 P.3d at 1162. 
5 Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434,436, 196 P.3d 352,354 (2008). 
6 Avilav. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,747,890 P.2d 331,333 {1995). 
7 Bilow v. Preco, lnc .• 132 Idaho 23, 27, 966 P .2d 23, 27 (I 998). 
8 McC.oy v. lyons, 120 Idaho 765,770,820 P.2d 360,365 (1991)(quoting Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 ldaho 
706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990)); see also I.R.C.P. S6(e). 
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NORA requirements. Defendant argues that all of Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed because 
Plaintiffs did not demand repairs or give him an opportunity to repair when the window defect 
was discovered in spring of 2009, did not give written notice in 2009, and hired a third party to 
make repairs in 2011 before sending written notice in 2013. 
The purpose behind NORA is to give contractors the opportunity to fix construction 
defects before a lawsuit is filed.9 I.C. § 6-2503, provides in part: 
(I) Prior to commencing an action against a construction professional for a construction 
defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the construction professional. 
The notice of claim shall state that the claimant asserts a construction defect claim against 
the construction professional and shall describe the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to 
determine the general nature of the defect. Any action commenced by a claimant prior to 
compliance with the requirements of this section shall be dismissed by the court without 
prejudice and may not be recommenced until the claimant has complied with the 
requirements of this section. If a written notice of claim is served under this section 
within the time prescribed for the filing of an action under this chapter, the statute of 
limitations for construction-related claims is tolJed until sixty (60) days after the period of 
time during which the filing of an action is barred.10 
(2) Within twenty-one (21) days after service of the notice of claim, the construction 
professional shall serve a written response on the claimant The written response shall: 
(a) Propose to inspect the residence that is the subject of the c1aim and to complete 
the inspection within a specified time frame. The proposal shall include the statement 
that the construction professional shall, based on the inspection, offer to remedy the 
defect, compromise by payment, or dispute the claim; 
(b) Offer to compromise and settle the claim by monetary payment without 
inspection; or 
(c) State that the construction professional disputes the claim and will neither remedy 
the construction defect nor compromise and settle the claim. 
(3)(a) If the construction professional disputes the claim or does not respond to the 
claimant's notice of claim within the time stated in subsection (2) of this section, the 
9Mendenhall at 436, 196 P.3d at 354. 
'
0 [Emphasis added.] 
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claimant may bring an action against the construction professional for the claim described 
in the notice of claim without further notice. 
The "reasonable detail" requirement is satisfied when a claimant provides a builder with enough 
infonnation to identify the general nature and location of the defect. 11 In Mendenhall, the Court 
found that the notice letter there provided. enough detail and pertinent infonnation to determine 
the general nature of defects when it stated, among other things, "water problem with north roof 
of great room, east spouting leaks in four places."12 NORA provides that if the construction 
professional fails to make a reasonable offer pursuant to the above requirements, the limitations 
on damages and defenses to liability provided for in§ I.C. 6-2504 do not app]y. I.C. § 6-2504 
reads in part: 
(2) If a construction professional fails to make a reasonable offer as required under 
section 6-2503, Idaho Code, or fails to make a reasonable attempt to complete the repairs 
specified in an accepted offer, or fails to complete, in a good and workmanlike manner, 
the repairs specified in an accepted offer, the limitations on damages and defenses to 
liability provided for in this section shall not apply. 13 
[ ... ] 
(5) A builder, under the principles of comparative fault pertaining to affirmative defenses, 
may be excused, in whole or in part, from any obligation, damage, loss or liability if the 
builder can demon§trAte any of the following affumative defenses in response to the 
claimed construction defect action: 
[ ... ] 
(e) The time oeriod for filing actions bars the claim. 
[ ... ) 
(6) AU applicable affinnative defenses are preserved for causes of action to which this 
cluy,ter does not apply. 
11 Mendenhall at 437, 196 P.3d at 355. 
12 Jd. 
13 Emphasis added. 
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Plaintiffs have interpreted this section as prohibiting Defendant from asserting an affirmative 
statute of limitations defense on any of their claims. Defendant asserts Plaintiffs' interpretation is 
incorrect because reading both l.C. §§ 6-2503 and 6-2504 together, he would on1y lose the 
special protections contained in NORA but would not lose the entire protection of the law as may 
be applicable. 
The first issue is whether or not Plaintiffs complied with the NORA requirements. 
Plaintiffs sent written notice to Defendant on August 8, 2013 with a list of defects identified in 
the House. The list of defects included: (a) Failure to property install windows, including failure 
to property fasten windows; (b) Failure to properly install flexible and metal flashings, including 
flexible flashings discontinuously installed at rough openings; and improper materials used as 
flexible flashings materials; (c) Failure to properly install sealants, including improperly tooled 
and constructed sealants; (d) Failure to property install weather-resistive barrier (WRB), 
including WRB improperly omitted, reversed-lapped, and installed with insufficient laps at 
vertical and horizontal seruns; (e) Failure to property install roofing components, including 
improperly constructed diverter flashings at roof-to-wall transitions; (f) Failure to properly install 
gutters and downspouts, including gutters not properly connected to downspouts. Plaintiffs then 
sent a second notice with substantially the same list of defects on September 3, 2013, along with 
a copy of the Forensic's report that further explained the defects. The list of defects in both 
notices provided enough infonnation to identify the general nature and location of the defects in 
the House. Under NORA, Defendant had twenty-one days after service of the notice to serve a 
written response that proposed to inspect the property. offered to compromise and settle the 
claims without inspection, or disputed the claims. 
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However, in March 2011, over two years before sending written notice, Plaintiffs hired a 
third party, Butler, to replace all of the windows, the exterior trim, and the interfaces between the 
windows and stucco that Defendant had installed. Thus, at the time Plaintiffs sent written notice 
in 2013, the windows, the exterior trim, and the interfaces between the windows and stucco had 
already been completely replaced and Defendant was effectively denied any opportunity to 
actually make repairs to work he was responsible for. Because Plaintiffs had hired a third party 
to do extensive repairs before sending written notice, Defendant was not able to inspect his own 
work on the windows to be able to remedy the defects. Defendant was deprived of any real 
chance to make repairs and remedy the defect related to the windows and exterior trim before 
litigation was commenced, which is the purpose behind NORA. Even if Defendant had received 
verbal notice from Plaintiffs about the windows leaking in spring of 2009, verbal notice does not 
comply with NORA. Therefore, concerning the defects related to the windows, exterior trim, and 
interfaces between the windows and stucco, Plaintiffs did not comply with the NORA 
requirements. 
As to the remaining defects that were not replaced or repaired by others prior to the 
notices, such as the roof and gutters, Plaintiffs did comply with the NORA requirements, which 
would have triggered Defendant's duty under§ 6-2503(2), absent other factors and defenses. 
Defendant did fail to respond as required by this section. within the twenty-one days set forth. 
Plaintiffs did not hire RAM to start making repairs on the House until forty-eight days after the 
first notice and twenty-two days after the second notice. Pursuant to NORA, Plaintiffs were able 
to bring an action against Defendant for the construction defects without further notice. 
Therefore, concerning the construction defects other than those already replaced by Butler, 
Plaintiffs abided by the NORA conditions. 
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The second issue, related to NORA, is whether or not affinnative defenses, such as 
statute of limitations, are lost because Plaintiffs complied with NORA regarding the defects other 
than the windows and exterior trim. If Plaintiffs' interpretation is accurate. Defendant would Jose 
his statute of limitation defenses as to the negligence claim, the breach of contract claim, the 
implied warranty claims, and Idaho Consumer Protection Act claim, for damages that had not 
been repaired by Butler in 2011. Plaintiffs have not offered any case law that concurs with their 
interpretation that noncompliance with NORA causes construction professionals to lose their 
affirmative defenses listed in § 6-2504. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, over which 
courts exercise free review.14 Courts interpret statutes according to their plain and obvious 
meaning, but will resort to judicial construction when the statute is "ambiguous, incomplete, 
absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws. "15 
This Court reviewed the NORA statutes according to their plain and obvious meaning 
and did not need to engage in statutory construction. I.C. § 6-2503(1) provides: 
If a written notice of claim is served under this section within the time prescribed for the 
filing of an action under this chapter, the statute of ]imitations for construction-related 
claims is tolled until sixty (60) days after the period of time during which the filing of an 
action is barred. 
As laid out in detail below, it is the Court's view that Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, impUed 
warranty claims, and Idaho Consumer Protection Act claim are barred by the applicable statutes 
of limitation, and were so barred prior to the notice provide pursuant to NORA. The breach of 
contract claim and breach of implied. warranty claims ran on November 5, 2012. The Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act claim ran in either the spring of 2011 or in March of 2013. Plaintiffs 
did not send out the first written notice pursuant to NORA until August 8, 2013. According to 
14 Ada Crtly. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, UC, l4S Idaho 360, 368, I 79 P 3d 323, 331 (2008). 
15 Id (citing State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689, 85 P .3d 656, 66S (2004)). 
Case No. CV-2013-31 1 




I.C. § 6-2503(1 ), only when written notice is given within the time prescribed for filing of an 
action does the statute of limitations toll for construction related claims. Here, Plaintiffs did not 
give written notice pursuant to NORA within the time prescribed for filing their various causes 
of action. By the time Plaintiffs sent out written notice to Defendant, their claims had run and 
were time barred, except the negligence claim.16 Plaintiffs cannot attempt to comply with NORA 
and expect to receive its benefits after the time period for filing their claims has already expired. 
Therefore, even assuming Plaintiffs' interpretation is correct, Plaintiffs are not able to receive 
that benefit from NORA because the time period for filing their breach of contract claim, implied 
warranty claims, and Idaho Consumer Protection Act claim had already run and were barred. 
To hold otherwise would require a construction of NORA which essentially creates a new statute 
of limitations for anyone who makes a NORA claim, regardless of when the work was done or 
damages occurred. It is the Court's view that this is not the intent of NORA. Instead, the purpose 
of NORA is to prevent construction lawsuits by requiring persons in the Plaintiff's position to 
give NORA notices and pennit repairs and, in that way, eliminate litigation, but only if that 
notice is within the applicable time for bringing such lawsuits in the first place. 
II. Negligence 
Plaintiffs claim that Defendant was negligent in his construction of the House, resulting 
in damages from ]atent defects involving the windows, stucco, trim, roofing, stone, gutters, and 
underlying weatherproofing components. Defendant asserts that the economic loss rule bars 
recovery under the negligence claim, therefore the claim must be dismissed. In the alternative, 
Defendant asserts that the negligence claim was not filed within the applicable statute of 
16 As to the negligence claim, even if the statute oflimitations had not run, under Plaintiffs' interpretation ofNORA, 
Defendant would have lost that affirmative defense; however, the claim is still barred under the economic loss rule. 
Therefore, denying Defendant the statute of limitations defense for the negligence claim is irre1evant. 
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limitations and must be dismissed because the cause of action accrued in the spring of 2009 
when the Plaintiffs first discovered the windows leaking. 
a. Economic Loss Rule 
For a negligence claim. a plaintiff must prove the following: (1) a duty, recognized by 
law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of the 
defendant's duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs 
injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.17 The economic loss rule limits an actor1s duty so that there 
is no cause of action in negligence. 18 The general rule in Idaho is that ''there is no recovery for 
pure economic loss in a negligence action, as there is no 'duty' to prevent economic loss to 
another." 19 Courts have found that "unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits 
recovery of purely economic damages in a negligence action."20 The definition of economic loss 
includes "costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the 
transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or 
use:,21 Property damage recovery, which continues to be appropriate for negligence actions, is 
applicable only to property other than that which is the subject of the transaction.22 The Idaho 
Supreme Court has defined the "subject of the transaction" as the subject matter of the contract.23 
The economic loss rule applies unless the case falls within two exceptions: a special 
relationship between the parties or unique circumstances.24 Plaintiffs do not dispute that the 
11 Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,399,987 P.2d 300,311 (]999); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 
484,489,903 P.2d 73, 78 (1995); Mugavero v. A-/ Auto Sales, Inc., 130 Idaho 554,556,944 P.2d 151, 153 
(Ct.App.1997). 
18 Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 28,244 P.3d 166, 172 (2010). 
19 Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 710, 99 P.3d 1092, l 100 (Ct. App. 2004). 
20 Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc .• 141 Idaho 296, 300, I 08 P .3d 996, t 000 (2005). 
21 Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306,309 (1975). 
22 Id 
23 Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Jdaho 785,791,215 P.3d 505, 51 l (2009). 
24 8/ahd at 301, 108 P.3d at 100 I. 
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damages sought are all economic in nature but assert that a special relationship exists between 
the Funks and Landvik. A special relationship "refers to those situations where the relationship 
between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty.''
25 
However, a 
special relationship is only found in an "extremely limited group of cases where the law of 
negligence extends its protections to a party's economic interests."26 The Idaho Supreme Court 
has recognized two situations where a special re]ationship exception applies. 27 First, when a 
professional or quasi-professional negligently performs personal services, such as insurance 
agents, attorneys, architects, engineers, and physicians.28 Real estate developers may arguably be 
considered quasi-professional.29 Second, a special relationship may exists "where a party holds 
itself out to the public as performing a specialized function and induces reliance on superior 
knowledge and skill. ,,30 In Nelson, the Court found that a special relationship did not exist 
between the homeowners and the material suppliers because the homeowners were not obligated 
to use the services of the material suppJiers and the homeowners had no direct contact with the 
suppliers because the construction company negotiated for the materials.31 Conversely, in Duffin, 
the Court held a special relationship existed between the Idaho Crop Improvement Association 
("ICIA") and a fanner who had the ICIA certify his seed, which turned out to be diseased.32 
Because the ICIA held itself out as an expert in the field as it was the only entity that could 
25 Duffin 11. Idaho Crop Improvement Assoc., 126 Idaho 1002, 1008, 895 P.2d 1195, 1201 (1995). 
26 /d 
27 Aardema, l47 Idaho at 792,215 P.3d at 512. 
21 Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301. 108 P.3d at JOOI~ see McAlvain 11. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777,780,554 P.2d 
955,958 ()976). 
29 Blahdat301, 108 P.3dat 1001. 
30 Nelson, 140 Idaho at 710, 99 P.3d at 1100. 
lt Id 
32 Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005, 895 P .2d at 1198. 
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certify seed potatoes in the state of Idaho and it engaged in marketing to induce reliance on that 
fact that its seed had been certified, there was enough to find a special reiationship.
33 
In this case, the "'subject of the transaction" would be the contract between the parties for 
construction of the House. As such, the damage to the House caused by alleged negligent 
construction is purely economic. Plaintiffs concede this but believe the exception applies. 
Plaintiffs do not claim that Defendant is considered a professional or quasi-professional and no 
case law was provided that would support an assertion that a general contractor would fall within 
this narrow exception. It would not be equitable to impose duty of a special relationship on 
Defendant because he is not considered a professional or quasi-professional. 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant held himself out as having a unique and special expertise 
in stucco home construction, which they relied upon in selecting him as their general contractor, 
thus fonning a special relationship between them. Although Plaintiffs rely on Duffin, the case 
here is very different. The defendant in Duffin was the only expert in its field that could certify 
seeds in the entire state ofldaho. Even if Defendant told Plaintiffs he had a special expertise in 
stucco, he was not the only general contractor with those kinds of special expertise in the entire 
state. Similar to Nelson, Plaintiffs were not obligated to use the services of Defendant. There are 
numerous contractors and builders in the area that Plaintiffs could have chosen from to construct 
their House. Further, the ICIA in Duffin engaged in marketing to induce reliance on its seed 
certification. There has been no evidence presented that Defendant engaged in marketing to 
induce reliance on his work as a general contractor. Finding that a special relationship exists is 
extremely limited and here, there is no evidence to suggest that Defendant should be made part 
of that limited group. Therefore, this Court concludes that a special relationship between the 
33 /dat 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
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parties has not been shown, as a matter oflaw. The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor 
of Defendant as to Plaintiffs' negligence claim. 
b. Statute of Limitation 
Although Defendant also argued that Plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations, that argument wiU not be addressed because the negligence claim is barred 
by the economic loss rule.34 
III. Breath of Contract 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant materially breached the contract to build the House in 
accordance with the plans and specifications and in a reasonable. professional, and workmanlike 
manner. Defendant argues that any claim for breach of contract is barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations. Both parties agree there was a contract that Defendant wouJd construct the House 
for Plaintiffs, however, the parties disagree about what type of contract that was. Plaintiffs assert 
that the written instrument containing the estimate of materials is a written contract while 
Defendant maintains that there was no written contract between the parties and the Plaintiffs' 
claim is for a breach of an oral contract. 35 
A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain 
provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty."36 An oral contract is 
"[a]n action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing" 
and the statute of limitations is four years from the time action accrued.37 The accrual of actions 
34 See fu. 15. 
J!i The written document Plaintiffs' rely on is attached to the Affidavit of Monty Funk, filed December 24, 2014, Ex. 
C. 
36 Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (l983)(citingAnderson v. Whipple, 11 
Idaho 112,123,227 P.2d 351 (1951)); See also Farber v. Dewey-Davis Estale, Inc., 83 Idaho 394,398,364 P.2d 
173 (1961). 
37 1.C. § S.-217. 
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arising out of the construction of improvement to real property is governed by I.C. § 5-241 and 
provides: 
Actions will be deemed to have accrued and the statute oflimitations shall begin to run as 
to actions against any person by reason of his having performed or furnished the design, 
planning, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property, as follows: 
[ ... ] 
(b) Contract actions shall accrue and the applicable limitation statute shall begin to run at 
the time of final completion of construction of such an improvement. 
Plaintiffs claim that whether the contract was oral or written is a question of fact for a 
jury to resolve. "When the existence of a contract is in issue, and the evidence is conflicting or 
admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to decide whether a contract in fact exists. "38 
The Court has stated that "[g]enerally the determination of the existence of a sufficient meeting 
of the minds to form a contract is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of facts. "39 In 
Stout v. Boise Cascade Corp., 87 Idaho 38, 43, 390 P .2d 63, 65 (1964), the issue was whether or 
not a written instrument was a contract. The Idaho Supreme Court held: 
While we are well aware of the rule that the construction or interpretation of contracts is a 
question of law, before a contract can be construed it must be proven that a contract 
exists. If it be claimed that a particular instrument was not intended by the parties to be a 
contract, the question as to whether or not the instrument was so intended is a question of 
fact and not a question of law. 
However, "[tJhe question whether an agreement is complete in all ofits material terms is 
a question of law over which we exercise free review.',4o In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court 
38 Mendes Bros. Dairy v. Farmers Nat. Bank, 111 Idaho 511, 513, 725 P .2d 535, 537 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing 
Johnson v. Allied Slore.s Corp., l 06 Idaho 363, 368, 679 P .2d 640, 645 ( 1984 )). 
39 Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Jdaho 363, 368, 679 P .2d 640, 645 (1984). 40 Danie v. Golas, 121 Idaho 149,152,823 P.2d 183, 186 (Ct.App.1992) 
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has held that "In order for a contract to be fonned there must be a meeting of the minds:,4
1 
Also, 
the "meeting of the minds" must occur on all material terms to the contract.
42 
In this case the parties agree that there is a contract for construction of the House. When 
there is a dispute over whether a contract was even entered into; the jury decides that. But that is 
not even a question in this case. The dispute here is whether this particular written docwnent 
creates a written contract, or whether the agreed contract was oral. While determining whether or 
not a written instrument is a contract may be a jury question in some instances, this Court 
reviews the document in question here, as a matter of law, to detennine if it even meets the 
minimum requirements for a written contract. If it does not, then the contract is oral. This 
important determination is necessary to decide which statute of limitations applies. As a result, 
this Court reviews this issue as a question of law to determine if the instrument is complete in its 
material terms. 
The Court concludes that the written document reJied on by Plaintiffs is not complete, 
definite, or certain in its material terms, primarily because it lacks material terms altogether. 
The written document has the heading "Dan Landvik Building and Remodeling" and is five 
pages in length. It only contains information concerning various aspects of a construction 
project, with costs associated with each of those aspects, and a total price at the end. Plaintiffs' 
names are not on any page of the instrument and neither is the subject matter of the document, 
the terms and conditions of any construction details, the method of payment, how changes would 
be handled, or any other detail related to the construction of the House. The document does not 
include an acceptance, a time frame for completion or payment, or any description or 
41 Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 703, 779 P.2d IS, 17 (1989). 
42 Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 233-34, 697 P .2d 1244, 1247-48 (Ct.App, 1985); Barry v. Pacific West 
Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831-32, 103 P.3d 440, 444-45 (2004). 
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identification of the property upon which the work would be done. There are no signatures on the 
document and although Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Funk initialed the instrument at one point, that 
copy was not put into the record. The instrument does not contain any contractual provisions, 
much less provisions that are capable of being reduced to certainty. It only Jists materials, 
measurements for those materials, and the estimated prices based on bid amounts from 
Defendant's subcontractors. Numerous material terms should have been included in order for 
this document to be considered a contract and no enforceable written contract can come into 
being when the parties leave substantial material tenns open for future negotiations. 
Interestingly, over six years have passed since the House was completed and, in some fashion, 
decisions were made during construction and payments were made, either during or after 
construction. all without any reference to the document Plaintiffs now assen was a written 
contract for the construction of this House. Clearly. what the parties had was an oral construction 
contract, which may have started with the bid document included in this record, but that went 
forward and was completed without any written contract of any kind. 
Therefore, the written document in this case is not a written contract and the oral 
agreement between the parties is the only controlling contract. According to I.C. § 5-241 (b ), the 
applicable time limitation for a breach of contract claim begins to run on the date of completion 
of the construction and the statute oflim.itations for oral contracts is four years. The completion 
of construction occurred no later than November 5, 2008; therefore, the statute of limitations ran 
on November 5, 2012. This action was not filed until October 15, 2013 and because there are no 
remaining issues of material fact on this issue, the claim for breach of contract is barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations and is DISMISSED. 
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IV. Breach orimplied Warranty of Workmanlike Performance and Implied 
Warranty of Habitability 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant breached the implied warranty that his construction 
services would be done in a workmanlike manner. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant 
impliedly warranted that the House would be habitable once construction was complete but as a 
result of the defects, the House is no longer habitable. Defendant argues that any claims of 
breach of implied warranties are barred by the applicab]e statute of limitations. 
In examining the basic concept of breach of warranty in Salmon Rivers Sportsman 
Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 91 Idaho 348,544 P.2d 306 (1975), the Idaho Supreme 
Court recognized the "dual character of an action for breach of implied warranty as it has 
developed in Americanjurisprudence.',43 The Court stated: 
Consideration of an action grounded on breach of implied warranty can become 
complicated "by the peculiar and uncertain nature and character of warranty, a freak 
hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract.',« 
In deciding whether a breach of warranty action is is governed by tort or contract law, the 
Court stated it depends .. upon the type of recovery sought, the legal basis upon which the desired 
recovery is grounded, and the applicable statute of limitations.,,., 
In Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 91 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975), the implied 
warranty of workmanlike performance was discussed: 
In circumstances involving personal services, however, the warranty is implied that the 
services will be performed in a workmanlike manner. The standard imposed may vary 
depending upon the expertise of the actor, either possessed or represented to be 
43 Salmon at 353, 544 P .2d at 31 l. 
44 Id 
4s Oats 11. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 Jdaho 162, 168,879 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1994). 
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possessed, the nature of the services and the known resultant danger to others from the 
actor's negligence or failure to perform.
46 
The Court "recognize[s] that when builder-vendors sell newly constructed buildings there is an 
implied warranty that the buildings will be habitable.',47 The Court in Tusch stated that "[b]y 
adopting the implied warranty of habitability, we did not intend to make builders or developers 
the insurers against any and all defects in a home" and quoted Bethlahmy: 
"The implied warranty of fitness [for habitability] does not impose upon the builder an 
obligation to deliver a perfect house. No house is built without defects, and defects 
susceptible of remedy ordinarily would not warrant rescission. But major defects which 
render the house unfit for habitation, and which are not readily remediable, entitle the 
buyer to [relief]. The builder-vendor's legitimate interests are protected by the rule which 
casts the burden upon the purchaser to establish the facts which give rise to the implied 
warranty of fitness [for habitability], and its breach.',48 
In this case, although arguments could be made that the breach of implied warranty 
claims could be governed by either tort or contract causes of action, the parties have agreed, in 
their briefing and during oral argument, that the implied warranty claims run with the contract 
and are not governed by the tort claim. 49 Considering both the parties agree and the fact the 
recovery sought is economic damages, this Court finds that the implied warranty claims fall 
under the contract. As discussed above, the contract between the parties is an oral contract and 
the applicable statute ofJimitations is four years. According to I.e.§ 5-241(b), the applicable 
time limitation for a breach of contract claim begins to run on the date of completion of the 
construction. The completion of construction occurred not later than November 5, 2008, 
therefore, the statute of limitations ran on November 5, 2012. This action was not filed until 
~ Hoffman at 36, 539 P.2d at 588. 
41 Beth/ahmyv. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,415 P.2d 698 (1966); See also Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 47, 
740 P.2d 1022, 1032 (1987). 
48 Tusch at 48, 740 P .2d at 1033 ( quoting Bethlahmy. supra. 91 Idaho at 68, 4 I 5 P .2d at 711 ). 
49 Funk v. Landvik Mt. for Summary Judgment Tr. at 12: 14-15~ at 29. 
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October 15, 2013 and because there are no remaining issues of material fact on this issue, the 
claims for breach of implied warranty of workmanlike perfonnance and breach of implied 
warranty of habitability are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and are DISMISSED. 
V. Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("ICPA") by 
selling or installing goods in the House in such a way that the installed goods were not of the 
standard, quality, or grade represented and that Defendant installed them in such a way that they 
did not have the characteristics, uses, benefits, or qualities represented. so Plaintiffs also assert 
that Defendant misrepresented the nature of the services provided and he engaged in 
unconscionable methods, acts, or practices. Defendant asserts that any claim under ICP A is 
precluded by the applicable statute of limitations because the claim accrued on November 5, 
2008 when the transaction was complete. Plaintiffs argue that the claim did not accrue until 
receiving the Forensic's report in August of 2013 because they did not know the true nature of 
the defects before that point. 
The purpose of the ICPA is to "protect both consumers and businesses against unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade or 
commerce, and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection."51 I.C. 
§ 48-608 provides: 
( 1) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services and thereby suffers any 
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or 
employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by this 
chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative, may 
5° Considering the ample body of law the provides remedies to persons in the position of Plaintiffs in this case, the 
Court questions whether the ICPA even applies to this case, i.e., whether the acts complained of qualify as unfair 
methods or practices, pursuant to I.C. § 48-603, or unconscionable methods. acts or practices, pursuant to LC. § 48-
603C. Nevertheless, that issue has not been raised and will not be considered further . 
.SI I.C. § 48--601. 
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bring an action to recover actual damages or one thousand dollars ($1,000), whichever is 
the greater ... 
The ICPA also provides that ''[n]o private action may be brought under this act more than two 
(2) years after the cause of action accrues."52 However, it does not further clarify when a cause 
of action begins to "accrue." The issue of when a cause of action accrues, when there are no 
factual disputes, is a question of law for detennination by the court. 53 "The cause of action 
accrues, and the statute oflimitation begins to run, when a party may sue another."54 
Our Supreme Court has stated that "[dJamages are 'objectively ascertainable' when there 
is objective proof that would support the existence of an actual injury ."55 In a case alleging fraud 
and involving a claim for violation of the ICPA, a district court found that the claims accrued 
when the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the fraud or when the plaintiff "knew or, with 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been able to know, a cause of action for fraud 
might exist."56 Although "the date of discovery is [generally] a fact question for the jury," 
summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding that 
date.57 However, in In re Beach, 441 B.R. 313 (Banlcr. D. Idaho 2011), the Banlcruptcy Court 
analyzed ICP A and provided: 
Under this statute, '3efore an "accrued" claim arises under the ICP A, a person must purchase 
or lease goods or services, and thereby suffer an ascertainable loss. In addition, the 
ascertainable loss must be the result of a practice declared unlawful by the ICP A, which 
includes those practices identified in Idaho Code§ 48-603. Section 48-603, in turn, 
s2 1.c. § 48-6)9. 
53 W. Corp. v. Vanek, 144 Idaho ISO, 151, 158 P.3d313, 314 (Ct. App. 2006). 
st Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc .. 103 Idaho 912,915,655 P.2d ll9, 122 (Ct. App. 1982); See also Spence v. Howell, 126 
Idaho 763,770,890 P.2d 714, 721 (1995) (The cause of action accrued upon the breach of the contract.); Corbridge 
v. Clarie £quip. Co., l 12 Idaho 85, 88, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1986) (Cause of action does not accrue until aggrieved 
party suffers damages.); Stephelu v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,254,678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984) (A negUgence cause of 
action accrued when the plaintiff sustained injuries.). 
5
' Lapham v. Stewart, 51 P.3d 396, 137 Idaho 582 (2002); See Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 502, 788 P .2d 1321, 
1325 (1990); Davis v. Moran, ll2 Idaho 703, 709, 735 P.2d 1014, 1020(1987) . 
.56 Performance Chevrolet, Inc. v. Mkt. Scan Info. Sys .• Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1171 (D. Idaho 2005) (quoting 
Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 90 P.3d 894,901 (2004)). 
S? Id. 
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provides additional elements necessary to the accrual of an ICPA claim: the ~trending ~y 
must be a 44person" who, in the conduct of a trade or commerce, knows, or wtth an exercise 
of due care should know, that he is committing one of the acts specified in Idaho Code § 
48-603.58 
The Bankruptcy Court found that the violation ofICPA occurred and that any cause of action 
accrued when the bank gave the debtors a misleading Disclosure Statement at the time of the 
loan closing because it was then that the debtors suffered any ascertainable injury.59 In a 
footnote, the Bankruptcy Court cited Performance Chevrolet, Inc. v. Mkt. Scan Info. Sys., Inc., 
402 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Idaho 2005) and stated that the fraud standard used in that case 
concerning the ICPA statute of limitations is not appropriate in ICP A cases "because, while the 
deceptive nature of many ICPA injuries shares similar characteristics with fraud, not al] of the 
fraud elements are required to prove an ICP A violation.''60 
In this case, a claim accrued under the ICP A when Plaintiffs purchased services from 
Defendant and suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of practices found 
unlawful by the ICPA. Plaintiffs purchased Defendant's services as the general contractor for 
their House from March of 2006 to November of 2008. Plaintiffs discovered the water leaking 
from the windows in the spring of 2009. Plaintiffs hired Butler to replace the windows that 
Defendant had installed in March 2011. There are two points in time when Plaintiffs' ICPA 
claim could have accrued. First, when Plaintiffs first discovered the windows and other areas 
leaking water in spring of 2009, which would be an ascertainable loss of property because that is 
objective proof of an actual injury. Water leaking into the House in various areas objectively 
causes damage to the property. Second. the claim could have accrued when Plaintiffs hired 
Butler to replace the windows in March 2011 because that is an ascertainable loss of Plaintiffs' 
58 Id at 319. 
59 Id at 319. 
""Id (citing State ex. rel. Kidwell v. Ma&ter Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 61S P.2d 116, 122-23 (1980)). 
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money to repair the alleged defects in the House. As to the claim that Plaintiffs did not know the 
full extent of the potential damage until August 2013, the obvious response is that ascertainable 
damage certainly occurred before that date and could have been discovered as far back as when 
the original leaking occurred in 2009. An ICPA action cannot be brought more than two years 
after the cause of action accrues, so Plaintiffs must have brought their claim either by spring of 
2011 or March 2013. Plaintiffs' Complaint was not filed until October 15, 2013. Therefore. the 
claim of a violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations and is DISMISSED. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendant 
Daniel Landvik and DISMISSES all of Plaintiffs' claims. 
IT JS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
DA TED this I q day of -I J\u. { \~,, 2015 
~&J. Ma,+-PHEN~ 
District Judge 
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Case No. CV 15-178C 
AFFIDAVIT OF TOM PETERSEN IN 
SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The matters stated herein are based upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. I am an employee of DeBest Plumbing, Inc. ("DeBest"). 
AFFIDAVIT OF TOM PETERSEN IN SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT- I 
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3. I am familiar with the agreement between DeBest and Gil Gould for plumbing work 
performed and materials supplied at a residence on 2109 Waterlily, McCall, Idaho (the 
"Residence"), over the period of February 2013 through early July 2013. 
4. DeBest entered into an agreement with Gil Gould dba Gould Custom Builders 
based upon a proposal to repair piping damaged by frozen pipes that occurred before February 7, 
2013 at the Residence. 
5. DeBest had no agreement with the Davisons, owners of the Residence, to provide 
any plumbing work or materials. 
6. I personally worked on the repair project at the Residence. 
7. On or about July 26, 2013, I received a telephone call from Gil Gould stating that 
Scott Davison had contacted him and that there was a leak at the Residence. 
8. On or about July 26, 2013, I met with Gil Gould and performed clean-up work 
resulting from the leak on the Residence. I worked for several hours with Gil Gould cleaning up 
all visible water damage. 
9. After working for several hours on clean-up at the residence, Gil Gould stated that 
he would finish up the clean-up work and repair of property damage. 
10. It was my understanding that any additional clean-up effort and repairs would be 
relatively minimal and undertaken within a few days of July 26, 2013. 
11. Scott Davison may have been present at the Residence on July 26, 2013, but I had 
no contact or communication with him. 
12. I never communicated directly to Scott Davison or Anne Davison at any point. 




13. I never received any written notice, by mail, email, or otherwise, to repair any 
damage at the Residence from the Davisons or Gil Gould. 
14. I was not aware of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act until after this 
litigation began. 
DA TED this t day of August, 20 I 6. 
~ Tom Petersen 
"fu SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of August, 2016. 
{½JU4!:(; prxf 
Notary Public for Idaho 1 
Residing at: CAfdvve.JI 
My Commission Expires: 1 / 3'.n ft :1: 
I I 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5-t- day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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1423 Tyrell Lane 
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Boise, Idaho 83701 
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Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
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Case No. CV 15-178C 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARCY NEIDIGH IN 
SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The matters stated herein are based upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. I am an employee and the Chief Executive Officer of DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
("DeBest"). I am also the custodian of records for DeBest. 
3. I am familiar with the agreement between DeBest and Gil Gould for plumbing work 
performed and materials supplied at a residence owned by Scott and Anne Davison at 2109 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARCY NEIDIGH IN SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT- I 
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Waterlily, McCall, Idaho (the "Residence"), over the period of February 2013 through early July 
2013. 
4. DeBest entered into an agreement with Gil Gould dba Gould Custom Builders 
based upon a proposal to repair piping damaged by frozen pipes that occurred before February 7, 
2013. 
5. DeBest had no agreement with the Davisons to provide any plumbing work or 
materials. 
6. Tom Petersen, an employee of DeBest, was contacted by Gil Gould regarding a 
leak at the Residence, on or about July 26, 2013. 
7. Tom Petersen informed me of the leak and his initial clean-up and repair efforts 
that took place on or about July 26, 2013. 
8. It was DeBest's understanding that any additional clean-up effort to be undertaken 
by Gil Gould would be minimal and completed within a few days of July 26, 2013. 
9. DeBest had no contact with the Davisons or Gil Gould after the clean-up and repairs 
on July 26, 2013 until DeBest received an invoice from Gould Custom Builders in February 2014 
for the cost of repairs undertaken on July 26, 2013 and additional costs incurred after December 
18, 2013. 
10. Upon receiving the invoice in February 2014, DeBest learned that no repairs had 
occurred after July 2013 until December 18, 2013. 
11. DeBest had no knowledge that Gould Custom Builders was undertaking additional 
and extensive remodeling and repairs until it received the February 2014 invoice. 




12. DeBest forwarded the invoice to its insurer, which investigated the claim. 
13. DeBest' s insurer was given the opportunity to inspect the Residence in April 2014, 
but not until after the additional and extensive remodeling and repairs to the Residence was already 
completed or near completion. 
14. At no point prior to or on July 26, 2013, did DeBest or any DeBest employee receive 
any written notice of the damage at the Residence or of an opportunity to repair the alleged damage. 
15. At no point after July 26, 2013, did DeBest or any DeBest employee receive any 
written notice of the damage at the Residence or of an opportunity to repair the alleged damage. 
16. I was not aware of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act until after this 
litigation was commenced. 
i ~-i±. 1 DATED this_'.::[.___ day of August, 2016. 
~ \ ·' 
(I'\[JLA !'.l1 A J,eo/jh 
'~yNeidi h 
1 
v ( 1 
·-jlJ_. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this i_ day of August, 2016. 
~arµPrP 
Residing at: Ut C{ ive. l J 
My Commission Expires: --<--if--"'--=-+.......__.,___ 
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Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
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YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant's will call on for hearing Defendant 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc.' s 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment before the Honorable Jason Scott on the 
19th day of September, 2016 at 1 :00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED This ~ayof August, 2016. 
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CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
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DEFENDANT DEBEST PLUMBING, 
INC. 'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
CONFIRM IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE NOTICE 
AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ACT 
APPLY TO PENDING LAWSUIT 
COMES NOW Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. ("DeBest"), by and through it counsel 
of record, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Confirm 
Implementation of the Provisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act Apply to Pending 
Lawsuit. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Confirm Implementation of the provisions of the Notice 
and Opportunity to Repair Act applying to the pending lawsuit. We do not dispute that it has 
now been shown to apply. We do dispute that Plaintiffs have complied with the notice 
provisions of the act. They have not. 
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UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. In February 2013, DeBest entered into an agreement with Gil Gould dba Gould 
Custom Homes based upon a proposal to repair residential piping and plumbing fixtures at 2109 
Waterlily, McCall, Idaho (the "'Residence"). A.ff. Darcy Neidigh, ,rn 3-4 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
2. DeBest had no agreement with the owners of the Residence where the work was 
perfonned. A.ff Darcy Neidigh, ,r 5 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
3. There was no agreement by DeBest to supply any material or provide any services 
for the benefit of Plaintiffs, the owners of the residence. DeBest provided its services and 
materials for Gil Gould dba Gould Custom Builders. A.ff: Darcy Neidigh, ,r,r 4-5 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
4. On or about July 25, 2013, Plaintiffs discovered ]eaking and water damage in the 
Residence. Pis' Complaint, ,r 5 (July 21, 2015). 
5. On or about July 26, 2013, Plaintiffs emailed Gil Gould, infonning him of the 
leaking and water damage. A.ff. Tyler JI. Neill, ,i 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 51 :8-
52:15 (May 5, 2016)). 
6. On or about July 26, 2013, Gil Gould called Tom Petersen, an employee of 
DeBest who had perfom1ed work on the residence, to infonn him of the leaking and water 
damage of the residence. Aff' Darcy Neidigh, ,i 6 (Aug. 5, 2016), A.ff. Tom Petersen, ,i 7 (Aug. 5, 
2016). 
7. On or about July 26, 2013, Tom Petersen met with Gil Gould at the residence and 
the two undertook efforts to repair the leaking and clean-up the water damage. Aff Tom 
Petersen, ,I 8 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
8. Although Scott Davison may have been present at the Residence on July 26, 
2016, Tom Petersen did not have any conversation with him. A.ff. Tom Petersen, 1 11 (Aug. 5, 
2016). 
9. After working for several hours on clean-up at the residence, Gil Gould stated to 
Tom Petersen that he would finish up the clean-up work and repairs. Aff. Tom Petersen, ,i 9 
(Aug. 5, 2016). 
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10. When Tom Petersen left the Residence on July 26, 2013, Gil Gould had no 
discussion or agreement with Tom Petersen or DeBest regarding when he would start work later, 
what work he would do, or how the billing should be handled. Aff. Tyler H. Neill, ~ 2, Exhibit A 
(Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depa., 106:14-25 (May 5, 2016)). 
11. It was DeBest's understanding that any additional clean-up effort and repairs 
would be undertaken and completed within a few days of July 26, 2013. A.ff Darcy Neidigh, ,r 8 
(Aug. 5, 2016), Aff Tom Petersen, ,r 10 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
12. Gil Gould of Gould Custom Builders, Inc. completed repairs on the Residence by 
the end of July 20 I 3, after which the Davisons occupied the Residence until late autumn 2013. 
A.ff. Tyler H. Neill, ,r 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depa., 86:11-87:3 (May 5, 2016)). 
13. At the time clean-up and repairs were completed on the Residence by the end of 
July 2013, there was no indication that there was any further damage to the Residence. Aff. Tyler 
H. Neill, ,i 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 66:5-13 (May 5, 2016)). 
14. While occupying the Residence in August 2013, Anne Davison notified Gil Gould 
of previously undiscovered water damage on the upstairs bathroom floor, which Gil Gould 
inspected, but did not repair at that time. DeBest was not notified of this damage. A.ff Tyler H. 
Neill, ,r 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 65:11-66:16 (May 5, 2016)), Aff. Darcy 
Neidigh, ,r 9 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
15. After clean-up and repairs were made on the Residence between July 26, 2013 
and July 31, 2013, no further repairs were undertaken until around December 18, 2013. A.ff Tyler 
H. Neill, ,r 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 97:10-23 (May 5, 2016)). 
16. When Gil Gould of Gould Custom Builders, Inc. inspected the Residence in 
December 2013 and tore off the ceiling, he discovered that there was water damage in the walls 
of the bedroom, in the closet, under the stairs, in the hallway and entrance, and partly in the 
utility room. Mold was discovered in the Residence at this time. Aff. Tyler H. Neill, ,r 2, Exhibit 
A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 108:12-21 (May 5, 2016)). 
17. Gould Custom Builders, Inc. undertook major remodel and repair efforts on the 
Residence beginning around December 18, 2013 and concluding in the spring of 2014. Afl Tyler 
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H. Neill, ,r 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 97:10-23, 129:4-8 (May 5, 2016)). 
18. Neither the Davisons nor Gould Custom Builders, Inc. had any contact with 
DeBest after the initial clean-up and repairs on July 26, 2013 until DeBest received an invoice 
from Gould Custom Builders, Inc. in February 2014 for the cost of repairs undertaken on July 
26, 2013 and additional costs incurred after December 18, 2013. A.ff Darcy Neidigh, ,r 9 (Aug. 5, 
2016). 
19. DeBest had no knowledge that Gould Custom Builders, Inc. was undertaking 
additional and extensive remodeling and repairs until it received the February 2014 invoice. A.ff 
Darcy Neidigh, ,r 11 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
20. DeBest's insurer was given the opportunity to inspect the Residence in April 
2014, but not until after the additional and extensive remodeling and repairs to the Residence 
was already completed or near completion. A.ff Darcy Neidigh, ,i 13 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
21. At no point prior to or on July 26, 2013, did DeBest or any DeBest employee 
receive any written notice of the damage at the Residence or of an opportunity to repair the 
alleged damage. Aff Darcy Neidigh, ,i 14 (Aug. 5, 2016), A.ff Tom Petersen, 'il 13 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
22. At no point after July 26, 2013, did DeBest or any DeBest employee receive any 
written notice of the damage at the Residence or of an opportunity to repair the alleged damage. 
A.ff Darcy Neidigh, ,r 15 (Aug. 5, 2016), ~ff. Tom Petersen, 'il 13 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
23. At no time prior to this litigation was DeBest aware of the Notice and Opportunity 
to Repair Act ("NORA") or its rights thereunder. ~ff Darcy Neidigh, ,i 16 (Aug. 5, 2016), A.ff 
Tom Petersen, ,i 14 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
ARGUMENT 
a. Plaint(ffs make their argument without citing to the record and by providing facts that 
are ,iot in the record. 
Plaintiffs, in their memorandum in support of their motion, provide a five page narrative 
alleging facts that are not supported by the record. Plaintiffs only cite to the "Initial Affidavit of 
Gilbert Gould" once, in support of the contention that "Mr. Peterson, Gilbert Gould, and the 
Davisons had inspected, identified, and determined the cause of the leak." Allegations of facts 
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concerning the initial remodel project, events that occurred after the July 26, 2013 repair and the 
delay in making further repairs, and investigations by Defendant's insurer, are all made without 
reference to the record and in many cases, do not exist in the record. 
h. Plaintiffs failed to serve written notice of opportunity to repair to Defendant p1·ior to 
filing this lawsuit 
Although Plaintiffs do not explain the prerequisite requirement for NORA that the 
construction project was a substantial remodel, Defendant does not dispute that NORA applies to 
this litigation. To the extent that Plaintiffs again argue that NORA vests rights to a homeowner 
to sue a subcontractor without privity of contract, such argument has already been decided. This 
Court on previous motions has ruled NORA does not change the common law requirement. The 
remaining issue is whether Plaintiffs complied with NORA prior to commencing litigation. 
Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue. For this Opposition 
to Plaintiffs' Motion, we present tbe following argument incorporating some of the argument on 
swnmary judgment. 
Idaho Code § 6-2503(1) states, 
Prior to commencing an action against a construction professional for a 
construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the 
construction professional. The notice of claim shall state that the claimant asserts 
a construction defect claim against the construction professional and shall 
describe the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature 
of the defect. Any action commenced by a claimant prior to compliance with the 
requirements of this section shall be dismissed by the court without prejudice and 
may not be recommenced until the claimant has complied with the requirements 
under this section. If a written notice of claim is served under this section within 
the time prescribed for the filing of an action under this chapter, the statute of 
limitations for construction-related claims is tolled until sixty (60) days after the 
period of time during which the filing of an action is barred. 
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Idaho Code § 6-2502(8) defines ··serve" or "service'' as ··personal service or delivery by certified 
mail to the last known address of the addressee." 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted the use of the term "shall" in NORA imposes "a 
mandatory obligation" when explaining the requirement of a construction professional to serve a 
written response once served with written notice from the claimant. Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 
Idaho 434, 438, 196 P.3d 352, 356 (footnote 4) (2008). Based on this interpretation, it is clear 
that the use of the term "shall" under Idaho Code 6-2503(1) creates a mandatory obligation on 
the part of the claimant to serve written notice to the construction professional. In Funk v. 
Landvik (Power County Case No. CV-2013-211), an Idaho 6th Judicial District case, the Court, in 
granting summary judgment to a construction professional, stated that "verbal notice does not 
comply with NORA." See Aff. of Tyler H. Neill, ,i 4, Exhibit C (Aug. 5, 2016) (Memorandum 
Decision Granting Defendant Daniel Landvik 's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9 (Mar. 19, 
2015)). The Funk Court also held that a written notice that was served after the repair work had 
been completed was insufficient under NORA as the construction professional was deprived of 
any real chance to make repairs and remedy the defect. Id. 
There is no question that the Davisons did not comply with NORA's notice requirements. 
Although DeBest was made aware of the leak and some of the damage to the residence based on 
a conversation with Gil Gould on July 26, 2013, the Davisons never provided any written notice 
to DeBest at any point. Further, prior to the extensive remodel and repair project that began on 
December 18, 2013, DeBest had no knowledge that such a project was taking place or that there 
was even still a need for construction on the Residence until mid-February 2014. It is clear and 
undisputed that the Davisons did not comply with the notice provisions of NORA. There was no 
written notice to DeBest detailing the alleged damage or giving DeBest an opportunity to repair, 
either before the initial repairs on July 26, 2013 or before the extensive remodeling and repairs 
that took place beginning December 18, 2013. The only written notice by Davisons was an 
email sent from Scott Davison to Gil Gould. The email was not sent to DeBest. 
To the extent that Plaintiffs claim DeBest had actual notice of the damage on July 26, 
2013, such notice does not satisfy the requirements under Idaho Code §§ 6-2503(1) and 6-
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2502(8). NORA cJearly and unambiguously states that "the claimant shall serve vmtten notice 
of c1aim on the construction professional" and that serve or service means "personal service or 
delivery by certified mail to the last known address of the addressee." Phone calls or 
conversations do not meet these requirements. Written notice was not given to DeBest in any 
form, let alone through personal service or delivery by certified mail. Further, it is undisputed 
that DeBest not only did not receive written notice regarding the December 18, 2013 remodel 
and repairs, but that they did not even have any notice or knowledge of the initiation of remodel 
and repairs. By the time DeBest was made aware of the December 18, 2013 remodel and repairs 
in the spring of 2014, there was no longer any meaningful opportunity to inspect or repair the 
Residence. The majority of the work had been completed. As such, it is clear that Plaintiffs did 
not comply with NORA prior to filing this lawsuit. 
c. Waiver 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, and 
the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and that he 
thereby has altered his position to his detriment." Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 259 P.3d 595, 
603 (2011) quoting Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006). 
"Waiver is foremost a question of intent." Id. quoting Seaport Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 
736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App. 1987). "A c1ear intention to waive must be shown 
before waiver shall be established." Id. citing Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 
253, 256, 846 P .2d 904, 907 ( 1993 ). "[T)o impose the equitable doctrine of waiver, there must 
be 'direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right or acts 
amounting to an estoppel by the party whose conduct is to be construed as a waiver."' Idaho 
Migrant Council v. Northwestern Mut. Lffe Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 804, 806, 718 P.2d 1242, 1244 
(Ct.App. 1986) quoting Milne v. Anderson, 576 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska 1978). 
Plaintiffs argue that by having its insurer inspect and evaluate the property in April 2014, 
DeBest waived its rights to written notice under NORA. Inspecting and evaluating the property 
in no way demonstrates an intent to relinquish a known right. Further, almost all, if not all, of 
the repairs had been completed at the time DeBesfs insurer inspected the Residence. In addition 
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to the fact that there was no intentional relinquishment of DeBest's rights under NORA, the 
Davisons also were not disadvantaged by DeBest's insurer investigating and estimating damage. 
Written notice of an opportunity to repair would not have been sufficient at the time of 
investigation as there would have been no meaningful opportunity to repair. The Davisons 
needed to provide written notice prior to the commencement of repair and restoration. As such, 
Plaintiffs did not alter their position to their detriment. 
To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that DeBest waived NORA requirements by 
undertaking repair and clean-up efforts in July 2013, such action does not constitute a voluntary 
relinquishment of a known right. Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that DeBest was 
knowingly relinquishing its NORA rights. Plaintiffs have not shown "direct, unequivocal 
conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right." DeBest was not even aware 
of its rights under NORA until after this litigation commenced. There simply cannot be a 
voluntary relinquishment of a known right in this case, because DeBest did not know of any 
rights to written notice under NORA. 
Further, DeBest believed the repair was completed near the time of discovery in July 
2013. Tom Petersen fixed the leaking faucet and helped Gil Gould remove the visibly damaged 
materials on July 26, 2013. After several hours of work, Gil Gould informed Tom Petersen that 
he would finish up the repairs. Repairs were completed by July 31, 2013 and there was no 
indication that there was further damage. DeBest did not waive a right to notice of an 
opportunity to make repairs that it did not even know were necessary. The focus of any question 
of waiver is on the intent and knowledge of the party purportedly waiving a right. Without 
knowledge either of the right to written notice or of the damage to the property, neither Tom 
Petersen nor DeBest could have the intent to waive. 
Defendant did not have knowledge of the additional, extensive claimed damage to the 
Residence. Based on Gil Gould's testimony in his deposition, the damage was not known or 
apparent until he tore apart the ceiling in the Residence in December 2013. DeBest could not 
knowingly reJinquish its opportunity to repair when it did not know what damage was claimed, 
that additional repairs were necessary and were going to take place over four months later, or 
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that five months of work was going to be necessary to repair the Residence. At no point did 
DeBest voluntarily relinquish a known right. At a minimum, DeBest should have received 
written notice pursuant to NORA before the Davisons and Gil Gould undertook the extensive 
repairs and restoration in December 2013 when they discovered the damage to the Residence. 
DeBest could not waive its right for notice of the opportunity to repair the extensive damage 
when it did not know it existed in the first place. 
In Plaintiffs' memorandum, mention is briefly made of promissory estoppel, but no 
analysis is provided. Plaintiffs seem to suggest that by engaging in the settlement process, 
promissory estoppel bars Defendant from asserting its NORA rights. 
To prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a party must prove the existence of all 
four elements of promissory estoppel: I) reliance upon a specific promise; 2) 
substantial economic loss to the promise as a result of such reliance; 3) the loss to 
the promise was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and 4) the 
promisee's reliance on the promise must have been reasonable. 
Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 399, 49 P.3d 402, 404 (2002). The doctrine of promissory 
estoppel is intended to serve as a substitute for consideration to make an agreement, but it is not 
a substitute for an agreement between the parties. Id., 137 Idaho at 400, 49 P.3d at 405. 
In the case before this Court, there was no promise that notice was not required. Nor was 
there a promise to settle. As such, there was no agreement either. DeBest only engaged in the 
settlement process in April 2014, after the work on the Residence was completed. There is no 
detrimental reliance as Plaintiffs could not have provided Defendant with valid notice of an 
opportunity to repair at that time. 
Finally, even if this Court were to find somehow that Defendant waived its defenses to 
the sufficiency of notice under NORA, such a waiver does not mean that Plaintiffs complied with 
NORA and it would not entitle Plaintiffs to the attorney fee provision under NORA. There is no 
question that Plaintiffs did not comply with NORA notice requirements. If this Court determines 
that there was some type of waiver by Defendant, Plaintiffs should not be able to use NORA as a 
sword. Rather, such a determination should merely allow Plaintiffs to continue with the lawsuit. 
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A waiver of a right by Defendant does not bestow rights upon Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant does not dispute that NORA applies to this litigation. However, it is clear and 
undisputed that Plaintiffs did not comply with NORA, as no written notice of alleged damages or 
an opportunity to repair was served on Defendant. Further, there was no waiver of NORA 
requirements by Defendant. Defendant was not aware of its rights under NORA and therefore, 
could not voluntarily relinquish such a right. Defendant respectfully requests that this Court 
deny Plaintiffs' motion. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:&/~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintifft 
[X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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Case No. CV 15-178C 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE 
COMES NOW, Defendant DEBEST PLUMBING, INC., by and through its attorneys of 
record, CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, and, pursuant to the Scheduling Order filed 
November 16, 2015, and LR.C.P. 26(b )( 4), hereby discloses the following expert witness who may 
be called to testify on Defendant's behalf at the trial of the above-entitled matter: 
1. Patrick J. Coppi CR, Coppi Restoration Group LLC, 3523 Red Oak Drive, Boise, 
Idaho 83703 .. Mr. Coppi has prepared a report of his opinions and the basis and reasons 




therefore, attached hereto as Exhibit A. He is expected to testify consistent with the opinions 
stated in said report. We anticipate using the photographs and drawings in said report as exhibits 
to support his opinions. 
Mr. Coppi'scurriculum vitae is attached as ExhibitB, which includes Mr. Coppi's testimony 
history and publications history. Mr. Coppi's fee schedule is attached as Exhibit C. Defendant 
reserves the right to disclose any supplemental opinions of Mr. Coppi subject to any new testimony 
or documentation Defendant may receive. 
Defendant reserves the right to disclose additional expert witnesses if the same are retained 
prior to trial. Defendant also reserves the right to call any and all experts identified by any other 
parties to this action. 
DATED This/ 0 day of August, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By: &7Zt~c 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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I hereby certify that on the .J.t2_ day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
[X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 





Davison V. DeBest 
Limited Report 
Evaluation of July 23rd 2013 Water Leak Mitigation, 
Repair Scope, and Associated Costs 
Davison Residence 
2109 Water Lilly, Pilgrim Cove 
McCall, ID 83638 
Prepared for 
Robert D. Lewis 
Cantril! Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen LLP 
Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
1423 Tyrell Lane 




Coppi Restoration Group LLC 
7154 West State Street #241 
Boise, ID 83714 
208 250-6353 
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Background and Assignment 
Robert D. Lewis of Cantril! Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen LLP contacted me regarding the Davison 
Residence on May 10, 2016. The Davison property is located at 2109 Water Lilly, Pilgrim Cove, McCall, ID 
83638. Lewis reported to me that DeBest Plumbing Inc. was in a dispute over costs related to a water 
leak that had occurred in July of 2013. Lewis reported that DeBest had accepted responsibility for the 
leak, but that the Davison's contractor, Gilbert Gould, had presented billings to DeBest that were far in 
excess of what they were expecting. DeBest sent an independent inspector to assess and estimate the 
damages. That independent inspector's estimate was far and away less than the Gould billings Gould 
had presented. 
Lewis also reported that Gould had provided water damage mitigation services, and in that process 
decided with Scott Davison to complete temporary repairs without making a full assessment of damages 
until the Davison's had left for the year. In December 2013, approximately five months after the initial 
leak, Gould assessed the damage and started permanent repairs. In the process of these repairs, Gould 
reported that he had discovered significant damage caused by the initial leak. 
Lewis asked me to independently review the documents to evaluate the following: 
1. Gould's mitigation activities and costs. 
2. Gould's repair scope and invoices billed for the water damage. 
3. Gould's contracting and business practices involved in the remediation and repair of the 
home. 
4. The assessment and estimate of repairs generated by DeBest's independent inspector. 
Limited Report 
This is a limited report. It is my understanding that additional documents have been requested but not 
received at this time. Additionally, I have made a request to inspect the property, but as yet, a date has 
not been set. 
I expect to amend and/or supplement this report after the additional document review and/or 
inspection. 
In preparing this report I reviewed documents, interviewed DeBest's independent inspector, and 
obtained an executable Xactimate file of the estimate made by the inspector. I uploaded it into my 
software and reviewed the data it contained. 
Documents Reviewed 
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1. 33 photos 
2. Independent inspector's assessment, including Xactimate estimate 
3. Complaints CV 2015-178c, and answer and demand for jury trial 
4. Exhibits 1 through 21, and deposition of Gilbert Gould 
5. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories 
Summary of Findings 
1. The length of time the leak was active was no longer that 7 days. 
2. DeBest Plumbing's response was appropriate. 
3. Gould's initial assessment and mitigation were grossly inadequate. 
4. Gould and Davison further exacerbated the problem by closing up the ceiling, leaving trapped 
moisture elsewhere, and unreasonably waiting 4 months and 3 weeks to re-assess and start 
repairs. 
5. DeBest's independent inspector made a valid Xactimate estimate which includes cost for 
damage caused by DeBest, and for the damage caused by Gould's lack of mitigation. 
6. Gould grossly overcharged for work performed and should not be compensated for overcharges. 
7. Gould demonstrated poor contracting business practices. 
Detail of Findings 
1. The length of time the leak was active was no longer than 7 days. 
It is important to understand the length of time between when the leak occurred, and when the 
leak was discovered. Damages caused by the water from the time it was leaking until the time it 
was discovered have been accepted by DeBest. DeBest left with the understanding that Gould 
was taking care of the mitigation and repairs. Gould, as the general contractor, took control of 
the project when he was called by the homeowner and accepted the responsibility to mitigate 
and repair the leak. By Gould's own account, as of July 25, 2013, he had control of the property. 
In Exhibit 6, Gould states that the tub faucet that leaked was installed on June 15. Gould also 
states that the faucet had been leaking for 40 days. 
Exhibit 7 is a Consolidated Supply invoice dated July 11, 2013. The invoice shows the shipping 
date as July 11, 2013, for the faucet that DeBest installed; sometime after that it arrived in 
Boise. It is not plausible for the faucet to have been installed on June 15, 2013. 
When I purchase special-order items from Consolidated Supply, delivery takes several days-
typically a week or longer. Additionally, it is neither customary nor prudent for a plumbing 
contractor to schedule the installation of an ordered part before it arrives, is inspected, and is 
verified to be the correct part. 
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The invoice, along with my experience in ordering plumbing parts and scheduling plumbing 
repairs, indicate that Gould is mistaken, and the time estimate for mold amplification is wrong. 
My time estimate for when the pipe was leaking before Gould started mitigating is no longer 
than 7 days. 
The length of time the structure was exposed to moisture before Gould took control of the 
home is minimal in comparison to the length time Gould and Davison left the home to sit 
unmitigated. Mold discovered during repairs, as described in Gould's deposition, could not have 
happened during this time. If mold had amplified over time it was due to unmitigated trapped 
moisture after Gould took control of the project and waited close to 5 months to assess and 
start repairs. 
2. DeBest Plumbing's response was appropriate. 
Gould contacted Tom Petersen of DeBest Plumbing on July 26, 2013. Gould had hired DeBest 
Plumbing to complete plumbing repairs for a 2012 broken pipe freeze that had caused extensive 
damage. The 2012 freeze up occurred when the cabin was left unattended. 
Gould describes Petersen as having arrived and assisted Gould in the demolition of the 
downstairs bedroom ceiling. Petersen stopped the active pipe leak. Petersen did accept 
responsibly for the current pipe leak and damage from that leak. With the knowledge that Gould 
was experienced with water damage and repair, Petersen believed that Gould's mitigation 
activities would be adequate, and that the repairs would be appropriate for the water loss that 
had occurred. 
Although DeBest had acted honorably in taking responsibility, and had known Gould to be an 
experienced contractor capable of taking care of the repairs, Gould did not honor the trust given 
by DeBest. 
Instead, Gould allowed the situation to worsen, and did not communicate the extent of the 
damage he was assigning to DeBest until February 14, 2014. Two invoices dated February 14, 
2014 were forwarded to DeBest. These were a mitigation bill for the amount of $2127 .50 and a 
partial billing of repairs for $33,401.62. The invoices sent far exceeded what DeBest was 
expecting. 
Additionally, Gould completed a significant portion of the repairs prior to this notification, which 
prevented a DeBest representative from inspecting and verifying the cause of the unreported 
damages. 
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3. Gould's initial assessment and mitigation were grossly inadequate. 
Documents and testimony show that the Davison flood was significant. In Exhibit 5, Gould 
describes the situation in a letter: "sagging ceiling ... water coming through it ... hardwood floor 
soaked with standing water." Later, Gould describes insulation from the ceiling as being 
"soaked." He also believes the water had been leaking for 40 days. 
Documents also show that Gould had been exposed to water damage of this type before, and 
that he had used restoration companies in the past. Restoration companies were available to 
assist, but on this occasion, Gould chose not to call in a local restoration company. He decided 
to assess and mitigate the water damage himself instead of using one of the professional 
companies he had used in the past, such as CTR or Disaster Response. He also chose to drive 
back to Boise to pick up a single undersized dehumidifier. 
Restoration is a skilled profession. That said, water damage assessment mitigation repair is not 
rocket science, particularly for a professional home builder/journeyman electrician who spent 
the majority of his career in Valley County. 
Gould limited his inspection to what he immediately saw, but did not inspect the surrounding 
areas for trapped moisture. Gould cleaned up a minimal amount of water with towels, 
performed some insulation removal, and placed one, undersized dehumidifier in the bedroom. 
With the volume of water as Gould described, he should have conducted further investigation 
and used additional equipment to mitigate the surrounding areas. 
Proper mitigation as described in the Standard and Reference Guide for Professional Water 
Damage Restoration would have included the following: inspection of all affected areas; 
documentation as to moisture content; demolition if needed in other areas to promote drying; 
application of antimicrobials to prevent mold; and the placement of specialty drying equipment 
such as fans, dehumidifiers, and in this case wall and hardwood floor drying units. 
Though Gould is not a certified water damage technician, his intimate knowledge of how a 
home is constructed and his exposure to water damages in the past should have produced an 
understanding of where water would most likely flow, absorb into, and cause damage. Yet he 
did not inspect the surrounding areas or mitigate damage to these areas. 
Instead of inspecting the walls in the immediate or surrounding rooms, Gould placed a single 
dehumidifier in the home, with no fans, and without hardwood drying equipment. Gould did not 
inspect the crawl space that he later claimed had mold growth from the upstairs bath leak. 
After three days of running an undersized dehumidifier, Gould called it dry without using a 
moisture meter. He then proceeded with temporary repairs and painting to accommodate the 
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homeowner. This included closing up the ceiling cavity below the upstairs bathroom floor, 
restricting airflow to trapped moisture in this area. It is no wonder that in August, Ann Davison 
reported new damage to Gould in the bathroom floor above. 
On page 88 of Gould's deposition he explains his lack of assessment as due to the stress of trying 
to prepare for the Davison's guests that were coming for the fourth of July. 
Gould had been hired to mitigate the damage. He took control of the project, and then failed in 
his important and accepted responsibility. 
By closing up the ceiling and leaving moisture in surrounding areas, including the hardwood 
floor, Gould effectively created ideal conditions for mold to amplify. 
4. Gould and Davison exacerbated the problem by closing up the ceiling, leaving trapped 
moisture elsewhere, and unreasonably waiting 4 months and 3 weeks to re-assess and start 
repairs. 
Proper mitigation on a flood of this type always reduces costs. On this flood, proper mitigation 
would have saved the time and expense of remediating mold, and significantly reduced the 
water damage caused by the DeBest leak. Left unmitigated, trapped moisture can cause 
secondary damage from moisture migration and microbial growth. Those damages could be 
appearance-only, such as swelling and blistering, but could also impact the structural integrity of 
materials. 
The following month after the mitigation and temporary repair, Ann Davison phoned Gould to 
report that the bathroom floor was then showing signs of water damage. This is a classic 
example of moisture migration after the fact. Additional Materials that were present in the 
surrounding areas to the immediate damage those are highly susceptible to non-repairable 
latent damage. These include hardwood flooring, particle board sub- floor, and sheet rock. 
Beyond the structural damage cause by swelling of the materials, as unmitigated moisture 
further migrated from the source area, the areas that were dry became wet and became 
conducive to mold growth. 
Instead of doing the prudent thing with respect to the integrity of the home, Gould and Davison 
bypass common sense and their personal and professional experience. They make temporary 
repairs, leaving the home in a state of deterioration with the plan to address the issues later so 
that the Davison's can use the cabin through the summer and fall. They do this without regard 
to the costs they eventually try to pass on to DeBest. 
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As previously described, Gould has sufficient knowledge and experience-he should have known 
the importance of proper assessment and mitigation. It was predictable that unaddressed water 
would cause further damage. 
In addition, Davison had a working knowledge of the effects of water damage. In deposition, 
Gould mentioned that Davison had experienced a significant mold contamination in the year 
2000, and that the Davison home was involved in the significant water damage that led to the 
tub faucet replacement by DeBest. 
Both Gould and Davison had knowledge of the seriousness of the situation, yet made decisions 
based solely on their own immediate needs, without consideration of the expense to DeBest. 
5. DeBest's independent inspector made a valid Xactimate estimate, which includes cost for 
damage caused by DeBest, and for the damage caused by Gould's lack of mitigation. 
Six months and 3 weeks after the leaking pipe was discovered, DeBest was invoiced and notified 
that the extent of the damage was far in excess of what they initially thought. At that time, 
DeBest sent an independent inspector to assess the extent of the damage and make a Xactimate 
estimate of the repairs reported by Gould. 
Xactimate is construction-estimating software used to estimate the costs of water damages and 
repairs in 85 percent of all water damages in North America. Hundreds of general contractors in 
Idaho use this software in estimating successful profitable projects. The software price lists are 
updated monthly. The independent inspector used the January 2014 price list that is used for 
McCall. As a general contractor, I have used the software in over 3,500 water damage repair 
estimates since 1996. 
The DeBest inspector met with Gould and reviewed the scope of repair. Using Gould's detailed 
description of the work performed and the dimensions of each affected room, the inspector 
generated a fair market value estimate for the work performed by Gould. 
I reviewed the estimate, floor plan drawings, and pictures and found the independent 
inspector's estimate of $24,005.06 to be a valid estimate of costs for structural repair to the first 
and second floors of the home. I believe that this estimate accurately reflects the mitigation and 
repairs to these areas as described by Gould. 
The estimate does not include the cost to move and cover furniture or box contents out of the 
way for repairs. 
It is also important to note: 
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a. That the repairs included in the independent inspector's estimate included both the 
immediate repairs that DeBest took responsibly for and the damage repairs caused by 
lack of proper mitigation. 
b. This estimate does not include mold remediation. Mold remediation would not have 
been required if the flood had been mitigated properly. Costs for mold remediation 
should be absorbed by Gould as he is the general contractor that caused the 
contamination. 
c. Additionally, if I were to estimate this project as if it had been properly mitigated and 
repaired, the mitigation expenses would slightly increase, and the repair expenses would 
significantly decrease in comparison to the estimate generated by the independent 
inspector. The overall cost would be about the same or slightly less. 
d. With proper mitigation and repairs, total time to dry and repair the home would have 
been completed in four to six weeks. 
e. The estimate does not contain expenses and associated costs for mold remediation in the 
crawl space. 
i. No assessment or mitigation was performed in crawl space. 
ii. Length of time was too short for mold growth. 
iii. Gould's description of the mold in the crawls space and on the rim is indicative 
of long-term, multi-year exposure to moisture and choking. 
6. Gould grossly overcharged for work performed and should not be compensated for 
overcharges. 
The Xactimate estimate in itself is a valid comparative tool to determine if Gould's billings are 
appropriate. The cost difference between Xactimate and Gould indicate that Gould's billings are 
far in excess of what costs for the McCall area market were in 2013 and 2014. 
The independent inspector's estimate is for $24,005.06. Gould's final billing amount is in excess 
of $127,272.99. 
To further understand the cost difference in addition to the Xactimate estimate, I reviewed all 
documents contained in the exhibits. Gould's billings are vague and lack substantial support. 
Because all supporting documents are not available, specifically invoice, time cards, and invoices 
from BC&G Construction, specific differences are difficult to assess. However, generalized 
findings can be determined as to the contributing factors to the excessive billings. It is my 
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understanding that further supporting documents have been requested, and have not been 
submitted at this time. 
Based on analysis ofthe invoices and material receipts included in the exhibits, as well as careful 
examination of the floor plan and dimensions of each room, it is apparent that Gould grossly 
overcharged for the work he supervised. 
Material quantities detailed in submitted invoices look appropriate for the project. 
The rate declared by Gould for skilled craftsmen is appropriate, but the rate declared for the 
mold remediation technicians and general laborer is excessive. 
Labor with respect to materials used appears to be excessive. 
Labor hours as compared to the proven Xactimate productivity rates and my 30 years' 
experience indicate that the hours billed are grossly inflated. 
Providing lodging and travel to workers is not justified. There are ample subcontractors and 
craftsmen in the McCall area who could have easily filled the needs of this small repair/remodel 
job. 
Gould subcontracted the majority of the work to BC&G Construction, which is a limited liability 
construction company owned by his son. The supervision needs of this project did not require 
two general contractors or the profit and overheads each company built into their charges. 
It is typical of small LLCs not to have the overhead and expenses of larger companies, such as 
multiple employees, workman's comp, advertising, and offices. Lack of expenses further 
diminish the need for overhead and "builder commission" fees. 
I believe that if any laymen walked through the project, they would have difficulty 
understanding why two general contractors were needed, and where the requested 
$127,272.99 was spent. 
7. Gould demonstrated poor contracting business practices. 
Normally, in the construction and repair business, a homeowner or responsible party contacts a 
general contractor and a bid is made for a fixed amount. Less often, a time and material contract 
can be made that clarifies rates, materials, and the types of expenses that will be billed. A 
contract is drawn up by the contractor, and the financially responsible party has the opportunity 
to accept the agreement, negotiate, or decline the agreement and seek additional quotes. 
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Although the damaged home was Davison's, DeBest was an involved party yet Gould did not 
give DeBest the opportunity to understand the magnitude of the damage or costs that they 
would be billed for. 
Gould's lack of documentation and his decision not to report the damage for close to seven 
months after a significant portion of the work was completed, and prior to DeBest being able to 
inspect-were irresponsible. 
Because of the magnitude of damage Gould should have communicated heavily with DeBest 
about the scope of repair and costs. 
An ethical business person would not be trying to charge for damages that they caused, or for 
the preexisting mold condition in the crawl space. 
Approving BC&G's unsupported labor hours on a time and material basis was inappropriate. It 
was inappropriate for Gould to pay his family rates far beyond the normal market rate, and to 
pay per diem when local skilled craftsman, remediation technicians and laborers were available. 
Gould should have upheld the good business practice of disclosure by immediately generating a 
scope of repair for DeBest. Gould is irresponsible in spending DeBest money. 
Conclusion 
DeBest plumbing responded promptly and acted appropriately. 
I believe De Best Plumbing is responsible for the fair market value of the mitigation and repairs for water 
damage created during the 7 days before the leak was discovered and that DeBest did not cause the 
extensive damage that they are being held responsible for. 
Davison, having had a major mold remediation in 2000 and subsequent water damage experience, 
certainly had knowledge about un-mitigated water in relationship to mold growth and the high cost of 
remediation. Davison agreed to temporary repairs and then postponed repairs until the following 
winter. Like Gould, Davison made this choice without consideration to DeBest's expenses. 
I believe that Scott Davison should also have to take on a portion of the additional expense because he 
made decisions with Gould that contributed to the excessive damage. 
Gould, with great experience in repairing damages from pipe leaks and mold, improperly mitigated the 
leak and postponed the repair that resulted in extensive damage. He then benefitted from his own 
mistakes. Essentially, Gould created an environment conducive to mold growth. 
PatCoppiCR Coppi Restoration Group LLC 8/9/2016 Page 10 
00000474
- -
Gould did not communicate with the financially responsible party in a timely manner, defying good 
contracting practices and common sense. 
Gould continued on with repairs, putting his family to work, and overcharging for the value of the work. 
The project dragged on for close to a year with unjustified expenses such as travel and per diem. 
I believe that with consideration to the fact that Gilbert Gould was the general contractor on the project 
that accepted the responsibility to mitigate the damage, and that he allowed moisture seepage to cause 
additional damages, to cause the mold, failed to disclose, and then overcharged for his repair-the lion's 
share of additional damage and expense belongs to him. 
ln my professional career I have mitigated thousands of water damages that involved multi-floor 
flooding from pipe leaks. Without a single doubt I know this home could have been assessed, dried and 
repaired at a fraction of the time and expense. 
General Statements 
I stand ready to support any or all of my statements and to answer any questions regarding my report in 
deposition or court testimony. 
I now certify that I have no interest in the property or products which are the subject of this report, and 
that neither the scope of my employment, nor the compensation paid in any way impacts the findings 
and conclusions expressed herein. 
This report is intended for informational use only. No liability is implied or accepted upon issuing this 
report. All findings of this report are based on documents, personal interview, and photos. This report is 
not intended to serve as specifications. Should new evidence be obtained, I reserve the right to change 
any of the conclusions in this report. 
If other relevant documents are provided, depending on what they show, this report may be amended. 
Thank you for the opportunity to assist in this matter. 
DATE SUBMITTED: August 8, 2016 
Patrick J. Coppi C.R. 






Curriculum Vitae / Bio 
PATRICKJ. COPPI CR 
Coppi Restoration Group LLC 
-
3523 Red Oak Dr., Boise, Idaho 83703 - (208) 250-6353 patcoppi@hotmail.com 
Biography of Pat Coppi 
Patrick J. Coppi has over 30 years of experience in General Contracting. His experience includes 
scoping, estimation and project management residential and commercial construction. Pat 
specialized in structural repairs of all kinds, fire and water damage mitigation, content 
restoration, mold remediation, and insurance claim contracting. Pat started as a General 
Contractor doing remodel, and repair in the Boise area, and then served 13 years at Disaster 
Kleen up serving Treasure Valley. Pat was Vice President of Operations/General Manager for the 
last 9 years. As an industry leader Pat has personally estimated and managed the successful 
restoration of over 5000 structural and content restoration projects, over-saw and trained 
project managers/estimators that have completed over 10,000 projects. Pat is well versed in all 
aspects of Construction, and Restoration Company management. 
In addition to general contracting structural rebuilds for construct defects, damages caused by 
fire, water, and mold, Pats experience includes tear gas, trauma scene, fuel oil, natural gas 
explosions, suspect hanta virus, and Legionella cleanups, also tenant land lord disputes. During 
Pat's term at DK he was an expert witness and consultant helping bring several law suits to 
resolution. Pat has assisted homeowners and insurance companies by scoping and estimating 
repair costs on hundreds of insurance claims in dispute prior to going to litigation. 
Pat Currently owns and Operates Coppi Restoration Group LLC, and Fire Water Mold Damage 
Consulting LLC. Pat also is an associate at Advise and Consult Inc. which is an expert witness 
firm specializing in property damage law suits. Pat has been accredited by several states 
Departments of Insurance to teach continuing education classes to insurance agents. 
Additionally, he has taught l00's of property managers, real-estate agents, adjusters, and claim 
managers on construction/restoration industry related topics. 
Pat has extensive experience in the usage, and application of the Xactimate Estimation System, 
and restoration industry standards such as IICRC s 500 Water Standard, S 520 Mold Standard. 
Pat is Familiar with International Building Code, and is a registered General Contractor in the 




Owner, Boise Fire and Water Damage 
Journeyman Level Craftsman, Morrison Knudsen Engineering Group 
Owner, Boise Fire and Water Damage 
Manager, Fire and Water Damage Renovators 
Disaster Kleenup Serving Treasure Valley; Operation Manager 
DKTV Estimator 
DKTV Vice President of Operations 
Owner/Consultant - Fire Water Mold Damage Consulting LLC 
Associate Consultant at Advise and Consult, Inc. 
Licenses 
Currant; Coppi Restoration Group LC registered contractor State of Idaho 
1985 through 1987 
1987 through 1989 
1989 through 1995 
1995 through 1997 
1997 through 1998 
1998 through 2001 
2001 through 2010 
2010 through present 
2010 through present 
Prior: As VP of Operations at Disaster Kleenup serving Treasure Valley Pat maintained licenses 
and trained estimators and project managers for compliance to contractors licenses held in 
Idaho, Utah, Oregon and Nevada and Public Works Licenses in Idaho. 
Professional Education. Current and Past Certifications 
Certified Restorer Restoration Industry Association 
American Indoor Air Quality Council quarterly CE 
Disaster Kleenup Western Chapter Annual Conference 
EPA Lead Certificate R-1-18955-10-00124 
Blood borne Pathogens Certificate of Completion 
2000 through present 
2005 through Present 
2000 through 2010 
03-23-2010 
2010,2013 
Annual Advance Xactimate Training 2006, 2007, 2009 
Predix Certified PDP Administrator 2009 
Vale Training Solutions Green Risk Professional 2009 
Association of Specialists in Cleaning and Restoration Annual Conference 2006 
Xactimate 24 Advanced Estimating Course 2006 
Vortex Drying System School Graduate 2004 
Building Science Institute Certified Building Science Thermogragher 2003 
"Mold in Buildings: Prevention. Assessment. and Resolution" 2003 
Idaho Health and Welfare/Environmental Protection Agency, 
Successful Subrogation Liberty Mutual Inc. 2002 
Resti-Con Certificate of Attendance "Managing Mold Liability'' 2001 
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Xactimate Basic Estimating Training Course 2000 
ASCR Fire, Water, Smoke, Damage Restoration 2000 
Several past Certifications such as, 
National Institute of Disaster Restoration, Estimating Technical Seminar 1997 
Odor Technician, Fire Technician, Advanced Water Technician, 
Institute of Inspection Cleaning And Restoration (IICRC) 1996 
Past and Current Affiliations 
Association of Specialists in Cleaning and Restoration 
National Institute of Disaster Restoration 
Institute of Inspection Cleaning and Restoration Certificate 
Indoor Air Quality Association 
Better Business Bureau 
Disaster Kleenup International 
American Indoor Air Quality Council 
American Red Cross 
Classes and Presentations by Pat Coppi 
State of Idaho Department of Insurance, approved instructor, 
"Mold Considerations for Business Professionals" 
State of Idaho Department of Insurance, approved instructor, 
"Infrared Inspection for Water Damage and Construction Defect" 
State of Idaho Department of Insurance, approved instructor, 
"Mold Remediation EPA Guidelines" 
State of Idaho Department of Insurance, approved instructor, 
"Accelerated Drying Systems" 
State of Idaho Department of Insurance, approved instructor, 
"Disaster Contingency/Deodorization Sewage Back up" 
State of Idaho Department of Insurance, approved instructor, 
"After the Fire-Large Loss" 
State of Idaho Department of Insurance, approved instructor, 
"Today's Restoration Capabilities. Mold"* 
State of Idaho Department of Insurance, approved instructor, 
"Restorative Cleaning Strategy"* 
State of Idaho Department of Insurance, approved instructor, 
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"Large Loss Structure Drying New Orleans" 
*Instruction is also approved by the Department of Insurance in 
Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming, Nevada, Montana 
Other Presentations 
Guest speaker on Mold Remediation, Oregon Association of Realtors, Building Owners and 
Managers Association (BOMA), Apartment Managers Association, Boise Independent Insurance 
Association (BIIA), Idaho Apartment Owner's Association, and the Idaho Real Estate Managers 
Association (IREM). 
CE for, Fannie Mae, HUD, Rural Development, Public Housing Authority, The Idaho Housing and 
Finance Company. 
Guest Speaker "Large Loss New Orleans. Katrina/ 911 New York", Building Owners and 
Managers Association (BOMA), Apartment Managers Association, Boise Independent Insurance 
Association (BIIA} 
Guest speaker IAQC Content and Personal Belonging Decontamination 2012 
Committees /Advisory Panels 
Mold Sub Committee, South Western Idaho Building Contractors Association 2004 
American Indoor Air Quality Council' Advisory Panel 2004 
American Red Cross, Service Delivery Committee Chair, Board of Directors 2005 
Ethics committee Western Chapter Disaster Kleenup International 2009 
Listing of Expert Witness Cases - 4 year look back. 
Don D. Rutherford and Sons: vs. Landis Case No. llcv3359 eighteenth Judicial District, 
Sedgwick County, Kansas, District Court, Civil Division 2012 
Lee vs. Ramsey Construction. Case No. CV 2010-0013618-C 
Canyon County, Idaho 
2013 
Rose Gress vs. Christine and Lance Griswold Case No. CV2012-02518-H 2013 
Third Judicial District Idaho 
Lena Kettle vs. David Weitz. TVM Development LLC. Nampa Idaho 2015 






STATEMENT OF RETAINER TERMS & CONDITIONS 
1. Fee Structure 
All time, including travel hours, spent on the project will be billed. (Travel time is billed, portal to portal.) The 




$1,100 1 to 4 hours 
$2,200 4 to 8 hours 




Depositions, court testimony, appraisals, arbitration's & 
mediations when in the process of being argued or heard. 
Minimum charge- 4 hours -- see flat fee below. 
Consulting, Expert witness, appraisals and estimates outside of 
court or hearings. 
Flat fee for deposition, court appearance, mediations & appraisal 
hearings based upon number of hours rounded to minimum. 
Clock starts upon arrival at site for deposition, court testimony, 
appraisals, arbitration, mediations, etc. Preparation time billed 
hourly and added to minimum charge at $175 per hour. 
Clerical Assistant 
Research Assistant 
Hourly rates will be adjusted semi-annually to reflect changes in the cost-of-living. If overtime for 
nonprofessional personnel is required, the premium differential figured at time and one-half of their regular 
hourly rate is charged at direct cost to the project. Unless otherwise stated, any cost estimate presented in a 
proposal is for budgetary purposes only, and is not a fixed price. 
2. Reimbursable Expenses 
a) Travel expenses necessary for the execution of the project, including rail, taxi, bus, air, rental 
vehicles, and vehicle fuel charges will be billed at direct cost. Highway mileage in company or 
personal vehicles will be charged at$ . 75 cents per mile. 
The following expenses will be billed at direct cost: 
a) Accommodations, all meals at cost. 
b) Telephone/fax charges. 
c) Postage and shipping/courier services. 
d) In-house printing and reproduction. 
e) Other project expenses: photocopying, laser printing, photos, and so forth. 
3. Invoice & Expense Billing 
a) Issued monthly 
b) Due upon receipt 
c) Interest rate of 1.8% per month applies on unpaid balance over 30 days 
d) Retainer At option of company applied to final payment 
00000482
~OU~fff i~'l¥M~~ 
Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
AUG 11 2016 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLpSSINo __ ......Jlnat.No~--
1423 Tyrell Lane Flied., A.M2 '.ffi 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF 
TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF SCOTT DAVISON 
August 18, 2016@ 9:30 a.m. 
TO: SCOTT DAVISON AND VERNON K. SMITH: 
·P.M. 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the Defendants will take the testimony on oral 
examination of SCOTT DAVISON, pursuant to Rules 26 and 30(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure before M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., a Notary Public, or in case of their inability to 
act or be present, before some other officer authorized to administer oaths, on the 18th day of 
FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSffiON DUCES TECUM OF SCOTT DAVISON - 1 
[J ORIG I ff" L 
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August, 2016, at the hour of 9:30 a.m. of said day at the offices of Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & 
Sorensen, LLP, Boise, Idaho. 
Oral examination will continue from time to time until completed. You are respectfully 
requested to have said SCOTT DA VIS ON present for the purpose of taking such deposition at the 
time and place indicated, and bring with him the following: 
1. The deponent is required to bring to the deposition all records in his possession or 
under his control that are relevant to the claims asserted in this case against Defendant. 
The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to 
attend and cross-examine. 
DATED This '1 day of August, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:~&~~L~~..._____.,.___" -
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the !I_ day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
M&M Court Reporting 
421 W. Franklin Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
[X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Email 
Robert D. Lewis 
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Scott Davison et al. 
vs. 




AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
Case Number: CV 15-178C 
Cantril! Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
Boise, ID 83706 
STATE OF IDAHO 




Received by Tri-County Process Serving LLC on August 8, 2016 to be served on BC & G 
CONSTRUCTION NKA CHASE CUSTOM HOMES LLC. 
I, Antonio Roque, who being duly sworn, depose and say that on Monday, August 8, 2016, at 8:22 PM, I: 
SERVED the within named BC & G Construction nka Chase Custom Homes LLC by delivering a true 
copy of the Subpoena and Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum to Tina Gould, Manager, a person 
authorized to accept service on behalf of BC & G Construction nka Chase Custom Homes LLC. Said 
service was effected at 1607 S. Pomander Road, Boise, ID 83705. 
I hereby acknowledge that I am a Process Server in the county in which service was effected. I am over 
the age of Eighteen years and not a party to the action. 
Our Reference Number: 154658 
Client Reference: Robert D. Lewis 
.,,,, ...... ,.,, 
,,, \J lN" ,,, ," i I\ ## 
,,.>t~ c__~ •••••••• ,.,, .. -:J •• •• ~ 
.:~\'"'·· .. -
~ -<: Ji,.R y • \ :: •o~ \. 
.. • ..!::::,,.' • -
; : .._- •' r. : : 
Subscribed and sworn before me today 
Tuesday,August9, 2016 
• •,, ... ""'•o· • • .,. I : 
; \ p\l\>,\, .,...:t--1-----------------
~ •.. .••n"f;',: . 
,_., J' •••••••••G '\,.V .,l' 
,,, l',4 TE o~ , ...... 
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING Lea.,,.,.. ....... ~ 
P.O. Box 1224 
Boise, ID, 83701 
(208) 344-4132 
Public for the 
Residing at Meridian 
My Commission Ex 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB#2713 
-
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DA VI SON, ) 





DEBEST PLUMBING, INC. an Idaho ) 
corporation, ) 
SUBPOENA AND DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF 30(b)(6) 
REPRESENTATIVE FOR BC&G 
CONSTRUCTION LLC, now kno,vn as 
CHASE CUSTOM HOMES LLC 
) 
Defendant. ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: 
) 
GILBERT "BO" GOULD 
REGISTERED AGENT 
BC&G CONSTRUCTION LLC 
CHASE CUSTOM HOMES LLC 
1607 POMANDER ST 
BOISE, ID 83705 
SUBPOENA AND DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF 30(b)(6) REPRESENTATIVE FOR n 




YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the Defendants will take the testimony on 
oral examination of the CORPORATE DESIGNEE OF BC&G CONSTRUCTION LLC, 
now known as CHASE CUSTOM HOMES LLC PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6), 
pursuant to Rules 26 and 30(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure before M&M Court 
Reporting Service, Inc., a Notary Public, or in case of their inability to act or be present, before 
some other officer authorized to administer oaths, on the 7th day of September, 2016, at the hour 
of 10:00 a.m. of said day at the offices of Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, 
1423 Tyrell Lane, Boise, Idaho 83706. 
AREAS OF INQUIRY 
BC&G CONSTRUCTION LLC, now known as CHASE CUSTOM HOMES LLC, shall 
designate one or more officers, partners, managers, agents or other persons to testify as witnesses on 
the following areas of inquiry: 
1. All work and contracts between BC&G CONSTRUCTION LLC, now known as 
CHASE CUSTOM HOMES LLC and any person related to work performed at 2109 Water Lily 
Pilgrim Cove, McCall, Valley County, Idaho (hereafter "Project") from September 2013 to 
September 2014. 
2. All work and contracts with Gould Custom Home Builders for work performed at 
2109 Water Lily Pilgrim Cove, McCall, Valley County, Idaho, from September 2013 to September 
2014. 
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3. BC&G Construction LLC and/or Chase Custom Homes LLC invoices for, repair, 
remodel, renovation and all other work performed at 2109 Water Lily Pilgrim Cove, McCall, Valley 
County, Idaho from September 2013 to September 2014. 
DOCUMENTS REQUESTED 
The term "Document" shall mean, without limitation, the following items, whether 
printed or recorded or reproduced by any mechanical process, including data stored on computers, 
tapes, disks, punch cards, or printouts, or written or produced by hand: papers, books, lists, 
memoranda, summaries or records of telephone conversations, summaries or records of personal 
conversations or interviews, daily logs, log books, diaries, objects, agreements, contracts, statements, 
cancelled checks, books, reports, studies, analyses, spreadsheets, tangible things, correspondence, 
telegrams, cables, telex messages, charts, graphs, maps, reports, notebooks, summaries or reports of 
consultants, photographs, videotapes, photographic negatives, photographic slides, movies, 
microfilm, microfiche, brochures, pamphlets, advertisements, circulars, fliers, press releases, drafts, 
letters, and any marginal comments appearing on any document, and all other writings. 
"ESI" (i.e, "Electronically Stored Information") shall mean all Documents, existing in 
any electronic format (e.g., Word, Excel, Outlook, .pdf, HTML, .tif, .jpeg, .wav, .pst), including 
without limitation emails ( current and archived), text messages, instant messages, social media posts, 
voicemails, documents, spreadsheets, and calendars. 
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1. All contracts with Gould Custom Home Builders for work performed at 2109 Water 
Lily Pilgrim Cove, McCall, Valley County, Idaho (hereafter "Project") from September 2013 to 
September 2014. 
2. BC&G Construction LLC and/or Chase Custom Homes LLC invoices for, repair, 
remodel, renovation and all other work performed at 2109 Water Lily Pilgrim Cove, McCall, Valley 
County, Idaho from September 2013 to September 2014. 
3. Time cards for all labor on the Project, whether employees or contract/subcontractors 
from September 2013 to September 2014; 
4. All invoices to Gould Custom Home Builders on the Project from September 2013 to 
September 2014; 
5. All bids, purchase orders and invoices for materials on the Project. 
6. Time cards for all labor on the Project, whether employees or contract/subcontractors 
from September 2013 to September 2014; 
7. All invoices to Gould Custom Home Builders on the Project from September 2013 to 
September 2014; 
8. All bids, purchase orders and invoices for materials on the Project; 
9. Pay stub records of wages paid on the Project, showing workman's comp deductions, 
and required insurances and taxes withheld for each employee that worked on the Project in 2013 
and 2014; 
10. A copy of the declaration pages from any liability insurance policies for 2013-2014; 
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11. Certificate of insurance showing proof of worker's compensation insurance coverage 
for 2013-2014; 
12. Any invoices and record keeping accounting for the per diem charged to Gould 
Custom Builders, Inc. for work performed on the Project in 2013-2014. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified 
above, or to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100. 00 and all 
damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this subpoena. 
DATED This 8th day of August, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By: &SO~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
[X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
" 
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'•./ERHOtl K SMITH ,A. 
208Q4S'7212 · 0 8/1.,.,.16 14!40 
PAGE 02/05 
#219 P.002/003 
Robert D, Lewis, ISB #2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB #7754 
DOUGLAS~~,CLERK By _____ ....... ___ ,Deputy 
AUG 15 2016 
Case No ____ lnst. No. __ _ 
Flied {() ; ( :3 A,M, ____ P.M. 
CANTRlLL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. B.ox 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345~ 7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COtJRT.OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, rN AND POR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 














. Case No. CV 15-l 78C 
STIPULATION TO VACATE AND 
RESET HEARING 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Scott Davison and Anne Davison, by and through their attorney of 
record, Vernon K Smith and Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc_, by and through its attorney of 
record, Robert D. Lewis, and hereby agree that Plaintifl's Motion to Confirm Implementation of the 
P-rnvisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act Apply to Pending Lawsuit currently 
scheduled for hearing on August 15. 2016 at 1 :30 p.m. may be vacated and rescheduled for Monday, 
Septem.ber 19, 2016 at 1:00 p.m. 
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08/15/2EH5 08: 4'3 20834511 • \1'EF:HIJH I< '3MITH A 
.2063457.212 08/12-16 14'.4() 
_.,,.,,-· 
DATfil> this j,l¾,y of Auguot, 2016.( 
Vernon. K Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DATED This [ 2-day of August, 2016. 




Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESET HEARING~ 2 
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F'AGE 04/05 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 15th day of August, 2016 I served a true and correct 
copy ofthe above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Robert D. Lewis 
PO Box 359 
. Boise,JD 83701 
Valley County Clerk 
PO Boxl350 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Judge Scott's Clerk 
Facsimile 208-3 
// 
emon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
) 
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.OUGLAS ~ MILLER, CLERK 
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
fax; (208) 345-1129 
Sy A IM."f' Deputy 
AUG 1 5 2016 
Case No, ____ lnet. No __ _ 
Fled u,1 /7:§p~. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
·· Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 













ORDER TO VACATE AND 
RESCHEDULE HEARING DATE 
Upon reading the Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing Date on Pending 
Motion, and for good cause appearing therefore, 
. IT.· IS HEREBY ORDERED,, AND ·n-ns DOES ORDER, That the Hearing 
previously scheduled in this matter for August 15, 2016, at 1:30 p.m., is vacated and 





VERNON K. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
• 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
I.S.B. # 1365 
Attorney for the Plaintiffa 
Scott and Anne Davison 
• DOUGLAS 1:i_~R, CLERK 
8y, ~ 04JPUfy 
AUG 1 9 2016 
C..ND.__ ___ ,_ __ _ 
flld ____ • ______ ,. 
INTHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











CASE NO. CV-2015-178C 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. (hereafter DeBest) filed their Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, raising the single issue regarding serve of "written Notice" of the defect, claiming 
DeBest must also be served written notice as was served upon the General Contractor on July 26, 
2013. They contend that being the sub-contracting "Construction Professional" involved in this 
renovation-remodel project, they should have notice pursuant to the Notice and Opportunity to 
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Repair Act ("NORA"), LC. § 6-2501 et seq., and absent such notification in writing to them, the 
suit now pending against DeBest should be dismissed. 
II. 
BACKGROUND FACTS REGARDING WRITTEN NOTICE SERVED UPON 
THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR 
The.General Contractor, Gould Custom Builders Inc. (hereafter GCBI), was notified of the 
defect in writing on July 26, 2013. The written notice was served upon its managing agent, Gilbert 
Gould, by e.,mail, and GCBI immediately contacted their sub-contractor, DeBest, who had 
provided those professional services through their licensed plumber, Tom Peterson, pursuant to 
their sub-contract with GCBI. 
Mr. Gould reached Tom Peterson that same morning, and notified him of the defective 
installations, and they immediately went to the Davison residence. While there, Mr. Peterson, Scott 
Davison, and Mr. Gould located and stopped the leak behind the upstairs bathroom wall, and Mr. 
Gould and Mr. Peterson began removal of damaged sheetrock, water soaked insulation, and 
damaged materials in the bedroom below, then commenced cleanup work and did initial repairs to 
the bedroom ceiling and walls to accommodate the Davisons so they could remain in the residence 
until they left for California that Fall. 
In those conversations between Davison, Gould, and Peterson that morning, they then 
contacted Lorrie Brede, the residential installation supervisor for DeBest, who was informed of 
the situation and accepted the liability and responsibility for the cost of needed restoration and 
repairs, and specifically wanted GCBI to do that repair work, as GCBI was infinitely familiar with 
the remodel that had. recently been completed, and was best suited to undertake the repairs needed, 
and DeBest authorized all repair work was to be done by GCBI, and the billing invoices were 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
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then to be sent to DeBest for payment. That was their agreement. 
Mr. Peterson used his cell phone to call to Lorrie Brede since she was the supervisor for 
DeBest's residential plumbing installations, and the primary contact to address this residential 
plumbing issue. Tom Peterson may have spoken to Darcy Neidigh later that day, or thereafter to 
discuss the situation, but the initial contact from Tom Peterson was Lorrie Brede, his direct 
supervisor, the morning of July 26, 2013. Mr. Gould also spoke to Ms. Brede on the phone, to 
receive direct authorization to make the repairs under their admitted liability and responsibility 
over the damage,· and obtained his instructions where to send the billing invoices. 
While Mr. Gould spoke to Ms. Brede, he explained the situation by which the repairs would 
be made, and there was never any indication repairs would be undertaken immediately, as the 
Davisons were agreeing to remain in the residence and eliminate the cost of alternate housing as 
they would be unable to remain there if repairs were to be commenced immediately. The purpose 
of the contact was to report the situation, secure DeBest's awareness of their liability and 
responsibility, and reveal the fact some initial clean up and repairs would be done within a few 
days to get the downstairs bedroom fixed enough so Davisons could continue to use that bedroom 
until they left that Fall, at which time full restoration would be performed, as the water had soaked 
much of the materials over the 3 8-40 days it was flowing in the residence, and much material had 
to be torn out and replaced. During his conversation Mr. Gould specifically told Ms. Brede the 
major repairs would be made after the Davisons left in the Fall, to avoid incurring alternate housing 
costs, and there was clear understanding as to that process. 
When the major restoration was commenced that Fall, DeBest's insurance company soon 
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became aware of the repairs, as the billing invoices received by DeBest were then submitted to the 
liability carrier; as the accruing costs were such that De Best preferred to present the claim to their 
liability insurance carrier for payment, who instead hired Intermountain Claims ofldaho, at which 
time Mr. Gould asked the carrier-adjusters to inspect the restoration progress, but they failed to 
inspectthe damage or the repairs until the following February, when most of the repair work was 
then completed. 
III. 
THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION 
The question is now presented to the Court, by the effect of Defendant's Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment: Upon whom is "service" of a "written notice" to be made under the Notice 
and Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA"), LC. § 6-2501 et seq .. 
The "initial" written notice was sent to GCBI, the "Construction Professional" with 
whom the Davisons had contracted, as the Act requires, as Notice was served upon GCBI bye-
mail, and immediately acted upon by GCBI, the General Contractor, when receiving the July 
26, 2013 written notice of the defect. There was further "written notification" to DeBest agents, 
through e-mails exchanged with the DeBest agents and representatives, being the carrier and 
the adjusting agents when they became involved, and there was further "written notice" relating 
to the costs of the repairs directly mailed to DeBest from GCBI, being the billing invoices as 
work was being performed pursuant to the authorization that GCBI had received from DeBest 
on July 26, 2013. QCBI was told that upon presentation of the billing invoices, DeBest would 
reimburse GCBI for all costs incurred. 
This controversy surrounding N.O.R.A. has the potential of raising a number of issues 
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this Court may (or may not) address in light of Defendant's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. These points of interest could include the following: 
1. Does N.O.R.A. apply to this specific controversy, and is litigation through N.O.R.A. 
the sole remedy available to damaged homeowners? 
2. If N.O.R.A. applies, then once the provisions of N.O.R.A. are satisfied, are 
homeowners free to sue the responsible party outside the remedies of N.O.R.A., and 
initiate suitunder common law rights, such as an action for negligence, rather than to 
pursue statutory remedies under N.O.R.A.? 
3. If NORAapplies (being a substantial remodel), is written notice served upon GCBI, 
the General Contractor, sufficient compliance under the provisions ofN.O.R.A.? 
4. When written notice is served upon a General Contractor, being the construction 
professional with whom the homeowners contracted, does that service constitute 
compliance with N.O.R.A. for purposes of service of written notice? 
5. Does DeBest come within the language ofN.O.R.A. referencing whom written notice 
is to be served, given the language that requires written notice be served upon the 
construction professional with whom the homeowner contracted? 
6. Does N.O.R.A. require sub-contractors by served written notice of a defect, in addition 
to the General Contractor, recognizing DeBest never contracted with the homeowners, 
and had no "privity of contract" with Davisons, for which reason this Court has held 
DeBest cannot be sued in "contract", under common law or under this statute? 
7. Irrespective ofN.O.R.A., do homeowners have a common law negligence claim against 
plumbers.for their liability under the general principles of common law negligence for 
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performing professional services under a duty and standard of professional care, for 
which damages were sustained from their negligent installations? 
8. Can the failure to serve written Notice upon a sub-contractor (ifrequired to be served) 
be waived by the actions and conduct of the sub-contracting construction professional, 
when· the purpose of notice is met by the participation of all parties/persons/entities 
involved, to the same effect that written Notice had been served upon all construction 
professionals on the project? 
DeBest has filed the additional affidavits of Mr. Neill, Ms. Neidigh, and Mr. Peterson. 
Certain aspects of which are in conflict with the recollection of the facts as they are specifically 
recalled by Mr. Gould, and the Court is invited to review once again the initial Affidavit of 
Gilbert Gould, which contains a copy of the Notice he received from the Davisons, and to also 
review the supplemental and Second Affidavit of Gilbert Gould, identifying relevant factors of 
material importance relating to the discussions between the individuals on July 26, 2013, which 
occurred immediately following the discovery of the water leakage and resulting damages. This 
Supplemental and Second Affidavit of Gilbert Gould is filed in relation to Defendant's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and in presented to support the position presented in this 
Memorandum submitted by the Davisons. 
The issue presented in Defendant's Motion, identified in their Memorandum, is stated to 
be: "Plaintiffs failed to provide written notice of the claim to DeBest, which bars their [Plaintiffs] 
claim without prejudice." (See. Def's Memo., filed in Support of 2nd M/SJ, p. 1). Their Motion 
states the· issue in this context: "dismissing Plaintiff's remaining claim of negligence against this 
Defendant, without prejudice, on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Notice and 
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Opportunity to Repair Act under Idaho Code §6-2501 et seq., and that said Defendant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter oflaw." (Defs 2nd M/SJ. P. 1). 
The issue, is simply stated to be: upon whom is "written" notice" to be served by the 
homeowners under N.O.R.A.? There exists no dispute written notice was served upon the General 
Contractor, GCBI, onJuly 26, 2013, but DeBest's contention is the sub-contractor is entitled to be 
served "written notification" of the defect as well, before they can be sued, even under a common 
law theory of negligence, let alone under N.O.R.A. 's statutory remedies. 
DeBest contends that absent that written notification being served upon DeBest, this 
lawsuit, despite being grounded as a common law negligence action, must be dismissed, and 
cannot be re-filed until written notice of the defect is served upon DeBest, as written notice just 
served upon the General Contractor, GCBI, is not sufficient compliance underN.O.R.A.. 
As the Court may appreciate, the statute is not a model of clarity, but it is explicit in stating 
whom among the constructional professionals, is to be served the written notification, as it 
expressly states notice is to be served upon the Construction Professional under contract with 
the homeowner. There is no dispute written notification was served by the homeowners 
(Davisons) upon their General Contractor (GCBI), a construction professional, by e-mail in the 
early morning hour of July 26, 2013 (see initial Affidavits of Gilbert Gould and Scott Davison). 
GCBI was the only "construction professional" on this remodel project with whom the 
homeowners had a contract, and GCBI was the only contractor in "privity of contract" with the 
homeowners, had direct contract, and was responsible for communications between the contractor 
and homeowners. 
Reading the specific language in N.O.R.A., it speaks to the subject of "written notice", 
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and says written notice is to go to the "construction professional" with whom the homeowner had 
a "contract", and that makes it limited to GCBI, and adequate compliance with the notification 
provision was accomplished in the way it was processed, and the relevant issue (plumbing defect) 
was immediately communicated to the sub-contractor by the General Contractor, and the sub-
contractor immediately accepted responsibility to correct the defect, and agreed to assume the costs 
of all repairs, and DeBest, specifically authorized GCBI to make all repairs necessary to correct 
the damage, and have all billing invoices sent to DeBest, who would pay the costs upon receipt of 
the invoices. 
The Defendant must realize that if the matter were dismissed, there would be no statute of 
limitations precluding re-filing, as the applicable statute is four years under LC. §5-224 (plus 
another 60 days under 6-2503(1)), since this concept of professional "plumbing" negligence is 
controlled by LC. §5-224, not LC. §5-219, as addressed hereafter. 
The argumentDeBest would then raise, however, is they have been precluded from making 
the repairs, as the homeowners repaired the residence through the service of GCBI, depriving 
DeBest the "opportunity" to correct the damages caused from their defective work. That approach 
ignores the fact that DeBest was the one who specifically authorized GCBI to make the repairs, 
and DeBest promised to pay GCBI for the restoration costs when authorizing GCBI to handle the 
repairs on July 26, 2013. 
Attempting to dismiss one suit,·only giving rise to another, for the same damage, seems to 
present a flawed argument, when DeBest authorized GCBI to make the repairs and for GCBI to 
send the billing invoices to DeBest, and DeBest promised to pay all costs incurred. GCBI did as 
was told, made the restorations and repairs, sent progress billings, and complied with the 
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instruction and authorization from DeBest, and provided notification as progress with the repairs 
proceeded that Fall. 
DeBest has been provided various forms of actual written notice, and this entire protracted 
situation seems to lend credence to the idea that if any notice were required to be served upon 
DeBest, the notices they got were sufficient, or were otherwise waived, or quasi-estoppel applies, 
as everyone knew the situation, and acted in accordance with what DeBest personnel has directly 
seen, had then said, and had then agreed to and then promised to do throughout this ordeal. 
In pursuit of whom the written Notification is to be served under the provisions of 
N.O.R.A., we initially see the Act fails to include definition of the term "notice" or the meaning 
of the phrase "written notice of the claim" in any definition in LC. §6-2502. We know, however, 
"written notice" must be served upon a "construction professional", and that written notice must 
describe the claim in "reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature of the defect", 
as referenced within J.C. §6-2503(1). That relevant portion of the Act begins: 
6~2503. NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR. (1) Prior to 
commencing an action against a construction professional for a 
construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of 
claim on ·the·construction professional. The notice of claim shall 
state that the claimant asserts a construction defect claim against 
the construction professional and shall describe the claim in 
reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature of the 
defect. 
The question then becomes: Who is the "Claimant", and upon what "construction 
professional" that is the written notice to be served? 
The N.O.R.A. Act defines the "Claimant," m subsection (3) of LC. §6-2502(5), to 
specifically include "homeowner", who is (5) (a) Any person who contracts with a construction 
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professional ..... 
The "Written Notice" attached to the Initial Affidavit of Mr. Gould is what was served by 
e-mail by the Claimants (homeowners) upon their General Contractor (GCBI), who is the 
"construction professional" with whom they contracted, and the only one with whom they held a 
contractual relationship in this remodel project. 
When the. General Contractor received the computer-dated e-mail entry around 7 :00 a.m. 
the morning of July 26, 2013, the General Contractor immediately contacted Tom Peterson, the 
responsible professional who performed the defective plumbing installations, an employee of 
DeBest, the sub-contracting construction professional under GCBI, and they met that morning at 
the Davison residence to inspect and identify the nature of the defect, determine the cause of 
leakage, cure the defective installations, and make arrangements to restore the damaged interior of 
the residence caused from the water, and arrange for payment of the costs of restoration. 
Mr. Gould and Tom Peterson called and spoke to Lorrie Brede, after their inspection with 
the homeowner, and determined the cause and nature of the defect, agreed upon liability, agreed 
who would make the repairs, and agreed who would pay for the cost of the repairs. 
The parties determined the cost was upon DeBest, and the issue of repairs and costs .ti:!!! 
deferred directly to and accepted by the subcontractor. DeBest, as Tom Peterson and Lorrie Brede 
(DeBest's residential plumbing supervisor), agreed DeBest was responsible, accepted liability for 
the damages, and.DeBest would pay the costs to restore the damage to the interior, and Ms. Brede 
and Mr. Peterson spoke with Mr. Gould, authorizing GCBI to do the repairs, and GCBI was 
instructed to send all billing invoices to DeBest, and they would be paid upon receipt. 
Pursuant to N.O.R.A., the "construction professional" with whom the homeowners 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 10 
00000506
contracted was properly notified, and the purpose of notification to the construction professional 
was achieved. The specific nature of the defect was determined, and as importantly, the issue to 
be resolved was responsibility for the defect, which was resolved, and the liability for the damages 
was accepted by DeBest, and by virtue of that resolution, a contractual commitment was made by 
DeBest to pay the cost of all repairs that would be made by GCBI. 
There was no surprise major repairs would begin later on that Fall, as Mr. Gould had 
specific conversation with Lorrie Brede that the major scope of the needed repairs would not be 
commenced until after the Davisons left the vacation residence that Fall, as much of the interior of 
the residence had to be stripped out, removed and replaced with new installations. If they started 
immediately, the Davisons would require alternate housing, at a tremendous expense. 
The Court will recall the essential commitment to pay the costs of repairs from the contents 
of the proposed Third Party Complaint, where the obligation is referenced in Paragraph 13: 
13. After about three hours, Gould no longer needed assistance from the De Best 
employee and dismissed him. Before they parted, Gould agreed with the DeBest employee that 
Gould would complete the water damage remediation, and agreed with DeBest that he would 
complete the water damage repairs. Gould agreed to send a bill for its work to DeBest. 
Consequently, the responsible party accepted liability for the damages and agreed to pay 
the costs of repairs; authorized GCBI to do the repairs and send billing invoices to DeBest. As 
work got underway, invoices were sent to DeBest, who never raised any issue as to the timing or 
the accruing costs in the repairs. Once invoices were received, DeBest turned the matter over to 
their liability insurance carrier, rather than absorb the accruing costs as an "in house" expense. 
Ultimately, DeBests' insurer, in the course of that process, hired Intennountain Claims ofldaho to 
negotiate, and potent1ally seek to settle the matter with the Davisons. 
However, Intermountain declined to propose any settlement (see Initial Scott Davison 
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Affidavit), and Davisons engaged in on-going discussions with the adjuster, though they declined 
to make any reasonable offer of settlement, and Davisons would not accept a damage estimate 
grossly below the actual cost of the repairs. 
The written notification to the General Contractor resulted in the agreed upon deferral of 
responsibility to DeBest, who accepted liability and the responsibility for payment of the costs of 
repairs, and agreed GCBI would make the repairs, and authorized billing invoices be sent to 
DeBest who would pay them upon receipt. 
That set of facts, coupled with the statutorily-required inspections, negotiations, and 
attempts at settlement, as contemplated by NORA, suggests the intended purpose ofN.O.RA. was 
achieved in this setting. Notwithstanding those above facts, the following inquiry is within the 
topic of the issue presented by this Second Motion for Summary Judgment: 
1. If "NORA" applies to this remodel project, are homeowners obligated to 
. serve notice of the defect only upon the General Contractor, the 
"construction professional" with whom they are in "contract", or is a sub-
contractor, who accepts liability in communications with the General 
Contractor, entitled to be served written notification? 
2. When a sub-contractor receives notification of the defect, participates in the 
inspection, reviews and cures the defect, accepts liability for the defect, 
accepts responsibility for the damages, commits to pay the costs of repairs, 
authorizes repairs to be made, and directs billing invoices be sent to DeBest 
· for payment, and thereafter engages in settlement proceedings, does that 
conduct constitute waiver or impose quasi estoppel upon DeBest from 
asserting a lack of service of written notice of the defect, knowing it was 
served upon the General Contractor, from which the above occurred? 
3: Whether the billing invoices served upon DeBest in the Fall of 2013, then 
submitted the to DeBest' s insurance carrier for payment, constitute a 
"written notice of the defect", and confirm the waiver and application of 
quasi-estoppel in this matter? 
IV. 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The Courtis·infinitely familiar with the standards to be applied in summary proceedings. 
A moving party initially carries the burden to establish there exists no genuine issue of material 
fact. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). The question 
presented in this Second Motion for Summary Judgment appears, however, to raise a question of 
law, as opposc:;d to disputed issues of fact. 
The single issue is whether DeBest is entitled to be served any written notice of the defect, 
or conversely, is written notice served upon the General Contractor, the construction professional 
with whom the homeowners had contracted, sufficient Notice to comply with N.O.R.A. .. 
As to summary proceedings, proceedings, the court is required to liberally construe 
disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions in favor of the non-moving party. Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho, 373 375, 3 P.3d, 51, 
53 (2000). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. McPheters v. Maile, 138 
Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003). To overcome a motion for summary judgment a party 
need only raise a genuine issue of material fact. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Johnson, 93 
Idaho 850, 853, 476 P.2d 786, 789 (1970). A material issue of fact is one that is relevant to an 
element of the .claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the case. Rife v. 
Long, 127 Idaho 841,849, 908 P.2d 143, 151 (1995). 
Factual disputes may not be resolved on summary judgment. Posey v. Ford Motor Credit 
Co., 141 Idaho 4 77, 481, 111 P .3d 162, 166 (Ct.App.2005). A genuine issue of material fact is 
one on whi.ch the outcome of the case may be different. O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 
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9, 13, 72 P.3d 849, 853 (2003). Summary judgment can only be granted when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact. J.R. Simplot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 613, 167 P.3d 748, 750 
(2006). Issues of credibility are not resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Capstar Radio 
Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411,419,283 P.3d 728, 736 (2012). 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Notice And Opportunity To Repair Act {NORA) Requires Written Notice Be 
Served Upon The Construction Professional With Whom The Homeowners Contract 
From a procedural standpoint, DeBest's Motion may better be viewed in the nature of a 
Rule 12(b) motion, arguing an affirmative defense over the issue as to whom the Notice of the 
defect is to be served upon, as this issue is more in the nature of a question of law, rather than a 
disputed question of fact, and Rule 56 motions typically address genuine issues of material facts. 
The issue is not whether written notice was served, but rather whether that written notice 
was served upon the correct construction professional. The Act requires serving the written notice 
upon the "construction professional" with whom the homeowner had contracted. Since GCBI is 
the construction professional with whom the homeowner had contracted, it appears logical the 
Notice required under N.O.R.A.is to be served upon GCBI, as the statute so states. 
As a condition precedent to commencing any civil action under N.O.R.A., the "claimant," 
as defined in I.C. §6-2502(3) of the Act, must provide "written notice" to the "construction 
professional," defined in I.C. § 6-2502(4), ... "Claimant," is defined in subsection (3) of I.C. §6-
2502(5) of the Act, and includes "homeowner," who is specifically defined to be: 
(5)(a) · Any person who contracts with a construction professional for the 
construction, sale, or construction and sale of a residence ... 
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The defective work performed by DeBest was a sub-contractor, brought onto the project 
by the General Contractor to perform professional plumbing installations, and admittedly, had no 
direct contract with the homeowner, as this Court has held. When the defect was discovered by 
Mr. Davison, and the General Contractor was notified in writing, efforts were begun to resolve the 
problems and establish responsibility for the defective installations. DeBest was not in "privity of 
contract" with the Davisons, and DeBest successfully used its lack of privity of"contract" to derail 
the cause of action brought by Davisons against DeBest for contract breach. That debate focused 
upon the concept of "privity", and whether "privity" had been modified by the provisions of 
N.O.R.A. This Court said it was not modified, and privity was still required to bring suit within 
N.O.R.A. under a claim sounding in contract, but no such requirement was necessary to a common 
law claim for riegligence, when negligent conduct results in damages to the property. 
DeBest wants to charge forward, creating yet another defense over the issue of notice, 
(interestingly also tied to the concept relating to the word "contract", as stated in the Act), arguing 
they had a right to written notice of the defect on July 26, 2013, despite the fact they before argued 
they had no contract, and were never in "privity" with the homeowners. That sounds a little bit 
like what 'judicial estoppel" may be all about. 
The Act specifically says "service" of the "written notice" is made upon the construction 
professional with whom the claimant contracts. That is the construction professional upon whom 
service of the notice was made in this matter. Despite DeBest leading the charge that held for the 
propositii:m DeBesfwas never in contract with the Davisons, and that lack of "privity" required 
dismissal of the contract claims against DeBest, it now appears DeBest wants to "overlook" the 
language used in the Act, and present the argument they are entitled to written notice because they 
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were the responsible party for the defect, irrespective of the fact there was no "privity of contract". 
Though it may be a legitimate question to ask who gets the written notice, to play both sides of the 
"contract" coin might be a little on the edge, and possibly disingenuous. 
The interpretation of statutory language requires use of the ordinary meaning of the words 
within it. Accordingly, the Court determines the Legislature's intent from the statutory language 
and ordinary meaning of the terms. See Ag Servs. of Am., Inc., v. Kechter, 137 Idaho 62, 64, 44 . 
P.3d 1117, 1119 (2002). 
The N.O.R.A. statute says a "Claimant" is a "homeowner" and the claimant-homeowner 
serves notice upon the construction professional with whom they contract, and it is that 
construction professional upon whom the service of the written notice was made. So, limited to 
that definition, Davisons contracted with GCBI, the General Contractor, and there has been no 
"privity of contract" with DeBest, so the argument made by DeBest is illogical, for purposes of 
who is to receive service of "written notice" under N.O.R.A .. , 
So, with that statutory interpretation, the construction professional upon whom written 
notice was requiredto be served was properly and sufficiently done. 
The record is replete Davisons served their E-mailed written notice upon GCBI, who in 
turn notified Tom Peterson and DeBest Plumbing personnel located in Boise, Lorrie Brede, to 
determine the defect and resolve the issue of restoring the damages. Mr. Gould and Tom Peterson 
began immediate repairs on July 26, 2013, including correction of the cause of the leak defect, 
removal of damaged sheetrock, water soaked insulation, and damaged materials in the bedroom 
below the upstairs bathroom, and both Tom Peterson and Lorrie Brede authorized GCBI to make 
repairs, and send billing invoices to De Best, who would satisfy all costs of the repairs upon receipt. 
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DeBest has acknowledged, from the moment the discovered defect was found, and 
throughout the discussions thereafter, that DeBest performed the installations that caused the 
damages, and for that reason the Davisons, Gil Gould, Tom Peterson, and Lorrie Brede entered 
into a resolution as to responsibility and the cost of repairs, whereupon DeBest specifically 
authorized and instructed GCBI to perform the restoration, as GCBI was familiar with the remodel, 
was trusted by the DeBest owners, had a relationship with DeBest that transcended a period of 
thirty years,·and DeBest instructed Mr. Gould to send billing invoices to them and they would be 
paid. Once invoices were received by DeBest, seeing the extent of the repair work needed to be 
performed, DeBest turned the matter over to their liability carrier for payment, and the carrier 
assigned the matter to a claim's adjuster, Intermountain Claims ofldaho, who undertook settlement 
efforts, hoping to settle the damage claim for less than a fifth of the actual cost of the repairs. 
Consequently,several forms of written notice(s) were submitted along the way, initially by 
Davisons to GCBI onJuly 26, 2013, then through a series of emails with the adjusters and liability 
insurance carrier acting for DeBest, and then through the involvement of Mr. Gould with the billing 
invoices sent that Fall to DeBest, in relation to the damages and repairs being made. The content 
of the initial notice to GCBI appears not to be in dispute. From the nature of the disclosure of the 
defect, it was sufficient. See e.g., Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 437, 196 P.3d 352, 355 
(2008) ("Mendenhall's March 11 letter satisfies the notice requirements of NORA for the 
construction defects he alleges therein. His letter sufficiently identified the nature and location of 
the defects .... ). The specific reference to the Notice issue in Mendenhall, supra, was addressed as 
follows: 
"This case comes down to whether Mendenhall's March 11 letter described 
his claims "in reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature of the 
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defect[ s ]. " In enacting NORA, the Legislature did not define the phrase "reasonable 
detail." Accordingly, we must determine the Legislature's intent from the statutory 
language and ordinary meaning of the terms. See Ag Servs. of Am., Inc., v. Kechter, 
137 Idaho 62, 64, 44 P.3d 1117, 1119 (2002). "Reasonable" means" being or 
remaining within the bounds of reason . .. not extreme ... not excessive ... not 
demanding too much." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY1892 (1966). "Detail" simply means" to relate in particulars." Id. at 
616. These definitions indicate that NORA's notice requirement does not require 
claimants to describe alleged defects with excessive particularity.[!] Instead, the" 
reasonable detail" requirement is satisfied when a claimant provides a builder with 
enough information to identify the general nature and location of the defect. 
Mendenhall's March 11 letter satisfies the notice requirements of NORA for the 
construction defects he alleges therein. His letter sufficiently identified the nature 
and location of the defects. The letter stated, among other things, "water problem 
with north roof of great room, east spouting leaks in four places.'' [2] This surely 
provided enough detail and pertinent information to permit the Aldouses to inspect 
the home and determine "the general nature of the defect[s]." 
In our case, DeBest, and its adjusting agent, declined to make a final settlement offer, as 
only an estimate was submitted, in the amount of $24,005.06 as that estimate was revealed on 
April 30, 2014 accompanied by the "limiting language": "This is an estimate of damage only and 
not an offer of settlement. This estimate is not an authorization for repair, nor is it a guarantee of 
payment." (See original Scott Davison Affidavit). 
As a matter of"public policy," (as defined in Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, L.L.C., 
141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 (2005)), the Idaho Legislature made the determination 
residential construction litigation must first undergo, as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation, settlement efforts under the provisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, LC. 
§6-2501 et seq. To that end, Mendenhall v. Aldous, supra, observed that underlying purpose and 
included the following language: 
The Act was. passed in 2003. The Idaho Building Contractors Association 
sponsored the bill in an effort .to curb litigation against building contractors by 
homeowners. The purpose of the law is to give contractors the opportunity to fix 
construction defects before a lawsuit is filed. In furtherance of this goal, NORA 
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requires a claimant to "serve written notice of claim on the construction 
professional," prior to filing an action alleging a construction defect. 
146 Idaho at 436, 196 P.3d at 354. 
The Davison met all conditions precedent before resorting to civil action, starting with 
written notice to the construction professional with whom they had contracted, as the Act required, 
and engaged in good faith on-going settlement efforts undertaken with DeBest agents and 
representatives, but in the end they were facing a payment ofless than one-fifth of the repair costs. 
Once this statutorily-mandated notice was served upon the construction professional with 
whom Davisons had contracted, and participated with all parties engaging in attempted settlement, 
then upon the eventual failure of those efforts, Davisons were entitled to file lawsuit for any 
judicial remedy available to them. They could have sued the construction professional with whom 
they had contracted, under theories of contract, or could directly sue the negligent party, under a 
theory of common law negligence, as DeBest had a duty in the performance of their professional 
installations, and were negligent in those installations, admitted their liability, and admitted 
responsibility forthe cost of all repairs, and Davisons could sue, as this Court has so held, upon a 
common law theory of negligence, resulting from the failed performance of their work, breach of 
their duty of professional care in the rendition of their professional plumbing services, which 
resulted in substantial damage to the interior of the residence. It remains undisputed DeBest 
authorized GCBI to do the work and agreed to pay GCBI for the repairs to the residence, and stood 
liable to pay all costs upon receipt of the billing invoices. 
Having failed in its commitment to GCBI, such failure required Davisons to pay the billings · 
to avoid recording of liens against this State leasehold interest held by Davisons, as the laborers, 
materialmen, and assorted obligations created in the repair process were owing, and absent 
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payment, liens would be filed. 
Despite the fact all work was performed as authorized by DeBest, and billings sent to 
DeBest as instructed, DeBest instead submitted a claim to their liability insurance carrier, who had 
their claim's adjuster attempt to "compromise" the obligation, hoping to settle the claim for less 
than one-fifth the actual costs to restore the residence, and once that didn't go over too well, the 
situation left civil litigation the only means to secure reimbursement. 
B. DeBest, Through Its Actions, Waived, And Now Is Estopped From Asserting Lack Of 
Notification, Even If Entitled To Be Served With The Written Notice On July 26, 2013 
As addressed above, notice was served upon the construction professional with whom the 
homeowner-claimant had contracted, and that sufficed all that is statutorily required. As one would 
reasonably envision, and as it was immediately undertaken, the General Contractor immediately 
informed the sub-contractor responsible for the defective work, who together immediately 
participated in the inspection and resolution process. 
By virtue <?f the Notice to the General Contractor, the intended results ofN.O.R.A. were 
fulfilled by the activities and conduct that DeBest undertook with GCBI in the initial inspection 
process, their subsequent resolution of liability and responsibility with their commitment for pay 
of the repair costs, and that was thought to have fully resolved the matter. However, then came the 
involvement of the carrier-adjusters, and their participation in the attempt to address a settlement 
that sought to compromise their responsibility down from what was committed to be done by 
DeBest when they engaged in a resolution following the notice of defect under the Act, to an 
abandonment of their commitment by the carrier-adjusters. 
Not only is there the limiting language as to whom notice is to be served under the Act, 
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but also the conduct of DeBest, in undertaking to engage in direct negotiations with the Davisons, 
and resolution of the damages, and then through the insurance carrier-adjuster, that conduct. should 
constitute a waiver of any need for any further notice of the existing defective condition caused by 
the sub-contractor, as the purpose was fulfilled by the notice served upon the General Contractor. 
DeBest is estopped from asserting lack of written notice to them on July 26, 2013, assuming any · 
initial or further notification in writing was required to be served upon them. 
In Pocatello Hospital, LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 330 P .3d 
1067 (2014) the Idaho Supreme Court provided the following description of what constitutes the 
"waiver" of a known right by a party: 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or 
advantage .... " Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,457,259 P.3d 595, 
603 (2011) (quoting Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820,824, 136 P.3d 291,295 
(2006)). "Waiver is foremost a question of intent" and the party proving waiver 
is required to show a clear intent to waive. Id. ( quoting Seaport Citizens Bank 
v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct. App. 1987)). Waiver 
will not be.inferred from the parties' conduct absent "a clear and unequivocal act 
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel." Id. at 
458,259 P.3d at 604 (quoting Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 
256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993)). Importantly, the party asserting waiver must also 
"show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon [the waiver] and that he thereby 
has altered his position to his detriment." Id. at 457, 259 P.3d at 603 (quoting 
Fullerton, 142 Idaho at 824, 136 P.3d at 295) (silence insufficient to show intent to 
waive); see also Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 
785, 788, 10 P.3d 734, 737 (2000) (concluding waiver was not established when 
seller failed to show detrimental reliance on buyer's waiver of payment term); 
Panorama Residential Protective Assoc. v. Panorama Corp. of Wash., 97 Wn.2d 
23, 640 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Wash. 1982) (concluding that when lease called for 
rent adjustments every two years and landlord failed to adjust rent for many years 
by the terms of the lease, the landlord waived the right to past adjustments but not 
future adjustments). 156 Idaho at 719,330 P.3d at 1077. 
The recently filed affidavits of DeBest personnel suggest DeBest was not aware of or 
familiar with the provisions ofN.O.R.A. lfthat be true, the fact remains they undertook to do what 
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they did in this situation, including an acceptance of the liability and committing to pay for all 
costs of repairs to restore the residence, authorizing GCBI to make any repairs and send the bills 
to DeBest for. payment. Whether they knew of the Act or not, it has been routinely said that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse or defense, especially with regard to legislative enactments that 
are published through the Idaho Code, and made available to the public, in effect for over thirteen 
years. 
As noted above, DeBest was extensively involved in the resolution that DeBest itself 
elected to reach,· and throughout the ensuing months thereafter, including the restoration and 
repairs, the billings and receipt of the invoices, and the attempted compromise with an insurance 
adjuster having a different approach to settlement, resulting with their statement on April 30, 2014, 
declaring: "This is an estimate of damage only and not an offer of settlement. This estimate is 
not an authorization for repair, nor is it a guarantee of payment." Does that not appear to 
contradict the commitment made by DeBest on July 26, 2013? The parties (at least the 
Davisons) attempted in good faith to settle this matter, and relied upon the representation to them 
on July 26, 2013 that it was resolved and settled, but later it is discovered that DeBest gave the 
matter to their liability carrier, who, in bad faith, have thus far welched on the matter. 
When a settlement is reached, and performance fails, and N.O.R.A. has been fulfilled, are 
not the homeowners entitled to bring some action against some of the construction professional(s), 
either under the statute, or under some common law theory, to obtain reimbursement from the 
responsible party, especially the one who accepted responsibility, who authorized restoration and 
who committedto pay for the repairs, who said send invoices and they will be paid in full? 
If that responsible party is allowed to escape their admitted liability, upon a theory they 
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never received a written notice regarding the very defect they admitted responsibility, agreed to 
pay all costs incurred to restore the damages they had caused, and authorized repairs to be 
performed by GCBI, and said send the billing invoices and they will be paid, and then compound 
that with the fact such responsible party was not entitled to direct written notice under the Act 
since they knowingly had no contract with the homeowners, does it not raise concern whether a 
claim for contract breach should be filed by GCBI, or that vicarious liability between the General 
Contractor and sub-contractors would apply, or that punitive damages may be appropriate in 
situations where there is shown to be a deliberate abandonment of an obligation, upon which the 
Davisons rightfully relied when they agreed to stay in the damaged residence, not incur alternate 
housing expense, and told a resolution was reached during their discussions on July 26, 2013, 
whereupon DeBest was getting a tremendous benefit of delayed restoration, avoiding a huge 
liability for alternate housing that would be required if the Davisons relocated elsewhere during 
their seasonal stay in Idaho throughout the remaining summer-fall of 2013. 
What now appears to be DeBest's argument is failing to serve "written notice" of the defect 
upon them on July 26, 2013, despite the language in the Act contradicts any entitlement to written 
notice, they are entitled to a dismissal of this pending action, despite the fact the claim is based 
upon DeBest's negligence, founded upon well-established case law relating to common law 
negligence, brought about over DeBest's negligent installation and defective workmanship, 
resulting in extensive interior damages to their residence. 
The very essence of NORA seeks resolution of the defect and resulting damages (precisely 
what took place on July 26, 2013). If we disregard that event, it becomes a meaningless exercise 
of patience and committed good faith by the homeowners to do as they did, as it becomes all for 
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not, when the sub-contracting construction professional, despite accepting responsibility and 
liability, who agrees to pay the costs of repairing all damages, then delegates that obligation to a 
liability insurance carrier, who hires an adjuster that declines to honor the very resolution reached 
with the homeowners and General Contractor on July 26, 2013. How does this conduct of DeBest 
keep the parties out of the judicial system? 
· Despite the settlement requirements imposed by NORA, declared to be the public policy 
in Idaho, DeBest could have remained aloof from the inception, refusing to go to the residence (as 
they claim ignqrance of the Act); and could have remained silent about the repairs, could have 
refused to authorize GCBI to make the repairs, could have remained silent as to whom was to pay 
for the costs of restoration, and not tell GCBI to send the bills to DeBest. DeBest could have 
taken the position that any remedies available to the Davisons are derived through their General 
Contractor only, and let the matter develop in that direction. 
Instead, and as the Davisons so relied upon, the written notice was served upon the 
construction professional with whom they were under contract, and the efforts at resolution were 
conducted by the General Contractor with the responsible sub-contracting construction 
professional, to whom the liability, responsibility and the obligation was presented and fully 
accepted, upon which the Davisons did so rely that DeBest would do as they committed to do. 
This Court should find that DeBest participated with the General Contractor and 
shouldered its responsibilities as a "construction professional" and received adequate Notice of the 
defective work from GCBI, the General Contractor, who was directly notified in writing of the 
details of the defect; and from which all parties participated in making the initial inspections, 
correction ofthe defect, temporary cleanup and physical removal of materials in certain areas of 
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the residence, along with minor repairs to damaged areas made to accommodate the continued 
habitation of Davisons until the restoration efforts could take place, after Davisons' departure, so 
as not to dismpttheresidential accommodations ofDavisons while staying in Idaho. The intended 
effect of Davisons' agreement to remain in the residence was to avoid the horrendous expense of 
alternate and temporary housing that would come about if major repairs were to be undertaken 
immediately, as the restoration work would require relocation of the Davisons during that major 
removal and material installation process. Instead it was agreed the restoration process would 
begin upon their departure, and upon the repair work being performed, progress billings would be 
generated and sent to DeBest for payment, who later forwarded the billing invoices on to the 
insurance carrier for payment, creating the "avoidance mentality" that so often rears its head in 
these financial matters, 
DeBest having acted in good faith and reasonably relied and acted upon as it was agreed 
on July 26, 2013, and having agreed to do as they did, DeBest's conduct renders them to be 
satisfied with the written notice given to the General Contractor, as it was sufficient compliance . 
with the statute, and notwithstanding that sufficient notice under the statute, DeBest's conduct 
constitutes a waiver of any other or further notification from the homeowner, and DeBest is 
estopped from asserting any lack of notification defense, as stated in Profits Plus Capital 
1vfanagement, LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873, 332 P.3d 785 (2014), as perhaps characterized in 
the nature of a promissory estoppel arising out their engagement in the NORA settlement process: 
This· Court has described promissory estoppel as: "A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of a 
promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Smith v. 
Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 67, 625 P.2d 417, 421 (1981) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 901(1) (1973)). The elements required to 
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support such a claim are: "(1) one party's reliance on a promise creates a substantial 
economic detriment, (2) the reliance was or should have been foreseeable, and (3) 
the reliance was reasonable and justified." Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 
64, 205 P .3d 1196, 1200 (2009). "Promissory estoppel is simply a substitute for 
consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between parties." Lettunich v. 
Key Bank Nat.Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005). Thus, 
where there is evidence of adequate consideration, the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel is ofno consequence. Id. at 368, 109 P.3d at 1110. 156 Idaho at 891, 332 
P.3d at 803. 
In summary, both by the reasonable interpretation of the service of written notice 
requirements upon a constructional professional, and by application of the doctrines of waiver, 
quasi estoppel, and promissory estoppel, the law would require DeBest is precluded from asserting 
a lack of service of the written notice of the defect upon them, as served upon the General 
Contractor on July 26, · 2013, and the assertion of such lack of notice to DeBest does not give rise 
to any basis to dismiss this action whatsoever. 
C. An Action For Common Law Negligence Arises Out Of The Defective Plumbing, And 
Is Not Limited To Statutory Mechanisms For Recovery 
DeBest would appear to argue that because they were not served with the initial "written 
notice" as was served upon the General Contractor, not only must the action be dismissed under 
N.O.R.A., but there could be no common law negligence-based claims asserted against DeBest by 
the Davisons. As before cited to the Court, there are long-standing principles of general negligence 
law, as especially applied within the realm of professional negligence, have recognized that 
negligence-based actions can - and in fact frequently do arise directly out of various 
relationships. See e.g., Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412,416, 16 P.2d 661,662 (1932). The 
Idaho Supreme Court.stated the distinction between those actions that arise in tort and those actions 
that can arise in contract in a decision issued February 26, 2016, In re Cornell, Idaho __ , 
__ P.3d __ , 2016 WL 825003, Supreme Court No. 42822, Opinion No. 18 (Feb. 26, 2016): 
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In Bishop v. 0-,vens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012)], this Court 
recognized that "[t]he abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative 
enactment addressing the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern." 
152 Idaho at 619, 272 P.3d at 1250. Under common law, claims arising out of 
contracts.generally survive the claimant's death, while those sounding in pure tort 
abate. Id. · The magistrate court in this case found the following excerpt from 
Bishopinstructive for determining whether a case sounds in contract or tort: As this 
Court previously recognized, "[l]egal malpractice actions are an amalgam of tort 
and contract theories." See Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 
654 (1982). The tort basis of legal malpractice actions flows from the elements 
of legal malpractice: "(a) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (b) the 
existence ofa duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) failure to perform the duty; and (d) 
the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of the damage to 
the client. ... " Id. (quoting Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 437, 628 P.2d 
1336, 1338 (1981)). "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is 
defiped by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson, l 03 Idaho 
at 704, 652 P .2d at 652; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P .2d at 643 (holding that the 
tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the attorney-client relationship). 
Breach of an attorney's duty in negligence is a tort. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 
140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004); Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 706-07, 
652 P.2d at 652, 654-55. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the 
failure to perform obligations directly specified in the written contract. See 
Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55 (holding that a breach 
of contractclaim would arise if the attorney did not do what he promised to do in 
the contract, e.g., failing to draw up a contract of sale). Thus, under the abatement 
rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attorney 
foolhardily· contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the 
litigation or provides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to the 
standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort. Id. at 620, 
272 P.3d at 1251. The magistrate court relied on the foregoing analysis to 
conclude that the claims, including the equitable claims, sounded in tort and were 
therefore abated. 
We agree with the district court that the thrust of the Estate's claims were 
torts in that they focused on Johnson's alleged breach of fiduciary duty and the 
damages that allegedly resulted from that breach. See Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 
Idaho 637, 646, 39 P.3d 577, 586 (2001) ("Where the gravamen of the claim is for 
damages arising out of the breach of a fiduciary duty, an award of attorney fees is 
not proper under LC. § 12-120(3) because the action sounds in tort." (citing 
Property Management West, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 899-900, 894 P.2d 130, 
132-33 (1995) (emphasis added))); see also Profits Plus Capital Mgmt., LLC v. · 
Podesta, 156 Idaho 873,892,332 P.3d 785, 804 (2014) (recognizing that a breach 
of fiduciary duty is a tort claim); Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, 
Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994) ("A claim for a breach 
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ofa fiduciary duty is a negligence action in which the duty to act is created by the 
relationship between the parties."). 
In Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 93 P .3d 680 (2004) the Court spoke to 
the scope of these professional malpractice-type actions. limited to eighteen professions 
recognized by Idaho statute, which excluded the profession of "Realtor,", the job classification in 
that case .. 140 Idaho 351-52, 807 P.2d 682-83. 1 The Court went on to apply the long-starlding 
analysis of tort claims arising out of contract, as based upon the Court's earlier decision in Taylor 
v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 664, 669 (1971). Based upon the Taylor, the Court 
engaged in the following analysis in Sumpter: 
As Taylor states above, "[i]f the relation of the plaintiff and the defendants 
is such that a duty to take due care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and the 
defendant is negligent, then the action is one of tort." Citing the United States 
Supreme Court, this Court further held: 
The distinction is that: If the cause of complaint be for an act of omission 
or nonfeasance, which, without proof of a contract to do what has been left 
undone, would not give rise to any cause of action (because no duty apart 
from contract to do what is complained of exists), then the action is founded 
upon contract, and not upon tort. 
94 Idaho at 138,483 P.2d at 669, quoting Atlantic & P. Railway Co. v. Laird, 164 
U.S.393, 399, 17 S.Ct. 120, 122, 41 L.Ed. 485,487 (1896). See also Hudson v. 
Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 477-78, 797 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (1990). It can also be 
said that i(a cause of action for breach ofa duty based on a contractual promise 
could also be maintained without the contract by virtue of a statutory or common 
law duty, then the action is founded upon tort, not contract. Because the duties 
owed by Holland were clearly statutory, the Surnpters must deal with these breaches 
in tort, not contract. As such, we affirm the district judge's determination that the 
four-year statute oflimitations period ofI.C. § 5-224 applies in this case (see Jones 
l . 
As listed in the statutes cited for support in Sumpter, the eighteen Idaho professional 
malpractice professions are: architecture, chiropractic, dentistry, engineering, landscape 
architecture,law, medicine, nursing, occupational therapy, optometry, physical therapy, podiatry, 
professional geology, psychology, certified or licensed public accountancy, social work,. 
surveying, and veterinary medicine, "and no others." 
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v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chtd., 125 Idaho 607, 613, 873 P.2d 861, 867 
(1994) (holding "[b]ecause there is no statute of limitations specifically governing 
negligence actions that do not involve personal injury or malpractice, we apply the 
four-year statute oflimitations found in LC. § 5-224")). 
140 Idaho at 353-54, 93 P .3d at 684-85. 
The trade commonly known as "plumbing", defined in Idaho law at LC. §54-2603 · 
("Plumbing") and J.C. §54-2604 ("Plumbing systems"), is firmly ensconced within that grouping 
of job classifications generally known as the "trades," by which a person progresses by various 
degrees from an "apprentice" position, to "journeyman," and eventually to what is now known as 
"plumbing contractor," but in former times was referred to by the term more frequently used at 
common law, "master plumber." See e.g. IDAPA 07.02.05.010. Licensure History ("An 
applicant for any plumbing registration or certificate of competency who has been previously 
licensed as a journeyman or master plumber in any recognized jurisdiction is required upon 
application to the Division of Building Safety to disclose such Iicensure history and provide 
sufficient proof thereof An applicant for any plumbing registration or certificate of competency 
who has been previously licensed as a journeyman or master plumber in any recognized 
jurisdiction shall not be issued a plumbing apprentice registration. (3-29-12)"). Under Idaho law 
"there is still the · 'general rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, 
foreseeable risks ofharm to others.' Id. (quoting Sharp v. WH Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 
300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990))." Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 
P.2d 300, 310 (1999). Such negligence liability has been generally recognized to exist in Idaho 
plumbing cases without much discussion of the underlying principles of negligence that apply. 
See for example, Lutherv. Howland, 101 Idaho 373,613 P.2d 666 (1980), and likewise, in Richard 
J. and Esther E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 983 P.2d 834 (1999), 
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• 
where the Court noted De Best Plumbing's potential vicarious liability for the acts ofits employee 
without actually discussing any underlying basis for negligence liability in the case ("Byers was a 
'servant' of the 'master' DeBest in that Byers was an employee ofDeBest, and as a consequence, 
DeBest was potentially subject to vicarious liability for Byers' torts. (DeBest's vicarious liability 
'extends to any and all tortious conduct of the servant which is within the "scope of the 
employment."). 
DeBest is not disputing their duty of care, or challenging the applicable negligence standard 
that applies to the conduct of a plumber who defectively installs plumbing fixtures that cause 
extensive water damage to a residence. The only issue is: "Upon whom Notice is to be given under 
the provisions of N.O.R.A.", and not what otherwise exists as a common law cause of action for 
negligence. There is no obligation to present evidence on issues not raised by the moving party's 
motion. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994). 
DeBest has not placed at issue, nor raised any question with respect to its negligence liability 
concerning the performance of its employees breach of the applicable standard of care in the work 
at the Davison residence, and it is understood Idaho does recognize a plumber's negligence is not 
precluded because of either an underlying contract or other statutory mechanism between the sub-
contracting plumber and homeowner where defective work was performed. Professional 
negligence would be precluded by the mere fact that the professional had entered into a contractual 
engagement with the General Contractor of a residential remodel project, and when this Court has 
held no ''privity of contract", Court has not held N.O.R.A. to be the only remedy to Davisons for 
recovery of these damages caused by DeBest. 
VI. 
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CONCLUSION 
DeBest is not the construction professional to whom direct written notice is required to be served 
under N.0.R.A, as DeBest was not under contract with the homeowner-claimant as defined 
therein, and consequently the written notification to be served under the provisions in the Act is 
upon the General Contractor, which was properly and sufficie 
This Second Motion for Summary ~t must be denie . 
Respectfully submitted this~ August, 20 
ernon K. Smith 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Scott and Anne Davison 
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CASE NO. CV-2015-178C 
. SECOND AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT GOULD 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
GILBERT GOULD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of majority; that I am competent to testify; and I make this 
affidavit upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. Commencing in the late Fall months of 2011, into 2012, I undertook what later 
came to be the beginning stages of an extensive renovation-remodel project for the Davison 
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vacation residence located at 2109 Water Lily Pilgrim Cove, McCall, Idaho. This project was done 
through my company, Gould Custom Builders, Inc. That first phase of the renovation work began 
with the footings, foundation, crawl space, and the water drainage system. After that work was 
done, the renovation was then expanded into the interior of the residence, starting with the falling 
tree that was discovered the winter of 2012-2013, and then the discovery of the interior water 
damage resulting from some freezing-thawing conditions from a severe cold snap that winter. The 
renovation then progressed into the interior of the residence, which was commenced approximately 
in the month of January, 2013, at which time I was to conduct a complete remodel and renovation 
of the interior of the vacation residence. All my transactions with the Davisons were upon our oral 
agreement, as there were no written agreements ever signed between Gould Custom Builders, Inc. 
and the Davisons concerning any of the work I have performed for them, as I have done projects 
for them on this leasehold property since sometime in the 1990's. 
3. Once the interior portion of the remodel project got underway, Gould Custom 
Builders then hired DeBest Plumbing, Inc. of Boise, Idaho to undertake the necessary professional 
plumbing work, on a sub-contract basis, for what was needed in conjunction with this interior 
renovation project, as there was some plumbing modifications to the interior plumbing due to the 
previously damaged plumbing, which DeBest performed all of the plumbing installations on this 
project. 
4. To Affiant's best recollection of events, DeBest was the last servicemen to enter 
this residence, which occurred during the June 15-17, 2013 period of time, as DeBest was 
scheduled to complete the last of the plumbing installations then needed to be made in relation to 
the upstairs bathroom, involving the tub fixtures and line connections, which were installed by 
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Tom Peterson, the licensed plumber who worked for DeBest as one of their journeymen plumbing 
installition employees. 
5. Once again, there was no written sub-contract signed between Gould Custom 
Builders, Inc. with DeBest Plumbing, Inc., or with any other subcontractor that worked on this 
Davison project, and with respect to DeBest, I had been a long term acquaintance of the owners, 
and used the plumbing services of DeBest for over thirty years, having also worked with/for them 
in years past. I have utilized the plumbing services of DeBest as my sub-contractor on many 
projects over the past decades, and have established a position of trust, reliance, and confidence 
with the owners and their personnel over the passing decades. 
6. Tom Peterson, DeBest's licensed journeyman plumber, came to the residence in 
Mid-June to complete the installation of the faucet connections going to the clawfoot bathtub in 
the upstairs bathroom of the residential cabin, and upon his completion of those installations and 
connections, Mr. Peterson then turned the water on to allow the water supply to flow into the water 
supply lines in the residence, so that all of the interior water source fixtures had water service 
running to them, and could be accessed upon demand. The effect of this activation allowed the 
water to flow through the distribution water lines, and if there was a defect in the connections, the 
water was there, and was under pressure, and if there was a defective connection, water would 
escape from the lines and into the residence, which is precisely what took place within the interior 
of the residential cabin, after Mr. Peterson activated the water source. 
7. No other working personnel were at the residence after the installations were 
undertaken by DeBest, and Mr. Peterson was the last workman needing to enter the residence by 
Mid-June, 2013, as all that was left to complete was to finish his trim installations and connect the 
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water lines. The residence was locked securely upon Mr. Peterson's departure, and no one was in 
the residence until Scott Davison arrived at this cabin, as scheduled, on July 25, 2013, after a period 
of some 38-40 days and nights following the water supply system being activated and pressurized 
by Mr. Peterson, the effect of which allowed water to leak out from the defective connections Mr. 
Peterson had made, until discovered and corrected the morning on July 26, 2013. 
8. Mr. Davison arrived late evening on July 25, 2013, and early that next morning I 
received Mr. Davison's email he served upon me, a copy of which is attached to my original 
Affidavit, and attached hereto as well, notifying me he had arrived late that evening and found 
the serious water leak that early morning in the residence, with standing water on the hardwood 
floors, and discovered the ceiling was damaged in the downstairs bedroom below the upstairs 
bathroom where Mr. Peterson had installed the final connections in that bathroom in Mid-June, 
2013. The water leakage allowed water to flow through the ceiling and insulation materials, and 
down through the bedroom ceiling, then sagging and portions of which had fallen free to the floor 
in places from the weight of accumulated water from the leaks above.I immediately relayed this 
email and the information within it to Tom Peterson, the licensed plumber who performed the 
installations as the journeyman employee working for DeBest. I placed the call to his cell phone, 
number 941-8323, and requested he come to the Davisons' cabin residence that morning so we 
could locate the source of the defective connection, stop the water leaks, and assist with some 
immediate remediation and damage caused by the leaks in his plumbing. 
9. I immediately traveled to the Davison residence and there met with Messrs. Tom 
Peterson and Scott Davison at the residence, and Mr. Peterson and I made the inspection to 
detern1ine what was the defect, and discovered the leaks behind the wall in the access area behind 
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the upstairs bathroom. Mr. Peterson corrected the defective line connections that he acknowledged 
were the connections he had earlier performed in Mid-June 2013, and then assisted me with 
removal of damaged ceiling sheetrock and water soaked insulation materials downstairs. 
10. The leak was essentially identified to be the connection from the trim piece from 
the tub faucet in the upstairs bathroom that entered into and through the wall, and attached to the 
service lines. Mr. Peterson referred to it as a loose fitting, and admitted to me and Scott Davison 
the defective work was his fault, and the leak was the result of his installations, and DeBest 
Plumbing would accept full responsibility and stand liable for the repairs and costs resulting from 
the damages to the interior from the water. 
11. Once Mr. Peterson corrected the defect and stopped the water leakage to prevent 
further water flows, Mr. Peterson called the DeBest Office, using his cell phone, and had 
conversation with Lorrie Brede, the DeBest supervisor in charge of residential plumbing 
installations, and she assured Mr. Peterson that DeBest accepted full responsibility and liability 
for his defective installations, as confirmed that fact to me and Mr. Davison, and I then took the 
cell phone and spoke directly to Ms. Brede, and she confirmed to me that DeBest would pay the 
costs of all repairs and wanted me to do the repair work, and for me to send all billings directly to 
them for reimbursement and payment. The parties acknowledged the cost was upon DeBest, and 
the issue of repairs and costs was then understood to be deferred to and accepted by DeBest, as 
Tom Peterson and Lorrie Brede had so determined, and Ms. Brede and Mr. Peterson specifically 
authorized me (GCBI) to do the repairs as deemed needed, and GCBI was instructed to send the 
billings when payment was required, and DeBest, would pay the invoices upon receipt. 
12. I wanted direct contact with Lorrie Brede to confirm that DeBest was accepting the 
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responsibility, and that I was to bill them directly for the cost of repairs, and not the Davisons. 
When speaking directly with Ms. Brede, she gave me that clear confirmation, and she confirmed 
GCBI was to do all of the repair work, as GCBI was familiar with the remodel that had been 
completed, and was best suited to undertake the needed repairs. She, on behalf of DeBest, 
specifically authorized me (GCBI) to perform all repair work needed to be done to restore the 
damage, and the billing invoices were then to be sent to DeBest for payment. That was the 
agreement we all made that morning, and that was the resolution of the matter that we relied upon. 
13. Whether Tom Peterson spoke to Darcy N eidigh later that day, or anytime thereafter, 
to discuss the situation, your Affiant is not personally aware, but Affiant does confirm Tom 
Peterson's initial contact with DeBest agents/representatives was Lorrie Brede, because she was 
his direct supervisor, and Affiant is acquainted with her position with DeBest. It was upon that 
specific conversation I had that morning with Ms. Brede on July 26, 2013, over Mr. Peterson's 
cell phone, upon which I relied upon and received direct authorization to make the repairs under 
their admitted liability and responsibility over the damages, and obtained those instructions as to 
whom and where to send billing invoices, and who would be paying the costs. 
14. As to our discussions about when repairs were to be made, as I spoke with Ms. 
Brede, I explained the situation by which the repairs would ultimately be made, and there was 
never any indication major repairs would be undertaken immediately, as the Davisons were 
agreeing to remain in the residence and eliminate the cost of alternate housing as they would be 
unable to remain there if repairs were to be commenced immediately. The purpose of the contact 
was to report the situation, secure DeBest's awareness of their liability and responsibility, and 
confirm some initial clean up and repairs would be done within a few days to get the downstairs 
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bedroom sufficiently restored to allow Davisons to continue to use that bedroom until returning to 
California that Fall, at which time the full restoration could be undertaken, as the water soaked 
much of the materials over the 38-40 days it was flowing within the residence, and much material 
had to be tom out and replaced, regardless when the repairs were to be made. During this 
conversation with Ms. Brede, I specifically stated to her that the major repairs would be made after 
the Davison's left that Fall, to avoid incurring alternate housing costs, and there was clear 
understanding as to that being the course of the restoration process, as it saved the relocation costs .. 
15. After major repairs were commenced that Fall, DeBest's insurance company 
became involved, and made aware of the damages, as the billing invoices were sent to DeBest, and 
the billing invoices were sent to their liability carrier, as I was told by DeBest the costs were such 
that DeBest preferred to submit a claim to their insurance carrier for payment. Their carrier then 
hired an adjuster, Intermountain Claims of Idaho, and I asked the carrier-adjusters to come to the 
residence to inspect the project, but they never arrived until the following February, and when they 
came to the residence, most of the repair work was well underway or then completed. 
16. During the years I worked as a subcontractor doing electrical work, it had always 
been my personal practice to handle any claims arising out of work that I had performed through 
my own insurance coverage, and not require the placement of those claims upon either the 
homeowner or upon a general or primary contractor. 
17. Whenever I engage work as a general contractor, it remained my practice for any 
subcontractors I use for them to be primarily responsible to any homeowner for claims arising out 
of any defective work performed by that subcontractor. 
18. In this case, it was agreed between Davisons, Peterson, Brede, and affiant that the 
SECOND AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF GIL GOULD IN OPPOSITION TO 
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liability for this damage was accepted by and was being turned over to DeBest, and I was to send 
billing invoices to DeBest when needed to be paid. I spoke with DeBest's agents, sending DeBest 
the initial invoice billings, as instructed, and identified the scope of repairs that needed to be made. 
DeBest then had their insurance carrier step in, who became involved with both the Davisons and 
me thereafter. In that following process, I spoke to the insurance carrier/adjusting agent(s), and 
was involved in some e-mail communications regarding the repairs, costs, and the adjusters' 
estimation. Those e-mail communications I have located are attached hereto. I sent that 
correspondence as I came to understand DeBest wanted the matter deferred to their insurance 
carrier and their adjusting agent, Ronald Egland, as DeBest wanted them to pay all costs of repair. 
19. By my accounting, through the month of March, 2014, the Davisons' the repair 
costs had reached $91,716.76, and ultimately came to $123,345.64 (excluding the mold 
restoration) and then with that expense of the mold restoration, the total cost of the restoration was 
$127,202.99. In my experience, the damage estimate presented by DeBest's insurance adjuster, 
Intermountain Claims, as was presented by Ronald Egland on April 30, 2014, in the amount of 
$24,005.06, was grossly inadequate, and I was amazed and stunned when I was presented that 
estimate from thei knowing the work and restoration involved. 
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My commission expires: / Z, - ;J..o - LR' 
CERTI 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this d y of August, 2016, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing SECOND AND SUPPLEMENT FFIDA VIT OF GILBERT GOULD IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was serve upon the following: 
Robert D. Lewis 
Attorney at Law 
CANTRILL SKINNER, et al. 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: 208-344-8035 
Facsimile: 208-345-7212 
Email: roblewis@cssklaw.com . 
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0312112e1& 15:49 VERNON K SMITH-
From: SCOTT DAVISON <scottdavison13@gmail.com> 
Date: Fri, i6 Jvl iois 06;48;44 -0700 
To: i::chinadollt.9l@froiitiernet.net> 
Cc: Anne Oavison<adavison1@aol.com> 
Subject:The Cibin looks.great 
GiL 
PAGE 06/13 
I arrived in McCGlll 1/esterdoy and the cabin looks wonderful.. I also apprec.1ote 
how r.r11;1ch core-yo_o took. in getting things back into the cab.in - really great.· 
. '~ ' ~. ' ' ' 
. We d.o h_ove one·rss'ue,. thoµgh. There is a pretty sefious.:lec;,k in the ceiling of the 
downstairs bedroom .{presumably from a pipe 'coming from the upstairs 
bathroom). Looks-pretty serious - anc.i means we con'i use. the upstairs· 
bathroom until we ·at ·1ecist fix the leak. ln'terms offixin'g the cefling, we've got a 
bufich of guests coming a week from today so it would be great if we can get it 
repaired .. 
Thanks again for· St;Jch a greot job - and sorry to the bearer of bad news_ 
$, 
'. •' :\' 
00000537
AUG-17-2016 06:36P FROM:GIL GOULD GOULD CUST 2086344094 







- T0:12083451129 - P.2 Page 1 of 4 
Elle- are al 1M D411!1llll fer 'Ille wor1< do,. on 1116 Oevlaon cabin Ill Pllgrlm cave MeOeN, IC11ho from Iha ei.n up lhN IIMi Maren blllng. I wu IOkl !IV Todd Morgan 11> only c:omm1¥1biw 
with you for thas.. 
GR Gould 
Gould Cu;nom Bulka111, Inc •. 
_.., .. ··-·------------~------·---... ,--~---------------------- ------
8/17/2016 
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AUG-17-2016 06:36P FROM:GIL GOULD GOULD GUST 2086344094 







• TO: 12083451129 - P.1 Page 1 of2 
Encloaod la• eopy of U.. blll"ll I h""" -to !h<I.,........... eompeny for !he monln of Maid> for your........i..1 am go,lng bl~ al of Iha palt blllnp and this""" to Ron Egillnd who lo the 
one who camt IO look III lhe a.J1'11111" frorn the slartlllld he Is the one 11\e !Olk IRMn !he head offli:e mild I lholJd ~tom now on. 
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"Gil & Gina Gould" <chinadoll797@frontiernetnet> 
<rone@intermountainclaims.com> 
Saturday, April 19, 2014 3:45 PM 




Page 1 of 1 
I am just following up on the progress for the Davison cabin repairs that have already been billed out, but have not 
been paid by your insurance company yet. Do you have any idea when these bills will be paid? The cost and 
expenses have been accumulating since the middle of December of last year and myself and the Davison's have 
put out a great deal of money to pay the bills. It is really difficult to keep going without getting paid for our work 
and the materials and other subcontractors that have supplied things and did work on this job. See what you can 
do on your end to speed up payment for these bills that are already due and past due. 
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"Gil & Gina Gould" <chinadoll797@frontiernet.net> 
<rone@intermountainclaims.com> 
Monday, April 21, 2014 1 :08 PM 
DeBest Plbg. claim 
TO: 12083451129 - P.4 Page 1 of l 
Some response to my emails would be greatly appreciated as this has been going on a very long time with 
nothing being done by the insurance company. This problem was created by the installation done by DeBest 
Plbg, and the resulting damages and repairs and the cost to do them is their responsibility and since you are their 
insurance currier and they pay you to be covered for these kind of problems you should be taking care of this 
problem better then you have been doing. Work and expenses have been going on since December of last year 
with not one dime put out from you or DeBest Plbg., and I doubt that you or them could stand to be paying out for 
something like this is without being reimbursed for those expenses for four months. We need something from you 
real soon. 
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"Gil & Gina Gould" <Chinadoll797@frontiemetnet> 
<rone@intermountainclaims.com> 
Friday, April 25, 2014 4:38 PM 
DeBest claim 
T0:12083451129 P.7 
- Page I of I 
Darcy at De Best Plumbing told me that you were going to move on this claim for them by the end of this week. It 
is 4-30pm Friday the 25 which is as close as you can come to the end of a week, and nothing from her as to any 
contact from you. Are you making an attempt to get this claim taken care of? I keep sending you emails with no 
response so I can't tell if you receive them or not so I would really appreciate some response to my emails to you 
if in fact you are getting them. 
Gil Gould 
Gould Custom Builders, Inc. 
8/17/2016 
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"Gil & Gina Gould" <chinadoll797@frontiemetnet> 
"Darcy Neidigh" <darcy@debestplumbing.oom> 





Page 1 of 1 
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"Gil & Gina Gould" <chinadoll797@frontiemetnet> 
"Darcy Neidigh" <darcy@debestplumbing.com> 





Pagel of 1 
I hate to be a pest but I really need to know what is happening with this claim and when I will get funds to pay all 
of the bills that are now coming up past due and people calling for their money which I don't have because of the 
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"Gil & Gina Gould" <chlnadoll797@frontiernet.net> · 
"Ron Egland" <rone@intermountainclaims.com> 
Friday, April 25, 2014 4:59 PM 
Re: DeBest claim 
TO: 12083451129 - P.8 Page 1 of 1 
I have to take my dog to Cascade for surgery Monday morning about 9am then pick her up about 2Pm so I could 
meet with you say around noon. If that works for you let me know. I was in Boise and missed your message or I 
would have responded. 
Gil 
- Original Message -
From: R 
To: ·G· Gould' 
Cc: ''Darcy Neidjgtj' 
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2014 4:49 PM 
Subject: RE: DeBest claim 
Gil, 
t.calLed.an.dle.ft.yp.ua\tOlcamailatlO:l.S~es.terdaym.ornlt:lgasklng,that_\(0.1.1,call.IJle.tc.discu.ssthisclalm.. 
I will be in McCall Monday afternoon for a 4:00 pm appointment. Do you have time to meet before that? 
Ron 
-----------·-------- -----·---------'---------
From: Gil & Gina Gould [mailto:d,lnadoll797@frontlemetnet] 
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2014 4:38 PM 
To: Ron Egland 
Subject: DeBest clalm 
Ron, 
Darcy at OeBest Plumbing told me that you were going to move on this claim for them by the end of this week. 
It is 4-30pm Friday the 25 which is as close as you can come to the end of a week, and nothing from her as to 
any contact from you. Are you making an attempt to get this claim taken care of? I keep sending you emails 
with no response so I can't tell if you receive them or not so I would really appreciate some response to my 
emails to you if in fact you are getting them. 
Gil Gould 
Gould Custom Builders, Inc. 
8/17/2016 
00000545
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"Gll & Gina Gould" <chlnadoll797@frontlemet.net> 
"Ron Egland" <rone@intennountainclaims..com> 
Sunday, April 27, 2014 5:58 PM 
Re: DeBest claim 
TO: 12083451129 - P.9 Page 1 of 1 
I can meet some lime after 9am after dropping my dog off for surgery in Cascade so I could be back in McCall after 1 Oam 
until about 1 :30 when I will need to go back to Cascade to pick up the dog. If meeting In Cascade a little after nine or 
sometime In that time frame that would work as well just let me know. Is there something you would like me to have on hand 
if we can meet? 
Gil 
·-- Original Message -
From: Ron Egland 
To: 'Gil & Gina Gould' 
Sent: Sunday, April 27, 201410:34 AM 
Subject: RE: OeBest claim 
Gil: 
I was not able to rearrange my Itinerary to meet with you at noon but will be available by phone if that will work. 
_ .. ___ ,. __ _,.._ __ . ___ , ... _~------
From: GIi & Gina Gould [malfto:chlnadoll797@fmntiemet.net] 
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2014 5:00 PM 
To: Ron Egland 
Subject; Re: DeBest dalm 
Ron, 
I have to take my dog to cascade for surgery Monday morning about 9am then pick her up about 2pm so I could meet with 
you say around noon. If that works for you let me know. I was in Boise and missed your meS$8ge or I would have 
responded. 
Gil 
·-· Original Message -
From: Ron Egland 
To: 'Gil &;Gina Goulg' 
Cc: 'Dargy Neidjgh' 
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2014 4:49 PM 
Subject: RE: DeBest claim 
,,G.IJ., 
I called and left you a voice mail at 10:15 yesterday morning asking that you call me to discuss this claim. 
I will be In Mccall Monday afternoon for a 4:00 pm appointment. Do you have time to meet before that? 
Ron 
--···- ,.,,. ,, ·---------------- _________ ,,. ... , 
From: GIi & Gina Gould rmaittp:chlnadolf797@fronttemet.ni;tJ 
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2014 4:38 PM 
To: Ron Egland 
Subject: DeBest dalm 
Ron. 
Darcy at DeBest Plumbing told me that you were going to move on this dalm for them by the end of this week. It Is 4-
301lm Friday the 25 which is as close as you can come to the end of a week, and nothing from her as to any contact from 
you. Are you making an attempt to get this claim taken care of? I keep sending you emails with no response so I can't tell 
if you receive them or not so I would really appreciate some response to my emails to you if in fact you are getting them. 
Gil Gould , 
Gould Custom Builders, Inc. 
8/17/2016 
00000546
AUG-17-2016 06:38P FROM:GIL GOULD GOULD CUST 2086344094 • 







"Gil & Gina Gould" <ct,inadoll797@frontiernetnet> 
"Ron Egland" <rone@intermountainclaims.com> 
Tuesday, April 29, 20141:32 PM 
cost breaddown to Ron Egland.doc 
DeBest claim 
. TO: 12083451129 - P.10 Pagel of l 













'! ,. -· 
DA VlSON CABIN 
DEBEST PLUMBING CLAIM 
I wanted to send this to you after our meeting on Monday the 28th showing the expense 
breakdown thru the month of March on the sheet I had when we met. 
January bi1ling on 2/14/14 
January billing on 2/14/14 
February billing on 3/3/14 
March billing on 4/11/14 
Total of claim thru the month of March 
Deduction from this amount for no coverage for mold that is 
The responsibility ofDeBest Plumbing Inc. 








These amounts are not the final cost involved with this claim as 
There are still expenses unpaid or billed out for the month of April 
And will be into the month of May until the completion of this claim 
And a final billing wiH be presented at that time. 
The Davison's have paid out for expenses to date 
Total paid out by me for expenses thru March 
Amounts that are outstanding for subcontractors 
Amounts that are outstanding for materials & misc. 
Amounts for builder commissions and OH not paid 
This totals to 
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"Gil & Gina Gould" <chinadoll797@frontiemetnet> 
"Ron Egland" <rone@intennountainclaims.com> 
Wednesday. April 30, 2014 5:37 PM 




Page 1 of 1 
You have to be kidding if you think this is a tn.ie and fair settlement for the damages done to the Davison's cabin, as your 
total doesn't even cover the actual hard cost for materials and subcontractors other then the finish carpenters and demo 
crew which have done tha bulk of the labor. This will never fly with me or the homeowners. 
Gil 
- Original Message -
From: Ron Egland 
To: chinadoll797@frontiemet.net 
Cc: ~~..;,;1:,1~:;;f!i,;h',..; t~ mzrrltiiffi@!;/;11'..D.i::a:;r.i, 
Sent: Wednesday. April 30. 2014 5:27 PM 
Subject: Davison water loss 
Mr.Gould: 
Thank you for meeting with me Monday regarding this loss. 
As you are aware, all of the information regarding this loss has been submitted to the Onclnnatl Insurance Company 
who insures DeBest Plumbing. The information submitted was reviewed by them and they asked that I prepare an 
itemized estimate for the water damage using our Xactlmate estimating program. In preparing that estimate, I 
Initially prepared a sketch of the affected areas and from that sketch, I input all of the water damage Information 
based on the scope of damage as obse.rved with the Input of Information from you regarding the finish. 
The Oncinnatl has requested that I share that estimate with you as it is the basis for which Onclnnatl Insurance Is 
extending an offer of settlement to the Davison's for this claim. The total of the estimate amounts to $24,005.06. As 
you are aware, this itemization does not include any mold remediation. 
If you see something that I have failed to include, please contact me. A release of all claims will be required before 
any payment Is made. 
Regards, 
Ron Egland 
Boise Property Claims Manager 
lntermountain Claims Inc. 
rone@intermountalnclaims.com 
(208) 323-7571 ext 213 
(208) 375-8905 fax 
www.lntermountalnclalms.com 
Workers Comp Locations: Boise, IOAHO-Portland, OREGON - Bllllngs, Missoula, MONT ANA- Salt Lake Oty, UTAH 
Property and Casualty Locations: Missoula, MONTANA- Portland, OREGON - Boise, Lewiston, Idaho Falls, Pocatello, 
Twin Falls, I OAHO - Salt Lake City, St. George, UTAH 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication, and any attachments, may contain confidential and prlvlleged 
Information for the use of the designated recipients named above. Any unauthorized review, use, dlsclosure or 
distribution ls prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy 
all copies of the original message. Thank you. 
8/17/2016 
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"Gil & Gina Gould" <chinadoll797@frontiernet.net> 
"Anne Davison" <adavison1@aol.com> 
Wednesday, April 30, 2014 5:42 PM 
Fw: Davison water loss 
TO: 12083451129 
- P.13 Page 1 of2 
I don't know if you received this estimate from Ron Egland or not but this is my response to his email and wanted 
you to have it for your records. We can not accept this ridicules offer. What a disappointment after our meeting on 
Monday never indicating anything of this nature. 
Gil 
-- Original Message -
From: Gil & Gina Gould 
To: Ron Egland 
Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2014 5:37 PM 
Subject: Re: Davison water loss 
Ron, 
You have to be kidding if you think this is a true and fair settlement for the damages done to the Davison's cabin, 
as your total doesn't even cover the actual hard cost for materials and subcontractors other then the finish 
carpenters and demo crew which have done the bulk of the labor. This will never fly with me or the homeowners. 
Gil 
--· Original Message -
From: Ron Eglang 
To: 9bioadoUZQZ@fi:ootiernet.net 
Cc: 'Darcy Neidigh' ; tQdg morgan@cinfin.com 
Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2014 5:27 PM 
Subject: Davison water loss 
Mr.Gould: 
Thank you for meeting with me Monday regarding this loss. 
As you are aware, all of the information regarding this loss has been submitted to the Cincinnati Insurance 
Company who insures DeBest Plumbing. The information submitted was reviewed by them and they asked 
that I prepare an Itemized estimate for the water damage using our Xactimate estimating program. In 
preparing that estimate, I Initially prepared a sketch of the affected areas and from that sketch, I input all of 
the water damage Information based on the scope of damage as observed with the Input of information from 
you regarding the finish. 
The Cincinnati has requested that I share that estimate with you as It is the basis for which Cincinnati 
Insurance Is extending an offer of settlement to the Davison's for this claim. The total of the estimate amounts 
to $24,005.06. As you are aware, this Itemization does not include any mold remediation. 
If you see something that I have failed to include, please contact me. A release of all claims will be required 
before any payment is made. 
Regards, 
Ron Egland 
Boise Property Claims Manager 
lntermountain Claims Inc. 
·rcme@imermountalnc.la ims;com 
(208} 323-7571 ext 213 
(208) 375-8905 fax 
8/17/2016 
00000550






Workers Comp l.Dcatlons: Boise, IDAHO- Portland, OREGON- Billings, Missoula, MONTANA- Salt Lake City, 
UTAH 
Property and Casualty Locations: Missoula, MONTANA - Portland, OREGON - Boise, Lewiston, Idaho Falls, 
Pocatello, Twin Falls, IDAHO-Salt lake City, St. George, UTAH 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication, and any attachments, may contain confidential and 
privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. Any unauthorized review, use, 
disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by 
reply emall and destroy all copies of the origina I message. Thank you. 
8/17/2016 
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VERNON K. Si\·1ITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main St. 
Bo.ise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho Stnte Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345·1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
'v'ERHOH ><'. ·::;MITH • 
DOUGLA("t A~·· '. •'L~ CLER" . 0 t'.:d, ·1~ 
BY----....~-?i2-0eputy 
SEP O 6 2016 
Case No ___ nst.No, ___ _ 
FilP.Cf A M, ____ P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 




) Case No. CV I 178C 
} 
) NOTICE OF CO!vfPLIANCE 






I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 6th day of September, 2016, the undersigned, Vernon 
Smith, did deliver those documents that were produced by Gilbert Gould of Gould Custom 
Builder's, Inc., for delivery to the Law Office of Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, ~-------.,,- '"" in compliance with with the Subpoena of Records served upo9-"liim. -----.. "·,\ 
( /..,,.,,,-· '·\ ·, 
\ i 
\ / 
·,., .. , .. ;'· 
Dated this 6m day of September. 2016. ,.//. ·,, ..... ,.... /.·· 
/ "· ... fr ,, ,.,. . "', .... ~ ~-,.,·-""",,.,, 
/. !, ,..#'°~T ----· ":::::,., 
A1.ttorney for Plaintiff 




NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE P.l 
00000552
09/06/2015 15:08 '•/ERHOH t< '3MITH - PAGE 03 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 6th day of September, 2016, I caused a true and co1Tect 
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following 
addresses as fo!lm,vs: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Valley 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, JD 83701 
T\OTICE OF CO!'vf PLIANCE 
( ) 
( X ) 
( ) 
U.S .. Mail 
Fax 208-382-7107 
Hand Delivered 
') "'t t . '-
00000553
Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
-
SEP 1 3 2016 
CaseNo 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
FiiecJ__ ~ No_ 
~-Af~ 
,Af. 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 










STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
) 
Case No. CV 15-178C 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAURIE BREDE IN 
SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I, Laurie Brede, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state: 
1. The matters stated herein are based upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. I am an employee of DeBest Plumbing, Inc. ("De Best"). 
3. For the past 12.5 years, I have been the dispatch coordinator for DeBest. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAURIE BREDE IN SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT- I 
Q OR I GI r,J ,fj, L 
00000554
4. Darcy Neidigh and Rick Garrett are my superiors and supervisors at DeBest. 
5. My job duties for DeBest include receiving service calls from customers, passing 
on job requests to DeBest technicians, and scheduling appointments. 
6. I do not provide estimates or quotes to customers or other contractors. 
7. I do not authorize any projects for DeBest. 
8. At no time during my employment with DeBest have I ever had the authority to 
bind DeBest to any contract or agreement. 
9. At no time during my employment with DeBest have I ever had any authority over 
financial matters for DeBest. 
10. At no time during my employment with DeBest has Darcy Neidigh, Rick Garrett, 
or any DeBest employee ever given me any reason to believe I had any authority to bind DeBest 
to any contract or agreement, or to negotiate any financial matters for DeBest. 
DATED this frf day of September, 2016. 
~.~ 
LaieBrede 7 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~~ day of September, 2016. 
~~c-P 
N6taryI>uBicfordah~ I 
Residing at: Cctld w.e- t ! 1 (D 
My Commission Expires: 1 /20 / I 3: 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the l J._\1-- day of September, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 







AFFIDAVIT OF LAURIE BREDE IN SUPPORT OF 2ND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-3 
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CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY Be SORENSEN, LLP 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
1423 TYRELL LANE P.O. BOX 359 
ROBERT D, LEWIS 
CLINTON 0. CASEY 
DEAN C. SORENSEN 
DANIEL J, SKINNER 
TYLER H. NEILL 
Valley County Clerk 
VALLEY COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, Idaho 83611 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
WWW,CSSKLAW.COM 
(208) 344-8035 
September 12, 2016 
RE: Davison v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
Valley County Case No.: CV-15-l 78C 
Dear Clerk: 
DAVID W. CANTRILL, 
OF COUNSEL 
GARDNER W, SKINNER, JR, 
(RETIRED) 
FACSIMILE (208} 345-7212 
CSSKLAW@CSSKLAW.COM 
I am enclosing the following original documents for filing in the above-referenced case: 
1. Affidavit of Laurie Brede; and 
2. Defendant's Reply Memorandum. 
Please conform the copies and return them to me in the self-addressed, stamped envelope 
provided. 




Robert D. Lewis, ISB # 2713 
Tyler H. Neill, ISB # 7754 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF 2nd MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. ("DeBest") and hereby submits its Reply 
Memorandum in further support of its 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment. 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SECOND 
AND SUPPLEMENT AL AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT GOULD 
Defendant objects to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment for failure to support factual position by citing to particular parts 
of materials in the record, as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(l). Plaintiffs 




repeatedly state allegations and facts with no citation to any materials in the record. Section II 
entitled "Background Facts Regarding Written Notice Served Upon the General Contractor" 
contains no citations to any materials in the record. Plaintiffs merely invite the Court ''to review 
once again the initial Affidavit of Gilbert Gould" and "to also review the supplemental and Second 
Affidavit of Gilbert Gould ... " Pis' Memo in Opposition to Def's 2nd Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 6 (Aug. 19, 2016). The only citation to the record exists on page 7 of Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum which does not even specify the particular part of the materials cited. Additionally, 
Plaintiffs cite to a proposed Third Party Complaint which is not part of the record. 
Plaintiffs' improper citations and lack of citations violate Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c)(l). Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3), "The court need consider only the cited 
materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Further, under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e), 
If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address 
another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: 
(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; 
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; 
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials, including the 
facts considered undisputed, show that the movant is entitled to it; or 
( 4) issue any other appropriate order. 
Given the broad discretion the Court has pursuant to the above cited rules, Defendant respectfully 
requests that this Court take the action it best sees fit in regard to this matter and objection. 
Defendant also objects to Plaintiffs' assertions regarding settlement offers and 
negotiations. Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 provides: 
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Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting, 
offering, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the claim 
or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise 
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of 
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course 
of compromise negotiations. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, 
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. Compromise negotiations encompass mediation. 
Plaintiffs repeatedly mention settlement offers and discussions in their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. See Pls' Memo in Opposition 
to Def's 2nd MotionforSummaryJudgment,p. 11, 12, 17, 18, 20, 22 (Aug. 19, 2016). Additionally, 
the Second and Supplemental Affidavit of Gilbert Gould contains improper references to 
settlement negotiations. Said affidavit mentions specific amounts negotiated and includes 
correspondence regarding settlement and negotiations. A.ff Gilbert Gould, ,r 19 and attached 
exhibits (Aug. 19, 2016). These references to settlement are barred by Idaho Rule of Evidence 
408, and therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court strike such references from the 
record. 
WRITTEN NOTICE 
It is undisputed that written notice was not provided to DeBest. No written communication 
whatsoever was given to DeBest regarding the construction defects until DeBest was provided 
with an invoice from Gil Gould and Gould Custom Builders, Inc. ("GCBI"), the general contractor, 
in February 2014, more than two months after work had commenced on the Plaintiffs' residence 
("Residence"). Plaintiffs argue that a July 26, 2013 email sent to Gil Gould and the February 2014 
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invoices and correspondence with DeBest' s insurer both meet the written notice requirement under 
the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act under Idaho Code§ 6-2501 et seq. ("NORA"). For the 
reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' arguments fail. 
Plaintiffs contend that the email sent to Gil Gould on July 26, 2013 meets the notice 
requirements of NORA. Plaintiffs state, "There exists no dispute written notice was served upon 
the General Contractor, GCBI, on July 26, 2013 ... " Pis' Memo in Opposition to Def's 2nd Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 7 (Aug. 19, 2016). This is not true. In fact, it is clear that written notice 
was not served on the general contractor, within the definitions of "service" under NORA. Idaho 
Code § 6-2502(8) defines "service" as "personal service or delivery by certified mail to the last 
known address of the addressee." It is undisputed that Gil Gould and GCBI were not served written 
notice through personal service or certified mail. The only written notice given to Gil Gould and 
GCBI was an email. Such notice does not meet the service requirements under NORA. 
Regardless of whether Gil Gould and GCBI, the general contractor, were served with 
written notice, such notice would not relieve Plaintiffs from the requirement to serve written notice 
upon DeBest. Idaho Code 6-2503(1) provides: 
Prior to commencing an action against a construction professional for a 
construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the 
construction professional. The notice of claim shall state that the claimant asserts 
a construction defect claim against the construction professional and shall describe 
the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature of the 
defect. Any action commenced by a claimant prior to compliance with the 
requirements of this section shall be dismissed by the court without prejudice and 
may not be recommenced until the claimant has complied with the requirements 
under this section. If a written notice of claim is served under this section within 
the time prescribed for the filing of an action under this chapter, the statute of 
limitations for construction-related claims is tolled until sixty ( 60) days after the 
period of time during which the filing of an action is barred. 
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Plaintiffs argue that "written notice is to go to the 'construction professional' with whom the 
homeowner had a 'contract' ... " Pis' Memo in Opposition to Def's 2nd Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 8 (Aug. 19, 2016). Plaintiffs base this argument on Idaho Code§ 6-2502(5)(a), which 
defines "homeowner" as "Any person who contracts with a construction professional for the 
construction, sale, or construction and sale of a residence." Plaintiffs ignore the definition of 
"construction professional" under Idaho Code§ 6-2502( 4), which provides (with emphasis added): 
"Construction professional" means any person with a right to lien pursuant to 
section 45-501, Idaho Code, an architect, subdivision owner or developer, builder, 
contractor, subcontractor, engineer or inspector, performing or furnishing the 
design, supervision, inspection, construction or observation of the construction of 
any improvement to residential real property, whether operating as a sole 
proprietor, partnership, corporation, limited liability company or other business 
entity. 
Idaho Code § 6-2502(4) clearly states that a subcontractor is a construction professional under 
NORA. Nowhere under Idaho Code § 6-2503 is it stated that written notice is to go to the 
construction professional with whom the homeowner had a contract. In fact, the plain reading of 
Idaho Code 6-2503(1) makes it clear that written notice is to be served upon the construction 
professional against whom an action is commenced. 
Finally, the invoices and correspondence with DeBest's insurer do not constitute service 
of written notice within the meaning of NORA. The first invoice was sent to DeBest in February 
2014. A.ff. Darcy Neidigh,, 9 (Aug. 5, 2016). GCBI began remodel and repairs of the Residence 
on or about December 18, 2013. A.ff. Tyler H Neill,, 2, Exhibit A (Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 
97:10-23, 129:4-8 (May 5, 2016)). Two months of work had taken place on the Residence before 
DeBest was provided the first invoice. This invoice and subsequent invoices do not meet the 
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requirements of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (NORA), as they did not provide an 
opportunity to inspect and repair or describe a claim in reasonable detail, they were not sent by 
Plaintiffs, and they arrived after there was any meaningful opportunity to repair. Further, DeBest's 
insurer was not given the opportunity to inspect the Residence until April 2014, at or near the 
completion of the remodel and repairs. As with the invoices, there was no meaningful opportunity 
to repair when DeBest's insurer was given an opportunity to inspect. 
For the reasons stated above, it is clear that Plaintiffs did not serve written notice upon 
DeBest prior to commencement of this action, and therefore, this action should be dismissed 
without prejudice. 
WAIVER/ESTOPPEL 
Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that DeBest waived its right to be served written notice 
under NORA. "A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, 
and the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and that 
he thereby has altered his position to his detriment." Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 259 P.3d 595, 
603 (2011) quoting Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820,824, 136 P.3d 291,295 (2006). "Waiver 
is foremost a question of intent." Id. quoting Seaport Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 
735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App. 1987). "A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver 
shall be established." Id. citing Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,256,846 P.2d 
904,907 (1993). "[T]o impose the equitable doctrine of waiver, there must be 'direct, unequivocal 
conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right or acts amounting to an estoppel 
by the party whose conduct is to be construed as a waiver."' Idaho Migrant Council v. 
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Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 804,806, 718 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Ct.App. 1986) quoting 
Milne v. Anderson, 576 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska 1978). 
Plaintiffs argue that through Tom Petersen's participation in the initial repairs and clean-
up, and DeBest's insurer's inspection and evaluation of the property in April 2014, DeBest waived 
its rights to written notice under NORA. Tom Peterson's participation in the initial repairs and 
clean-up do not constitute a waiver of DeBest's NORA rights. Plaintiffs have not provided any 
evidence that Tom Petersen or DeBest knowingly relinquished NORA rights. Plaintiffs have not 
shown "direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right." 
Neither Tom Petersen nor DeBest were even aware of their rights under NORA until after this 
litigation commenced. A.ff. Darcy Neidigh, ,i 16 (Aug. 5, 2016), A.ff. Tom Petersen, ,i 14 (Aug. 5, 
2016). 
There simply cannot be a voluntary relinquishment of a known right in this case, because 
DeBest did not know of any rights to written notice under NORA. In fact, DeBest was not aware 
of whether NORA even applied to this case until Plaintiffs produced information and documents 
relating to the cost of the remodel and the assessed value of the Residence in response to 
Defendant's Second Set oflnterrogatories on August 4, 2016. The focus of any question of waiver 
is on the intent and knowledge of the party purportedly waiving a right. Without knowledge either 
of the right to written notice or of the damage to the property, neither Tom Petersen nor DeBest 
could have the intent to waive. 
Similarly, inspecting and evaluating the property does not demonstrate an intent to 
relinquish a known right. Further, almost all, if not all, of the repairs had been completed at the 
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time DeBest's insurer inspected the Residence. In addition to the fact that there was no intentional 
relinquishment of DeBest's rights under NORA, Plaintiffs also were not disadvantaged by 
DeBest's insurer investigating and estimating damage. Written notice of an opportunity to repair 
would not have been sufficient at the time of investigation as there would have been no meaningful 
opportunity to repair. Plaintiffs needed to provide written notice prior to the commencement of 
repair and restoration. As such, Plaintiffs did not alter their position to their detriment. 
Defendant adamantly disputes Plaintiffs and Gil Gould's contention that there was an 
understanding that significant repairs would take place in the winter and spring of 2014. Defendant 
did not have knowledge of the additional, extensive claimed damage to the Residence. Based on 
Gil Gould's testimony in his deposition, the damage was not known or apparent until he tore apart 
the ceiling in the Residence in December 2013. DeBest could not knowingly relinquish its 
opportunity to repair when it did not know what damage was claimed, that additional repairs were 
necessary and were going to take place over four months later, or that five months of work was 
going to be necessary to repair the Residence. At no point did DeBest voluntarily relinquish a 
known right. At a minimum, DeBest should have received written notice pursuant to NORA 
before the Davisons and Gil Gould undertook the extensive repairs and restoration in December 
2013 when they discovered and assessed the damage to the Residence. DeBest could not waive 
its right for notice of the opportunity to repair the extensive damage when it did not know it existed 
in the first place. 
In Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, mention is also made of promissory estoppel. Plaintiffs seem to suggest that by 
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engaging in the settlement process in April 2014, or by Defendant's conduct around the time the 
leak was discovered, promissory estoppel bars Defendant from asserting its NORA rights. 
To prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a party must prove the existence of all 
four elements of promissory estoppel: 1) reliance upon a specific promise; 2) 
substantial economic loss to the promisee as a result of such reliance; 3) the loss to 
the promisee was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and 4) the 
promisee's reliance on the promise must have been reasonable. 
Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 399, 49 P.3d 402, 404 (2002). The doctrine of promissory 
estoppel is intended to serve as a substitute for consideration to make an agreement, but it is not a 
substitute for an agreement between the parties. Id., 137 Idaho at 400, 49 P.3d at 405. 
In the case before this Court, there was no promise that notice was not required. Nor was 
there a promise to settle. As such, there was no agreement either. DeBest only engaged in the 
settlement process in April 2014, after the work on the Residence was completed. There is no 
detrimental reliance as Plaintiffs could not have provided Defendant with valid notice of an 
opportunity to repair at that time. There was no promise made by DeBest at the time of the initial 
repairs that written notice was not required for additional repairs. No promise was made that notice 
of future discovered damages was not required. 
To the extent that Plaintiffs claim that Laurie Brede authorized Gil Gould to perform all 
repair work needed to be done, and that such claimed authorization constitutes a promise or a 
waiver of notice requirements, such argument also fails for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs have 
not shown evidence that Ms. Brede had any intent to waive notice requirements. Second, Plaintiffs 
have not provided evidence that if Ms. Brede authorized Gil Gould to make all repairs, that she 
knew the extent of damage, especially where further damage was discovered after their alleged 
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conversation. Where additional and more extensive damage was discovered in August 2013 and 
later in December 2013, Ms. Brede could not knowingly waive a right to written notice of an 
opportunity to repair damages she did not know existed. See A.ff. Tyler H Neill, i1 2, Exhibit A 
(Aug. 5, 2016) (Gould Depo., 65:11-66:16, 108:12-21 (May 5, 2016)). 
Additionally, Ms. Brede did not have any authority to bind DeBest to any agreement or to 
handle financial matters. Three types of authority can exist: express, implied, and apparent. 
Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 854 P.2d 280,287 (Ct.App. 1993). "Express authority 
is articulated between the parties." Id. "Implied authority is authority which is necessary, usual, 
and proper to accomplish or perform the main authority expressly delegated to an agent." Id. 
"Apparent authority exists where a principal voluntarily places an agent in a position where 'a 
person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages and nature of the particular 
business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority." Id. 
"Apparent authority cannot be created by the acts and statements of the agent alone." Id. "One 
must use reasonable diligence to ascertain the agent's authority." Id. "Reasonable diligence 
encompasses a duty to inquire with the principal about the agent's authority." Id. "If no inquiry is 
made, the third party is chargeable with knowing what kind of authority the agent actually had, if 
any, 'and the fault cannot be thrown on the principal who never authorized the act or contract."' 
Id. 
Ms. Brede did not have any express or implied authority to bind DeBest to an agreement. 
Ms. Brede was and is the dispatch coordinator for DeBest with responsibility over receiving 
customer calls, passing on job requests to technicians, and scheduling appointments. A.ff. Laurie 
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Brede, ,r,r 3, 5 (Sep. 9, 2016). She does not authorize projects for DeBest, nor does she provide 
quotes or estimates. A.ff. Laurie Brede, ,r,r 6-7 (Sep. 9, 2016). She had no express authorization 
from DeBest to make any promises relating to financial matters, nor did she have any authority to 
bind DeBest to contracts. A.ff. Laurie Brede, ,r,r 8-9 (Sep. 9, 2016). She also did not have authority 
to authorize work to be done. A.ff. Laurie Brede, ,r 7 (Sep. 9, 2016). Such authorization cannot be 
reasonably implied as necessary, usual, and proper in performing her job duties. Finally, there is 
no apparent authority in this case. DeBest never placed Ms. Brede in a position where Gil Gould 
would be justified in believing Ms. Brede had authority to bind DeBest to an agreement. A.ff. Laurie 
Brede, ,r 10 (Sep. 9, 2016). Further, there is no evidence that Gil Gould ever inquired with DeBest 
about Ms. Brede's authority to authorize repairs to be made. With no express, implied, or apparent 
authority, Ms. Brede could not waive DeBest's right to written notice under NORA. 
NORA DOES NOT PROVIDE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plaintiffs further argue that if they did not comply with NORA's notice requirements, then 
they should still be able to bring a cause of action against DeBest under common law negligence. 
Plaintiffs seem to be misinterpreting the statutory construct of NORA. NORA is a procedural 
statute, not a remedial statute. NORA does not provide for a negligence cause of action. Rather, 
it sets forth the procedures necessary to bring and maintain a cause of action in either contract or 
tort. This Court previously ruled on a similar issue in this case, that NORA does not create a cause 
of action in contract that did not exist otherwise. Similarly, NORA does not create an action in 
tort, but rather sets forth the procedures for bringing a claim in tort. Since Plaintiffs failed to 
comply with NORA's notice requirements, they are barred from proceeding with an action in tort, 
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as well as in contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs failed to comply with NORA's written notice requirements prior to filing this 
cause of action, and therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this matter, 
without prejudice, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-2503(1). 
DATED this (;:>_. day of September, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, L 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of September, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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[X] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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Case No. CV l 5- l 78C 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE 
COMES NOW, Defendant DEBEST PLUMBING, INC., by and through its attorneys of 
record, CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, and, pursuant to the Scheduling Order filed 
November 16, 2015, and I.R.C.P. 26(b )( 4), hereby provides the following First Supplemental Expert 
Witness Disclosure identifying a supplemental report following the inspection by Patrick Coppi, the 
expert witness who may be called to testify on Defendant's behalf at the trial of the above-entitled 
matter: 
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1. Patrick J. Coppi CR, Coppi Restoration Group LLC, 3523 Red Oak Drive, Boise, 
Idaho 83703. Mr. Coppi has prepared a supplemental report of his opinions formed after his 
limited inspection of Davison's house on August 25, 2016, and the basis and reasons therefore. 
The report is attached hereto as Exhibit D. Mr. Coppi is expected to testify consistent with the 
opinions stated in said report. We anticipate using the photographs and drawings in said report 
as exhibits to support his opinions. 
Mr. Coppi's curriculum vitae was previously provided as Exhibit B, which includes Mr. 
Coppi's testimony history and publications history and Mr. Coppi's fee schedule was previously 
provided as Exhibit C. Defendant reserves the right to disclose any supplemental opinions of Mr. 
Coppi subject to any new testimony or documentation Defendant may receive. 
Defendant reserves the right to disclose additional expert witnesses if the same are retained 
prior to trial. Defendant also reserves the right to call any and all experts identified by any other 
parties to this action. 
DATED This 12th day of September, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP 
By: __ '-----=---;....__,g~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I 2th day of September, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
~~~ 
Robert D. Lewis 
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Davison V. DeBest 
Limited Post Inspection Report 
September 8, 2016 
Davison Residence 
2109 Water Lilly, Pilgrim Cove 
McCall, ID 83638 
Prepared for 
Robert D. Lewis 
Cantril! Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen LLP 
Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
1423 Tyrell Lane 




Coppi Restoration Group LLC 
7154 West State Street #241 
Boise, ID 83714 
(208) 250-6353 






I completed the inspection on August 25, 2016. It was a clear and sunny day. I used a high intensity LED 
floodlight to inspect the crawl space. Rob Lewis was present; the property manager opened the cabin, 
but did not attend the inspection. Following are the inspection findings. 
Summary of inspection 
The findings of the visual inspection and non-intrusive inspection support the information and opinions 
presented in my initial report, with one exception. Based on the inspection, I have now determined that 
the independent inspector's estimate of repair exceeds the work completed by Gould. The discrepancy 
was due to a room dimensioning error at_the time he generated the estimate. 
Additionally, during the inspection I found a portion of the upstairs bathroom that was wet, and a large 
area of new wood flooring on the main floor that received water damage after the DeBest repairs were 
completed. 
Bathroom Floor and Underlayment 
At this time, there is an area of the upstairs bathroom floor that is saturated with water and in a state 
conducive to deterioration and mold growth. This area of vinyl and underlayment is 4 to 6 inches wide, 
and runs the length of the shower pan. It is adjacent to the carpeted hallway. 
The floor is saturated because, at the time of install, the seam between the vinyl flooring and the 
shower pan was not caulked properly. Water spillage occurs from the normal use of the shower. 
Typically, floor-covering installers caulk this area for that reason. The more often a shower is used, the 
wetter it becomes. 
In deposition, Gill Gould reported that he had to place fans in the hallway outside of the bathroom 
several months after the DeBest leak, during repairs. It is probable that the water he was drying at that 
time was from the shower usage and not from the DeBest leak. 
Hardwood floor cupping caused by water vapor moving from crawlspace 
At this time, the flooring said to be replaced on the main level after the DeBest leak has indicators of 
water damage and seasonal trapped moisture in the flooring and sub-floor. There is reverse cupping and 
indicators of movement. 
This pattern of movement and cupping indicates that seasonal excessive humidity was present in the 
crawlspace after the repair. 
Testimony and documents reflect that the property has had a long history of water problems in the 
crawlspace. A high-grade vapor barrier was installed, along with a French drain to control water. My 
inspection shows that those water control measures have failed. 
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At the time of my inspection, there were high volumes of water staining, and soil deposits on top of the 
vapor barrier. 
In addition, a large pile of soil has been deposited into the crawlspace. This deposit of soil, 
approximately 20 gallons, has occurred during multiple seasonal flooding events. 
During times of seasonal water intrusion in the crawlspace, standing category 3 water accumulates on 
top of the vapor barrier as much as 10 inches deep. Humidity is elevated over several months as the 
standing water evaporates. During this time of high humidity, water vapor migrates through the sub-
floor and into the wood flooring and lower wall cavities. The excessive moisture has caused cupping and 
movement that is present at this time. Seasonal trapped moisture at this level is conducive to mold 
growth. 
Because of the chronic water problem, it is probable that water movement and migration caused mold 
under the bedroom flooring and lower walls long before the DeBest flood occurred. 
It is predictable that if the water intrusion and humidly problems are not resolved, mold remediation 
and flooring replacement will again be needed in the future. 
Water freely flows into crawl space above and through the soil. 
Exterior inspection shows numerous contributing factors to the high moisture content in the crawlspace. 
In violation of code, large areas of the ground surrounding the cabin are reverse graded, carrying 
groundwater and watershed from the roof to the foundation during rainstorms. 
Water from snowmelt is held against the siding, causing damming and intrusion. 
Also, according to code, siding clearance above ground should be a minimum of 6 inches. Siding now is 
below grade in some areas, and close to grade in others-both wick moisture upward and into the 
framing and sub floor. 
It is probable that this type of water movement additionally contributed to mold under the bedroom 
flooring and lower walls. 
There are cracks in the foundation, and gaps/holes that water can penetrate the building. 
Ventilation to the crawlspace has been sealed, causing the crawl space to hold humidity. 
Crawlspace work was not completed as Gould described in testimony. 
Inspection of the crawl space shows that work as described by Gould in deposition, and included in the 
inspector's estimate, was not completed. 
During my inspection I looked very closely for signs of mold remediation, insulation replacement, and 
vapor barrier replacement. 
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There are no indicators of mold removal, such as sanding, or wire brush marks on wood. There are no 
indicators of chemical mold remediation treatments. There are no indicators of vapor barrier or 
insulation replacement. 
There is an area where spray foam insulation removal was started, but it seems to have suddenly halted 
and was not completed. With respect to its location on the foundation wall adjacent to the soil deposits, 
I believe it was removed because of damage caused by groundwater flooding not related to the DeBest 
leak. 
The vapor barrier that was installed during foundation repairs in 2011/2012 is still in place under the 
bedroom floor area, and throughout the crawlspace. It is covered with water deposits and soil residue 
deposited during water flooding events, and is littered with rodent droppings. 




Wet bathroom floor and underlayment 
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Harwood floor cupping indicative of water vapor moving from crawlspace 
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Crawl space vapor barrier 
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Soil accumulation from flooding is under bedroom 
Examples of exterior reverse grading 
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Examples of siding perforations, and clearance violations 
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Crawlspace area of insulation removal from wall and rim joist 
Bag of soil contaminated with insulation debris and abandoned 
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Interior of wall cavity behind bathroom tub 
General Statements 
I stand ready to support any or all of my statements and to answer any questions regarding my report in 
deposition or court testimony. 
I now certify that I have no interest in the property or products which are the subject of this report, and 
that neither the scope of my employment, nor the compensation paid in any way impacts the findings 
and conclusions expressed herein. 
This report is intended for informational use only. No liability is implied or accepted upon issuing this 
report. All findings of this report are based on documents, personal interview, and photos. This report is 
not intended to serve as specifications. Should new evidence be obtained, I reserve the right to change 
any of the conclusions in this report. 
If other relevant documents are provided, depending on what they show, this report may be amended. 
Thank you for the opportunity to assist in this matter. 
DATE SUBMITTED: September 8, 2016 
Patrick J. Coppi C.R. 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB#2713 
- DOUGLA~ER, CLERfC 
By. ~)?-Deputy 
OCT O 3 2016 
Case No._ _ _,nst. N ___ _ 
Filed A.M ____ P.M 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-l 78C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
~ ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
) 





COMES NOW the Defendant above-named, by and through its attorneys of record, Cantrill 
Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, and moves this Honorable Court for an Order instructing the 
Plaintiffs, their counsel, representatives, and witnesses to refrain from making mention of, or 
interrogating, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, during the voir dire of the jury, 
opening statement, interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statements, or any other 
time while in the presence of the prospective jurors (prior to selection) or jurors (after selection), 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE - 1 
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concerning the matters identified below without first approaching the Bench and obtaining the 
Court's permission outside the presence and hearing of all prospective jurors (prior to selection) and 
of jurors (after selection). 
This motion is made on the grounds that the matters identified below are inadmissible for any 
purpose on proper and timely objection and that they have no bearing on the issues in this action or 
the rights of the parties to this action, and on the further grounds that permitting such mention would 
prejudice the jury, and sustaining objections to such mention would not cure such prejudice, but 
rather would reinforce the impact on the jurors of such prejudicial matters. 
Defendant seeks an Order in limine concerning the following matters: 
l. Reference to Insurance of any party relative to the matter at issue. 
An Order of the Court prohibiting such reference is the best possible means to circumvent the 
problems and prejudice which would be created by any such reference. 
Introduction of such evidence is improper under Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 411. On 
multiple occasions, plaintiffs have previously submitted discovery responses, memoranda on various 
motions, affidavits, and argument specifically referencing conduct of Cincinnati Insurance Company 
and its representatives. Their goal has been obvious and the prejudice to Defendant is clear. They 
want to have this case decided on the passion and prejudice which may arise from unwarranted 
consideration of insurance coverage. That is inappropriate. Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503, 
757 P.2d 1222 (Idaho App. 1988). 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE - 2 
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2. Reference to any matters dealing with (1) attempts to compromise the property 
damage claim which has been disputed in both amount and extent or (2) the offering or 
promise to pay for damage to Plaintiffs' property. 
Introduction of such evidence is improper under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 408 
and Rule 409. Such evidence would be prejudicial to Defendant. 
3. The advancement or offering to present any expert opinions through Plaintiffs 
witnesses or any other witnesses as a sanction for noncompliance with this Court's Scheduling 
Order. All expert testimony for Plaintiffs must be excluded. 
This Court issued its Scheduling Order on November 16, 2015. Under Part 3, discovery was 
to be completed not later than 60 days before trial. That date was September 9, 2016 and discovery 
is closed. Plaintiffs have not supplemented any discovery. 
Under Part 5, the Scheduling Order addressed disclosure of experts. The Court specifically 
required "expert disclosures shall contain the items identified as discoverable in IRCP 
26(b)(4)(A)(i)." Part 5 required the disclosure of experts to be not later than 120 days before trial. 
That date was July 11, 2016. No disclosure of experts occurred at that time other than Plaintiffs 
initial discovery responses (attached in pertinent part as Exhibit A), which will be addressed below. 
Nor has Plaintiff disclosed any testimony of rebuttal experts as required by Part 5, 60 days prior to 
trial was September 9, 2016. 
Defendant requested under Interrogatory No. 3 that certain disclosures be made with regard to 
identity of expert witnesses, in the attempt to obtain all opinions, underlying facts, and data within 
the scope of Rule 26(b )( 4), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs provided their Interrogatory 
Responses dated January 4, 2016. Attached hereto are pertinent discovery responses. The cover 
page of their response to discovery, pages 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 pertinent to answers to Interrogatory No. 
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3, page 17 the response to Request for Production No. 3, and pages 21, 22 and 23 where the 
discovery responses were signed by counsel and verified by the Plaintiffs. 
The Scheduling Order expressly stated "expert disclosures shall contain the items identified 
as discoverable in IRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i). 
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(i) What must be disclosed; Retained experts. For individuals 
Retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the 
case or who are employees of the party: 
• complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and 
the basis and reasons for the opinion must be disclosed; 
• the data or other information considered by the witness in 
forming the opinions; 
• any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the 
op1mons. 
• any qualification of the witness, including a list of all 
publications authored by the witness within the preceding 
ten years; 
• the compensation to be paid for the testimony; and 
• a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified 
as an expert at trial or by depositions within the preceding 
four years. 
Clearly, Plaintiffs' discovery responses did not contain any item identified in this Rule. 
After the Scheduling Order was issued, Rule 26(b )( 4)(A) was modified to include subpart 
(ii). It provides as follows: 
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(ii) What must be disclosed; Non-retained experts. For the 
individuals with knowledge of relevant facts not acquired in 
preparation for trial and who have not been retained or specifically 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case: 
• a statement of the subject matter on which the witness 
is expected to present evidence under Rule 702, 703 
or 705, Idaho Rules of Evidence, and 
• a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness 
is expected to testify. 
We submit that nothing specified in Rule 26(b )( 4)(A)(ii) is disclosed in Plaintiffs' discovery 
responses. 
In Easterling v. Kendal, 159 Idaho 902, 367 P.3d 1214 (2016), the Supreme Court had 
occasion to review a Trial Court Order excluding testimony of nonretained experts. The Court ruled 
that the parties have a duty to respond to discovery requests concerning the facts and opinions to 
which nonretained experts will testify. Id. at 911, 367 P .3d at 1223. Because the Plaintiff did not 
provide a complete statement of each expert's opinions, the facts relied on in forming those opinions 
and any exhibits that would be used to support such opinions, the Court recognized that the 
information requested in the discovery requests to Plaintiff had not been provided. Failure to provide 
an adequate response justified the District Court's discretionary decision to order that Plaintiff could 
not elicit opinions from the experts. 
Here, Plaintiffs' answer to Interrogatory No. 3 is general. Nothing pertinent to Rule 
26(b )( 4)(A)(i) is disclosed. Plaintiffs do disclose several construction professionals included in the 
case directly, but the same situation exists here as in the Easterling case. Plaintiff generally 
references opinions of one or two experts, leaves open testimony for most of the experts, and has no 
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clear disclosure of the underlying facts and data that support any opinions that Plaintiffs generally 
mention. 
Plaintiffs have not complied with this Court's Scheduling Order and have not fully responded 
to Defendant's discovery, and therefore should be barred from eliciting opinions from any expert as 
testimony in this case. 
Defendant's request oral argument on this motion. 
DATED This 30th day of September, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& ~SORENSEEN~, LP / ~ . ' 
By: /W9 ~ ------~-----------
Robe rt D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of September, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE - 7 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 





Vernon K. Smit!1 
1900 \\'. \fain St,ed 
Boise. kbho 83702 
ISB l 36.5 
-
Tdcpho:;t:: (208) 345-1125 
Facsimil1?: (208) 345-l l2Q 
;\nomey f,)r Plaintiffs 
fN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF °11-1.E FOCRTH JUD!CIAL DISTRICT or 
THE STATE OF ID All 0, IN AKO FOR THE COl l1\TY OF VALLEY 
Scott Dm·ison and Anne Davisnn, 
DeBcst Plumbing, Inc. 
















Case No. CV l 5-178C 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
lNTERJ{OGA TORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Cmv1ES NOW rhe Plaintiffs above-named, through ~:ounsei, Vernon K. Smith, and do 
respond {o Defendant's First Set or Interrogatories und Request for Production of Documents as 
follov,;s: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTER.ROG A TORY NO. 1: (i) Please state the name, address and telephone number, of each 
and cv .. :ry person. as defined on Page 3 herein, known to :you r.r y::_,ur present ,Jr fonner :iitomeys 
who h:ive any knowledge, or whu purport to hnve any knc,wledge, of any ,)f the frKts of thi~ case. 
(By this Interrogatory w;;: seek the narnes, acldress~s, unJ telepl,onc numbers cif ::dl possible 
PLA/JVTJFFS' RESPONSE' TO DEFENDA.iVT'S FIRS'T SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES4ND REQUEST FOR PRODUCT/ON OF DOCUJJENTS-PA GE I 
Exh. A, Defendant's Motion in Limine Page 1 of 10 
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Scmt and :\nm..• D,p;iso;, on J~i'.y .:-4, 2013: the proce;:;~ inv<.,!vcd in the cornpkk resiora1ion of 
the interior of the cabin :>itc. including the prtlir,1i:",ary com;-ct1ons iniiidly made l1y the De Best 
Plumbing JX:r3onn::L including work ;~erformed and stak:me.nts madt by thl:'ir plumbc.1\ Tom 
Peterson. who made: ;he:: wrrcctive install3tions: th~ ;:;vent of the discowry of the defrctiYe 
plumbing instaltations on July :24, 2013. when 1he Davidsons arrived in Idaho to begin their 
summer vaca:ion in Idaho ar their vacation home. and the extent of tbe damage n::su!ting from 
the water presence throughout the interior of the cabin site, and the narnre and extem of lhc 
repairs undertaken to res10re the premises to 1he state and condition the interior of the cabin was 
prior to the defective plumbing installations and water damage throughout tht interior, together 
with the billings and statements presented for ihe work perfonned and the fees and expenses 
assessed for that \Vork and the payment thereof 
INTERROGATORY :,,;o. 3: Identify every witness you cxpeet wi!l testif)' at trial 10 presem 
evidence under I.RE. 702, 703, and 705. Defendant seeks to obtain all opinions, underlying 
facts, and data within rhe scope of Rule 26(b)(4). Idaho Rules of Civil Proctdurc. Your ansv,·er to 
this interrogatory should be snppkmcnted pursuant to Rule 16(e} at least ninety (90) days before 
lhe date ser for rrial to begin. 
(a) For individuals retained or sptciiically employed to provide expert testimony 
in the case [or who me cmployel'.S of the p:.uty j ;:>rovide: a complet~ statement 
of all opinions to be expressed in the basis and reasons 1hercforc; the data or 
other inforrnation considered by the witness ia forming, the opinion; ar:d 
exhibits to he used as ::1 summary nf or support for the opinions: any 
qualifications of the witness, including a li~t of ~111 publications author~d by 
PL4IN11 FFS' RESPONSE TO DEFEi\'DANT'S FIRST SET OF 
INTF:RR0GAJORJESA:\'D REQUEST FOR PR0DlJCTI0N OF DOCU.tfENTS-PAGE 4 
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the ,,·jrn;:::.~ within the.: pr,~c~ding l O Y'-\trs: the compensmion 10 bt p2id :or the 
t.,~stimon}: ;,. listing 0f any other cases in ,;diich rhe witness has k'stified as an 
expert at trbJ ur by d:::position \vit.hin 1.he pr~ceding four y~ars: 
(b) For indi .... ·iduals "vith kno·,\kdge of rekvant f:1c:s not acquired in prepJrmion 
for trial and \Vl10 have not been ret::i.ind or specifically cmplnye<l to provide 
expert testimony in the case, provide a stltement of the subject mailer on 
which the witness is expected w present evidence under Ida:10 Ruk of 
Evidtnce 702, 703 or 705, and a summary of the facts and opinions ro \vhich 
the witnt:ss is expected to testify; 
ic) Further, for each ,vitness identified in Answer to >lo. 3(a) and No_ 3{b\ stnte 
whether or not he or she performed any test. analysis or examination of any 
physical evidence related to rhis litigation, and if so: (i) during what dates he 
or she conducted same; (ii) whether he or she reuch any conclusions as a result 
of the test, analysis or examination: (iij) the name, or other means of 
identification, and address of the person who has present cu::.1ody of each item 
that was tested, analyzed or examined; ~md (iv) whether he or she submit1,.xl a 
report setting forth his or her opinions or conclusions, rmd, if so, pl.:asc state 
the date this report was submitted. am.l name and address of the pe:-son who 
has pres,~m custoJy thereof. 
RESPONSE TO tNTERROGATORY NO. 3: Scott and Anne Davison are the owners of ihe 
residence, Iocattd at 2109 Water Lilly in Pilgrim Cove, ;,,kCalL Idaho 83638, and v;i!! 1cs1itY as 
t0 their obse;vations regarding the defecti\'e p'.umhing installations :1nd the water d:11n;~ge 
PJATNTJFFS' llE"SPONSE TO lJEFEiVDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
liVTJ:,JUl.OGATORIESAND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OFI>OCUMEiYTS---J~.-1GE 5 
Exh. A. Defendant's Motion in Limine Page 3 of 10 
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resulting the·tcfi·on1!' and the ongoing repairs undertaken to restor~- the pren1ises nnd tbt payrncnts 
they have paid fur those repairs .'.md restorJ.tions rmidc by Gould Custom Builders Inc .. Aiso the 
owners. :1long with Gil Gouid, Bo Oou!d, Christopher Gould, Tom Peterson, and ,)thcr matcr-ial 
and labor .suppliers on and iviil testify as to the entire p,occss of the work and rt>pairs ~hat were 
made, based u;:ion their knowledge, including the plumbing installations and the replacement ,)f 
rhe defective component part(s) perfom1ed by the DeBest Plumbing employee-personnel. Tom 
Peterson. pursuar.t to DeBe.st's warranty, and rht'y will funher testify as to all services that wcr\! 
render('d nnd pcrfom1eJ by Gould Custom Buikkr's. Jnc., and their personnel, agents, 
employees, and subcontractors in thc- restoration and repair of the entire interior premises thm 
was required to be made as a result of the ,vater Jamage caused by 1he leaking plumbing 
components. Each of the pcrsonneL employees, ag.:nts, subcontractors of Gould Custom 
Buildcr·s Inc. Juve specialized knowledge wi1h respect to their experience in the custom building 
trade, making repairs, restorations renovations a11d restoration of buildings and interior decor 
from \Yater damage and construction restoration requi::-ernents, and will idcmi(y all of their work 
they perfoimed to restt,re rhe premises from the water damage. They are experts by virtue of 
their knowkdg(_:, skill, experience, training, and education, and will testify regarding 1he work 
they perforn1ed, the value of the sen ices they perfonned, the bilJings th:it \vere submitted to the 
homeowners for compensation for their services, and their detection of tht initial \1/%::r leakage 
resulting from the- defective plumhing components parts and installations in the bathroom wi,hin 
the cabin site premises. Gil Gould, as the managing agent of (3ould Custom Builders Inc .. had 
contracted the services of Ddkst ?lumbing Inc. as a subcontractor of his company, and as tha 
agent of the property owners, to p'..:rfonn the plumbing installations, and Gii Gould \.Vas in 
PLA lNTIFFS' RESPONSE TO .DEFENDANT'S FJRS,T SET OF 
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re~uJar ~~nj routine cont~c1 µ-}th L\~I3e!,t Plurnhing_ and their person~c~] r~~laring ,(, the initi:i! 
installati(>ns and the subsequent repair and repbcem~nts made t'.) 1b0sc ins:alla,ic,ns, 1.vhich 
involved the repair mid replacement of the defective piumbing cornpone;1ts and con-ecti\'e 
measures taktn under the \varranty provided by DcBest PJumbing. The resulting damages were 
so extensive r.hat DeBest Plumbing, initially n:queskd the homcov.11crs to submit a claim to their 
own homeovvT1a's insurance carrkr, hut the homeowners felt that was an improper avenue for 
recourse, as the damage was the resull of a plumbing installation that ,vas under warrnnly, and 
the damages should he covered by the liability insurance can-ier of DeBest Plurebing lnc., 
Therefore, DeBcst Plumbing 0l{;cted to submit the m:Jlter to their liability insurance carrier, 
Cincinnmi bsurance Company to proviJe the payment and compen$ation for the costs of 
restoration to the premises. The facts :md Jata i:1 this panicular case upon which each of these 
experts will base their opini0n is that gained from their observation of the defeci:ive plumbing 
installations, and 1hat installation caused the leak and water damage, and nee<l for the plumbing 
n:pair(s) aml interior restoration to restme the damage L'.aused by the leaking water, fo!IO\ving the 
dis~overy of the leak on July 24, 201 J. They all obsencd the damage caused from the water 
seepage throughout the interior of the cabin and from their personal observations and with the 
experience of the Gould construction personnel, realized much of the interior materials would 
have to be Tcmoved and replaced because of the concentration of moisture and the potential of 
mold throughout These observations and factors are those typic;~lly and reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the field of restorations and repairs from water damage, and it •,va:; from and upon 
those observations the detenninarion was made for removal and replacerne1:t of su:::h materials 
and ,,.hat was essential w be: don1: in the ne~d to re,~wre the interior of 1hc pr.::mises to ih 
PL4lNTlFFS' RESPOXSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SI::T OF 
lNTERROGATORfE,5,:.4ND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUJ!E/\'TS~P.4GE 7 
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gh·cn by ,hese ex.pens ·,vi!! ;;:m::irnce the ultimi.lt~ issue as to the damage susmineJ from the 
defective plumbing insta!latitms and the cost of restoration and repair required to restore the 
interior of th~~ premises to its condition prior Lo the water darnage from the defoctive installations. 
The Plaintiffs may elect to secure sen'jce:; of additional experts who \Vil! review the facts 
and data concerning the water damnge ::md the reSt(lration and repair taken to restore the 
premises, and to determine rhe reasonabkness of the fees assessed for those services and 
compensation paid, given the work perfonned and the reasonable value for those services 
performed in 1he area of McCall, Idaho. With that thought in mind, this ansv,·er will be 
supplemented as such addjtion information is received i!l this matter. 
JNTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please identify and dc;>scribe in detail all dr:nvings, il!u~trations, 
photographs, movies or videotapes, written documents or otlll:r memoranda of which either you 
or your presenI or form.er attorrn:ys are aware which pertain to any of the issues in this litigation. 
In :mswering this interrogatory, describe the nature and ;.;ubject matter of the item, its date:>, if 
applicable, and name. address. job title, anJ capacity of ~ach person ,vho prepared it or with 
knowledge of it, and for each such item, pkase specify wb.:ther or not you intend to utilize il at 
triai as an exhibit 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: To the e:'.lcnt any drawings, illustrations. 
photographs, movies, or videotapes, written documtnts, or other mcmor:mdums exist concerning 
these damages and repairs made then:10, the) \VOulJ be referred to and conmined in the 
production of documents_ It is the Dnvidsons' belief that Ronald Egland may now be the one 
who currently p~)S-sesses the photographs of the damaged interior of the cabin, 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTlOS NO. ~: Pka~e produce all dt1cum~ms ,,.bich pertiin ~,i 1:my of 
tJ1e issues (induding li:1bi!i1y a,1d damag~s) in this litig:a!ion, as ,vell as all pbysic:ai i,crns arnJ 
documents which Plaintiffs intend to utilize a trial as an exhibit. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODlJCTfO:,: 'NO. 2: All documents crnTently in the 
possc:ssion Df Plaintiffs that per1ain io liability ;;nd damages in this litigation, including physical 
items and documents 1.vhich Plaintiffs intend to utilize ;:it trial as an exhibit, are attached he;-eto, 
and upon such time further documentation is (tbtained that relates to the issues in this matter, 
they will he provided through supplementation. 
REQUEST FOR PRODl1CTION NO. 3: Please produce all items and documents identified in 
your Answer to !ntenogatory Nos. 1 (ii), 3(c), and 4. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Those documents available to 
Plainti ffa at the presl:nt time arc atwchcd hcri:.'.tO. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce each Jocument regarding all losses or 
expenses for \vhich you seek compensation in this action. 
RESPONSE TO REQCEST FOR PRODCCTION NO. 4: See attached documentation. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please produce each document that contains, refers io, 
or relates to any admission you contend the Defendant and its agents have made regarding 
subject matter of this action. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 1'0. 5: To each a<lmission that w<ts made by 
the- Defendants and their agcms, to the c:xtcnt not om!. it i.s attached hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODT iCTiO!\ NO. 6: Please prnduce each document thm contains, rdh.s to, 
or r0lates to any decL1rr.1tion again,~t i:,tere.st you conknd the Dcfond,mt has rnade regarding th,;; 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
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ho1ne caused by freezing during 2012/20] 3 \Vinter. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION ~O. l 5: There are n.:) written ccmtrncts 
relating to auy repairs mnJ..: hi the Yc1cation home that were ca~1~ed '.'.:y u:1y freezing .:ondi,irms 
winter conditions tlut required rt!pair. 
Dated this 31st day of December, 2015. 
V emon K.. Smith 
A rtomey for Plaintiffs 
\ 
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ST A TE OF ID/'i.HO ) 
Counry of Ada ) 
\"ERiFiCJ\T!O~, 
I, Scott Davi~on, Plaintiffs in the foregoing action, being first duly sworn, do hereby declare ro 
the undersigned authority that l have read and examined the foregoing document and to the best 




" --... ·--.....__~ 
SWOJ~·AMJ SUBSCRIBED TO me by !elephe'10, having bef7~ his sign~ in the 
past, this f January, 2016 ~ ; \ ) 
I 
) 
otary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires 
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County of i\da ) 
I, Anne Davison, Plaintiffs in the action, being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to 
the undersigned aiithority that J have read and examined the foregoing document, and to best 
of my knowledge and belief, it is tmc, coirect and complete. 
Anne Davison _________ _ 
SWORfANP:~UBSCRlBED TO me by telephone, 





Nota1y Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires 
the 
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Filed I\ ;Jl/ A.M. w----
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT --~.M 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBEST PLUMBING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2015-178-C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs Scott and Am1e Davison claim Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. botched a 
plumbing job it performed as part of a remodel of their cabin in McCall. The parties agree that 
the remodel project was a "substantial remodel" within the meaning of the Notice and 
Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA"), LC. §§ 6-2501 to -2504, rendering NORA applicable to 
this action. But they disagree about whether the Davisons either satisfied or are relieved from 
NORA's pre-lawsuit notice requirement. They have filed what amount to cross-motions for 
summary judgment on that point. Those motions were argued and taken under advisement on 
September 19, 2016. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that NORA requires the 
Court to dismiss what remains of this action. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
In early 2013, builder Gil Gould contracted with DeBest for DeBest to perform plumbing 
work at the Davisons' cabin in McCall, Idaho. (Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, 113-4; Gould 
Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, 13.) Gould was in the midst of completely renovating that cabin under 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER· l 
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an oral agreement with the Davisons. (Gould Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, ,r 2.) There was no 
contract between the Davisons and DeBest. (Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ,r 5.) 
DeBest finished its work in June 2013. (Gould Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, ,r 4.) For more 
than a month after that, the Davisons' cabin was empty. (Gould Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, ,r 7.) 
Then, on July 25, 2013, Scott Davison returned to the cabin and found standing water and other 
indicia ofleaky plumbing. (Davison Aff. filed Mar. 21, 2016.) The next morning, he sent Gould 
an e-mail, telling him about the problem. (Ex. to Davison Aff.) 
Gould then relayed this information by telephone to Tom Peterson of DeBest. (Gould 
Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, 18.) Peterson, Gould, and Scott Davison met that same day at the 
Davisons' cabin. (Gould Af[ filed Aug. 19, 2016, ,r 9.) The source of the leak was identified, 
and Peterson fixed it. (Id.) Peterson also helped Gould remove water-damaged insulation and 
sheetrock. (Id.) According to both Gould and Scott Davison, Peterson told Gould and Scott 
Davison that the leak was his fault and that DeBest would pay for the damage it caused. (Gould 
Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, ,i 10; Davison Aff. filed Mar. 21, 2016.) According to Gould, DeBest's 
acceptance of responsibility was then confirmed in a telephone call with a DeBest employee with 
a supervisory role at DeBest, who agreed that Gould should do the necessary work and bill 
DeBest for it. (Gould Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016. ,r~ 11-12.) The DeBest employee, Laurie Brede, 
disputes that she either authorized or had authority to authorize any such thing. (Brede Aff. filed 
Sept. 13, 2016, ,r,r 3-10.) In any event, at the time, DeBest's understanding was that any 
additional repairs would be minimal and would be completed by Gould within a few days. 
(Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ~ 9; Peterson Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ,r 10.) 
That isn't how it turned out. In August 2013, Anne Davison notified Gould of previously 
undiscovered water damage, but that infonnation was not relayed to DeBest. (Neill Aff. filed 
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Aug. 8, 2016, Ex. A at 65:11-66: 16; Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ,i 9.) Gould ultimately 
inspected the cabin in December 2013, and he began major repair efforts after discovering 
extensive water damage and mold. (Neill Aff filed Aug. 8, 2016, Ex. A. at 97:10-23.) DeBest 
was not notified of this additional damage until February 2014, when it received an invoice from 
Gould for the cost of both the July 2013 repair and the later, more extensive repair begun in 
December 2013. (Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ,i 9.) 
The record reflects some effort by the parties, after DeBest received the invoice, to agree 
on an amount De Best would pay for the damage to the Davisons' cabin. That effort was not, 
however, successful. Consequently, on July 21, 2015, the Davisons filed this action, alleging 
claims for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and 
negligence. (Compl. ,i 8.) 
In February 2016, DeBest moved for summary judgment. DeBest contended that the 
Davisons' contract and warranty claims failed as a matter of law because of the absence of a 
contract between it and the Davisons. In opposing that motion, the Davisons never contended 
they were relying on a contract between themselves and DeBest. Instead, they relied on the 
contract between Gould and DeBest. They asserted that NORA applies to this action, and they 
theorized that it eliminates the common law's requirement for privity of contract, enabling 
homeowners to sue subcontractors on contract theories, even without a contractual relationship. 
The Court rejected that theory and therefore granted summary judgment against the Davisons' 
contract and warranty claims. DeBest also challenged the Davisons' negligence claim, 
contending that negligence is not an available theory because its work on the Davisons' cabin 
had been performed under a contract (its contract with Gould). The Court rejected DeBest's 
argument that its contract with Gould somehow deprived the Davisons-non-parties to the 
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contract-of the right to sue DeBest in negligence to recover for any damage its allegedly 
negligent work did to their property. Thus, the Davisons' negligence claim survived the motion. 
A few months later, on June 27, 2016, the Davisons filed a motion entitled "Motion to 
Confirm Implementation of the Provisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act Apply to 
Pending Lawsuit." Through that motion, they continue asserting that NORA applies to this 
action, and they seek a ruling to that effect. Additionally, they seek a ruling that this action is not 
barred by NORA's pre-lawsuit notice requirement. Despite its unusual title, the Davisons' 
motion is in substance a motion for summary judgment on those two points. 
On August 8, 2016, DeBest filed its second motion for summary judgment, contending 
that the Davisons' negligence claim must be dismissed because they failed to comply with 
NORA's pre-lawsuit notice requirement. Thus, DeBest agrees with the Davisons that NORA 
applies to this action,1 but disagrees with them about the consequences of its application. 
As already noted, the parties' NORA-related cross-motions were argued and taken under 
advisement on September 19, 2016. They are ready for decision. 
1 
Because the parties agree that NORA applies to this action, it is not technically necessary for 
the Court to analyze that issue. Neve1iheless, the Court notes that the record substantiates the 
parties· shared conclusion in that regard. NORA applies to claims by "claimants" against 
·'construction professionals" arising from construction defects. LC. § 6-2503(1). As Gould's 
plumbing subcontractor on the project at issue. DeBest is a "construction professional'' under 
NORA. See LC. § 6-2502(4). So long as that project is a "substantial remodel," the Davisons 
are "claimants·' under NORA because they are homeowners asserting a claim against a 
construction professional arising from a construction defect that occurred during their cabin's 
substantial remodel. See LC.§ 6-2502(3). Gould's work on the Davisons' cabin indeed is a 
·'substantial remodel'' under NORA, see I.C. § 6-2502(9), because the total remodel cost 
exceeded half of the cabin's assessed value for property-tax purposes. (Neill Aff. filed Aug. 8, 
2016, B.) Thus, NORA applies to this action. The balance of the Court's analysis proceeds 
from that conclusion. 





Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). If 
the movant is seeking summary judgment against a claim or defense asserted by the nonmovant, 
the movant carries its burden by showing that the evidence does not support an element of the 
challenged claim or defense. E.g., McHugh v. Reid, 156 Idaho 229,303,324 P.3d 998, 1002 (Ct. 
App. 2014). The movant's showing can take either (or both) of two forms: (i) affirmative 
evidence disproving the element at issue; or (ii) a showing that the nonmovant is unable to offer 
admissible evidence proving that element. Id.; see also I.R.C.P. 56(c)(l). 
If the movant carries its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that a 
genuine factual dispute must be resolved before judgment can be awarded to the movant. E.g., 
Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 104, 294 P.3d 1111, 1116 
(2013). To carry that ultimate burden, the nonmovant "may not rest upon mere allegations in the 
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Id (quotation marks omitted). The record must be construed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the nonmovant's favor. Id. 
Nevertheless, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient" 
for the nonmovant to avoid summary judgment. AED, Inc. v. KDC Jnvs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 
163,307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013). 





A. DeBest's motion 
NORA is intended to "give contractors the opportunity to fix construction defects before 
a lawsuit is filed." 1\1endenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434,436, 196 P.3d 352,354 (2008). To 
that end, it provides that "[p]rior to commencing an action against a construction professional for 
a construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the construction 
professional." LC. § 6 ·-2503(1 ). "Serve" means "personal service or delivery by certified mail." 
LC. § 6-2502(8). The written notice, so served, must "state that the claimant asserts a 
construction defect claim against the construction professional and ... describe the claim in 
reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature of the defect." LC.§ 6-2503(1). 
'·Any action commenced by a claimant prior to compliance with [this pre-lawsuit notice 
requirement] shall be dismissed by the court without prejudice." Id (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that the Davisons never sent a NORA-compliant notice to DeBest The 
Davisons nevertheless say they complied with NORA's pre-lawsuit notice requirement as, after 
discovering the water leak, Scott Davison e-mailed Gould to tell him about it. In their view, 
NORA requires giving notice to the particular construction professional with which they 
contracted, even if, after giving the notice, they sue a different construction professional entirely. 
(Pls.' Mem. Opp'n Second Mot. Summ. J. 14.) Along those lines, they point out that, under 
NORA, a "claimant" must be either a "homeowner" or a homeowner's association, and a 
"homeowner" is "[a]ny person who contracts with a construction professional for the 
construction, sale, or construction and sale of a residence." J.C. § 6-2502(5 ). It is their contract 
with Gould that makes them a "homeowner" for purposes of NORA. Consequently, they argue, 
Gould is the person to whom they were required to give notice before suing DeBest. 
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The Davisons' argument contradicts NORA's plain language, Again, NORA provides 
that '·[p]rior to commencing an action against a construction professional for a construction 
defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the construction professional," stating 
"that the claimant asserts a construction defect claim against the construction professionaL" LC. 
§ 6-2503( 1) ( emphasis added). This is a directive that the notice be served on the construction 
professional to be sued. Moreover, NORA's definition of "construction professional" includes 
both contractors and subcontractors, LC. § 6-2502(4), making clear that NORA does not require 
privity of contract with the claimant for one to be considered a ·'construction professional" 
entitled to a pre-lawsuit notice. Thus, the Davisons were required to serve notice on DeBest, 
despite the absence ofprivity of contract, before suing DeBest. They simply did not do so. 
DeBest was given only oral notice of the water damage discovered in July 2013, not the written 
notice NORA requires. Further, as to the water damage that was not discovered and remedied 
until another several months later, DeBest was given no notice at all. 
The Davisons' failure to give the notice NORA requires triggers its mandate for dismissal 
without prejudice. The statutory language admits of no alternative. LC.§ 6-2503(1) ("Any 
action commenced by a claimant prior to compliance with [NORA's pre-lawsuit notice 
requirement] shall be dismissed by the court without prejudice.'·). The Davisons argue. though, 
that equitable alternatives are available. Despite that NORA commands the Court to dismiss an 
action filed without giving the mandatory pre-lawsuit notice, the Davisons say equitable 
principles---narnely, waiver and promissory estoppel-preclude dismissal. 
The Davisons' equitable arguments, however, run headlong into a bar on employing 
equitable principles to defeat statutes. Indeed,'" [i]t is well understood that equitable principles 
cannot supersede the positive enactments of the legislature."' ,')pencer v. Jameson, 14 7 Idaho 
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497,506,211 P.3d 106, 115 (2009) (quoting Davis v. Idaho Dep't £?( Health & We(fare, 130 
Idaho 469,471,943 P.2d 59, 61 (Ct.App.1997)); see also 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity§ 83 ('·A court 
of equity, accordingly, will not give relief in contravention of a statutory requirement or in 
contravention of a directly applicable rule of law, regardless of its view of the equities. Equity 
courts cannot disregard, or in effect repeal, statutory and constitutional requirements and 
provisions.") (footnotes omitted). The Court is not at liberty to disregard the statutory mandate 
for dismissal. even assuming dismissal were at odds with equitable principles. 
Consequently, DeBest is entitled to summary judgment as requested, even if the equitable 
principles the Davisons ask the Court to invoke otherwise would warrant relief here. The Court 
nevertheless will analyze those equitable principles to provide an alternative basis for its decision 
to grant summary judgment to DeBest. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that equitable principles could be invoked to override 
the statutory mandate for dismissal, the waiver doctrine does not justify that outcome here. 
·'Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right." Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Nw. 
Mut. L(le. Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 804, 806, 718 P .2d 1242, 1244 (1986) ( emphasis added). To result 
in a waiver of a legal right, a party's conduct must be "direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a 
purpose to abandon or waive" that right. Id. The Davisons argue that actions taken by DeBest-· 
inspecting the cabin and saying it would accept responsibility for the resulting dan1ages-amount 
to a waiver of its right under NORA to pre-lawsuit notice. But the evidence shows DeBest did 
not know, at any time before this action's filing, that it had a right to pre-lawsuit notice. 
(Peterson Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ,r 14; Ncidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, il 16.) There is no 
contrary evidence. Thus, there is no evidence that DeBest intentionally waived its right to the 
pre-lawsuit notice NORA requires. 
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The other equitable doctrine on which the Davisons rely. promissory estoppel, acts as a 
substitute for consideration. E.g., Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass ·11., 141 Idaho 362, 367-68, 109 
P.3d 1104, 1109-10 (2005). Four elements must be satisfied for it to be applied: "(l) reliance 
upon a specific promise; (2) substantial economic loss to the promisee as a result of such 
reliance; (3) the loss to the promisee was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and 
(4) the promisee's reliance on the promise must have been reasonable." Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 
Idaho 397, 399, 49 P.3d 402,404 (2002). Consequently, for a statutory pre-lawsuit notice 
requirement to be waived under a theory of promissory estoppel, a claimant must show that the 
paity to which it was required to provide notice made certain promises or representations that 
would alleviate the need for formal notice under the statute. See Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial 
Hosp., 130 Idaho 420,425,942 P.2d 544,549 (1997) (applying LC.§ 6-906, a pre-lawsuit notice 
provision in the Idaho T011 Claims Ad). 
Here, there is evidence that, after the plumbing leak was discovered, DeBest promised to 
pay for the damage resulting from it. The Davisons have never claimed in this action that 
DeBest's alleged promise in that regard constitutes a contract that they want to enforce. To the 
extent that alleged promise falls short of constituting a contract solely because of an absence of 
consideration, the doctrine of promissory estoppel might act as a substitute for consideration, 
validating the alleged promise as a contract. That seems to be a potentially pem1issible role the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel could play in this situation. 
NORA would not apply to an action for breach of any such contract. NORA applies to 
any ··action ... for a construction defect." I.C. § 6-2503(1). If the need for a brewing action of 
2 
Unlike NORA, the Idaho Tort Claims Act does not expressly mandate dismissal of an action 
filed without giving the requisite pre-lawsuit notice. 
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that s011 is avoided because an agreement is reached under which the construction professional 
will pay for the damage caused by its defective work, but then the construction professional 
breaches the agreement by not making payment, the homeowner's resulting breach-of-contract 
claim cannot reasonably be thought to be subject to NORA. Indeed, NORA defines the term 
"action" as claim ... for damage ... caused by a defect in the construction of a residence or 
in the substantial remodel of a residence." LC. § 6-2502(1). In this s011 of scenario, the claim 
technically is for damage caused not by the construction defect, but instead by the construction 
professional· s breach of a contract that did not even require any construction work. NORA· s 
purpose, again. is to ''give contractors the opportunity to fix construction defects before a lawsuit 
is filed.'' Mendenhall, 146 Idaho at 436, 196 P.3d at 354. Where what is at issue is a 
construction professional's promise to do something other than construction work-i.e., to pay 
for damage resulting from work done under an earlier contract-the NORA regime does not 
apply, as the opportunity it offers construction professionals to fix their work themselves (instead 
ofto pay for someone else to fix it) has already been bargained away. 
The Davisons are trying to use the doctrine of promissory estoppel in a different way. 
They want to use DeBest's alleged promise to pay for the damage resulting from its apparently 
defective plumbing work to estop DeBest from asserting the right to a pre-lawsuit notice before 
being sued~=.::· It is unclear how it could be reasonable for the Davisons, allegedly having 
been promised by DeBest that DeBest will pay for the damage, to do the following in supposed 
reliance on that alleged promise: (i) fail to sue DeBest upon the alleged promise; but (ii) instead 
sue DeBest in tort, without giving the notice NOR.A requires before doing so. Assuming DeBest 
made a promise to pay for the damage, as the Davisons say, the promise (if unperformed) may 
invite a breach-of-contract action that, as already explained, would not be subject to NORA. But 
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it is unclear how the promise alleviates the need for the NORA-required notice in connection 
with an action not based on the promise. Consequently. even if the Court had authority to invoke 
equitable principles to ove1Tide NORA ·s statutory mandate for dismissal in these circumstances, 
the Court would not invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel to do so. 
B. The Davisons' motion 
Through their own NORA-related motion, the Davisons seek two rulings: (1) that NORA 
applies to this action; and (2) that DeBest may not defend against this action by invoking 
NORA's pre-lawsuit notice requirement. Again, the parties are in agreement as to the first of 
those two points. The Davisons' motion is granted to the extent they seek a ruling that NORA 
applies. For reasons already explained, however, DeBest is not barred from defending against 
this action based on the Davisons' failure to comply with NORA's pre-lawsuit notice 
requirement. Thus, the Davisons' motion is otherwise denied. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that DeBest's motion for summary judgment is granted. In accordance 
with I.R.C.P. 54(a) and LR.C.P. 58(a), judgment will be entered in a separate document in 
DeBest's favor and against the Davisons. The judgment will provide that the Davisons' contract 
claims are dismissed with prejudice. Those claims' dismissal with prejudice is based on the 
Court's prior ruling, made in connection with DeBest's first motion for summary judgment, that 
the Davisons are not entitled (under NORA or otherwise) to sue upon the contract between 
DeBest and Gould. The judgment will provide that the Davisons' negligence claim is dismissed 
without prejudice. That claim's dismissal without prejudice is in keeping with LC. § 6-2503( 1 ). 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Davisons' motion to confirm NORA's applicability 
to this action is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted to the extent the Davisons seek a 
ruling that NORA applies, but it is denied to the extent the Davisons seek a ruling that they are 
relieved from complying with NORA's pre-lawsuit notice requirement. 
~h 
Dated this _2_ day of October, 2016. 
Jas . Scott 
DI~JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12 
00000614
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on October 5 , 2016, I served a copy of this document as follows: 
Robert D. Lewis 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, 
LLP 
( L}ti:S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
1423 Tyrell Ln 
PO Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701-0359 
Vernon K. Smith Jr. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W Main 
Boise, ID 83 702 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ANDORDER-13 
( ) Facsimile 
(~S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
DOUGLAS A. MILLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
By:~~~ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
00000615
• Al'lOUGLAS A.,cfc, ( CLER~ "'ay :r_~_ 
OCT O 5 2016 
Case No':tf I Inst. No 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAf!i'I)us~T ;,M. ___ P,.M 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBEST PLUMBING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2015-178-C 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
The claims for breach of contract and breach of express or implied warranty brought by 
Plaintiffs Scott and Anne Davison ("the Davisons") against Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
("DeBest") are dismissed with prejudice. 
The Davisons' negligence claim against DeBest is dismissed without prejudice. 
-lk 
Dated this 5 day of October, 2016. 
~Q~-~ 
Jaso.Scott 
DIS CT JUDGE 
JUDGMENT- I 
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OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV l 5-178C 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
COMES NOW Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., by and through its counsel of record, 
Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, and hereby moves this Court for an Order Granting 
Defendant De Best Plumbing, Inc.' s Motion for Award of Costs and Attorney Fees pursuant to Rules 
54( d)(l) and 54( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure following the Court's Judgment entered 
October 5, 2015. This motion is supported by Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc.'s Verified 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees filed herewith. 
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... 
DATED This /1/day of October, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
By:r&~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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I hereby certify that on the Hday of October, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
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Attorney for Plaintiffs 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
J>I<""" Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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From:cantrill Skinner 
Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
- 2083457212 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DAVISON, ) 
) Case No. CV 15-178C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
) 





TO: PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEY, VERNON K. SMITH: 
#342 P.002/005 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant, by and through 
its counsel of record, CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP, hereby offers Plaintiffs to 
allow judgment to be taken against them in the amount of$24,006.00. The amount set forth herein 
includes any attorneys' fees awardable by contract or law and any costs and expenses awardable by 
law, which have accrued to the date of this Offer of Judgment. 
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From:Cantrlll Skinner - 2083457212 #342 P.003/005 
This Offer of Judgment is made pursuant to and for the putposes specified in Rule 68 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and is not to be construed, either as an admission that said 
Defendant was liable in this action, or that the Plaintiffs have suffered any damages. 
DATED This / 2.... day of January, 2016. 
' 
Robert D. Lewis, Oft e Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 






Robert D. Lewis 
00000623
From:Cantrlll Skinner - 2083457212 #342 P.005/005 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of October, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the unaccepted Offer of Judgment now filed with the Court, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney.for Plaint(ff..<; 
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Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
ISB 1365 
Telephone (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
oclf e A. M~R· CLERK 
B 
, ,l t. ,,.._, Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
















MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISALLOW 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT, 
DEBEST PLUMBING, INC. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiffs above named, Scott Davison and Anne Davison, by and through their 
attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, have filed their motion to disallow any request for attorney 
fees, challenging the sole statutory basis Defendant has relied upon, identified to be I. C. §12-121, 
and specifically challenge the reasonableness of two identified costs sought by Defendant under 
Rule 54, l.R.C.P., as is reflected within their Motion for attorney fees and costs, and as further 
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identified within Defendant's Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, filed with the 
court on October 17, 2016. 
The Plaintiffs have objected to this request for attorney fees and those costs, and would 
identify the various reasons therefore within this Memorandum. 
COSTS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT 
The specific costs now being claimed in relation to an expert witness fee of $2,000.00, is 
not allowed by the rules, as only "reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a 
deposition or at a trial of an action, but not more than $2,000 for each expert witness for all 
appearances", as no expert testified at any deposition proceeding, or at any trial proceeding. 
There exists no basis to claim these expenditures under Rule 54, I.R.C.P .. This record fails to 
identify any expert who has testified at all, as none was ever were deposed, and there was no 
trial in this case, as there the matter was dismissed upon Defendant's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Rule 54(d)(l) provides, with respect to the "expert witness fee" and the 
"deposition" costs as follows: (1) In General; Items Allowed. 
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs are allowed 
as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, that party is entitled to the 
following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: ....... . 
(ix) reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of 
an action1 but not more than $2.000 for each expert witness for all appearancesi 
(x) charges for reporting and transcribing ofa deposition taken in preparation for trial of 
an action. whether or not read into evidence in the trial of an action; and 
(xi) charges for one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any of the parties to the actwn in 
preparation for trial of the action; 
The trial court may, on obiection, disallow any of the above-described costs on a finding that 
the costs were not reasonably incurred; were incurred for the purpose of harassment; were 




incurred in bad faith: or were incurred for the purpose o(increasing the costs to any other 
party. The mere fact that a deposition is not used in the trial of an action, either as evidence read 
into the record or for the purposes of impeachment, does not indicate that the taking of the 
deposition was not reasonable, or that a copy of a deposition was not reasonably obtained, or that 
the cost of the deposition should otherwise be disallowed, so long as it's taking was reasonable 
for trial preparation. 
The only depositions taken in this case were in regard to Mr. Gould, who undertook the 
restoration of the damages, and Scott Davison, the homeowner-claimant in this action. They each 
were deposed in anticipation of a trial in this controversy, but were not commenced until after the 
initial summary proceedings when the court denied Defendant's motion to reject Plaintiffs' tort 
claim. That cost of those two depositions is claimed to be in the amount of $1,268.89, and 
represents an expense that would have been avoided entirely had the Defendant endorsed the 
application of the statutory provisions that Plaintiffs invoked (NORA) when embarking upon this 
journey to recover the promised payment upon the deferred acceptance of the liability and 
responsibility from DeBest for the costs incurred in the restoration of the residence from the 
damages caused by the defective installation of the plumbing components by DeBest employee, 
Tom Peterson. 
DeBest personnel had accepted responsibility for the damages; promised prompt payment 
upon receipt of the billings and invoices; never recanted or rejected that commitment DeBest 
personnel had made; never said any of the personnel lacked authority when committing to the 
payment of those restoration costs; that DeBest management sought disbursement, in payment of 
those invoices, from their liability carrier, instructing them to make the payment. There was never 
any claim raised by DeBest that there existed a right to receiving written notice of the claim before 
their involvement, or before suit was filed against them, having at all times voluntarily accepting 
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the deference of the liability from the General Contractor, Gould Custom Builders, Inc. (GCBI), 
and told the carrier DeBest was liable, and were authorized to pay for the restoration process. 
The fact that no "Written Notice" was served upon the sub-contractor, who accepted 
liability and responsibility for payment, was a factor known from the inception of this case, and 
was never raised as an issue upon the selection of this statutory process and procedure utilized by 
the Plaintiffs back in July, 2013. The notice was never an issue or ever became a disputed fact, and 
the expenses of the deposition costs and the non-qualifying claim for "expert witness fee" would 
have only related to the "merits" of the case, upon the claim for recovery of the damages, and not 
to the "issue of statutory interpretation that brought forth the disposition of the case on a procedural 
matter before the court, whereupon this Court has perceived the issue to be one of an interpretation 
of the statute, invoking statutory construction. 
Had the matter been allowed to proceed to trial, those specific expenses may have been 
proven to be necessary, and potentially reasonable, but had the case gone to trial upon the merits, 
Plaintiffs would have been the prevailing party, and Plaintiffs would have been allowed to recover 
their costs as the prevailing party, together with their attorney fees under NORA, and Defendant's 
expenses would not be an issue to consider, as they would been required to pay as before agreed. 
These expenses (two depositions and non-qualifying expert fees) are totally unrelated to 
the issue that was raised by Defendant, as belatedly advanced through Defendant's second motion 
for summary judgment, which was strictly based upon a question of law, involving the courts 
perception as to what interpretation is to be given to the language that is contained in the statute. 
The Notice provision is a pre-requisite to the initiation of litigation against a construction 
professional (but it relates only to the "construction professional" with whom the homeowner had 




contracted, who alone is entitled to receive notice, as defined by the statute), and a reasonable 
interpretation, utilizing existing statutory construction rules, leaves the rational basis that the 
notice is to be provided to the "general contractor", being the construction professional with whom 
the homeowner-claimant had contracted for the remodel project, as referenced hereinafter. 
Had the Defendant and their counsel been of the mind to review and accept the application 
of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (NORA), as it was the statutory provision upon which 
the Plaintiffs have proceeded from the inception, and had the subject of "Notice" clearly been 
identified by Defendant, in the defense to the initial summary attack against Plaintiffs' claims, that 
would have framed the issue for the Court to address the mandatory venue Plaintiffs utilized in 
this controversy, whereupon Plaintiffs commenced with the required notice to the contractor with 
whom they had a contractual relationship, being written notice served upon the General Contractor, 
Gould Custom Builders, Inc., (GCBI), and that process was undertaken and accomplished. The 
General Contractor immediately came forth, brought with him the responsible sub-contractor, and 
they together addressed the damages relating to the execution of the remodel project, and the 
liability was immediately deferred to and accepted by the responsible sub-contractor, DeBest, 
Defendant herein. Dspite the use of that existing enactment and its statutory application, 
Defendant's counsel disregarded that statute; abandoned any recognition of that venue under the 
law, and instead brought forth their "privity" defense, saying Debest had no contractual 
relationship with the Davisons regarding the remodel project, and therefore had no "contract" 
claim to assert against Defendant, and then contended there was no right of action, as well, to 
assert a tort claim for the damages that DeBest had admitted they had caused, each of which 
defense addressed the very set of claims that were specifically authorized to be brought by the 




terms and provisions of the NORA Enactment, vesting both a "contract" and a "tort" claim against 
any "construction professional" that was involved in the project. That was the essence of the 
NORA enactment, the precise procedural remedy the Defendant obviously wanted to ignore, as 
that Act was the vehicle by which the Plaintiffs were able to recover their attorney fees as well as 
their full reimbursement for the satisfaction of the restoration costs they were forced to advance to 
avoid a lien filed on the State owned property. These defenses asserted by Defendant's counsel 
were seen by Plaintiffs to be both adverse and contrary to the very language contained within 
NORA, and now we have made "to whom 'written notice' must be sent before suit can be filed" 
as a further issue to be raised for appellate review in this controversial statutory process. 
When the very statutory procedure was deliberately being avoided by Defendant (because 
of Plaintiffs' right to recover attorney fees through it), the "notice" issue had to be ignored also, 
so it was not raised in Defendant's initial summary proceedings, as that would have exposed 
Defendant to the application of the statute, and their fear that fees would also be assessed against 
them. This Act had been on the "books" for a decade (enacted in 2003), and that is the avenue 
related to the right of recovery, and contrary to the provisions upon which the Defendant sought 
the to apply "privity" and a non-tort right of recovery, hoping to force Plaintiffs to instead initiate 
suit against GCBI, thereby bringing in another liability carrier to somehow "contribute" to the 
satisfaction of the restoration costs that had to be reimbursed. (See Third Party Complaint and 
Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend). Defendant was looking for indemnification, 
contribution , or other tort liability, none of which had any legal basis to apply in the case. That 
was the way in which the Defense counsel(s) were seeking to "restructure" the case to 
accommodate the way they wanted it to unfold before a jury. 
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Plaintiffs came forth in their response to remind the Defendant and point out to the court, 
that the area of the law that was actually (and only) involved was NORA,, and the issue was then 
immediately ripe for the Defendant to address the issue of notice, and assert their theory of what 
"written notice" they thought they were entitled to receive, despite their acceptance of the deferred 
liability. The Court was in a position to rule upon that issue, had Defendant shown a willingness 
to acknowledge the application of that statute, rather than for the Court to then direct Plaintiffs to 
proceed with their tort claim, under a common law right that permits a cause of action relating to 
negligent acts committed by DeBest, resulting in damages to the property of the Davisions, as 
opposed to a "statutory remedy" and statutory right of recovery. 
Had the issue as to the extent to which there may be need for additional notices to be 
served upon others been addressed in the initial summary proceedings under Defendant's motion 
to secure a dismissal of both claims, this controversy would now be months into the appellate 
process, where the parties would be addressing the right to initiate tort and contract claims, and 
address the service requirements regarding "written notice", which is now subject to a statutory 
construction, as it relates to "whom" among the construction professional(s) involved in a remodel 
project is to be served the notice in these controversies controlled by the provisions of NORA. 
Consequently, had this challenge been accepted by the Defendant, instead of ignored and avoided, 
those costs now being claimed would never been incurred, and now must be seen as being 
unnecessary and not reasonable in relation to the issue that resolved the litigation and framed the 
issues for appellate review. This Court is requested to deny those costs, for all of the reasons set 
forth above. 
ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT 
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Defendant's request for attorney fees has been made solely under I. C. § 12-121, a statutory 
provision that should not be considered to be an appropriate basis for its application in this case, 
in light of the facts, circumstances, course of proceedings, merits, and the claims that were raised 
by these Plaintiffs in this litigation, and for Defendant to rely upon that particular statute for 
recovery of attorney fees, is a marathon stretch, at best, and without merit in the reasonable 
consideration of the controversy and the manner in which this case has developed (including the 
court's ruling initially) and the manner in which it has now unfolded. 
The Defendant has declined to advance any other statutory provision for attorney fees upon 
this final dismissal of Plaintiffs' tort claim, now perceived to be the result of a theory of inadequate 
notice being brought forth under the language contained in NORA, and Defendant now willing to 
advance such an untenable position for the application of that statute to create the basis for an 
award. 
A court is provided a very narrow path upon which to consider the application of the 
provisions of I. C. § 12-121, which restriction and restraints should unconditionally preclude any 
applicable consideration of that statute, given both the restrictive provisions announced in the Rule 
54( e )(2) itself, and the restraints imposed by the language governing the application of the statute, 
announced in years of established case law. 
As this Court will appreciate, nothing within I. C. §12-120, including all sub-Parts 
enumerated therein, pertain to the events that transpired in this controversy, nor is the provisions 
of I. C. §12-123, a "close cousin" to the provisions recited within Rule 1 l(b)&(c), I.R.C.P. have 
any application to this controversy. Furthermore, the very provisions of the Notice and Opportunity 
to Repair Act, (NORA), codified under I. C. §§6-2501-2504, fails to afford any basis for a 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS-PAGES 
00000632
"construction professional" to make any application for any award of attorney fees, as 
"construction professionals" have NO right to any award under the Act. The only right to any 
recovery of attorney fees is reserved exclusively for the homeowner-claimant, as the statutory 
provision relating to attorney fees is so defined in §6-2504(l)(b), and stated to be: 
6-2504. LIMITATION ON DAMAGES. (1) In a suit subject to section 6-2503, Idaho 
Code, the claimant may recover only the following damages proximately caused by a construction 
defect: 
(a) The reasonable cost of repairs necessary to cure any construction defect, including any 
reasonable and necessary engineering or consulting fees required to evaluate and cure the 
construction defect, that the contractor is responsible for repairing under this chapter; 
(b) The reasonable expenses of temporary housing reasonably necessary during the repair period; 
( c) The reduction in market value, if any, to the extent that the reduction is due to structural failure; 
and 
(d) Reasonable and necessary attorney's fees. 
The Defendant, as confirmed by their own Motion and supporting Memorandum 1, have 
acknowledged their limited resource is the narrowly construed provisions of the "extraordinary" 
statutory provisions that require proof there was no foundation in fact or law to pursue the claims 
that Plaintiffs sought, wherein they were seeking recovery for the damages sustained, and 
reimbursement of the funds they were required to advance to avoid a mechanic's lien being filed 
against this State owned property. The "construction professional" ultimately sued in this case was 
the sub-contractor that admitted they had damaged the property by the defective professional 
services they performed in this remodel project. Even the Court initially embraced the right of 
action for recovery, at least with respect to permitting the litigation to proceed upon the common 
1 the only "motion" that is to be filed in this stage of the litigation is the "motion to disallow" attorney fees and 
costs, not a "motion for attorney fees and costs" as was filed in this matter by the Deendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS -.PAGE 9 
00000633
- -
law right to seek recovery under a negligence claim for the damages caused by DeBest, having 
well recognized that Defendant had, in all respects, unconditionally admitted the fact they were 
responsible for the defective installations by their employee, Tom Peterson, and that defective 
installation was the sole cause of the damages, and for that very reason, DeBest personnel 
undertook to commit to pay for all costs of restoration, even requesting and directing GCBI to do 
the restoration work and send copies of the billings and invoices to De Best, when the repairs were 
undertaken and completed, but only then to discover, upon doing as GCBI had been instructed to 
do, DeBest had "deferred" their obligation of payment to their liability carrier, who, in tum 
resorted to a local claims adjuster with a reputation that always takes the posture to minimize or 
avoid the obligation of payment however possible, which mutated in time to Defense Counsel(s) 
maneuvering their way into the idea of raising the statutory interpretation as to whom is to receive 
the "written notice" before suit is filed, which brought forth this Court's interpretation that any 
"construction professional" sued must first be served "written notice", which serves to raise the 
need for review of the rules regarding "statutory construction", which now will now be addressed 
through appellate review, but in the meantime, there is now a resulting dismissal, without 
prejudice, over this notification issue and the controversy whether notification to other 
"construction professionals, other than the General Contractor in control of the project, is required 
to trigger the right to proceed against the sub-contractor who then admitted the liability for the 
damages, and agreed to accept the deferred responsibility, accepted the liability, admitted total 
fault , and committed to the payment of restoration and promised payment was forthcoming upon 
the progress of the repairs and receipt of the billing statements and invoices for those costs. 
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As Defendant and their counsel(s) are aware, there is no other statutory or contractual basis 
to support a request for attorney fees through Rule 54, I.R.C.P., and it has previously been made 
infinity clear that Defendant, their liability carrier, and maybe their astute counsel(s), have always 
taken the posture that they had no idea and were completely unaware as to the existence of NORA, 
despite the past thirteen (13) years of its use and the appellate decisions relating to it. 
That Act has been statutorily mandated to apply to substantial remodels and construction 
cases as arisen in this controversy, and in the early stages of this case, Defendant refused to endorse 
the existence of, let alone the application of the Act, leaving Plaintiffs, but now causing Plaintiffs 
to suffer the delaying result of a court's decision that all construction professionals involved on 
the project must be notified before they can be subjected to a suit for the damages they thereafter 
come forward and admitted they had caused, now raising an issue of statutory interpretation and 
construction, over which any appellate courts will apply the standard of an exercise of free review. 
Had Defendant and their counsel been of the mindset to accept the application of the Act, 
and truly believed Debest was entitled to receive the direct service of "written notification", in 
addition to that notice directly served upon to the General Contractor, (all subs have an "agency 
relationship" with a General Contractor), this matter could have, and should have, been raised 
early on by the Defendant, if they truly perceived to notice to the General Contractor was 
insufficient to invoke compliance with the notice to go to the construction professional with whom 
the homeowner had contracted. 
In all fairness to these Plaintiffs, it is not within the elements of fundamental justice to find 
that the court endorsed and permitted Plaintiffs to advance their right ofrecovery, only then to find 
the Plaintiffs are at fault in doing what they did, and now subject to attorney fees and have applied 
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against them the provisions of LC. §12-121. Had this notice issue been accepted by Defendant 
and the sufficiency raised early on, this controversy would be on its way to sorting out the issues 
with a review by application of statutory construction and interpretation, settling the issue as to 
whom among the "construction professionals" are entitled to receive written notice, and the nature 
of the claims that can be brought (in contract and in tort) and whether there has been an abolishment 
or relaxation of the privity requirement under the modifying effects of this Act, along with a ruling 
that determines what defenses of acquiescence, estoppel, and waiver apply in a case such as this, 
when all parties engaged in the intended resolution process contemplated by the Act, whether they 
knew of its existence and application or not, and as the facts have revealed, liability was deferred 
and accepted, after notice was received by the General Contractor, and it became the liability 
carrier and the assigned "adjuster" that evolved into the "fly in the ointment" that caused the 
derailment in the discharge of the obligation of DeBest, an obligation that has been fully 
acknowledged, fully accepted and fully relied upon by both the homeowners and the General 
Contractor, all of which occurred after notice, and after the damages were discovered and cause 
determined, from which the liability was fully accepted in the deferral process, as between and 
among the construction professionals. 
An element of equitable estoppel should have an application in this controversy, when a 
Defendant declares an admission of liability and acceptance of the obligation to pay for the repairs; 
directs the repairs to be undertaken, and commits to pay upon receipt of the billing 
statements/invoices, only to come up against a liability carrier and its adjusting agent that declined 
to fulfill the contractual obligation to discharge the liability and pay the costs, as promised. 
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When the Defendant and its agents-representatives claimed ignorance of the Act, and chose 
to demonstrate a lack of knowledge as to the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, (NORA), and 
then wanted to renege upon the commitment of liability as deferred and accepted among the 
responsible construction professionals, it becomes a little disheartening to now see an attempt to 
recover attorney fees under the belief that Plaintiffs have acted without any foundation in fact or 
in law, when this district court had also endorsed Plaintiffs' tort claim as being lawful and 
appropriate to pursue, but later compromised by a belated argument the sub-contractor did not 
receive written notice, despite having participated fully with the General Contractor and directly 
participated in the inspection from the moment of the damage discovery, which brought both the 
discussion over liability, whereupon the sub-contractor accepted the deference of liability on July 
26, 2013, undertaken with the intent to achieve the very purpose of the Act, which, in every sense 
of its legislative formation, was intended to get parties together to engage in a process to find a 
solution, which is precisely what this Defendant did when accepting the deferred liability from the 
General Contractor, authorized the General Contractor to conduct the repairs in accordance with 
the departure of the homeowners from the residence in late summer, and committed to cover the 
costs of the repair of the damages. That constitutes a settlement 
The existing case law on record with the appellate courts that address the subject of NORA 
related claims have thus far involved a controversy only between the homeowner and the general 
contractor, and no case authority is found to address the statutory provisions as it relates to the 
requirement to give written notice to a sub-contractor on the project, who later admits and accepts 
the liability and fault when engaged in the participation with all parties, that being the 
Homeowner/General Contractor/Sub-contractor, and the sub-contractor then voluntarily accepted 
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responsibility and liability, knew the cause of the damage, and committed to provide the payment 
for the costs of restoration, never later claiming there was a lack of authority to commit to payment. 
This controversy may be seen upon review as an issue of first impression in the appellate 
courts, and that disposition will provide the statutory construction and interpretation as to the 
extent of notice to be given, and in this case, whether the facts require this sub-contractor to receive 
written notice, when arriving on scene with its agent-General contractor to inspect the damage, as 
the undisputed facts in this case have so confirmed. 
It remains Plaintiffs' position that the notice required to be given to a "construction 
professional" on this remodel project is only that construction professional with whom the 
homeowner had contracted, as the statutory provision does express the directive upon the 
homeowner to serve the written notice on the construction professional with whom he has 
contracted, and that was done. The statutory provisions are assembled from several areas, and 
provided in these definitions and application of those definitions. 
The first area is the definition of homeowner, which states in sub-part (5) of §6-2502: 
(5) "Homeowner" means: 
(a) Any person who contracts with a construction professional ..... . 
The second area is the definition of claimant, which states in sub-part (3) of §6-2502: 
(3) "Claimant" means a homeowner ....... that asserts a claim against a construction 
professional concerning a defect in the construction of a residence or in the substantial remodel of 
a residence. 
And the third area is the notice requirement, which states: 
6-2503. (1) Prior to commencing an action against a construction professional for a 
construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the construction 
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professional. The notice of claim shall state that the claimant asserts a construction defect claim 
against the construction professional and shall describe the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to 
determine the general nature of the defect. Any action commenced by a claimant prior to 
compliance with the requirements of this section shall be dismissed by the court without prejudice 
and may not be recommenced until the claimant has complied with the requirements of this 
section ..... 
A reasonable construction and interpretation of the combined definitions and directives 
regarding "what" each is defined to be, and "who" gets "what", begins with the acceptance that a 
"claimant" must be a "homeowner", and a "homeowner" must be under "contract" with a 
"construction professional", and it is that "construction professional" upon whom the claimant has 
a relationship, and would only logically be in a relationship to furnish the direct notice, as the 
contractor would be known to the homeowner, and able to know where he was to cause service of 
notice upon his contractor. There is a very good reason for the use of that combined language 
within the definition of "homeowner" , as a "claimant" , in all likelihood, would possess no 
knowledge as to who or where the sub-contractors are, or where they can be reached, and that 
could only be expected to be known by, through, and from to the General Contractor, the entity 
with whom the sub-contractors had undertaken their "agency relationship" and entered into their 
own sub-contract relationship with the General Contractor. 
Furthermore, the "claimant" is unfamiliar with the inter-relationship among those who 
have been brought onto the project, not knowing who may be an employee of the General 
Contractor, or brought on as a sub by the General, or who may be an employee or agent of a sub-
contractor, as homeowners only know and deal with their own General Contractor, and no one 
else. It would be unreasonable to expect a typical homeowner to know anything else. These 
unknown subs may come and go, possibly one damaging the work or performance of the other, so 
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agam, it is only a reasonable interpretation of any requirement to notify a "construction 
professional" to be the contractor with whom the homeowner-claimant had contracted, and not be 
required to speculate or engaged in an effort to track down what is within the exclusive knowledge 
of the General Contractor, who is in an agency relationship with those he brings to the project. It 
is incumbent upon the General Contractor to address his agents that he had engaged to come onto 
the project, and the General Contractor would take the necessary steps to address the problem they 
had created. That, again, is what took place in this controversy, and was undertaken in a manner 
consistent with what was contemplated by NORA. 
Who all may be involved in the in the contemplated performance of the work to be 
performed in the course of the work in progress is not within the reasonable expectation of the 
homeowner, and as a claimant, that homeowner is not expected to reach out to anyone other than 
the one with whom he had contracted, and that was accomplished in this case. The responsible 
party may then come to light, and may actually come forward, after the notification is provided to 
the General Contractor, which, again, is exactly what happened in this situation. It was upon that 
involvement of the notification to the General Contractor that the sub-contractor arrived, was fully 
informed, got engaged, and accepted the deferred liability and brought forth what was understood 
to be the solution to the damages caused by the responsible party, and in this case, that was DeBest 
accepted the deferred liability to the sub-contractor on the project. 
The homeowner-claimant in this case has never been shown to even know of, or seen or 
even spoken to DeBest, and it would be unreasonable to interpret the statutory construction to 
require a claimant to serve written notice upon someone he does not know, or is completely 
unknown, other than to the General, or to pursue an entity he has no knowledge about, and his 
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only logical and purposeful communication would be with the one he had contracted, as that would 
be the only logical point of contact to address an issue of a defect that was under the General's 
responsibility, jurisdiction, dominion and control. 
This analysis is directed to the belief that Plaintiffs have acted with a factual basis and a 
legal foundation when they undertook the notification to the General Contractor on the project, as 
they acted under a statute that had directed them to notify "their" contractor, the construction 
professional with whom they had a contract. They did what they understood the effects of the 
statute had reasonably required, and multiple notices to other potential "construction 
professionals" with whom they had no involvement in knowing what act they did in performing 
any services contemplated to be performed and furnished in the project, and that should not be 
read into the pronouncements within the statute. 
To require an extended notification to others, who are both unknown and uncertain, and 
had no contract with the homeowner, is not a logical basis to require notification, and such an 
interpretation is not explicitly clear in the statute, and there is no logical reason that such further 
notice must be given to other construction professionals, as there is no declaration to that effect 
beyond the interpretation of the "right to file the lawsuit" means more than the "construction 
professional" with whom the "homeowner-claimant", had "contracted". 
There would likely be communication to transpire between a sub-contractor contacted by 
the General Contractor to discuss the matter, after the initial notification, but the General 
Contractor has no obligation to provide any written notice to any subcontractor, yet that 
subcontractor has every right to come forward and assume the deferred liability, and may do so 
when the initial discovery and assessments are made as to the cause and extent of the damages. 
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This can all take place after the required notice to the General Contractor, and the sub-contractor 
has an unfettered right to assume and accept the deferred liability from the General Contractor for 
the damages caused on the project, and nothing in the statute prevents that, and nothing in the 
statute suggests there is an allowable basis to raise a defense that such acceptance of the deferred 
liability is suddenly abated by a defense that the sub-contractor did not first receive written notice 
from the claimant, but instead got all of the information from the General Contractor, who had no 
obligation to give any written notification at all. 
Nowhere in the statute does it appear the notification requirement is specifically required 
to go to any subcontractor, but we understand this Court's recognition that a sub-contractor is a 
"construction professional", since they are included within the definition of "construction 
professionals", but a subcontractor is not known to a homeowner, and that distinction in the 
language as to the person to whom the homeowner "has contracted" must be given meaning and 
purpose. Whenever the issue is one of statutory construction, or the interpretation of a statute, the 
ordinary meaning of the words used must be considered, as the appellate courts have manifestly 
so held. In Ada County v. David R, Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 893 P.2d 801 (1995) the court held: 
It is axiomatic that the objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to 
derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act. Ada County Assessor 
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425,428,849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993); 
Cox v. Department of Insurance, 121 Idaho 143, 146, 823 P.2d 177, 180 
(Ct.App.1991). Any such analysis begins with the literal language of the enactment. 
Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819,823,828 P.2d 848,852 (1992); Local 
1494 of Intern. Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 
586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978); Messenger v. Bums, 86 Idaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 
913, 915 (1963). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no 
occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction. Ada County v. 
Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho at 428, 849 P.2d at 101; Matter of Permit No. 
36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852; Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 




254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991). Where the language of a statute or ordinance is 
ambiguous, however, the court looks to rules of construction for guidance, Lawless 
v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175,560 P.2d 497 (1977), and may consider the reasonableness 
of proposed interpretations. Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 706, 682 P.2d 
1247, 1253 (1983). Constructions that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh 
results are disfavored. Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 60, 608 P.2d 861, 863 
(1980); Lawless, 98 Idaho at 177,560 P.2d at 499. 
Where an ordinance is ambiguous, the intent of the drafters may be 
ascertained by considering, first, the express language and, in addition, the context 
in which the language is used, the evils to be remedied and the objects in view. 
Local 1494 oflntemational Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 
630,639,586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978). 
In Local 1494 of Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630,586 
P.2d 1346 (1978), the court held: 
Our own interpretation of this statute is guided by the established principles of 
statutory construction: 
In construing a statute, it is the duty of this court to ascertain the legislative intent, 
and give effect thereto. In ascertaining this intent, not only must the literal wording 
of the statute be examined, but also account must be taken of other matters, "such 
as the context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times 
and of the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, contemporaneous 
construction, and the like." In re Gem State Academy Bakery, 70 Idaho 531-541, 
224 P.2d 529, 535 (1950). 
Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963). 
To begin with, then, "the literal wording of the statute must be examined." In 
all candor, it must be stated that the statute is not a model of clarity ..... 
Furthermore, "It is a universally recognized rule of the construction that, where a 
constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things 
excludes all others." Peck v. State, 63 Idaho 375, 120 P.2d 820, 822; Drainage 
Dist. No. 2 v. Ada County, 38 Idaho 778, 786, 226 P. 290; People v. Goldman, 1 
Idaho 714 ...... 
It would appear that the rules of construction require the interpretation that the "claimant", 
which is specifically defined to be, and is limited to, a "homeowner", and is defined as being the 
one who has "contracted" with a "construction professional", it is then required to exclude other 
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"construction professionals" from the general term of "construction professional", as it then 
becomes only the "construction professional" with whom the "claimant" has contracted, and to 
whom the "written notice" is to be served upon. 
So when the statute states: the "construction professional" is to be served written notice, as 
referenced in LC. §6-2503(1 ), wherein it states: Prior to commencing an action against a 
construction professional for a construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim 
on the construction professional concerning a defect in the construction of a residence or in the 
substantial remodel of a residence, the only one that can be is the "construction professional" with 
whom the claimant (homeowner) had before contracted, and that must be carried forward and into 
the meaning, because the interpretation required to be given to the recipient of notice is to exclude 
all other "construction professionals" with whom the homeowner has not contracted on the 
project. 
Consequently, the homeowner-claimant would only need serve "written notice" upon his 
contractor, as that would be the only one he would logically be expected to know whom to address 
an issue of defect to, before action can be taken. After that notice condition has been met, the fact 
that a responsible party has then come forward and agreed to accept the liability, agreed to assume 
the deferred responsibility, and committed to pay the costs to restore the premises, it is not within 
the meaning of the statute that after the General contractor had gotten his proper notice, to then 
expand the notice requirement to a sub-contractor, such that the sub-contractor who came forward 
and promised all involved that liability was resolved and the repairs would be paid by that sub-
contractor, that a defect can be asserted, claiming that sub-contractor was required to receive 




notice, when he is not included in the intended party to be served under the proper interpretation 
of the statute. 
When a sub-contractor, who is directly responsible for the damages, elects to participate in 
the inspection, accepts the liability and responsibility, and accepts the obligation that has been 
deferred to him, there is nothing stopping that terminates that commitment under the notice 
requirement that is limited to the "contracting" construction professional. To allow a sub-
contractor, who has taken that responsibility, and made that commitment to resolve the damage, 
and accepted the deferred liability, nothing in the statute says he cannot then be sued under that 
statute, under the theory he was not specifically given a written notice, when he was not within the 
class of "construction professionals" to whom the right of being served written notice was 
.intended. 
As we have previously stated, this statute may not go down in history as a model of clarity, 
(most statutes are not), but a reasonable interpretation that includes the correct statutory 
construction, a construction that specifically mandates "where a statute specifies certain things, 
the designation of such things excludes all others", must be taken to mean, and as applied here, to 
require that only the "construction professionals" that have contracted with the "homeowner" are 
entitled to receive written notice, and all other "construction professionals" are excluded from the 
right to receive written notice. We must have the definition of a "homeowner'' in mind when 
understand what "construction professional" is to be served the written notice by a "claimant". 
The "homeowner" can only become a "claimant" if he has "contracted" with the 
construction professional, and it is that "construction professional" the claimant is obligated to 
serve the written notice, to the exclusion of all other sub-contracting "construction professionals" 
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participating on the project. This limiting definition of claimant, to that of a "homeowner", must 
be incorporated into the notice provisions, under the correct statutory construction, and that must 
leave this court with an abiding conviction that the Davisons have engaged in the use of the statute 
with a reasonable construction and interpretation of its requirements, and that serving the 
"construction professional" with whom the homeowner had contracted was believed to be 
sufficient compliance with the statute, as no reasonable homeowner would have known who the 
sub-contractors were on the project, as the owner's only logical contact, and as the statute must be 
so construed, would be with the General Contractor only. 
This statutory construction is reasonable and consistent with the rules of statutory 
construction and interpretation, and this court may view the current controversy as a technical 
issue of statutory construction, requiring appellate review of the statutory interpretation to be given 
to resolve any pot~ntial confusion about who is entitled to get the notice, and the application of the 
provisions ofI.C. §12-121 are in-applicable to the situation before us. 
The vastmajority of the legal services claimed at this time by Defendant could have been 
avoided entirely had Defendant raised this controversial "notice" issue immediately, instead of 
waiting until it was time to engage in trial preparation to address the merits of the claim and defend 
the commitment to pay for the damages that DeBest had caused by the defective installation of the 
plumbing components. The delayed defense to raise the notice issue has caused these legal services 
to have now become excessive and unreasonable, and the claim for recovery of such fees cannot 
be awarded under the statutory basis being asserted. The nature and extent of the rendition of such 
services, along with the delayed performance thereof, and the claimed charges are unreasonable 
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and excessive, and Defendant is utilizing an inappropriate statute as the vehicle to even claim a 
recovery, and for those reasons the entire request should be denied. 
Rule 54( e), with respect to attorney fees, provides as follows: 
( e) Attorney Fees. 
(1) Pursuant to Contract or Statute. In any civil action the court may award reasonable 
attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 
54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by anv statute or contract. 
(2) Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121.Attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 
may be awarded by the court only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, which finding must be in writing and include 
the basis and reasons for the award. No attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-121 on a default fudgment. 
(3) Amount of attorney fees. If the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil 
action it must consider the following in determining the amount of such fees: 
(A) the time and labor required; 
(B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of 
the attorney in the particular field of law; 
(D) the prevailing charges for like work; 
(E) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
(F) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case; 
(G) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(H) the undesirability of the case; 
(I) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(J) awards in similar cases; 
(K) the reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if 
the comt finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; 
(L) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
Defendant is claiming to be the Prevailing Party in this controversy, and for that reason, 
seek their costs as a matter of right. Clearly, early on in the case, both parties were partially 
successful, and therefore would have partially prevailed under the provision 54(d)(l)(B), as the 
term is defined, when this court granted dismissal of Plaintiffs' Count One, the "contract claim" 
asserted under NORA, dismissed upon the court's perception the application of the common law 
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theory of privity of contract would apply in this matter, and there was a lack of privity between 
the homeowner-claimant and the sub-contractor. 
However, it must also be recognized that under the same definition of "Prevailing Party", 
the Plaintiffs had similarly prevailed in respect to the allegations in Plaintiffs' Count Two, being 
the right to pursue their "tort claim" against the Defendant. The result of that challenge resulted in 
Plaintiffs being justifiably called a prevailing party as to that portion of the claim to relief, and that 
effect served to make the equation, as it relates to the definition of the term, equal and even results, 
though it was then said that Plaintiffs had sufficiently prevailed at that juncture of the challenge 
that they could be made whole under the tort claim, and the contract added no additional benefit 
to the right of recovery, as Count Two was able to offer the full right of recovery. 
The situation changed only when the Defendants had to structure and mount an offensive 
to the request to declare the provisions of NORA to unconditionally apply to this transaction, so 
Plaintiffs could seek to recover their attorney fees under the provisions of NORA, in addition to 
full reimbursement for the damages sustained. That statute specifically allowed a homeowner-
claimant the right to recover attorney fees, as a statutory allowance under J.C. § 6-2504(1)(d). At 
that juncture of the controversy, Defendant could not dispute the provisions ofNORA must apply, 
as this was a "substantial remodel", as defined thereunder, and the criteria on tax assessed market 
value-cost of remodel ratios were clearly present several times over, and the remaining option was 
to then embrace the application of NORA, and structure an offense that Defendant is a 
"construction professional" and he was not served notice, and Defendant developed a challenge as 
to the statutory interpretation as to whom all is entitled to receive the written notice to implement 
the resolution proceedings envisioned under NORA, and that brought into question the statutory 
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interpretation to be given to the notice-service requirements under the Act. This court endorsed the 
perception that any construction professional who is sued under the Act must first receive written 
notice, irrespective of any limiting definitions. 
Of particular interest with regard to this application of the Court's perception of"Notice", 
had the Plaintiffs also given the written notice to DeBest, accepting the fact they are a construction 
professional by definition, and they admitted to being the responsible party for the damages in 
question, and they were under "contract" to render services on this remodel project, and had 
Plaintiffs then sued both Gould Custom Builders, Inc. (GCBI) and DeBest Plumbing Inc. (DeBest), 
and asserted the statutory actions of a "contract claim", would this court still dismiss the contract 
claim against DeBest upon the same theory there was a lack of privity of contract? If the Court 
were to do so, this Court would not be applying the language to the full extent it is calling DeBest 
a qualifying construction professional under the statute that is subject to being sued? If this Court 
resorts to "privity" again in that situation, and would dismiss the contract claim against DeBest, 
then why would the homeowner even go to the trouble to give notice to someone that in all reality, 
he had no personal knowledge or acquaintance with the sub-contractor, or even knew who they 
were or what they may have done, if the Court is inclined to dismiss the claim? How does the 
Court justify such a disposition? Is the Court saying the only claim that can to be asserted against 
a sub-contractor is in the nature of a tort claim only? 
The statute does specifically address the concept of "affirmative defenses" in such a 
manner that it would appear there is an intention to modify the common law affirmative defenses 
that are otherwise undermined by the Act, as it appears that may be the situation by I. C. §6-
2504( 6), which states: 
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(6) All applicable affirmative defenses are preserved for causes of action 
to which this chapter does not apply. 
When Chapter 25 specifically states that a "contract claim" may be filed by a 
homeowner-claimant against a subcontractor (this Court is calling a sub-contractor a "construction 
professional" by definition), does that not specifically say that the defense of common law privity 
has been brought into contention, and that it will not apply because the Act specifically "created" 
a "contract cause of action" that otherwise did not exist in contract law, and privity is therefore 
not one of those "applicable affirmative defenses" that is to be preserved, because this chapter 
has created a cause of action for a contract claim against a subcontractor that had no direct 
contractual relationship with the homeowner-claimant? 
We realize this court has previously expressed the judicial opinion in these 
proceedings that the NORA Act did not create any new cause(s) of action, but if that perception 
be the correct interpretation of the Act, then what purpose and legislative intention is to be 
accomplished when the legislature chose to structure that paragraph and include that sub-part (6), 
immediately after sub-part (5), which engages in a dissertation about the very concept of 
"affirmative defenses"? The legislature had in mind the concept of "affirmative defenses", and 
those "affirmative defenses" that otherwise apply elsewhere, do not apply to this Act. 
Plaintiffs perceived their right to file suit against a construction professional that includes 
a sub-contractor, under a claim based upon both contract and tort law, as allowed by the Act, and 
the Notice is perceived to be required to go to the construction professional with whom the 
homeowner had contracted, GCBI, and that is what transpired, and that serves to frame the issues 
to be among those to be reviewed. 
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If that be a correct interpretation of the Act, then Plaintiffs should still be in court, 
advancing both a contract and tort claim against the responsible construction professional that 
caused the damage, and secure a recovery against the liable entity that committed to pay for the 
cost of restoration. It remains Plaintiffs belief that the notice to the construction professional with 
whom they contracted, would allow the General Contractor to ferret out the particular sub~ 
contractor that directly caused the damage. That would be for the General to undertake, and when 
the liability was then deferred, and as importantly, then accepted, the right to pursued the recovery 
is properly engaged and activated, and the resolution process is then underway, and any subsequent 
failure to reach a resolution gives rise to a right to initiate suit as contemplated by the Act, and 
these defenses over "written notice" and a claimed violation of what they didn't even know existed 
at the time is possibly disingenuous, and more importantly, DeBest was involved right from the 
moment of discovery as to the cause of the damages, and specifically requested the bills and 
invoices be sent to them, and seeing the extent of the costs incurred in restoring the damage, they 
opened a daim with their liability carrier and tendered the statements for payment. The bills and 
invoices became an account stated, as they were accepted, never rejected or challenged by DeBest, 
and were to be paid, the very reason they were sent to the insurance carrier by DeBest, as DeBest 
had accepted the fault and agreed to cover the cost of restoration. 
Plaintiffs have pursued and acted upon a reasonable and logical interpretation of the statute, 
and the existing case law has not contradicted the process and actions they have taken, and the two 
cases rendered from the appellate court, to date, have supported that very proposition that the 
General Contractor, the one with whom the homeowner contracted, is the construction professional 
to whom notice is given, and that notice was the written notification of the defective workmanship 
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sent to GCBI, , and the General Contractor would take the necessary action to correct the situation, 
just as also contemplated by the provisions of NORA, and as we saw in this case, the engagement 
of the General Contractor brought forth the direct involvement of the sub-contractor, DeBest, who 
was specifically informed of the situation, immediately appeared at the residence and took action 
to curtail further damaging effects of the defective workmanship, and specifically agreed to accept 
the responsibility, and upon doing that, the responsibility for the costs was directly deferred to 
and accepted by DeBest, who readily (and honorably) accepted the liability and responsibility for 
the corrections and restorations that were required to be undertaken to fully restore the premises. 
Those proceedings were certainly reasonable and prudent, and no one can now say any 
aspect of what took place was without merit, or was frivolous in any manner, and the intended 
process of the Act was certainly reasonably thought to be underway, especially when Davisons 
agreed to remain in the residence until that fall, to avoid the horrendous cost that would have been 
incurred had any alternate housing been secured in the middle of summer vacation, the prime time 
for rental revenues. This is the thanks the Davisons get for being of the good nature to contribute 
to the reduction of costs otherwise involved, and willing to extend a good deed for the benefit of 
DeBest by staying in their damaged vacation residence, and postponing the repairs until they 
vacated the residence that fall. As they say, "Never let a good deed go unpunished", and true to 
the saying, this is now where they find themselves. And what next do they get thrown their way? 
A claim for about $50,000.00 of attorney fees and costs!!!. 
There is simply no factual basis to assert a claim for such attorney fees upon L C. § 12-121, 
when the issue of "liability" was accepted, and the only remaining controversy that had to be 
resolved ( clearly convoluted after the liability carrier chose to challenge the extent of damages, 
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despite DeBesf s acceptance oflaibility) was the reasonableness of the expenses that had been paid 
by the Davisons to avoid a lien filing at the conclusion of the restoration process .. 
The rule is clear that Costs are allowed as a matter of right to a "prevailing party", but it 
is also true that the rule states: "unless otherwise ordered by the Court". See Rule 54(d)(l)(A). 
Reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the "prevailing party", when provided for by any 
statute or contract. See Rule 54(e)(l). A "prevailing party" is defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B) to be as 
follows: 
"In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
may determine that a partv to an action prevailed in parts and did not prevail in 
part, and on so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties 
in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resulting judgment or judgments obtained." 
The Defendant prevailed, in part, with respect to the dismissal of the contract claim, but this 
Court allowed Plaintiffs to preserve the tort claim, as those matters were addressed in the first 
motion for summary judgment. At that stage, Plaintiffs still prevailed to the full extent of their 
right to proceed to a full recovery of their damages, as the court indicated full relief can be obtained 
through the tort claim, without need to pursue the theory of a breach under a contract claim. 
Had there been a complete dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, under the theory there was no 
proper notice to DeBest under the Act, that disposition would have alleviated all of the subsequent 
attorney fees being claimed to have been incurred by Defendant in the onslaught to the right of 
recovery, when the liability was established on July 26, 2013. With a disposition entered at that 
time over the defense of notice, the appeal process could have been commenced at that point in 
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the litigation, and all these subsequent maneuvering tactics would have been avoided. Therefore, 
the allocation of who, and to what extent, a party prevailed in this case must be addressed from 
what transpired by the decision of the court at that first entry of an interlocutory order that 
dismissed the contract claim, when the notice issue could have been the first line of attack, had the 
Defendant been willing to accept the existence and awareness if the Act. That would have stopped 
the litigation at that stage of the controversy, and prevented this rather outrageous claim for fees, 
under a flawed application of the provisions of LC. §12-121, which is both offensive as well as 
disappointing in the way the defense would make such an unfounded claim. 
It is recognized that LC. § 12-121 specifically provides the following language, but it 
remains subject to the limitations identified in Rule 54 above, and the limitations imposed by case 
law. The statute states: 
12-121. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or 
!!parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, association, private 
organization, the state ofidaho or political subdivision thereof. 
When considering attorney fees under LC. § 12-121, they are not awarded to a prevailing 
party as a matter of right but. rather. and only upon the district court's discretion. See Garner 
v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462,468,259 P.3d 614,620 (2011); Cowardv. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282,290, 
246 P.3d 391, 399 (2010). A district court can only award fees "when it is left with the abiding 
belief that the action was pursued. defended. or brought frivolously. unreasonably, or without 
foundation." C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001). It would certainly 
appear from the facts of the case, and the law that was thought to apply, that a party pursues an 
action which contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and 
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without foundation. A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes 
it fails as a matter of law. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 
894,693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, "[a] misperception of the law, or of one's 
interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the question is whether the position 
adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation." Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262,265 
(Ct.App.1997). 
Any claim under LC.§ 12-121 must be based on an analysis of the legal positions taken in 
the case, and not on extraneous factors .... facts asserted in an affidavit are irrelevant to the question 
of whether a plaintiff or defendant pursued a case frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
There may be a variety of motives for bringing any lawsuit, or for defending a lawsuit, or taking 
some action in preservation of your equitable or legal interests, some may be appropriate and some 
may not be. But the only question to be considered by a Court is whether the legal theories and 
facts of the case were pursued in violation of l.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). See Garner, 
supra. 
It would certainly appear that the Court's initial perception of the claims advanced in this 
case had alleged issues that raised fairly debatable and legitimate claims for Davisons' recovery, 
and the court believed it left Plaintiffs with a basis to recover fully when the contract claim was 
dismissed and the tort claim left intact, despite the turnabout with the notice controversy under 
NORA. 
A district court's denial of fees under LC.§ 12-121 will not be overturned absent a clear 
abuse of discretion. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008). 
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parties should be denied entirely, for the above and foregoing re 
Dated this 28 day of October, 2016. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
e movmg 
I hereby certify that on the 28 day of October, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 




Vernon K. Smith, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
ISB 1365 
Telephone (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Case No. ___ lnst. No. __ _ 
Filed ___ A.M 5: CX) P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Scott Davison and Anne Davison, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 














Case No. CV 15-178C 
MOTION TO DISALLOW 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs above named, Scott Davison and Anne Davison, by and through their 
attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, and do herewith move this Court to disallow the Motion filed 
by the Defendants, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., for those attorney fees and certain of those costs, as 
identified within Defendant's Verifified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, submitted to and 
filed with the court on October 17, 2016. This Objection to costs is made pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5), 
I.R.C.P., and Rule 54 (e)(6), I.R.C.P. 
Defendant has elected to seek attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-121, to which the district 
is restricted narrowly to the use of that statutory basis to award fees and the request therefore 
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should be denied, as addressed in the Memorandum submitted in suppo ~-
disallow, and the basis for the objection to such fees and costs,.~ the orandum, set ing 
forth the applicable statutory and case law, and supporting a u 
Dated this 28th day of October, 2016. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of October, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below upon: 
Robert D. Lewis 
1423 Tyrell Ln. 
P.O. Box 359 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
• .,. 
DO~~LA~A. Ml~R, CLERK 
i;y ! ).. A,_, Deputy 
OCT 1 7 2016 
Case No ___ lnst. No. __ _ 
Filed A.M. 5, <X) P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV 15-178C 
DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
COMES NOW Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc., by and through its counsel of record, 
Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, and hereby submits this Verified Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, following 
the Court's Judgment entered October 5, 2016. 
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I. STATEMENT OF ENTITLEMENT TO A WARD OF COSTS 
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to recover costs if they are 
the "prevailing party." See LR.C.P. S4(d)(l)(A). 
A determination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the trial court and 
is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & 
Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19, 117 P.3d 130, 132-33 (2005). Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B) 
guides courts' inquiries of the prevailing party question. It provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider 
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion 
may determine that a part to an action prevailed in part and did not 
prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering 
all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant 
judgment or judgments obtained. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). 
In this case, there is no question that Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. was a prevailing party 
as a result of the Court's ruling on Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Judgment entered October 5, 2016. Further, Defendant made an Offer of Judgment 
under Rule 68 on January 12, 2016, which was unaccepted. There is no reasonable basis for any 
dispute that DeBest Plumbing, Inc. was the prevailing party against Plaintiffs in this case. 
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A. COSTS AS A MA TIER OF RIGHT 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(C), costs of right shall be awarded as a 
matter of right to a prevailing party. DeBest Plumbing, Inc. submits the following costs that should 
be awarded as a matter of right: 
1. Court Filing Fees ............................................................................... $136.00 
Notice of Appearance ........................................................................ $136.00 
2. Expert Witness fees ..................................................................... ... $2,000.00 
Patrick Coppi ................................................................................. $2,000.00 
3. Copies (depositions) ....................................................................... $1,268.89 
Deposition of Gil Gould ...................................................................... 716.89 
Deposition of Scott Davison .............................................................. .55 l .97 
SUMMARY OF COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
1. Court filing fees ................................................................................ $136.00 
2. Expert Witness Fees ....................................................................... $2,000.00 
3. Charges for one copy of Depositions ............................................. $1,268.86 
TOT AL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT .......................... $3,404.86 
B. DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
Pursuant to Rule 54( d)(l )(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant DeBest 
Plumbing, Inc. also requests an award of discretionary costs on the grounds that the following costs 
as set forth below were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred in this case, and should 
in the interests of justice be assessed against the Plaintiffs. 
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This case presented unique, interesting and enormous claims that required significant expense 
in discovery, depositions and experts. There were numerous motions on NORA issues and two 
rounds of motions of summary judgment efforts. There is no doubt that claims asserted by the 
Plaintiffs were serious and could have resulted in substantial exposure to Defendant. Clearly, 
discretionary costs claimed below were necessary to the defense of this lawsuit. 
Defendant De Best Plumbing, Inc. recognizes that discretionary costs are awarded only if they 
are exceptional. The Idaho Supreme Court defines "exceptional" under IRCP 54(d)(l)(D) to mean 
costs incurred because the nature of the case itself was exceptional. Hayden Lake Fire Protection 
Districtv. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,314,109 P.3d 161,168 (2005). 
Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. submits that costs in this case are exceptional due to the 
extent of the alleged damages by the parties, the legal analysis of the applicability ofldaho Code § 
6-2503, et seq. (NORA) and the significant loss alleged by Plaintiffs. 
Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc.' s discretionary costs claimed in this matter are as follows: 
A. Expert witness costs above $2,000.00. 
Patrick Coppi ................................................................................. $4,045.00 
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS ................................................................ $4,045.00 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Attorney fees are sought pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(2). 
Plaintiffs pursued a claim under NORA. The statute requires proper notice before filing suit. 
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Summary judgment was awarded because there was no notice. The case was pursued without 
foundation. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(3) provides a list of twelve factors which a Trial Court 
should consider in determining the amount of attorney fees to award. Each factor is discussed briefly 
here. 
1. Time and Labor Required. Below are the time entry breakdowns of the time and 
labor involved in this case. The accounting statements are based upon daily time sheets prepared by 
the attorneys and paralegals working on the case. Mr. Lewis was the lead attorney who performed 
work on the case. His efforts were primarily focused on preparation for trial and trial work. Tyler 
Neill also worked on the case. Mr. Neill worked primarily on summary judgment briefing. The 
work performed by the lawyers produced no duplication of effort. The work of paralegal Beth 
Rountree likewise presented no duplication of effort and an Affidavit of Ms. Rountree is filed in 
support herein. 
2. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions. This Court noted in its Memorandum 
Decision this the lawsuit involved complex legal and factual issues as well as a great deal of specific 
expert testimony. 
3. Quality of the Legal Service. The lawyers representing all parties in this case are 
experienced lawyers specializing in civil litigation. Defendant's lead lawyer is AV-preeminent rated 
by the Martindale Hubble rating system and has been defending civil litigation matters in Idaho since 
1983. 
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4. The Prevailing Charges for Like Work. In this Defendants experience, attorney fees 
of $250.00 per hour are in the middle and closer to the bottom of hourly rates charged for defense 
work in similar cases by AV rated experienced litigation firms in Idaho. 
5. Whether the Fee is Fixed or Continuing. Lawyers for the Defendants were on a fixed 
hourly rate for defense of the matter. Hourly rates were $160.00 per hour for Mr. Lewis, $150.00 for 
and Mr. Neill and paralegal Beth Rountree's billing rate was $75.00 per hour. 
6. Time Limit Imposed by Client. The Defendants did not impose time limits on this 
litigation however, approximately 95% of all discovery was completed before the Court issued its 
ruling on summary judgment. 
7. Amount Involved and the Results Obtained. Plaintiffs' demand for damages totaled 
in excess of$127,000. Defendant's expert opined he believes costs of the repairs should have been in 
the neighborhood of $25,000. As noted above, Defendant submitted an Offer of Judgment to 
Plaintiffs in the amount of $24,006.00. By granting the Defendants summary judgment and 
dismissing this action the Court ruled that the Plaintiffs recover nothing. 
8. Undesirability of the Case. Other than the expense of defending claims of this nature 
which rely heavily on specialized expert testimony there is nothing particularly undesirable about the 
action. 
9. Nature and length of the Professional Relationship with the Client. This is the first 
action in which defense counsel has represented the Defendant. 
10. Awards in Similar Cases. I am aware ofldaho District Courts within the last nine 
months granting awards of attorney fees in cases such as these. 
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11 & 12. The Last Two Factors Include the Reasonable Cost of Automated Legal 
Research and any other Factors a Court Deems Proper. 
In sum then, the Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. respectfully requests that they be awarded 
total attorney fees in the amount of $42,623.00 as specifically set out in the ledger below: 
DATE TIME ENTRY TIME- AMOUNT 
KEEPER 
12/2/14 Prepare letter to T. Morgan about claims file. RDL 48.00 
12/4/14 Prepare letter to D. Neidigh ofDeBest Plumbing about my RDL 48.00 
involvement. 
12/8/14 Receive and review letter from B. Keipert regarding assignment RDL 48.00 
claims activity log and claims file. 
12/8/14 Review claims activity log in detail received from Cincinnati RDL 128.00 
Insurance 
12/8/14 Review claims file with four reports from independent adjuster RDL 128.00 
in detail received from Cincinnati Insurance. 
12/8/14 Review demand letter in detail received from Cincinnati RDL 32.00 
Insurance. 
12/8/14 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about response to demand letter. RDL 48.00 
12/8/14 Prepare proposed response to demand letter. RDL 64.00 
12/17/14 Review investigation analysis report number 1 in preparation of RDL 64.00 
preparing timeline for loss. 
12/17/14 Prepare timeline for loss. RDL 48.00 
12/18/14 Further review of claim file materials and repair efforts in RDL 96.00 
preparation of revising letter to plaintiffs counsel regarding 
repair efforts. 
12/18/14 Revise letter to plaintiffs counsel following review of claim file RDL 32.00 
materials regarding repair efforts. 
2/3/15 Prepare letter and 60 day report to B. Keipert. RDL 64.00 
2/13/15 Review fax from counsel for Davison with Gould explanation RDL 96.00 
of repairs and damage amount support. 
2/13/15 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about claimant's position. RDL 48.00 
2/17/15 Review and respond to B. Keipert's email message about RDL 48.00 
response to demand letter. 
2/17/15 Review and respond to T. Morgan's message about T. RDL 64.00 
Peterson's role in clean up. 




2/17/15 Prepare letter to claimant's attorney about settlement. RDL 32.00 
2/18/15 Revise and final letter to counsel for Davison regarding RDL 48.00 
settlement. 
2/18/15 Prepare letter to DeBest about settlement process. RDL 48.00 
2/24/15 Receive and review letter from claimant's attorney about further RDL 48.00 
information from Gould about claim. 
I 2/24/15 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about Gould position on RDL 48.00 
Davisons' claim. 
2/24/15 Telephone conference with claimant's attorney about case RDL 32.00 
status. 
2/24/15 Prepare message to Cincinnati Insurance about V. Smith's RDL 48.00 
position. 
2/25/15 Review and respond to email message with B. Keipert about RDL 64.00 
case strategv. 
3/6/15 Review and respond to email message with T. Morgan on case RDL 64.00 
strategy. 
3/10/15 Review and respond to email messages with CIC about RDL 32.00 
communication with Davison. 
4/6/15 Prepare letter to V. Smith about Davison contact and possible RDL 48.00 
settlement. 
4/7/15 Prepare message to B. Keipert about proposed letter to V. RDL 32.00 
Smith. 
4/7/15 Review message from B. Keipert authorizing letter to V. Smith RDL 16.00 
with Davison settlement message. 
4/7/15 Revise and final letter to V. Smith about settlement. RDL 16.00 
5/11/15 Prepare 90 day report and letter to B. Keipert. RDL 96.00 
7/29/15 Receive and review Complaint filed by Davison in Valley RDL 128.00 
County. 
7/29/15 Review email message from plaintiffs counsel about request to RDL 16.00 
accept service. 
7/29/15 Phone conference with T. Morgan about his investigation. RDL 32.00 I 
7/29/15 Phone conference with B. Keipert about Complaint. RDL 16.00 
7/29/15 Prepare letter to plaintiffs counsel about no authority to accept RDL 48.00 
service of Complaint. 
7/29/15 Prepare letter to DeBest Plumbing about Complaint. RDL 48.00 
8/6/15 Phone conference with D. Neidigh about case status. RDL 32.00 
8/28/15 Prepare status report and letter to B. Keipert. RDL 48.00 
10/5/15 Receive, review and respond to email message from DeBest RDL 64.00 
about service of Summons and Complaint. 
10/5/15 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about service of process on DeBest. RDL 48.00 
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10/5/15 Begin preparing Answer and Demand for Jury Trial. RDL 256.00 
10/5/15 Research regarding case law on third party beneficiary status RDL 128.00 
for homeowner. 
10/5/15 Prepare draft of Defendant's First Set of Request for RDL 128.00 
Admissions to Plaintiffs. 
10/7/15 Review email message from D. Neidigh about contract with RDL 32.00 
Gould. 
10/7/15 Telephone conference with D. Neidigh about contract RDL 48.00 
arrangement for plumbing reinstall. 
10/7/15 Prepare draft of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and RDL 112.00 
Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiffs. 
10/7/15 Receive and review DeBest's invoice and account ledger for RDL 48.00 
Gould. 
10/8/15 Review, revise and final Answer and Demand for Jury Trial. RDL 256.00 
10/8/15 Revise and final Defendant's First Set of Request for RDL 112.00 
Admissions and Defendant's First Set oflnterrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiffs. 
10/16/15 Receive and review Court's Notice of Hearing. RDL 48.00 
11/2/15 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about postponing 60 day RDL 32.00 
report. 
11/3/15 Review email message from B. Keipert approving extension on RDL 32.00 
60 day report. 
11/6/15 Receive and review Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's First Set RDL 112.00 
I of Requests for Admissions. 
11/6/15 Telephone conference with V. Smith about his mistake on date RDL 48.00 
of water leak in Admissions as July 25, 2012 rather than 2013 
as pleaded in Complaint. 
11/9/15 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about Plaintiff's Responses to RDL 48.00 
Requests for Admission. 
11/9/15 Prepare letter to D. Neidigh about Plaintiffs Responses to RDL 48.00 
Defendant's First Set of Requests for Admission. 
11/10/15 Telephone conference with D. Neidigh about Plaintiffs RDL 64.00 
Responses to Request for Admissions. 
11/10/15 Receive and review DeBest documents on bid contract with Gil RDL 64.00 
Gould. 
11/16/15 Travel from Boise, Idaho to Valley County Courthouse in RDL 576.00 
Cascade, Idaho for Status Conference. 
11/16/15 Attend Status Conference with Court and Plaintiffs counsel. RDL 128.00 
11/18/15 Receive and review Scheduling Order from Court. RDL 64.00 
11/18/15 Prepare letter to DeBest about trial defense. RDL 48.00 
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11/18/15 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about trial and defense. RDL 48.00 
12/1/15 Prepare Motion to Compel plaintiff to answer discovery. RDL 64.00 
12/1/15 Prepare Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis in Support of Motion to RDL 96.00 
Compel. 
1/4/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about service of RDL 32.00 
discovery responses and vacating hearing. 
1/4/16 Prepare Notice to Vacate. RDL 16.00 
1/4/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's First Set RDL 224.00 
• 
of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents. 
1/4/16 Prepare letter to D. Neidigh about plaintiffs' responses to first RDL 48.00 
discovery requests. 
1/8/16 Prepare 60 day report and letter to B. Keipert. RDL 240.00 
1/11/16 Telephone conference with D. Neidigh about terms of RDL 48.00 
Summary Judgment Affidavit. 
1/12/16 Prepare Offer of Judgment. RDL 96.00 
1/12/16 Prepare letter to D. Neidigh about effect of Rule 68 offer. RDL 48.00 
1/18/16 Review documents provided by client to prepare for conference RDL 144.00 
with DeBest employees. 
1/19/16 Office conference with DeBest employees D. Neidigh and T. RDL 416.00 
Peterson about Gould work and contractual arrangement for 
purposes of Summary Judgment. 
2/8/16 Research regarding subcontractor's duty or lack of duty to RDL 128.00 
owner of construction premise. 
2/8/16 Prepare Affidavit of D. Neidigh in Support of Motion for RDL 64.00 
Summarv Judgment. 
2/9/16 Review and revise Affidavit ofD. Neidigh in Support of RDL 48.00 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2/9/16 Research regarding owner right to sue subcontractor for breach RDL 224.00 
of contract with general contractor. 
2/9/16 Research regarding owner right to sue subcontractor for RDL 240.00 
negligence in breach of contract. 
2/9/16 Begin preparation of Memo Supporting Summary Judgment. RDL 416.00 
2/11/16 Review draft Affidavit ofD. Neidgh in Support of Motion for RDL 32.00 
Summary Judgment. 
2/11/16 Prepare letter to D. Neidigh about Affidavit in Support of RDL 48.00 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2/23/16 Research regarding whether contract can create a tort duty. RDL 224.00 
2/23/16 Review and revise Memo in Support of Summary Judgment. RDL 224.00 
2/24/16 Review, revise and final Memorandum in Support of Summary RDL 96.00 
Judgment. 
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2/24/16 Prepare Motion for Summary Judgment. RDL 48.00 
2/24/16 Prepare Notice of Hearing RDL 16.00 
3/22/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to RDL 224.00 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of 
Gilbert Gould in Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Affidavit of Scott Davison in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
3/22/16 Research regarding cases cited in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in RDL 192.00 
Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3/24/16 Research regarding Idaho cases on whether a statute can modify RDL 512.00 
common law principles. 
3/26/16 Prepare Motion to Strike Affidavit of Gilbert Gould and RDL 96.00 
Affidavit of Scott Davison. 
3/26/16 Prepare Motion to Shorten Time. RDL 96.00 
3/26/16 Prepare Defendant's Reply Memorandum on Summary RDL 384.00 
Judgment. 
3/28/16 Revise and final Motion to Shorten Time. RDL 64.00 
3/28/16 Prepare Order on Motion to Strike. RDL 32.00 
3/28/16 Revise and Final Motion to Strike. RDL 32.00 
3/28/16 Revise and final Reply Memo on Summary Judgment. RDL 352.00 
3/28/16 Research regarding compromise negotiations as basis for RDL 224.00 
waiver or estoppel. 
3/28/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs counsel about our Offer RDL 48.00 
of Judgment. 
3/29/16 Prepare email message to DeBest Plumbing about status of RDL 32.00 
Summarv Judgment proceeding. 
3/31/16 Review plaintiffs Response to Motion to Strike. RDL 96.00 
4/4/16 Review Affidavits, memoranda and pertinent case law to RDL 320.00 
prepare for hearing on Motion for Summarv Judgment. 
4/4/16 Travel from Boise, Idaho to Cascade, Idaho for hearing on RDL 304.00 
Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
4/4/16 Attend hearing on Summary Judgment. RDL 192.00 
4/4/16 Return travel from Cascade, Idaho to Boise, Idaho. RDL 288.00 
4/5/16 Prepare proposed Summary Judgment Order. RDL 64.00 
4/5/16 Prepare email message to B. Kiepert about Summary Judgment RDL 48.00 
ruling. 
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4/5/16 Prepare email message to D. Neidigh about Summary Judgment RDL 32.00 
ruling. 
4/6/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about discovery RDL 32.00 
from 
Gould Construction. 
4/8/16 Review email message from D. Neidigh about case strategy and RDL 48.00 
prepare response. 
4/11/16 Review Order on Summary Judgment received from Court. RDL 32.00 
4/14/16 Prepare letter to plaintiffs' counsel about deposition of G. RDL 48.00 
Gould requested. 
• 4/19/16 Prepare 90 day report and letter to B. Keipert. RDL 192.00 
4/21/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about his intent to RDL 48.00 
appeal Court rejection of NORA as modifying common law. 
4/21/16 Prepare Notice of Deposition for Gil Gould. RDL 16.00 
4/21/16 Review Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal. RDL 96.00 
4/21/16 Telephone conference with R. England about water damage RDL 48.00 
investigation. 
4/21/16 Telephone conference with R. England about water RDL 48.00 
investigation experts locally he recommends. 
4/21/16 Telephone conference with J. Hargis ofBelfor about possible RDL 48.00 
expert services. 
4/21/16 Prepare message to J. Hargis about expert assignment. RDL 48.00 
4/22/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs' Memo in Support of Motion for RDL 160.00 
Permissive Appeal. 
4/22/16 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about plaintiffs' motion. RDL 48.00 
4/26/16 Review Plaintiffs' Motion and Memo in Support of Motion for THN 45.00 
Permissive Appeal in preparation of objection to same. 
4/26/16 Research Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act in preparation THN 75.00 
of objection to Motion and Memo in Support of Motion for 
Permissive Appeal. 
4/27/16 Research case law on Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act in THN 90.00 
preparation of objection to Motion and Memo in Support of 
Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
4/28/16 Telephone conference with J. Hargis about inquiry on expert RDL 32.00 
witness assistance. 
5/2/16 Review plaintiffs' discovery production, claims file and RDL 608.00 
pleadings to identify documents for exhibits to prepare for 
deposition of G. Gould. 
5/2/16 Research regarding recognized protocol for water damage RDL 224.00 
response and remediation. 
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5/3/16 Research regarding Idaho case law in mitigation of property RDL 144.00 
damage. 
5/4/16 Draft Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' RDL 150.00 
Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
5/4/16 Outline questions and identify exhibits to prepare for deposition RDL 672.00 
of Gil Gould. 
5/4/16 Receive and review Order Resetting Trial from Court. RDL 48.00 
5/4/16 Prepare letter to DeBest Plumbing about Order from Court and RDL 48.00 
trial. 
5/4/16 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about Order from Court and trial. RDL 48.00 
5/5/16 Research privity requirement for contract construction cases in THN 90.00 
preparation of Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
5/5/16 Research NORA for breach of contract in preparation of THN 120.00 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Permissive Appeal. 
5/5/16 Research NORA as a bar to plaintiff's claim for failure to THN 180.00 
provide written notice in preparation of Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Permissive Appeal. 
5/5/16 Continue preparing draft Defendant's Memorandum in RDL 240.00 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
5/5/16 Travel from Boise, Idaho to Cascade, Idaho for deposition of RDL 304.00 
Gil Gould. 
5/5/16 Attend deposition of Gil Gould. RDL 672.00 
5/5/16 Return travel from Cascade, Idaho to Boise, Idaho. RDL 288.00 
5/6/16 Research standard of review for permissible appeal in THN 105.00 
preparation of Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Aopeal. 
5/6/16 Continue preparing draft Defendant's Memorandum in THN 480.00 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
5/9/16 Review, revise, final and sign Defendant's Memorandum in RDL 64.00 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
5/9/16 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about filing Defendant's RDL 48.00 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Permissive Appeal. 
5/9/16 Telephone conference with J. Hargis about potential expert. RDL 48.00 
5/10/16 Telephone conference with D. Neidigh about Gould's RDL 48.00 
deposition. 
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5/10/16 Prepare detailed deposition summary from handwritten notes RDL 256.00 
taken during G. Gould's deposition and from exhibits received 
for reference in future litigation and discovery purposes. 
5/10/16 Telephone conference with T. Peterson about split faucets he RDL 64.00 
replaced. i 
5/10/16 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about Gould's deposition and case RDL 48.00 
I strategy, 
5/10/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about possible expert RDL 32.00 
i services. 
5/10/16 Prepare letter to P. Coooi about case background and status. RDL 48.00 
5/10/16 Receive and review copy of Court filed Order to Vacate and RDL 48.00 
Reschedule Hearing Date on Pending Motion from plaintiffs' 
attorney. 
5/11/16 Review email message from P. Coppi and attached curriculum RDL 80.00 
vitae and contract. 
! 5/11/16 Prepare email message to P. Coppi about IICR certification. RDL 48.00 
5/11/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about his background. RDL 32.00 
5/11/16 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about engaging P. Coppi RDL 32.00 
as an expert. 
5/17/16 Review file to identify materials to provide to expert Pat Coppi. RDL 96.00 
5/17/16 Prepare letter to P. Coppi about expert assignment. RDL 48.00 
5/18/16 Office conference with P. Coooi about expert assignment. RDL 144.00 
. 5/23/16 Review Plaintiffs' Response and Supplemental Memorandum in THN 120.00 
Support of Motion for Permissive Appeal (25 pages). 
5/23/16 Research case law cited by plaintiff in Response and THN 90.00 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Permissive Appeal. i 
5/23/16 Draft oral argument for hearing. THN 105.00 
6/3/16 Draft oral argument and prepare for hearing on Motion for THN 90.00 
Permissive Appeal. 
6/6/16 Round trip travel from Boise, Idaho to Cascade, Idaho to attend THN 570.00 
hearing on Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
6/6/16 Attend hearing on Motion for Permissive Appeal. THN 270.00 
• 6/7/16 Research regarding Idaho's NORA to determine scope of RDL 64.00 
DeBest's rights to notice under the Act. 
6/6/16 Research NORA notice requirements for potential Summary THN 60.00 
Judgment motion. 
6/7/16 Draft Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs. THN 135.00 
DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 14 
00000672
-
6/7/16 i Office conference with Pat Coppi about his preliminary expert RDL 320.00 
• opinions about the culpability of Gould and the inflated cost of 
their repairs. 
617116 Prepare Third Party Complaint against Gould Custom Builder, RDL 288.00 
Inc. 
6/8/16 Review and revise DeBest's Third-Party Complaint Against THN 45.00 
Gould. 
• 
6/8/16 Research case law for scope of "remodel" for purposes of THN 75.00 I 
NORA 
6/8/16 Review Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's First Set of THN 60.00 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents for 
information on cost of remodel for purposes of NORA and for 
notices sent to contractors. 
6/8/16 Review and revise DeBest's Third-Party Complaint Against RDL 192.00 
Gould. 
6/8/16 Telephone conference with B. Keipert about case status. RDL 16.00 ! 
6/8/16 Telephone conference with D. Neidigh about no written notice RDL 48.00 
from Davisons. 
6/8/16 Prepare Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint. RDL 64.00 
6/9/16 Telephone call with Valley County Assessor for information on THN 30.00 
assessed value of property. 
6/9/16 Research assessed value of property requirements for possible THN 45.00 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
6/9/16 Receive and review Court Order Denying Motion for RDL 64.00 
Permissive Appeal. 
. 6/10/16 Prepare letter to D. Neidigh about filing motion to add Gould as RDL 48.00 
i third party defendant. 
• 6/10/16 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about hearing date. RDL 48.00 
6/14/16 Draft memo on assessment value of house for NORA THN 30.00 
requirements. 
6/14/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum in THN 124.00 
Support of Motion for Permissive Appeal Before the Idaho 
I Supreme Court (24 pages). 
6/14/16 Research Idaho Appellate rules regarding procedure for THN 60.00 
interlocutory appeals. 
• 6/15/16 Research Idaho Appellate rules and case law to determine THN 75.00 
I 
i 
response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Appeal before Supreme 
Court. 
• 
6/22/16 Receive and review message from P. Coppi about budget for RDL 48.00 I 
i future services. 
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6/22/16 Prepare email message to P. Coppi about case strategy. RDL 48.00 
6/22/16 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about case status. RDL 48.00 
6/22/16 Prepare letter to plaintiffs' counsel about motion before RDL 48.00 I 
Supreme Court and previous offer of Davisons' depositions. 
6/23/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion for Leave to RDL 105.00 
File Third Party Complaint (24 pages). 
6/23/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about Motion to RDL 48.00 
File Third Party Complaint, settlement possibility and Motion 
I to File Appeal. 
6/23/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs' Response and Objection to RDL 32.00 
DeBest's Motion for Leave to File A Third Party Complaint 
against Gould. 
6/24/16 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about status of Motion to RDL 32.00 
I File Third Party Complaint. 
6/27/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum for THN 120.00 
I 
Order Confirming Implementation of NORA (23 pages). 
j 6/27/16 Review Affidavits of Scott Davison and Gil Gould to compare THN 75.00 
to facts in plaintiffs' NORA motion. 
6/27/16 Research case law cited by plaintiffs in NORA motion. THN 60.00 
6/27/16 Review Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum to Confirm RDL 80.00 
Implementation of the Provisions of the Notice and Opportunity 
to Repair Act Apply to Pending Lawsuit to confirm 
implementation of provisions of NORA. 
6/27/16 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about plaintiffs' latest RDL 32.00 
motion . 
. 6/27/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about his last RDL 16.00 
motion. 
6/28/16 Research NORA cases for Motion for Summary Judgment. THN 105.00 
6/29/16 Research for Reply Brief on Motion for Third Party Complaint. THN 75.00 
6/29/16 Draft Reply Brief on Motion to file Third Party Complaint. THN 105.00 
6/29/16 Review B. Keipert's email message authorizing Summary RDL 32.00 
Judgment on NORA. 
6/30/16 Research District Courts for cases on written notice THN 60.00 
requirement for NORA. 
6/30/16 Research estoppel arguments as defense for plaintiffs on THN 75.00 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
6/30/16 Draft DeBest's Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for THN 210.00 
Summarv Judgment. 
j 6/30/16 Research case law and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for RDL 75.00 
Reply Brief on Motion for Third Party Complaint. 
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16/30/16 Draft Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to RDL 120.00 
File Third-Party Complaint. 
7/7/16 Research standing issue in preparation of Reply Memorandum THN 75.00 
in Support of Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint. 
7/7/16 Research indemnity issue in preparation of Reply Memorandum THN 90.00 
in Support of Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint. 
7/7/16 Continue drafting Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion • THN 285.00 I 
for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint. 
7/8/16 Research contribution and indemnity in preparation of Reply THN 165.00 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File Third-
Party Complaint. 
7/8/16 Continue drafting Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion THN 270.00 
for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint. 
7/8/16 Receive and review Notice of Hearing on motion to confirm RDL 32.00 
NORA from plaintiffs attorney. 
7/11/16 Draft Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Confirm THN 165.00 
Implementation of the Provisions of the Notice and Opportunity 
to Repair Act Apply to Pending Lawsuit. 
7/14/16 Research "waiver" in preparation of Memorandum in THN 90.00 
Opposition to Motion to Confirm Implementation of the 
Provisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act Apply 
to Pending Lawsuit. 
7/15/16 Prepare oral argument in preparation for hearing on Motion for THN 75.00 
Leave to File Third Party Complaint. 
7/18/16 Review notes and prepare for hearing on Motion for Leave to THN 30.00 
File Third-Party Complaint. 
7/18/16 Attend telephonic hearing on Motion for Leave to File Third THN 120.00 
Party Complaint. 
7/18/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about expert report and RDL 64.00 
inspection of Davidson house. 
7/18/16 Prepare Request to Inspect the Premises Pursuant to Idaho Rule RDL 80.00 
of Civil Procedure 34. 
7/18/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about discovery. RDL 48.00 
7/18/16 Prepare letter to plaintiffs' counsel about discovery issues. RDL 48.00 
7/18/16 Prepare email message to B. Keipert on case status. RDL 48.00 
7/20/16 Receive, review and respond to email message from B. Keipert RDL 64.00 
about Court decision to deny request to file Third Party 
i Complaint. 
7/21/16 Draft letter to Court regarding time frame for second Motion THN 30.00 
for Summary Judgment hearing. 
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7/21/16 Receive and review Supreme Court's Order Denying plaintiffs' RDL 48.00 
Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
7/21/16 Prepare email message to B. Keipert about Supreme Court RDL 32.00 
Order. 
7/22/16 Research NORA notice requirements and waiver of THN 90.00 
requirements in preparation of Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Confirm Implementation of the Provisions of the 
Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act Apply to Pending 
Lawsuit. 
7/22/16 Continue drafting response Memorandum in Opposition to THN 255.00 
Motion to Confirm Implementation of the Provisions of the 
Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act Apply to Pending 
Lawsuit. 
7/22/16 Draft Affidavit of Darcy Neidigh in Support of Second Motion THN 75.00 
for Summary Judgment. 
7/22/16 Draft Affidavit of Tom Petersen in Support of Second Motion THN 105.00 
for Summarv Judgment. 
7/25/16 Review and revise Motion to Compel. THN 30.00 
7/25/16 Draft Affidavit of Tyler H. Neill in Support of Defendant's THN 90.00 
Motion to Compel. 
7/25/16 Research Promissory Estoppel in preparation of Memorandum THN 60.00 
in Opposition to Motion to Confirm Implementation of the 
Provisions of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act Apply 
i to Pending Lawsuit. 
• 7/25/16 Continue drafting Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to THN 120.00 
Confirm Implementation of the Provisions of the Notice and 
I Opportunity to Repair Act Apply to Pending Lawsuit. 
7/25/16 Begin preparation of Motion to Compel discovery responses to BDR 52.50 
defendant's second set of discovery and Affidavit of Tyler Neill 
in Support of Motion to Compel and exhibits for same. 
7/26/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' attorney about discovery. RDL 32.00 
8/1/16 Review and respond to message with P. Coppi about contact RDL 48.00 
with R. England. 
8/1/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about status of his expert RDL 32.00 
report. 
8/2/16 Revise Affidavits of Darcy Neidigh and Tom Peterson in THN 60.00 
support of 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment. 
8/2/16 Draft Memo in support of 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment. THN 240.00 
8/2/16 Draft Affidavit of counsel in support of 2nd Motion for THN 45.00 
Summary Judgment. 
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8/2/16 Telephone conference with D. Neidigh about Affidavit in RDL 32.00 
Summarv Judgment. 
8/3/16 Revise memo in support of 2nd Motion for Summary THN 45.00 
Judgment. 
8/3/16 Research waiver for Response to NORA motion. THN 165.00 
• 8/3/16 Draft response to NORA motion. THN 300.00 I 
• 8/3/16 Telephone conference with Plaintiffs counsel about his RDL 48.00 
discovery efforts. 
8/4/16 Research Promissory estoppel for Response to NORA motion. THN 90.00 ! 
8/4/16 Call with client regarding information for affidavits. THN 30.00 
8/4/16 Draft Response to NORA Motion. THN 195.00 
8/4/16 Revise affidavits of Darcy Neidigh and Tom Petersen. THN 30.00 I 
8/4/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs' 2nd Discovery Responses. THN 30.00 
8/4/16 Draft memo in support of Motion for Summarv Judgment. THN 225.00 
8/4/16 Draft 2nd Motion for Summarv Judgment. THN 30.00 
8/4/16 Review message from plaintiffs counsel about our request to RDL 64.00 
supplement discovery and response about discovery deadline. 
8/4/16 Telephone conference with D. Neidigh about DeBest RDL 48.00 
knowledge of NORA and T. Petersen authority to bind DeBest 
to agreement. 
8/4/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about scope of his report RDL 64.00 
and questions on format. 
8/4/16 Receive and review plaintiffs Second Discovery Responses. RDL 112.00 
8/4/16 Prepare duces tecum request and notice of depositions for Scott RDL 80.00 
and Anne Davison. 
• 8/4/16 Review and respond to various messages about scope of repairs RDL 96.00 
by Gould with Pat Coppi. 
i 8/4/16 Review P. Coppi draft expert report. RDL 128.00 
8/5/16 Revise memo in support of 2nd Motion for Summary THN 90.00 
Judgment. 
8/5/16 Revise affidavit of counsel in support of 2nd Motion for THN 15.00 
Summary Judgment. 
8/5/16 Revise response to NORA motion. THN 210.00 
8/5/16 Review and revise affidavits on Summarv Judgment. RDL 80.00 
8/5/16 Review and respond to message with D. Neidigh about RDL 64.00 
Summarv Judgment and DeBest affidavits. 
8/5/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about his draft report. RDL 240.00 
8/5/16 Telephone conference with DeBest personal counsel about RDL 64.00 
Summarv Judgment affidavits. 
DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES-19 
00000677
-
8/5/16 Telephone conference with D. Neidigh about request to review RDL 48.00 
draft Summary Judgment memorandum. 
8/5/16 Prepare message to D. Neidigh about draft memorandum. RDL 48.00 
8/5/16 Telephone conference with D. Neidigh about her signature on RDL 48.00 
affidavits. 
8/5/16 Review and respond to message with D. Neidigh about RDL 64.00 
Summary Judgment and DeBest affidavits. 
8/5/16 Begin preparation of Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure BDR 30.00 
. pursuant to Scheduling Order and IRCP 26(b)(4) and required 
• exhibits for same. 
8/8/16 Review, revise and final opposition memo to plaintiffs motion RDL 224.00 
to confirm application of NORA. 
8/8/16 Prepare letter to D. Neidigh about case status. RDL 64.00 
8/8/16 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about case status. RDL 64.00 
8/8/16 Revise and finalize 30(b)(6) deposition notice with duces tecum RDL 48.00 
for BC&G, LLC. 
8/8/16 Revise and finalize subpoena of records to Gould. RDL 48.00 
8/8/16 Prepare Notice to Vacate hearing on motion to compel. RDL 48.00 
8/8/16 Begin preparation of Third Party Subpoena and Deposition BDR 112.50 
Duces Tecum to Bo Gould, BC&G Construction LLC/Chase 
Custom Homes LLC regarding project and bills to Gould 
Custom Builders. 
8/8/16 Begin preparation of Third Party Subpoena Duces Tecum and BDR 37.50 
subpoena letter to Gilbert Gould with additional input from 
expert P. Coppi. 
• 8/9/16 Review P. Coppi 2nd draft report. RDL 128.00 
8/9/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about his second draft RDL 64.00 
report. 
8/9/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs counsel about S. Davison RDL 32.00 I 
deposition date. 
8/9/16 Prepare amended notice duces tecum for S. Davison deposition. RDL 48.00 i 
8/10/16 Review, revise and final expert witness disclosure. RDL 96.00 
• 8/12/16 Draft oral argument and prepare for hearing on plaintiffs' THN 75.00 
NORA Motion. 
8/12/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs counsel about inspections RDL 32.00 
of residence. 
8/12/16 Receive, review and sign Stipulation consolidating hearings. RDL 32.00 
8/15/16 Review signed Stipulation to vacate and reset hearing on RDL 32.00 
plaintiffs' motion. 
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8/15/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about his failure RDL 16.00 
to file Stipulation. 
8/17/16 Review and analyze plaintiffs' documents to identify exhibits RDL 464.00 
and outline questions for deposition of S. Davison. 
8/18/16 Review exhibits and question outline to prepare for deposition RDL 96.00 
of plaintiff S. Davison. 
8/18/16 Review and respond to P. Coppi's message about cabin RDL 64.00 I 
drainage system. 
8/18/16 Attend deposition of S. Davison. RDL 512.00 
i 8/19/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about S. Davison's RDL 48.00 
deposition and request to inspect house. 
! 8/19/16 Prepare letter to plaintiffs' counsel about Anne Davison's RDL 48.00 
deposition vacated. 
8/19/16 Prepare Notice to Vacate Deposition. RDL 32.00 
8/19/16 Review message from plaintiff S. Davison about house RDL 32.00 
I 
inspection on 8-25-16. 
8/19/16 Prepare message and review response of P. Coppi about RDL 48.00 
plaintiffs' agreement to allow house inspection. 
8/19/16 Receive, review and respond to plaintiff and plaintiffs' property RDL 64.00 
manager about scope of inspection. 
8/22/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs' Opposition to Second Motion for THN 195.00 
Summary Judgment and Second Affidavit of Gil Gould (54 
pages). 
8/22/16 Research local rules of procedure and Motions to Strike for THN 90.00 
Motion to 
Strike Plaintiffs' Opposition to Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
8/22/16 Draft Reply Brief for Second Motion for Summary Judgment. THN 225.00 
8/22/16 Receive and review Plaintiffs Response to Second Motion for RDL 112.00 
Summary Judgment and Supplemental Affidavit of G. Gould. 
8/22/16 Prepare deposition summary of S. Davison. RDL 176.00 
8/23/16 Research Motions to Strike. THN 60.00 
8/23/16 Draft Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Opposition to Second Motion THN 75.00 
for Summary Judgment. 
8/23/16 Research promissory estoppel and quasi estoppel. THN 120.00 
8/23/16 Draft Reply Brief on Second Motion for Summary Judgment. THN 180.00 
• 8/23/16 Receive, review and respond to message with D. Neidigh about RDL 64.00 
case status. 
8/23/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about plaintiffs' RDL 48.00 
position that all water damage was on July 26. 
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8/23/16 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about Davison's deposition and case RDL 112.00 
status. 
8/24/16 Call with Laurie Brede regarding information about Gil Gould's THN 45.00 
affidavit. 
8/24/16 Review discovery and deposition transcript for information in THN 45.00 
support of reply brief on Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
8/24/16 Research estoppel for Reply Brief. THN 210.00 
8/24/16 Research authority and apparent authority for Reply Brief. THN 75.00 
8/24/16 Review, revise and final letter to B. Keipert about case strategy RDL 64.00 
and case status. 
8/24/16 Telephone conference with L. Brede about any call she had RDL 96.00 
with Gould in 2013. 
8/24/16 Prepare email message to D. Neidigh about case status. RDL 48.00 
8/25/16 Research waiver and promissory estoppel. THN 60.00 
8/25/16 Draft Reply Brief on Second Motion for Summary Judgment. THN 120.00 
8/25/16 Travel to and from Pilgrims Cove, McCall, Idaho. RDL 928.00 
8/25/16 Inspect 2109 Lily, McCall, Idaho for evidence of remediation RDL 496.00 
and repair work. 
8/26/16 Research "third party beneficiaries" and promissory estoppel for THN 90.00 
Reply Brief to Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
8/26/16 Review discovery materials and prepare for deposition of Bo THN 105.00 
I Gould. 
8/26/16 Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about inspection RDL 48.00 
of plaintiffs' house and mediation required by Scheduling 
Order. 
• 8/26/16 • Telephone conference with plaintiffs' counsel about inspection RDL 64.00 
of plaintiffs' house and mediation required by Scheduling 
Order. 
8/26/16 Review and respond to message ofD. Neidigh about L. Brede RDL 75.00 
recollections. 
8/29/16 Research "apparent authority". THN 75.00 
8/29/16 Draft Affidavit of Laurie Brede and Tom Petersen. THN 105.00 
8/29/16 Draft Reply Brief on Second Motion for Summary Judgment. THN 105.00 
8/29/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about his draft addendum RDL 32.00 
report. 
8/31/16 Review and respond to messages with P. Coppi about his RDL 64.00 
photos and draft reports. 
8/31/16 Review and respond to several messages with P. Coppi about RDL 64.00 
his Draft Post Inspection Report. 
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i 8/31/16 Receive and review P. Coppi photos from inspection of cabin. RDL 64.00 
9/1/16 Prepare for deposition of Bo Gould. THN 75.00 
I 916116 Prepare for deposition of Bo Gould ( draft outline of questions, THN 420.00 
review newly produced documents from Gil Gould that are 
roughly 500 pages). 
9/6/16 Revise Affidavit of Lorrie Brede. THN 15.00 i 
! 9/6/16 Draft Reply Brief for Second Motion for Summary Judgment. THN 90.00 
j 9/6/16 Receive and review Supplementary Affidavit of Gil Gould and THN 45.00 
compare to original that is nine pages. 
I 916116 Prepare photographs received from P. Coppi from site BDR 30.00 
i 
inspection for production to Plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to 
IRCP 26(b)(4). 
1 9/7/16 Prepare for deposition of Bo Gould by reviewing invoices THN 60.00 
provided and revising questions. 
I 9/7/16 Attend deposition of Bo Gould ( deponent did not show up). THN 45.00 
9/7/16 Research case law on apparent authority. THN 45.00 
9/7/16 Research striking affidavits. THN 75.00 
9/7/16 Draft Reply Memo to Second Motion for Summary Judgment. THN 195.00 
9/7/16 Draft Motion to Strike Affidavits. THN 60.00 
9/7/16 Receive and review Insurance Certificate ofBC&G. RDL 48.00 
j 9/7/16 Telephone conference with P. Coppi about workman's RDL 32.00 
compensation insurance at BC&G. 
i 9/7/16 Telephone conference with Plaintiffs' counsel about BC&G RDL 32.00 
intent not to aooear at deposition. 
j 9/7/16 Attend deposition of BC&G and state for the record their non- RDL 128.00 
appearance. 
9/7/16 Telephone conference with Chris Gould about his excuse for RDL 80.00 
non-appearance at his deposition and his agreement to provide 
documents and cooperation. 
• 9/8/16 Draft Objection to Plaintiffs' Objection to Second Motion for THN 120.00 
Summary Judgment. 
9/8/16 Draft Reply Memo on Second Motion for Summary Judgment i THN 60.00 
(argument that NORA is procedural not remedial). 
9/8/16 Call with Laurie Brede at DeBest regarding information for THN 30.00 
Affidavit. 
9/8/16 Revise Affidavit of Laurie Brede. THN 30.00 
9/8/16 Email Darcy Neidigh regarding review of affidavit. THN 15.00 
9/8/16 Prepare message to D. Neidigh about possible need for L. Brede RDL 48.00 
affidavit. 
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9/8/16 Telephone conference with Plaintiffs' counsel about BC&G THN 48.00 
subpoena and potential mediation. 
9/9/16 Two calls with client regarding information for affidavit. THN 30.00 
9/9/16 Revise Reply Memo on Second Motion for Summary THN 45.00 
Judgment. 
• 9/9/16 Prepare Defendant's First Supplemental Expert Disclosures BDR 22.50 
with updated report from expert P. Coooi. 
9/12/16 Call with client regarding affidavit. THN 15.00 
9/12/16 Draft obiection to motions of insurance and settlement offers. THN 60.00 
9/12/16 Research rules and case law on insurance and settlement THN 75.00 
evidence. 
9/12/16 Revise Reply on Second Motion for Summarv Judgment. THN 30.00 
9/12/16 Review, revise and finalize Defendant's Supplementary Expert RDL 48.00 
Report. 
9/12/16 Review P. Coppi's 240 photos of Davison house to identify RDL 96.00 
exhibits. 
9/12/16 Review, revise and finalize Reply Memo. RDL 112.00 
9/12/16 Telephone conference with R. Egland about his photos. RDL 16.00 
9/12/16 Review discovery and pleadings to prepare Pre Trial Report. RDL 96.00 
9/12/16 Prepare letter to B. Keipert and Pre Trial Report. RDL 160.00 
9/12/16 Finalize Defendant's First Supplemental Expert Witness BDR 22.50 
Disclosure. 
9/13/16 Review, revise and finalize letter to B. Keipert with Pre Trial RDL 144.00 
Report as well. 
9/13/16 Telephone conference with D. Knotts about prospective RDL 16.00 
mediation. 
9/14/16 Prepare Case Status Report to D. Neidigh and review the RDL 96.00 
response. 
9/14/16 Review message from B. Keipert acknowledging Pre Trial RDL 16.00 
Report. 
9/16/16 Prepare oral argument on Second Motion for Summary THN 90.00 
Judgment. 
9/16/16 Prepare oral argument on Plaintiffs NORA Motion. THN 75.00 
9/16/16 Receive and review message from P. Coppi about his invoice. RDL 48.00 
9/19/16 Travel one way to Cascade, Idaho for hearing on Second THN 240.00 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
9/19/16 Attend hearing on Second Motion for Summary Judgment. THN 225.00 
9/19/16 Telephone conference with D. Knotts to confirm availability as RDL 32.00 
mediator. 
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9/19/16 Travel to Cascade to attend hearing on Motion for Summary RDL 288.00 
Judgment. 
9/19/16 Attend hearing on Motion for Summarv Judgment. RDL 240.00 
9/19/16 Prepare letter to B. Keipert about Motion for Summary RDL 48.00 
Judgment hearings. 
9/19/16 Prepare letter to D. Neidigh about Motion for Summary RDL 48.00 
I Judgment hearing. 
9/29/16 Research regarding evidence of insurance as prohibited in jury RDL 112.00 
I trial. 
9/30/16 Research regarding evidence of settlement as prohibited in jury RDL 192.00 
trial. 
9/30/16 Prepare defendant's Motion in Limine. RDL 416.00 
9/30/16 Review, revise and finalize Defendant's Motion in Limine. RDL 128.00 
10/5/16 Begin preparation of Defendant's proposed jury instructions BDR 135.00 
including specific instructions re: negligence, failure to 
mitigate. 
10/7/16 Review Court's Memorandum Decision and Order and RDL 160.00 
Judgment 
10/12/16 Begin preparation of Defendant's motion for costs and attorney BDR 240.00 
fees and verified memorandum of costs and attorney fees. 
10/13/16 Continue preparation of Defendant's verified memorandum of BDR 397.50 
costs and attorney fees and affidavit ofB. Rountree in support 
of same. 
10/14/16 Review, revise and finalize Defendant's motion for costs and RDL 240.00 
attorney fees and verified memorandum of costs and attorney 
fees, affidavit of B. Rountree in support of same. 
TOTAL FEES ......................................................................................... $42,623.00 
TOTAL COSTS AND FEES .............................................................................. $50,072.86 
DATED This _Bctay of October, 2016. 
CANTRILLSKINNERLEWISCASEY 
By:&~~ 
Robert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 





County of Ada ) 






That he is one of the attorneys of Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. in the above-
entitled action, and as such has knowledge of the facts relative to the above costs and 
attorney fees; 
That to the best of my knowledge and belief the description and amount of cost items 
and attorney fees in the above memorandum are correct and have been necessarily 
incurred in said cause; 
That the costs and attorney fees charged therein have been actually and necessarily 
incurred as stated therein; 
That the same are allowable under Rules 54( d)(l) and 54( e) of the Idaho Rules of 
CivilProcedure,and 
That said costs claimed are in compliance with Rule 54(d)(4) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
~g~;-
Robert D. Lewis 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /c./'/!Jay of October, 2016. 
Notary Public or Idaho 
7 
Residing at -~:::...__~=:..:....i..:':J..--_:, Idaho 
My Commission expires:_;,,:+,,<:+-==------
~ <;'b\\.~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /1/day of October, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrumenWmethod indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
~ Facsimile 208-345-1129 
~ Hand Delivery 
~ U.S. Mail 
;~;-
Robert D. Lewis 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
-~you~\~ti· ~~· c~~~~1~ 
OCT 1 7 2016 
Case No. ___ lnst. No. __ _ 
Filed A.M(:YQ() P.M. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
U~ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV 15-l 78C 
AFFIDAVIT OF BETH ROUNTREE 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
I, Beth Rountree, being first duly sworn upon oath, does depose and say: 
1. That I am employed by CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP as a 
paralegal and have been since 2011. 
2. My education includes a bachelor's degree in Political Science from Boise State 
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University (1992) and a certificate in Paralegal Studies from Boise State University (1995). 
3. I have been employed as a paralegal since March 1995 and my previous employers 
include Murphy Law Office, PLLC, Albertson's Inc., Idaho Attorney General's Criminal Law 
Division and Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
4. I am a member of the Idaho Association of Paralegals, Inc. and have been since 1996. 
I currently serve as a Board Advisor and Past President of the organization. 
5. Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATEDThis /f-fA dayofOctober,2016.~ 
B TH ROUNTREE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /C( day of October, 2016. 
Notary Public for Idah9, 
Residing at ,4k.. lout,\.., , Idaho 
My Commission expires:_-:,_,f'-1_,_2_0 ___ _ 
~~\\\-~~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day ofOctober, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
.. .ft ....... .. 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
~ Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
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Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
D~ A. Ml~R CLERK 
By A J. __,....> Deputy 
NOV O 8 2016 
Case No. ____ lnst. No, __ _ 
FilAd A.M.P 0· Zla PM. 
CANTRILL SKJNNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 











Case No. CV l 5- l 78C 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM ON ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. (DeBest), by and through their attorneys of 
record, CantriII Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP and hereby presents this Memorandum to the 
Court on the attorney fee and costs issues. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Memorandum is submitted in further support of Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees 
and Costs and in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs. 
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Defendant's Memorandum of Costs sets forth verified costs and attorney's fees in compliance 
with Rule 54(b). Defendant will concede that Plaintiffs Memorandum correctly points out that there 
has been no deposition and no trial testimony of Defendant's expert Pat Coppi. The inclusion of 
$2,000 for costs of expert witness fees is not consistent with Rule 54(d)(I)(C)(ix). That amount 
should be considered as a discretionary cost under Rule 54(d)(l)(D). Costs as a matter of right 
should be adjusted and awarded at $1,404.86, as Defendant is the prevailing party. 
We recognize that discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)( l )(D) and attorney fees under Rule 
54(e) are matters left to the dis(..Tetion of the Cou1t. Plaintiffs actually agree with Defendant on this 
issue and correctly cite Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462,259 P.3d 608 (2011) as authority. 
Unlike Garner, however, Defendant seeks attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule 
54(e) upon the basis that Plaintiffs did not have a valid lega1 basis for bringing this action. There 
was no foundation for Plaintiffs lawsuit. The foundation and purpose of NORA is notice of claim to 
the construction professional before suit, who then has an opportunity to repair the construction 
defect and damage. Idaho Code § 6-2503. Plaintiffs sued DeBest without prior statutory notice. 
Defendant's position will be supported by a discussion of the Procedural Matters in this case, 
followed by Argument. 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
On July 2 I, 20 I 5, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint seeking damages for repair costs of 
$123,345.64. The Complaint allegations are that DeBest Plumbing, Inc.' s performance of plumbing 
services to a vacation residence located on real property situated in Valley County caused those 
repair damages. (ii I). The damages arose from remodeling endeavors on the vacation home and 
residence where Plaintiffs' general contractor secured the plumbing services from DeBest by 
contract. (i] 4). On July 25, 2013, water damage was discovered within the residence facility and 
found to be the result ofloose fittings or defective fittings that were installed by DeBest's plumber. 
(~15). 
DeBest's plumbing services did not meet the fundamental purpose and objective of the 
contractual plumbing services and did not meet alleged express or imp1ied warranties. (ii 7). 
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DeBest' s services were alleged to have been negligent and defective and breached the 
reasonable standard and duty of care. (ii 8). 
Plaintiffs set forth no allegation whatsoever of application or compliance under the Notice of 
Opportunity and Repair Act, Idaho Code§§ 6·2501, ~- (NORA). Discovery was pursued and it 
was detcnnincd that Plaintiffs had no privity of contract with DeBest. A Motion to Compel was 
necessary to acquire discovery responses from Plaintiff. 
On February 26, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment upon the grounds 
that there was no privity of contract, so the contractual claim was subject to dismissal, and because 
Defendant's agreement to supply material and services was only for the benefit of the general 
contractor, Gould Custom Homes, Inc., and that said contract could not create a tort duty under Idaho 
law to support the cause of action in negligence, against subcontractor DeBest. 
In March 2016, Plaintiffs filed its Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Motion for S urnmary 
Judgment. This introduced for the first time Plaintiffs assertion that NORA applied to the claim, that 
NORA had been fully complied with by Plaintiffs written notice to the general contractor, and that 
DeBest engaged in the statutory required negotiations and settlement process required by NORA. 
It is noteworthy that there was no discussion or proof that the civil suit was based upon a 
substantial remodel of the residence, as defined. This was an assumption underlying Plaintiffs 
assertions with neither mention nor proof in their filings. Further, Plaintiffs assumed notice to the 
general contractor sufficed as notice of claim to DeBest. 
In their summary judgment response, Plaintiffs asserted that NORA permitted a direct action 
against a subcontractor like DeBest, and it did away with the common law privity requirement for 
contract claims. Plaintiffs also argued that DeBest could not assert the mere existence of a contract 
to deny an action for common negligence. 
On Ap1il 4, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and ruled on that motion from the Bench. On April 7, 2016, that Bench ruling was 
memorialized by an Order holding that the causes of the action for breach of contract, breach of 
express warranty and breach of implied warranty were dismissed for lack of privity. The Court also 
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ruled that breach of the duty to perfonn services in a workmanlike manner could suffice as a basis 
for the negligence claim. 
Plaintiffs continued to focus their litigation efforts on establishing that NORA created a cause 
of action against a subcontractor without need to establish privity. 
On April 20, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Permissive Appeal to seek an appellate forum 
to establish, contrary to the Court's Order on Summary Judgment, that NORA abrogated the concept 
that privity of contract is required in suits by a homeowner to pursue damages caused by 
subcontractors. 
The matter was briefed and argued. The Plaintiffs continued to assume, without proof~ that 
this matter involved a substantial remodel as defined, and that a written notice only to the general 
contractor triggered NORA's application to subcontractor DeBest. 
On June 6, 2016, this Court entered its Order denying the Plaintiffs Motion for Permissive 
Appeal. 
On June 14, 2016, Plaintiffs filed with the Idaho Supreme Court a Motion for Permissive 
Appeal under I.A.R. 12(c)(l). This motion was denied by Supreme Court Order dated July 20, 2016. 
On June 27, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Confirm Implementation of the Provisions of 
NORA Apply to Pending Lawsuit. A Supporting Memorandum was also filed. Again, Plaintiff 
continued to assert without proof of substantial remodel that NORA applied and that an email to the 
general contractor triggered NORA's application to subcontractor DeBest. Plaintiff sought to use its 
interpretation of NORA to gain advantage of interest and attorney fee provisions stated in NORA. 
On June 9, 2016, Defendant served its second set of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs. By 
Interrogatory Nos. 13-16, Defendant sought information from Plaintiffs to determine whether the 
construction project at issue was a "substantial remodel" of the Plaintiffs vacation home, as that term 
is defined in NORA. Plaintiffs were dilatory in their response and provided answers only after a 
Second Motion to Compel was filed on July 27, 2016. 
With proof from P Jaintiffs' discovery responses that there had been a substantial remodel, as 
defined, Defendant filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment on August 8, 2016. Plaintiffs had 
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responded to the discovery responses on August 4, 2016. The Second Motion raised the question 
whether the email to the general contractor and no other written notice to DeBest sufficed as notice 
under NORA of the damage claim and opportunity to repair. 
Defendant's prevailed on this Second Motion for Summary Judgment, acquiring final 
dismissal pursuant to the Order granting the Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs have not pursued any discovery in this case, whether Interrogatories, Requests for 
Admissions, Request for Production or Depositions. They have joined in with the general contractor 
to pursue this case through his cooperation and assistance. It was established by the discovery 
responses on August 4, 2016 that Plaintiff,; paid the general contractor at least $94,000 to perform 
work on the vacation home beginning in December 2013, and possibly paid him as much as 
$125,000. Those discovery responses also established that the Plaintiffs vacation home was assessed 
in 2013 at roughly $98,000 value. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs first raised the Notice of Opportunity and Right to Repair Act in response to the 
first Motion for Summaiy Judgment, as a basis for an affirmative right to relief under breach of 
contract, even though there was no privity between Plaintiffs and subcontractor DeBest. At the same 
time, Plaintiffs pursued the argument that notice was only required to be given to the general 
contractor, but the subcontractor could still be sued. NORA is a procedural statute to allow a 
construction professional notice before suit lt is not the remedial legislation abrogating privity of 
contract as Plaintiffs contend. 
Legal requirements of notice under NORA were not developed, but Plaintiffs relied on 
assumptions of notice and substantial remodel. Plaintiffs' attempts to have this Court recognize 
NORA never independently established the conditions precedent of NORA, and specifically, that 
notice was given or that the construction project was a "substantial remodel.'' That same approach 
was taken with the Motion for Pennissive Appeal, both before this Court and the Supreme Court. 
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The claim for attorney fees in this matter is supported by a simple and single factor. This 
case was pursued by Plaintiff under NORA without the legal "foundation" required by the NORA. 
The statutory defined written notice was not given to DeBest before suit was filed. 
DeBest was never given notice and opportunity to repair the damages caused by the water 
leak, as the general contractor finally assessed the damages in November 2013 and began the 
extensive repairs in the middle of December 2013. Those repairs continued up to February 2014 
before either Plaintiffs or the general contractor advised DeBest of the rc:.,'J)air efforts. The intent of 
NORA is to give a construction professional the opportunity to repair damages resulting from its 
services. Repairs were undertaken without notice to DeBest. 
Rule 54(e)(2) requires consideration of an award of attorney's fees when a case has been 
pursued without foundation. Statutory written 11otice is the foundation of NORA. This Court 
awarded Judgment as a matter oflaw because no statutory notice was ever provided to DeBest. 
PLAL"NTIFFS ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's Fees and Costs includes 
page after page of criticism of the "Court's perception of Notice" (pp. 25-27); this Court's 
"endorsement" of the perception that any construction professional who is sued under the Act must 
first receive written notice, i1Tespective of any limiting definitions in the Act (p. 25); and the 
Court's opinion that NORA did not create any new cause of action for homeov.,ners, among other 
things. (p. 26). It includes page after page of criticism about defense counsel "maneuvering" to raise 
statutory interpretations about Notice, (p. 1 O); raising the "unreasonable" statutory interpretation that 
the homeowner/claimant must serve written notice upon someone they do not know, (p. 16), when 
there is "no logical reason that such further notice must be given to other construction professionals." 
(p. 17); and about "the delayed defense" raised on the notice issue (p. 22). 
All of this criticism fails to establish that Plaintiffs had any foundation in the law for the 
lawsuit they pursued under the statutory provisions of NORA. Rather, these criticisms amount to 
nothing more than justification supporting Plaintiffs' pursuit of the purported NORA affirmative 
relief, even though not 1within the provisions of the Act itself. 
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In no event do the arguments establish that Plaintiffs had a foundation to pursue this lawsuit 
given the failure of written notice that was required by the clear and unambiguous provisions of 
NORA. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant submits that it should be awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of 
$1,404.86. 
Plaintiffs have attempted to use NORA as a sword to give them rights they do not have under 
the common law to pursue a case based upon breach of contract where there is no privity. Plaintiffs 
at the same time ignored the statutory requirements that are expressly set forth in NORA that require 
them to provide pre-lawsuit written notice to the construction professional who they intended to sue. 
The construction professional, DeBest in this case, had no opportunity to repair the water damage at 
a reasonable sum. Instead, Plaintiffs pursued repairs without any notice to DeBest and incurred over 
$ l 27,000 of repair costs on a vacation home that was assessed at a value of $98,000 when those 
repair costs were begun. Plaintiffs pursued this case based upon their own statutory interpretation, 
which was manifestly in error, without conducting any discovery on the metits of their own claim. 
Defendant also respectfully requests this Court to award discretionary costs and attorney's 
fees as set forth in the ::viemorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees. 
DATED This -Zay of November, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
&~/p 
By: __ +--L I~----'-l~~-·-~,____,,i.S:= __ · __ -
Rolfert D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on ~ayofNovember; 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise; Idaho 83702 
Attorneyfbr PlaintUfs 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] ~nd D~livery 
~· U.S.Mail 
Robert D. Lewis 
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VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-
~~~~~ 
NOV 1 ~ 2016 
Case No ___ _,lnst. No--.:---
Filed. A.M ..E}?..'C:f --.. ........ .:._-1P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 













Case No. CV 15-178C 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee: f'a~. ~ 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, DEBEST PLUMBING, INC, and 
Respondent's attorney, Robert D. Lewis, of the firm Cantrill+Skinner+Lewis+Casey& 
Sorensen, LLP, 1423 TyrellLane, P.O. Box 359, Boise, Idaho, 83701, and the Clerk of the 
above entitled Court of Valley County Idaho. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, acting through Vernon K. Smith, do appeal 
against the above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from those Judgment as 
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entered in the above entitled action on October 5, 2016, by the Honorable Jason D. Scott, 
District Judge presiding, as provided by Idaho Appellate Rule 17e(l ). 
2. That the above-named Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable Judgment 
under and pursuant to Rule 11 ( a)(l ), I.A.R.. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intends 
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the 
Appellants from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a.) Whether the district court erred in dismissing Appellants' contract 
claims asserted against Respondent, DeBest Plumbing, Inc. the sub-contracting professional 
plumbing. agent brought onto Appellants' substantial remodel project by the General 
Contractor, Gould Custom Builders, Inc., filed pursuant to and in accordance with the 
Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (NORA), but dismissed by the court upon the basis 
there was no "privity of contract" between the Appellants and the Respondent? 
b.) Whether the district court erred in dismissing Appellants tort claim 
asserted against Respondent, DeBest Plumbing, Inc. the sub-contracting professional 
plumbing agent brought onto Appellants' substantial remodel project by the General 
Contractor, Gould Custom Builders, Inc., filed pursuant to and in accordance with the 
Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (NORA), but dismissed by the court upon the basis 
there was no written notice served directly upon the sub-contractor, DeBest Plumbing Inc., 
as the written notice was served only upon the General Contractor on the remodel project, 
Gould Custom Builders, Inc., with whom the Appellants had their contractual relationship? 
c.) Whether Appellants are entitled to an award of attorney fees 
below and on appeal. 
4. No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. Preparation of a transcript m 
electronic format is requested for the entirety of the in-court civil proceedings held in this 
matter. 
6. A Standard Record as provided under I.A.R. 28(b) is requested and as 
provided by I.A.R. 28(b )(1 ), and Appellants do furthermore request that all pleadings, 
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motions, affidavits, and filed documents with the court by the parties in this controversy be 
included in the clerk's record on this appeal. 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Name and address: Dianne Cromwell, Judge Scott's Court Reporter, located at the Ada 
County Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 
b. That the court reporter has been paid an estimated fee only for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript, and the balance will be paid thereafter, as requested. 
c. That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid an estimated fee only for 
the preparation of the Clerk's Record, and the balance will be paid thereafter, as requested. 
d. That the required filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon al( 
pursuant to Rule 20, LA.R. 
Dated this 14th day ofNovember, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 14th day of November, 2016 I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered in the following manner described below: 
Dianne Cromwell 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Robert D. Lewis 
Cantrill Skinner, et al. 
1423Tyrell Lane 









Dated this 14th day ofNovember, 2016. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL P.4 
Vernon K. Sm1lli 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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To: Valley County Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF LDAHD vase ffi1. ____ inst. No 
IN AND FOR VALLEY COUNTY (IN THE (PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSlo'r!Jf1 A.M 2: 39)~. 
(INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION) OF THE STATE OF IDAHO) 
Scott Davison and Ann Davison, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-













SUPREME COURT NO. 
Dist. Court No. CV-2015-178-C 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF APPEAL 
Appeal From: Fourth Judicial District, Valley County. Honorable Jason D. Scott, Presiding. 
Court Case No.: CV-2015-178-C 
Order or Judgment Appealed From: Judgment 
Counsel for Plaintif£1 Appellant/Respondent: V emon K Smith 
Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant/Respondent: Robert Lewis 
Appealed By: Plaintiff 
Appealed Against: Respondent 
Notice of Appeal Filed: November 14, 2016 
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: Yes 
Request for Additional Reporter's Transcript Filed: No 
Name of Reporter: 
Was Reporter's Transcript Requested: Yes 
DATED this 15th day ofNovember, 2016 
DOUGLAS A. MILLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
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DEC O 5 2016 
Case No. ___ _ inst. No. __ _ 
Filed. J:::..• ----A.M.:_;.0O 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON and ANNE DA VIS ON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DeBEST PLUMBING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2015-178-C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiffs Scott and Anne Davison claimed Defendant DeBest Plumbing, Inc. botched a 
plumbing job it performed as a subcontractor for their general contractor during a remodel of 
their cabin in McCall. Early in the litigation, the Court granted summary judgment to DeBest on 
the Davisons' contract and warranty claims because there was no contract between the Davisons 
and DeBest. That left to be litigated the Davisons' negligence claim. Later, the Court granted 
summary judgment to DeBest on that claim because the Davisons failed to give pre-lawsuit 
notice of the claim to DeBest as required by the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act 
("NORA"), LC. §§ 6-2501 to -2504. 
Having defeated the Davisons' claims, DeBest seeks an award of costs and attorney fees. 
The Davisons move to disallow any such award. The motion to disallow was argued and taken 
under advisement on December 5, 2016, but the Court told the parties to expect a written 
decision to issue immediately after the hearing. This is that decision. For the reasons that 
follow, the Court now grants the motion to disallow in part and denies it in part, awarding costs 
and attorney fees to DeBest in smaller amounts than DeBest seeks. 






In early 2013, builder Gil Gould contracted with DeBest for DeBest to perform plumbing 
work at the Davisons' cabin in McCall, Idaho. (Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, 113-4; Gould 
Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, 13.) Gould was in the midst of completely renovating that cabin under 
an oral agreement with the Davisons. (Gould Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, 12.) There was no 
contract between the Davisons and DeBest. (Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, 15.) 
DeBest finished its work in June 2013. (Gould Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, 14.) For more 
than a month after that, the Davisons' cabin was empty. (Gould Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, 17.) 
Then, on July 25, 2013, Scott Davison returned to the cabin and found standing water and other 
indicia ofleaky plumbing. (Davison Aff. filed Mar. 21, 2016.) The next morning, he sent Gould 
an e-mail, telling him about the problem. (Ex. to Davison Aff.) 
Gould then relayed this information by telephone to Tom Peterson of DeBest. (Gould 
Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, 1 8.) Peterson, Gould, and Scott Davison met that same day at the 
Davisons' cabin. (Gould Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, 19.) The source of the leak was identified, 
and Peterson fixed it. (Id.) Peterson also helped Gould remove water-damaged insulation and 
sheetrock. (Id.) According to both Gould and Scott Davison, Peterson told Gould and Scott 
Davison that the leak was his fault and that DeBest would pay for the damage it caused. (Gould 
Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016, 110; Davison Aff. filed Mar. 21, 2016.) According to Gould, DeBest's 
acceptance of responsibility was then confirmed in a telephone call with a DeBest employee with 
a supervisory role at DeBest, who agreed that Gould should do the necessary work and bill 
DeBest for it. (Gould Aff. filed Aug. 19, 2016.1111-12.) The DeBest employee, Laurie Brede, 
disputes that she either authorized or had authority to authorize any such thing. (Brede Aff. filed 
Sept. 13, 2016, 113-10.) In any event, at the time, DeBest's understanding was that any 
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additional repairs would be minimal and would be completed by Gould within a few days. 
(Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ,r 9; Peterson Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ,r 10.) 
That isn't how it turned out. In August 2013, Anne Davison notified Gould of previously 
undiscovered water damage, but that infon11ation was not relayed to DeBest. (Neill Aff. filed 
Aug. 8, 2016, Ex. A at 65:11-66:16; Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ,r 9.) Gould ultimately 
inspected the cabin in December 2013, and he began major repair efforts after discovering 
extensive water damage and mold. (Neill Afl filed Aug. 8, 2016, Ex. A at 97: 10-23.) DeBest 
was not notified of this additional damage until February 2014, when it received an invoice from 
Gould for the cost of both the July 2013 repair and the later, more extensive repair begun in 
December 2013. (Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 2016, ,r 9.) 
The record reflects some effort by the parties, after DeBest received the invoice, to agree 
on an amount DeBest would pay for the damage to the Davisons' cabin. That effort was not, 
however, successful. Consequently, on July 21, 2015, the Davisons filed this action, alleging 
claims for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and 
negligence. (Compl. ,r 8.) 
In February 2016, DeBest moved for summary judgment. DeBest contended that the 
Davisons' contract and warranty claims failed as a matter of law because of the absence of a 
contract between it and the Davisons. In opposing that motion, the Davisons never contended 
they were relying on a contract between themselves and DeBest. Instead, they relied on the 
contract between Gould and DeBest. They asserted that NORA applies to this action, and they 
theorized that it eliminates the common law's requirement for privity of contract, enabling 
homeowners to sue subcontractors in contract, even without a contractual relationship. In an oral 
ruling rendered on April 4, 2016, the Court rejected that theory and therefore granted summary 
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judgment against the Davisons' contract and warranty claims. DeBest also challenged the 
Davisons' negligence claim, contending that negligence is not an available theory because its 
work on the Davisons' cabin had been performed under a contract (its contract with Gould). The 
Court rejected DeBest' s argument that its contract with Gould somehow deprived the 
Davisons-non-parties to the contract-of the right to sue DeBest in negligence to recover for 
any damage its allegedly negligent work did to their property. Thus, the Davisons' negligence 
claim survived the motion. 
The Davisons responded to the summary-judgment ruling by first asking the Court, and 
then later asking the Idaho Supreme Court, to allow a permissive appeal of the entry of summary 
judgment against their contract and warranty claims. Both the Court and the Idaho Supreme 
Court, however, declined to permit a permissive appeal. 
On June 27, 2016, during the course of their failed effort to obtain permission to appeal 
the entry of summary judgment against their contract and warranty claims, the Davisons filed a 
motion entitled "Motion to Confirm Implementation of the Provisions of the Notice and 
Opportunity to Repair Act Apply to Pending Lawsuit." Through that motion, they sought a 
ruling that NORA applies to this actio_n (as they had been contending), as well as a ruling that 
this action is not barred by NORA's pre-lawsuit notice requirement. Despite its unusual title, 
that motion was in substance a motion for summary judgment on those two points. On August 8, 
2016, DeBest filed what amounts to a cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of 
the Davisons' negligence claim on the theory that they didn't comply with NORA's pre-lawsuit 
notice requirement. Thus, DeBest agreed with the Davisons that NORA applies to this action, 
but disagreed with them about the consequences of its application. 
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On October 5, 2016, the Court ruled on the cross-motions. The Court held, as the parties 
agreed, that NORA applies to this action because Gould's work on the cabin constituted a 
"substantial remodel" under NORA. The Court then held that the Davisons indeed had failed to 
comply with NORA's pre-lawsuit notice requirement. Consequently, as NORA dictates, the 
Court dismissed the Davisons' negligence claim without prejudice. A judgment in DeBest's 
favor was issued that same day, dismissing the Davisons' negligence claim without prejudice and 
their contract and warranty claims with prejudice. 
DeBest filed timely papers seeking an award of costs and attorney fees. The Davisons 
responded with a timely motion to disallow the requested award. As already noted, that motion 
was argued and taken under advisement on December 5, 2016. It is ready for decision. 
II. 
REQUEST FOR AN AW ARD OF COSTS 
Certain types of court costs are awardable to a prevailing party as a matter of right. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(A), (C). Whether a party is a prevailing party is determined in the district 
court's discretion. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). DeBest is a prevailing party; it obtained a judgment 
dismissing the Davisons' claims. Thus, DeBest is entitled to an award of costs that are 
awardable as a matter of right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C). 
In that vein, DeBest originally requested $136.00 in court filing fees, $1,268.86 in 
deposition costs, and $2,000.00 in fees charged by its expert witness. As DeBest later conceded, 
though, the requested expert fees aren't awardable as a matter of right because the expert didn't 
testify. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(ix). That leaves the court filing fees, which are awardable as a 
matter of right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(i), and the deposition costs, which are awardable as a 
matter ofright under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(x)-(xi). DeBest therefore is awarded $1,404.86 in 
costs as a matter of right. 
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A prevailing party also may be awarded discretionary costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) in 
appropriate circumstances. An award of discretionary costs is appropriate if the prevailing party 
shows that the costs were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in 
the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) (emphasis 
added). As discretionary costs, DeBest seeks an award of $6,045.00 in expert fees, taking into 
account the $2,000.00 in expert fees it initially sought as a matter of right. Incurring those expert 
fees almost certainly was reasonable and necessary within I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D)'s meaning. But 
to be awardable, they also must be "exceptional." "Whether discretionary costs, including expert 
witness fees, are 'exceptional' depends on whether the nature of the case was itself exceptional." 
Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902,905,367 P.3d 1214, 1229 (2016) (quotation marks 
omitted). "[F]actors a district court should consider when determining whether costs are 
exceptional [are]: whether there was unnecessary duplication of work, whether there was an 
unnecessary waste of time, the frivolity of issues presented, and creation of unnecessary cost that 
could have been easily avoided." Id. (quotation marks omitted). This wasn't an "exceptional" 
construction-defect case, nor is it "exceptional" for a party to a construction-defect case to hire 
expert witnesses. Because these expert fees aren't "exceptional," they won't be awarded. 
Consequently, DeBest's total award of costs is $1,404.86. 
Ill. 
REQUEST FOR AN AW ARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
DeBest requests an award of attorney fees under LC.§ 12-121. Attorney fees are 
awardable to the prevailing party under section 12-121 in an action that was "brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). Whether that is 
the case is a discretionary determination. E.g., Idaho Military Historical Soc '.Y v. Maslen, 156 
Idaho 624, 631-32, 329 P.3d 1072, 1079-80 (2014). That determination need not be made on 
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wholesale basis; instead, it can be made on a claim-by-claim basis, with attorney fees 
apportioned between frivolous and non-frivolous claims. Id. at 632, 329 P.3d at 1080. 
The Davisons' contract and warranty claims were frivolous. They acknowledged that 
they had no contract with DeBest and that DeBest did plumbing work on their cabin as a 
subcontractor hired by Gould, their general contractor. The absence of any contract between the 
Davisons and DeBest plainly doomed the Davisons' contract and warranty claims. The Davisons 
vigorously contended, however, that NORA abrogated the requirement for privity of contract, 
entitling them to sue DeBest on contract and warranty theories, despite the absence of a 
contractual relationship. That argument simply wasn't well grounded in NORA's text, nor was it 
well grounded in NORA's purpose, which is simply "to give contractors the opportunity to fix 
construction defects before a lawsuit is filed." Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434,436, 196 
P.3d 352, 354 (2008). A legislative intention to abrogate the common law's privity requirement 
for homeowner suits against subcontractors shouldn't be inferred in the absence of clear statutory 
language indicating the legislature intended that result. See Callies v. 0 'Neal, 14 7 Idaho 841, 
847,216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009) ("[W]hen interpreting a statute, this Court presumes the 
Legislature did not intend to change the common law unless the language of the statute clearly 
indicates otherwise."). NORA contains no clear statutory language to that effect. The Davisons 
simply lacked a reasonable basis for contending that NORA entitled them to sue DeBest on 
contract and warranty theories, despite the absence of privity of contract. 
The Davisons' negligence claim, by contrast, was non-frivolous. The Davisons 
seemingly had a viable negligence claim against DeBest, leaving aside their failure to comply 
with NORA's pre-lawsuit notice requirement. The Court regards as unreasonable their 
contention that they satisfied that requirement by giving notice to Gould; NORA plainly requires 
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giving notice to the construction professional they chose to sue, which was DeBest, not Gould. 
That said, despite rejecting on summary judgment the Davisons' equitable arguments for why 
they weren't required, under the circumstances, to provide a NORA-compliant pre-lawsuit notice 
to DeBest, the Court regards those arguments as non-frivolous. After all, a DeBest 
representative was directly involved in the initial remediation efforts after DeBest's apparently 
negligent mistake was discovered, and there was evidence that DeBest representatives 
acknowledged the mistake and promised DeBest would foot the bill. Consequently, on the 
whole, the Court isn't persuaded that the Davisons brought or pursued their negligence claim 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
The Court therefore will apportion DeBest's attorney fees between the Davisons' 
frivolous contract and warranty claims, on one hand, and their non-frivolous negligence claim, 
on the other hand. An award of attorney fees is appropriate with respect to the former claims, 
which were resolved relatively early in the litigation, but not with respect to the latter claim. A 
precise apportionment of DeBest's attorney fees to the Davisons' contract and warranty claims 
isn't possible, but, after carefully reviewing DeBest's itemization of its attorney fees, the Court 
has arrived at one that is reasonable in its judgment. An explanation follows. 
First, the Court won't award DeBest any attorney fees incurred before the Davisons filed 
suit and asked DeBest' s counsel to accept service of process. That is when DeBest began 
incurring litigation-related attorney fees. According to DeBest' s itemization of attorney fees, the 
request to accept service was made on July 29, 2015. No attorney fees incurred before that date 
will be considered for apportionment to the Davisons' contract and warranty claims. 
Second, for the period between July 29, 2015, and April 4, 2016-the date on which the 
Court entered summary judgment against the Davisons' contract and warranty claims-the Court 
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apportions the work performed approximately equally between the contract and warranty claims, 
on one hand, and the negligence claim, on the other hand. There is no clearly better 
apportionment ratio during that period, as all claims were pending and all claims were actively 
under attack by DeBest. Thus, for that period, the Court apportions $4,400.00 in attorney fees to 
the contract and warranty claims. 
Third, during the period from April 5, 2016, through July 21, 2016--the date on which 
DeBest's counsel received the Idaho Supreme Court's order refusing to allow a permissive 
appeal of the entry of summary judgment against the Davisons' contract and warranty claims-
essentially no work related to the contract and warranty claims occurred other than the work 
related to the Davisons' efforts to obtain permission to appeal. The Court has attempted to 
identify all work related to those efforts and apportion it to the contract and warranty claims. 
The apportionment figure for that period is $3,695.00. 
Fourth, from July 22, 2016, through October 7, 2016--the date on which DeBest's 
counsel received the Court's decision granting summary judgment against the Davisons' 
negligence claim and the judgment of dismissal-no work related to the contract and warranty 
claims occurred at all. Thus, there is no apportionment figure for that period. 
Fifth, and finally, when awarding attorney fees, the Court generally considers it 
appropriate to award the attorney fees incurred in the process of seeking costs and attorney fees. 
In that regard, DeBest seeks $877.50 for work done from October 12-14, 2016. The Court 
apportions all of it to the contract and warranty claims because the work to seek costs and 
attorney fees done wouldn't have been any easier, or consumed any less time, had DeBest only 
sought attorney fees in connection with the contract and warranty claims. 
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Tallying these figures yields an apportionment of $8,972.50 to the Davisons' contract and 
warranty claims. The Court considers the work apportioned to those claims to have been 
reasonably necessary and to have been done at reasonable hourly rates. That amount therefore is 
awarded to De Best. In arriving at this award, the Court has considered all of the factors set forth 
in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Davisons' motion to disallow DeBest's request for an award of 
costs and attorney fees is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above. DeBest is 
awarded costs as a matter of right of$1,404.86 and attorney fees of$8,972.50, for a total award 
of $10,377.36. This award is deemed added to the judgment and is enforceable by way of 
execution. See l.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(F) ("All costs and attorney fees approved by the court ... are 
automatically added to the judgment as costs and collected by the sheriff in addition to the 
amount of the judgment and other allowed costs."). 
~"' Dated this__§_ day of December, 2016. 
Jas D. Scott 
DIS RICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on December 5 , 2016, I served a copy ofthls document as follows: 
Robert D. Lewis 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, 
LLP 
_MU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
1423 Tyrell Ln 
PO Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701-0359 
Vernon K. Smith Jr. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 WMain 
Boise, ID 83702 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Wand Delivered 
-( j Electronic Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
DOUGLAS A. MILLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
ByC:0\J\kJQi_g O ll~.A~ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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12/07/2016 16:41 
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: . (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
VER~~ON K SMITH- P11GE 02 
DO~LJSff. MiL~ CLERK 
ByAA . O&puty 
DECO 7 2G16 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 













Case No. CV 15-l 78C 
AMENDED NOTICE Of APPEAL 
Fee: 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, DEBEST PLUMBING, INC, and 
Respondent's attorney, Robert D. Lewis, of the firm Cantri11+Skinner•Lewis+Casey& Sorensen, 
LLP, 1423 Tyrell Lane, P.O. Box 359, Boise, Idaho, 83701, and the Clerk of the above entitled 
Court of Valley County Idaho. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I . The above-named Appellants, acting through Vernon K. Smith. do amend their 
Notice Of Appeal that heretofore did appeal against the aboveMnamed Respondent to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from that Judgment as entered in the above entitled action ,on October S, 2016, by 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL P. I 
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12/07/2016 16:41 2083451. VERNON K SMITH- PAGE 03 
the Honorable Jason D. Seo~ District Judge presiding, as provided by Idaho Appellate Rule l 7e( 1 ), 
and now does include therewith the appeal of that subsequent Memorandum Decision And Order 
On Costs And Attorney Fees as entered on December 5, 2016, that has automatically been added to 
and included within the October 5, 2016 Judgment, identified in the original Notice of Appeal. 
2. That the above-named Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
and the judgment (entered October 5, 2016 described in paragraph 1 above) is an appealable 
Judgment under and pursuant to Rule l l(a)(l), LA.R., and the subsequent Decision on attorney fees 
and costs are appealable, as they were added to the Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(F), I.R.C.P .. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intends to 
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellants from 
asserting other issues on appeal: 
a.) Whether the district court erred in dismissing AppellanL.:;' contract claims 
asserted against Re~-pondent, DeBest Plumbing, Inc. the sub-contracting professional plumbing 
agent brought onto Appellants' substantial remodel project by the General Contractor, Gould 
Custom Builders, Inc., filed pursuant to and in accordance with the Notice and Opportunity to 
Repair Act (NORA), but dismissed by the court upon the basis there was no ''privity of contract" 
between the Appellants and the Respondent? 
b.) \\1hether the district court erred in dismissing Appellants tort claim asserted 
against Respondent, DeBest Plumbing, Inc. the sub-contracting professional plumbing agent 
brought onto Appellants' substantial remodel project by the General Contractor, Gould Custom 
Builders, lnc., filed pursuant to and in accordance with the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act 
(NORA.), but dismissed by the court upon the basis there was no written notice served directly upon 
the sub-contractor, DeBest Plumbing Inc., as the "VIITitten notice was served only upon the General 
Contractor on the remodel project, Gould Custom Builders, Inc., with whom the Appellants had 
their contractual relationship? 
c.) Whether Appellants are entitled to an a:ward of attorney fees below 
and on appeal. 
d.) Whether the Defendant, DeBest Plumbing, Inc.} was entitled to an 
award of attorney fees and costs, as reflected in the Memorandum Decision 
And Order on Costs And Attorney Fees as entered on December 5, 2016. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
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5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. Preparation of a transcript is requested for 
those in-court civil proceedings held in this matter, identified by date and title as follows: 
a.) April 4, 2016, 3:00 p.m. hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
Defendant; 
b.) July 18, 2016 1 :00 p.m. hearing on Motion To File Third Party Complaint filed 
by Defendant; 
c.) September 19, 2016 1:00 p.m. hearing on 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by Defendant. 
6. A Standard Record as provide.d under I.AR. 28(b) is requested and as provided by 
LA.R 28(b )(1 ), and Appellants do furthermore request that all pleadings, motions, affidavits, and 
filed documents with the court by the parties in this controversy be included in the clerk's record on 
this appeal. 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Nome and address: Dianne Cromwell, Judge Scott's Court Reporter, located at the Ada 
County Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 
b. That the court reporter has been paid an. estimated fee, as requested, for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript, and any balance will be paid thereafter, as requested. 
c. That the Clerk of the District Corn1 will be paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the· Clerk's Record, when requested, and the balance will be paid thereafter, as 
requested. 
d. That the required filing fee h..1s been paid. 
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Rule 20, LA.R. 
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e. That service has been made upon all p 
_,..,,,,...., ..... --... -------·--......_ 
· es required to be seivoo.. om ursuant to 
I
__,.._,_, __ . " 




Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 7th day of December, 2016 I caused a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing to be filed with the Clerk of the Court, Valley County, Idaho, by fax 
transmission and a copy thereof to be delivered to and served upon the folloVvi.ng individuals in the 
marmer described below: 
Dianne Cromwell 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Robert D. Lewis 
Cantrill Skinner, et al. 
1423Tyrell Lane 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 









) U.S. Mail 
x ) Fax 345-7212 
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From:Can trlll Skinner 
Robert D. Lewis 
ISB #2713 
- 2083457212 #489 P.002/005 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
,,, DEC O 9 2016 
vase No 
Filed ·- -Inst. No._ 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
---AM 12: l.../~,--,-.,_ __ 
·--........ -P.M. 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent DeBest Plumbing, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 












Case No. CV l 5-l 78C 
Supreme Court No.: 44625 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S 
RECORD 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS AND VERNON K. SMITH THE PARTY'S 
ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding hereby 
requests pursuant to Rule l 9(a), l.A.R., the inclusion of the following materia] in addition to that 
required to be included by the I.A.R. and the Notice of Appeal. 
1. Transcript of hearing on June 6, 2016. 
2. Clerk's Record: 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD- I 
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From:Gantrill Skinner - 2083457212 #489 P.003/005 
a. Defendant's Motion to Compel filed December 2, 2015 
b. Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis filed December 2, 2015 
c. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed February 26, 2016 
d. Affidavit of Darcy Neidigh filed February 26, 2016 
e. Defendant's Motion to Compel filed July 27, 2016 
f. Affidavit of Robert D. Lewis filed July 27, 2016 
g. Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed August 8, 2016 
h. Affidavit of Tyler H. Neill filed August 8, 2016 
i. Affidavit of Tom Petersen filed August 8, 2016 
J. Affidavit of Darcy Neidigh filed August 8, 2016 
k. Second and Supplemental Affidavit of Gilbert Gould filed August 19, 2016 
1. Affidavit of Laurie Brede filed September 13, 2016 
m. Offer of Judgment filed October 7, 2016 
n. Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees filed October 17, 2016 
o. Affidavit of Beth Rountree filed October 17, 2016 
p. Defendant's Verified Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed 
October 17, 2016 
8,2016 
3. 
q. Defendant's Reply Memorandum on Attorney Fees and costs filed November 
I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcript has been served on the 
Court Reporter of whom a transcript is requested as named below at the address set out below. 
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From:Cantrlll Skinner - 2083457212 
Dianne Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
605 W. Fort Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
12/0.016 14:37 #489 P.004/005 
Dianne Cromwell 
Fourth Judicial District - Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
I further certify that this request for additional records has been served upon the Clerk of the 
District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 10. 
DA TED This q_ day of December, 2016. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
&-siem:tm'Sl?I' , LP 
By: ---+-=------1c.,,,,.c---\;;;;;,"'--'---,:;::;,-r-------
o be rt D. Lewis, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent DeBest 
Plumbing, Inc. 
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From:Can trill Skinner - 2083457212 #489 P.005/005 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _!f_ day of December, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Plaintfff.r; 
Dianne Cromwell 
Fourth Judicial District - Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Dianne Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
605 W. Fort Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
~ L,- Hand Delivery 
yJ U.S.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
~ Email: dcromwell@cableone.net 
[ ] Facsimile 208-345-1129 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail Y- Email: scheduling@ctucker.net 
Robert D. Lewis 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
SCOTT DAVISON, etal., 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
-vs-












SUPREME COURT NO. 44625 
Dist. Court No. CV-2015-178-C 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, DOUGLAS A. MILLER, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Valley, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the exhibits, 
offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as indicated: 
DESCRIPTION OFFER/ ADMIT SENT/RET AlNED 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 26th day of January, 2017. 
DOUGLAS A. MILLER, 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR VALLEY COUNTY 
SCOTT DAVISON, etal., 
Plaintiff7 Appellant, 
-vs-
DEBEST PLUMBING INC., 
Defendant/Respondent. 
TO: Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
TO: Robert D. Lewis 
Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 












SUPREME COURT NO. 44625 
Dist. Court No. CV-2015-178-C 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF SERVICE 
That the Clerk's Record, Exhibits and Transcripts in the above entitled cause has been 
lodged with the District Court and copies sent to counsel; that objections to the Clerk's Record and 
Reporter's Transcript, including any requests for corrections, deletions, or additions, must be filed 
with the District Court together with a Notice of Hearing within twenty-eight (28) days from the 
date of this Notice. 
DATED this 261h day of January, 2017. 
DOUGLAS A MILLER, 
Clerk of the District Court 
By:~ ,OU ct) l Qt I'~ 
Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR VALLEY COUNTY 
SCOTT DAVISON, etal., 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
-vs-












SUPREME COURT NO. 44625 
Dist Court No. CV-2015-178-C 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
TO RECORD 
I, DOUGLAS A. MILLER, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was compiled and 
bound under my direction and contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents and papers designated to be included under Rule 28, 
IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and any 
additional documents requested to be included. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and 
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if 
any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with 
the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record as required by Rule 
31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
seal of the said Court this 26th day of January, 2017. 
DOUGLAS A. MILLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
